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Theorising the Foundational Concepts of the Process of Financial Crime in 
Comparative Economic Systems: An Attempt in Grounded Theory 
Kadir Ozkan 
Abstract: 
Financial crimes have become one of the most destructive types of crime in post-industrial 
societies in terms of economic and financial consequences. While the importance of financial 
institutions in the modern economic system cannot be negated, their critical function in the society 
with their enormous powers brings about many questions, especially in relation to systems of checks 
and balances. The increasing number of adverse examples in the last decades provide evidence for the 
enormous negative consequences of corporate failures resulting from shortcomings in the checks and 
balances.   
 This study, hence, is motivated by the current financial failures, and aims at exploring and 
examining financial crimes in terms of the process of becoming a financial white-collar criminal in 
various financial systems, namely capitalist, socialist and Islamic systems, as well as exploring the 
vulnerability and propensity of each system in relation to financial crimes. In addition, this study, 
departing from the shortcomings of Eurocentric understanding and referring to cultural and religious 
norms, aims to re-conceptualise some of the concepts, subcategories and dimensions with the 
objective of developing and theorising an improved version of rational choice theory in criminology 
for a better comparison. 
In fulfilling the aims of the study, a discourse analysis approach through a deconstruction 
method is utilised to locate and identify the underpinnings of the existing theoretical frameworks 
through comparative case study as a method, by comparing extreme cases of market/capitalist finance, 
socialist/transitional and Islamic/moral finance. In addition, grounded theory is used as a method to 
construct a modified version of the existing theories by using a number of formal codes such as 
‗motivation‘, ‗environment‘, ‗target‘, ‗guardian‘ as concepts and ‗opportunity spaces‘, ‗real, perceived 
selves‘, ‗ideal and feared‘, ‗need and guarding gaps‘, ‗haste‘, ‗expectations‘, ‗deviance‘, ‗crime 
motivation‘, ‗act of crime‘ etc. as subcategories and ‗material‘, ‗social‘ and ‗moral‘ as dimensions.  
Such an attempt is rationalised on the ground that the current criminology theories are 
unfortunately linear theories and they do not make decisions about a regular person. Therefore, there 
is no crime theory that is confident enough to receive a regular person and make dynamic, relativist, 
complex analysis about them in prospect, depending on the changing conditions of the inner and outer 
world of the individual, unlike the ‗complex theory of crime‘ produced by this research through 
grounded theory. 
A comparative analysis to order the financial systems according to their vulnerability to 
financial crimes is also provided in this study using the ‗opportunity spaces‘ concept of the grounded 
theory which develops the classical ‗opportunity‘ argument of the rational choice theory to almost a 
small theory of opportunity. This analysis suggests that the most vulnerable financial system to 
financial crime is the market based financial system, which is followed  by socialist/transitional and 
Islamized financial systems.  The comparative analysis of the study on crime propensities of financial 
systems also confirms the literature on economic and financial systems that argues that the financial 
systems are converging despite their strong and distinctive ontological and epistemological 
differences and capacities to enrich and improve each other. 
The theoretical model developed in this study reveals that crime motivation is only an 
extension of ordinary motivation and has a dynamic nature. Dynamic in both the micro world of the 
individual and his/her close social/physical environment and also the macro environment in terms of 
the wider space of political-economy and social culture. 
This study fills an important gap in criminology literature which has been sought for decades 
since the 1970s. Indeed, the resultant theory in this study is unique in its approach because it is a 
micro-founded macro theory, unlike all the criminology theories which have either micro (biological, 
psychological theories, control theories) or macro (i.e. symbolic interactions, social bonds theory, life-
course theory, conflict theory) foundations. 
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
In recent decades, financial crimes have reached shocking levels (i.e. Enron), with 
devastating impacts (i.e. global mortgage fraud in 2007 and afterwards), which have 
been overlooked (i.e. Arthur Anderson) and render helpless (‗too big to fail‘ rescues‘), 
so that they turn a country, spearhead of laissez-faire capitalism, into an almost 
socialist state which nationalizes the biggest conglomerates, while developing 
countries privatize them. 
Observing the global environment of financial crime, Interpol (2012) agrees that 
financial crimes now have the power to affect nations in addition to individuals and 
corporations, but what has made their number and effects so big and so powerful is 
still a mystery. Is it really modern life with its many opportunities that causes the 
increasing crime rates? Is humanity damned by the consequences of modern life or 
does it have options to improve its crash picture of financial crime propensity? 
Should, for instance, one expect the same rate of financial crime propensity in 
Socialist and/or Muslim countries, which, in principle, encircle far greater circles i.e. 
to encompass all the working class or the whole ummah, respectively, and sometimes 
even prohibit, restrict and/or control property ownership? Should one expect the same 
number of financial crimes in these countries?  
This study is based on this comparative perspective and aims to explore the 
distinguishing features of various cultures, systems and societies, with the objective of 
putting them into a coherent process to draw a theoretical model of the financial crime 
propensity of each of these systems. These differences are the main source of original 
knowledge in this field, because we all work for money but this does not make most 
of us financial criminals. There is nothing wrong about working for money per se. We 
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all have ideologies, beliefs too, just as we have at least a few people around us to 
socialize with because we are conscious and we are social creatures. Nevertheless, all 
of us do not evenly distribute these functions in our lives. Some devote themselves to 
their ideologies so much that they do not have many friends nor do they work for 
money; some are so social and devote themselves so much to solidarity that they also 
do not work for money, etc. This study is not about them but about those who are 
unbalanced towards money, about those who have enormous sums of money but no 
principles and no real friends: financial criminals. Reconsidering them, one realises 
that they are not uniform in their inclinations either. This diversification in objectives 
and motivations as well as their targets is, we believe, worth closer observation and 
analysis. 
The subject matter of this study is white-collar financial crimes and we assume that 
financial criminals‘ rationality is materialistically-dominated; however, this does not 
mean that everybody with materialistic worldviews commits financial crime. 
Adversely, the crime process is so complex, just like all social phenomena, that it is 
only possible to predict it via probabilistic, non-deterministic and more complex, 
pluralistic ways. 
This study, hence, aims to present an attempt at theoretical conceptualisation, to 
develop an advanced understanding of the financial crime process, which merely 
represents an approach still far from presenting a complete picture of financial crime 
as a social phenomenon with all the relevant details. 
 
1.1. AIM, OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH PROCESS 
This study aims to explore and examine the process of financial crime in the sense of 
the process of becoming a financial criminal with the objective of constructing and 
locating it in a theoretical conceptualisation. As part of this process, the study 
examines, redefines and conceptualises the existing concepts and parameters of such a 
process, as provided by the existing theories, with the objective of developing a 
modified theoretical construct to identify the factors motivating individuals in 
committing financial crimes. In doing so, this research theoretically attempts, 
therefore, to reveal the reasons why some commit crime while others stay away from 
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it. Importantly, the aims of the study are conducted within a comparative economic 
framework, with the objective of locating the propensities of market, socialist and 
Islamic based financial systems towards financial crimes through the theoretical 
underpinnings of each of these systems in relation to the concepts, parameters and 
dimensions constructed or re-defined by this study as benchmarks. Thus, this research 
aims to identify the financial crime propensities of each of these systems; and in 
relation to the first aim, it also aims to conceptualise the motivational factors 
incentivising individuals towards financial crime within the opportunity spaces 
offered by each of the systems.  
This study hypothesises that if the working mechanism of the longitudinal financial 
crime process can be located, then frequency, period, severity, rise and fall of 
economic crimes in case of major structural change can be predicted by looking at the 
important parameters of the whole process, such as the macroeconomic processes, 
social structures and economic, social, political etc. environment.  
In responding to the comparative nature of the study, ten countries (United States of 
America, United Kingdom, Italy, Russia; China, Cuba, Iran, Sudan; Saudi Arabia, 
Malaysia) were selected by dividing them into four different groups: market 
(capitalist) economy, socialist (transitional) economy, fully Islamized economy and 
partially Islamized economy, by using the method of grounded theory in the sense of 
‗theory building by comparative case study‘, with the objective of determining the 
patterns that govern these financial systems according to their vulnerability to 
financial crime. 
As regards the objectives of this study, comparative analysis of such systems 
undoubtedly yields a great deal of insights, knowledge and understanding about the 
phenomenon of ‗crime‘ in general and ‗financial crime‘ in particular. For instance, 
even at the very beginning of this study, it was realized that not only are there hardly 
any common definitions available of ‗crime‘ as a fact, but also related concepts and 
parameters as part of the crime process, as evidenced by the literature. If crime is 
defined as behaviours that are banned by legal codes, then all the moral crime 
definitions of established religions and socialism have to be negated. As part of the 
socially constructed nature of the definitions, for example, financial white-collar 
crime becomes equal to political crime in a socialist system because no other people 
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have access to the effective positions in financial institutions in such states.  
As is clear from the conflicting nature of socially constructed definitions, this study, 
as an objective, commenced with the very basics of the existing literature with the 
objective of clarifying the definitions available so that a working definition could be 
developed. For this, grounded theory is utilised in deconstructing the existing 
literature and in constructing a modified theoretical framework with similar codes, 
based on our original (clarified) terminology. 
Most of the time, literature uses terms like ‗organized crime‘, ‗white collar crime‘, 
‗professional crime‘, ‗economic crime‘, ‗financial crime‘ and even ‗political crime‘ in 
an interchangeable manner. However, making a clear distinction between them is 
essential. Following these definitions therefore specific crimes are defined by this 
study to identify the framework and the remit of the study. 
The second important objective of this study has been the literature review of the 
theories of crime, as all the theories are classified according to their relevance to 
financial-white-collar criminality. In a critical approach, the rational choice theory is 
identified as the most relevant theory. Nevertheless, the current form of the rational 
choice theory has almost nothing to say about deviant motivation and thus is not 
useful for comparing various financial systems, because it is obvious that the same 
offenders under different financial systems may well have different levels of 
motivation due to the parameters and conceptual framework. If the motivation is 
excluded from the comparison, it is highly likely that we will produce misleading 
results. Similar to motivation, the nature of targets and the available opportunity 
spaces may differ as well and some qualities of them would be higher in certain 
systems while the same qualities would either be lower or stay unaffected in others. 
This is why a better foundational base for comparison by means of building a 
grounded theory based on rational choice is utilised as the main research design in this 
study. 
After these definitions, clarifications and literature review, a distinction is made 
between various financial systems in terms of their paradigms, principles about crime 
and criminology. It turns out that there are very significant differences in the 
criminological identities, ideologies and outlooks among the systems we scrutinize.  
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As another objective, this research attempted to use grounded theory building by 
forming the main codes first and detailing them by using categories and various sub-
categories. Based on the original rational choice theory, the long and arduous process 
of grounded theory is gone through and many codes are built and the relationships 
between them are shown in a quantitative manner.  This was necessary because the 
primary characteristics of alternative systems such as morality, central planning and 
complete control of social life were not discussed by the mainstream criminology 
theorists in the form of a criminology theory. At least some of the criminals, with not 
a single doubt, have completely different mind-sets, paradigms, worldviews, but the 
Western literature on crime has not yet included these uncommon ideologies in their 
discussions, mainly due to their Eurocentric positions. They failed to realize that non-
Western (wo)man would not think, behave, live, reason, believe, act, etc. like a 
Western (wo)man, but expected all these differences to converge to the Eurocentric 
positions. Therefore, building such a theory by improving the rational choice theory is 
considered by this study to be one of the first attempts.  
Fulfilling this objective took the research back to the initial question of the most and 
least vulnerable financial systems. Before analysing these systems, this research as an 
objective attempted to compare the fundamental ideas and assumptions of economic 
and financial systems in which financial crimes are committed. This forms the 
economic environment of financial crimes but there are more factors of the 
environment such as social, cultural, political, legal, and these parameters are 
addressed too.  
In order to answer this last question, the criterion of comparison based on the concept 
of greater and immediate ‗opportunity spaces‘ (both positive and negative) is 
determined and lastly compared with the financial systems to distinguish them 
according to their vulnerability to financial crime. 
Lastly, the targets and their relative weaknesses, positions, vulnerabilities in different 
financial systems are discussed and put into the context of ‗opportunity spaces‘. The 
research puts criminological motivation into the same framework and makes 
theoretical comparison of it based on the results of the grounded theory, as 
constructed in Chapter Five. The aim in this part of the research is to lay down the 
fundamental reasons for motivational differences between various financial crimes. 
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1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While preparing this study, initially, the researcher had only one question in mind 
which can be put into various forms: ―Which economic systems are more vulnerable 
to financial crimes than others?‖.  This research question, hence, is articulated in the 
following sub research questions: 
(i) How can we distinguish financial systems in order of exploitability or vulnerability 
in terms of their resistance to or propensity to financial crimes?;  
(ii) Which economic systems have a higher propensity to financial crime?;  
(iii) Are there any inner mechanisms, substructures, principles of economic systems 
which inferior economic systems could benefit from?; 
(iv) What is the socially optimal make-up, the criminologically sound integration of 
mechanisms of economic systems?, and  
(v) What kind of economic system would be the best in curbing the ever-increasing 
financial crime rates?. 
In order to answer the main research question, that is, ‗which economic systems are 
more vulnerable to financial crimes than others?‘, we need to have a criminological 
theory, because every theory has its own comparison requirements. For instance, if we 
use biological theory, we need to compare the racial features, such as genotype, 
anthropological, neurological, physical and anatomical make-up, of people living in 
certain spatial places. On the other hand, if we use sociological theories such as social 
learning theory, all the variables we manipulate change to a completely different set, 
which may be comprised of variables such as family, school, friend ties, socio-
economic environment of the crime, developmental variables in a continuous past 
social environment and some other social geography measures.  
Since this study explores, examines, and theorises financial crimes, it seems that the 
best theory to utilize in this study should be a rational choice theory. Nevertheless, the 
rational choice theory, although it fits well into the subject area, does not provide a 
sound foundation for our comparisons because of the extreme cases (encouraged by 
the grounded theory methodology) we compare. For this reason, the second research 
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question is developed, which has indeed been the primary question of the research and 
led to the initial question: why do people commit financial crimes? It should be noted 
that this research is primarily interested in answering the theoretical question, but in 
order to contextualise it, the financial systems are also compared in terms of their 
propensity for crime. 
 
1.3. RESEARCH RATIONALE AND MOTIVATIONS 
In order to explain the initial motivation for undertaking this study, perhaps a parable 
from Saul Alinsky (as cited by Reiner, 2009: 7) can help: ―A fisherman sees a body 
floating down stream and jumps in to rescue it. The same happens a few minutes later, 
and then again and again. When a tenth body floats down, the fisherman leaves it and 
runs upstream, to find out how to stop these people getting into the water in the first 
place‖. By the same token, financial crimes and financial crises through their 
consequences can be compared to dead bodies now. They are on the increase on a 
global scale and the acceleration of this increase is terribly high
1
 (Summers, 2009). 
Masciandaro (2004) asserts that today, the potential for financial abuse can threaten 
the strategic, political and economic interests of sovereign states. Very recently, the 
whole world suffered, and indeed is still suffering, from the subprime loans crisis that 
stemmed from mortgage fraud. In line with this, it has been also estimated that, by the 
middle of the 1990s, the ‗gross criminal product‘ of organized crime made it the 
twentieth richest organization in the world - richer than 150 sovereign states (Castells 
1998: 169).  
If the frequency and period of an occurrence of financial crisis and large scale 
financial crimes increases, it is highly likely that we are not experiencing something 
happening by pure chance. These instances are not simple, probabilistic events. There 
may be a structure behind them. For instance, 80% of the subprime lending in the 
United States was adjustable rate mortgages (Dodd, 2007), which must have applied 
great pressure to debtors and lenders and forced them to commit fraudulent acts.     
                                                 
1
In the last 20 years there have been 6 (or 7) major financial crises: 1987: Stock market crash; 1990s: 
Savings and Loans real estate crash; 1995: Mexican crash; 1997: Asian financial crisis after Russian 
collapse and LTCM; 2001: Crisis after tech bubble burst and Enron (Summers, 2009); 2007: Global 
financial crises initiated by the US real estate bubble. 
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There is no doubt that every economic system has financial crimes and financial 
criminals and no system is immune to them, but there is also no doubt that a criminal 
cannot commit the same crime with the same level of ease in every economic and 
financial system. Some systems are better or worse than others in different settings 
and for different crime types because their structures are different. Available 
opportunity spaces, the nature of target tools, mechanisms, processes, principles, laws, 
technologies of the countries that implement those economic systems, give different 
incentives, possibilities, feasibilities to the criminals which must be reflected in the 
total number and severity of financial crimes statistics. Having said that, this study is 
also aware that convergence is taking place between different economic and financial 
systems due to the globalisation and the hegemony of capitalism, and therefore 
differences are becoming less distinguishable. 
One can, however, still claim that certain differences of economic systems that may 
not be observable at first sight, that are happening ‗upstream‘, are the causes of these 
crimes as they are. If they had been set to something else, the nature, frequency and 
seriousness of crimes would not be the same. In other words, systematic observation 
of financial crimes along with the nature, the structure and working of economic 
systems may yield the root causes of financial crimes or to put it more bluntly, some 
economic systems may have a higher propensity or readiness to financial crimes than 
others due to their internal dynamics and working mechanism. Financial crimes, 
therefore, can be ranked accordingly and the strongest/weakest economic systems 
against financial crimes (only) can be identified. 
 
1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Considering the nature of aims and research questions, this study mainly benefited 
from discourse analysis with the objective of ‗theory building by comparative case 
study‘ (Eisenhardt, 1989) through grounded theory in criminology. For this, major 
financial systems, that are Capitalism, Socialism, and partially and fully Islamised 
financial systems, are analysed by comparing the following cases in order to build a 
grounded theory of financial crime or at least modify the existing theories. The cases 
are distributed among the systems as follows: 
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(i) Market Economy: G8 Members - USA, Italy, Britain, and Russia 
(ii) Socialist (Transition) Economy: China, Cuba 
(iii) Islamic Economy 
a) Fully Islamised: Iran and Sudan 
b) Partially Islamised: Saudi Arabia and Malaysia 
The time span of the analyses is confined to the period between 1980 and 2014 in 
order to produce coherent results.  For the successful completion of the study, many 
qualitative and quantitative data were extracted from various sources such as Hoffsted 
culture indices, GDPs, GNPs, Human Development Index, International Competition 
Index, Corruption Index, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and many other social 
and economic indices and databases, along with published crime statistics of the 
countries in question to serve as the secondary data of analyses. 
Criminological arguments are used intensively throughout the thesis. In this sense, 
incentives are important, because this study analyses financial crimes from the point 
of view of the rational actor. We also refer to the ‗rational choice theory‘ of 
criminology as an established theoretical base, not only because it is relatively 
analytic and may deliver solid results but also because it is objective in nature, which 
makes it a valuable tool for the comparison of the systems under scrutiny, fairly.  
Having said this, the cultural context through which rational choice theory is 
developed is indeed acknowledged too. However, considering the above-mentioned 
convergence, one needs a methodological framework through which one can make 
comparisons. In this study, this constitutes an improved, extended, dynamic, 
positivist, pluralistic and complex rational choice theory. 
For the second research question, qualitative comparative analysis is used as a method 
and utilizes concept-based comparison rather than agent-based comparison. Because 
of space constraints, a new conceptual framework with more explanatory power, 
namely ‗opportunity space‘, is developed in the first analytical chapter.  
Indeed we could use all of the codes of the grounded theory developed in this study to 
compare the financial systems, which would produce a neat, more concrete and 
detailed comparison. Nevertheless, the space restrictions forced us to choose the 
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alternative, opportunity spaces with fewer criteria that emerged from the grounded 
theory. However, the extensive comparative analysis based on the grounded theory 
developed by this study can be provided if requested, which is considered to be fully 
included in a publication developed from this study. 
 
1.5. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
This study is organised in seven main chapters. The research presented in this study 
commences with conceptual definitions by weeding out definitional problems as to 
what ‗crime‘ and ‗financial crime‘ are. Indeed, extreme perspectives not only force us 
to abandon the classical definitions of the mainstream criminology literature, but also 
to explain the reasons why these alternative systems have such different definitions. In 
order to feed the intellectual wonder of the reader we took the responsibility of 
explaining the foundational differences of perspectives, ideologies, beliefs of the 
alternative perspectives of criminology. The definitional issues, hence, are discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 3, literature on crime theories is reviewed with an extension to alternative 
paradigms of criminality. In this chapter, rational choice theory is identified as the 
best available theory which has some important inconsistencies shown in Chapter 4. 
Until the end of Chapter4, preparations for the empirical analysis are presented and 
after this Chapter research methodology is explained in Chapter 5, which predicates 
the two empirical chapters of Chapter 6, grounded theory and Chapter 7, comparative 
analysis of financial systems on the basis of financial white-collar crime vulnerability. 
Chapter 6, which forms an improved version of rational choice theory based on 
individual needs and societal effects, is the most authentic part of this research. 
Finally Chapter 8 concludes the analysis and puts results into the context of the 
greater literature and discusses the possibility of further research.  
The coding process of the grounded theory is presented as an appendix which is in 
fact an extension of Chapter 6. Thus, Appendix I plays a critical role in this study 
because it gives a positivist review of the grounded theory.  
Appendix II presents the difficulties of reaching data on financial white-collar crime 
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and Appendix III concludes this study. Appendix III introduces and compares 
financial systems in more general terms and can be taken as an introduction to 
Chapter 7 which compares the vulnerability levels of the financial systems for 
financial crime.  
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Chapter 2  
 
 CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS 
 AND ESTABLISHING THE FRAMEWORK 
 AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This chapter defines crime and financial crime and locates them in their contexts and 
after explaining and analysing all major Eurocentric criminological theories recalls 
the existence of two alternative paradigms and identifies the proper theoretical 
framework for the scholarly studies on financial crimes. This, therefore, should be 
considered as ‗working definitions‘ of the main concepts used in this study; and hence 
this chapter also aims to establish the framework and scope of this study. 
2.1.1. Misconceptions about Crime 
First of all, let us distance ourselves from the formal literature on ‗crime‘ for a short 
while and ponder about it in order to compare our perception of crime with the reality 
of it.  
Most of the time, we remember certain notorious criminals; disgusting live images, 
probably from Hollywood movies, police officers, CSI labs, judges and prisons. This 
is the common image of crime in society and it seems to belong to a distant, weird 
planet, which is populated by a disgusting species named ‗criminal‘. However, we are 
usually not aware that one-fifth of the whole world prison population may be living 
with us in the same country
2
; which means it is very probable that in a pretty close 
proximity we are neighbours of those people who have very high recidivism rates, if 
we are already not one of them. Thus, crime is not distant from us, and indeed, it is 
                                                 
2
This is correct in USA.  
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sometimes in us. 
Distance is only one of the concerns about the misconception of crime. Another 
misconception is the weirdness of it. The Youth Justice board reports that one in three 
young people carry a knife or gun and commit a crime every two minutes (The 
Telegraph, 06 March 2009) and 300 online crime occurs every minute (The Telegraph, 
06 September 2007) in Britain. In light of this pervasiveness, these statistics can be 
called anything but weird. Crime is, indeed, very familiar to us; it is even mundane in 
our daily life. 
People usually perceive frequent and mundane things as ‗normal‘ but the high 
frequency of crime does not necessarily mean that it is normal
3
. Most of the time it is 
abnormal. We experience a lot of ‗frequent‘, ‗mundane‘ but ‗abnormal‘ things, such 
as the unluckiness of the number 13, talk of vampires and legal maturity at 6574 days 
(18 x 365 + 4 = 6574) in some countries. Similarly, crime is frequent and mundane 
but abnormal
4
, pathological; unlike many frequent and mundane things
5
. This is one 
of the reasons why we have a criminological approach of ―rehabilitation‖ of criminals 
because crime harms our society. Criminals kill, threaten, rape, kidnap, assassinate 
etc. others.  
Like ourselves, some people can be perceived to be decent members of the society 
who have nothing to do with crime. Crime seems to be really distant from them, 
infrequent and weird for them. Like them, we never consider ourselves as criminals. 
Nevertheless, when asked the following questions people may hesitate about their 
criminality: ‗Have you received any parking violations or speeding tickets recently?‘; 
‗Have you claimed something unnecessary from your insurance company?‘; ‗Have 
you reported all your online sales to the government for taxing?‘; ‗How about 
copyright violations?‘; ‗Have ever you listened to music or watched movies over the 
internet for free?‘; ‗Do you have the license for all the software you use?‘. In sum, 
‗are you following all the laws and regulations of the country you live in or are 
travelling in?‘. But before answering all these questions, ‗do you really know about all 
the legal codes and regulations of your government and the governments you visit?‘; 
                                                 
3
This is a famous idea of Emile Durkheim. 
4
 A very similar analogy is used by Hayek and Caldwell (2007) to show that widespread 
misconceptions exist in economic analyses. 
5
Meaning social pathology here. 
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‗Is it possible that you are not sure about some of them and maybe even frequently 
violate them?‘.  
Statistics claim that many of us should answer this last question positively. For 
instance ―more than 300 internet crimes are being committed every hour‖ (The 
Telegraph, 06 September 2007) concerning which 7 million people are involved in 
illegal downloads in the UK (BBC, 28 May 2009). In 2002 on May 1
st
, 11 crimes 
were reported every minute in England and Wales (The Guardian, 14 June 2002). No 
place on Earth is free from this fact. According to UNODCP (1997: 124) the world 
trade in illicit drugs was ―about the same size as the total international trade in 
textiles‖, and larger than iron steel and motor vehicles in 1994.  
Thus, crime is a matter of everyday life; people commit crime. Some do not but even 
they, almost certainly, know at least one criminal very well or are victimized. In other 
words, as mentioned, crime is not a phenomenon that is distinct from us; it is with us 
and indeed in us as a society and as individuals. 
The distorted image of crime is not limited to its physical and conceptual alienation. 
We usually consider the criminal law as a precaution against damage to our society. 
However, it is really out of our perception of crime that governments use it for the 
integrity of our societies. In fact, ―[criminal laws] do maintain public order and safety 
and integrity of individuals (Williams, 1997: 15, emphasis added). 
Following from Williams‘ (1997) perspective, one may argue that crime is not only 
about criminals and it has never been so. We need crimes ―to conserve not only the 
safety and order but also the moral welfare‖, says Lord Simonds (Williams, 1997: 15)   
In this regard one cannot be sure that he/she is/was/will „not‟ (be) a criminal because 
crime is just an ordinary, frequent, dynamic, relative phenomenon in our daily lives. 
One cannot and should not isolate himself/herself from the conceptualization of crime 
and from the crowd known as ‗criminals‘.  We have a lot of misconception of crime 
and this is the main reason why, initially, we should focus our attention on the 
problem of definition so that at least we know what we are dealing with. 
2.1.2. Common Terminology in Social Sciences and Relativity of Crime 
If one needs to conduct research on something that is changing unpredictably, that is 
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vague and having multiple meanings at the same time, it is very hard to deal with it 
from the academic viewpoint. So we define everything we use. 
First of all, the definition of ‗crime‘ should address that it is relative as different sets 
of crimes have existed in different countries and centuries. Especially for a researcher 
who is doing cross-cultural research, this is an essential recognition.  
In fact, crime is not only relative but relative in more than one sense. To Sutherland 
and Cressey (1970) for instance, it is relative in at least two senses: legal and social.  
We observe many examples of legal relativity in history. For instance, the following 
have at different times been crimes (Sutherland and Cressey, 1970: 15), but none of 
them are crimes now: 
printing a book, professing the medical doctrine of circulation of the blood, 
driving with reins, sale of coin to foreigners, having gold in the house, 
buying goods on the way to market or in the market for the purpose of 
selling them at a higher price, writing a check for less than one dollar.  
While explaining ‗social relativity‘ on the other hand, Sutherland and Cressey (1970) 
focus on white-collar criminals. ―[Unlike] regular police, expert investigators must 
deal with the subtler forms of fraud which flourish in many areas of business ... [they 
are] interested in making subtle fraud ‘real crime‘, what has been mere chicanery is 
interpreted and dealt with as crime‖ (Sutherland and Cressey, 1970: 15, emphasis 
added). 
The fact that crime is a relative phenomenon is sometimes confusing and unexpected. 
If, for instance, you are living in eastern Connecticut, US, you can be sentenced to 
death but if you drive a few kilometres to pass into Western Rhode Island and commit 
the same crime, you would not. A few kilometres, a few days (i.e. before the 
enactment of a law incriminating certain acts) are sometimes more than enough to 
experience the relativity of crime. Nevertheless, in a „social‟ sense (in comparison to 
„legal‟ relativity) it is very hard to draw sharp boundaries in short spatial or time 
distances. For instance, if sodomy is a crime in a culture, it usually takes centuries for 
that culture to de-criminalize it, to see it as a normal act; legally though, it may take a 
few days or weeks to criminalize or de-criminalize certain acts. Following this 
argument, one can confidently claim that there must be disparities between the 
definitions of society and government in every country and between countries and 
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societies. Thus the consequences of the relativity of crime are immense, widespread 
and usually overlooked. 
Rather surprisingly, this discrepancy may even exist at the most extreme points: 
existence and non-existence of the phenomena
6. Let us take the concept ‗state crime‘ 
(Doig, 2011) for instance. No government has an incentive to create a legal definition 
of crime to incriminate itself but the society does. 
This discussion forces us to ask why it is crime there and why not here or why it was 
crime then and why not now? Are our definitions of crime problematic or theirs? Is 
there a universal, an ideal set of definitions of crime? If there are no agreed-upon 
crime definitions, what is the point of studying it in the first place?  
Maybe the most important of these questions for our study is ‗what do those 
differences tell us intellectually about social phenomena?‘; ‗is there a generalizable, 
consistent truth in this relativity?‘ and our answer, as will be clear at the end of this 
dissertation, is ‗yes‘, ‗indeed we can lay down the fundamental characteristics of this 
chaotic phenomenon despite its relativistic nature‘. 
After the discussion of relativity, now it is time to define our perspective, which will 
put our study into a framework of its own and will force us to be consistent with its 
understanding of the universe of financial crimes. 
2.1.3. Seeking a Common Ground for the Definition of Financial Crimes 
The consequences of different interpretations in the fundamentals of a given study are 
countless and of paramount importance. Even positive sciences are prone to this 
definitional problem and the perspectives play a crucial role in the defining process. 
To give an example, if one asserts that the shortest distance between two dots in the 
space is a line he/she may be a classical physicist and what he/she says is true but if 
                                                 
6
 There is a famous parable character in Turkish humour, Nasreddin Hodja, whose story explains the 
issue in a funny way: A small child and this old fellow go to the city with a donkey, all walking.. and 
they hear people saying: ―Look at these guys, they have a donkey but they are walking‖. Holding the 
child in his arms Hodja gets on the donkey. After a short while, they hear people saying: ―Look at this 
poor donkey, these people are abusing it,‖ and he gets down and they carry on walking until they hear 
other people saying: ―Look at this nasty boy, he makes this old man walk‖, then they change places 
until they hear some more people saying: ―Look at this bad man, he is in comfort but he makes this 
little child walk‖. They become angry at all these people and Hodja finally shoulders the donkey. 
Funny, but serious! Crime definitions may be relativistic even at an individual level. 
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the distance is said to be a curve, then, it is more likely that he/she is a quantum 
physicist
7
 and again, what he/she says is true. Despite the identicalness of the 
phenomenon observed, conclusions may vary a great deal and implications are 
dramatic enough to baffle researchers.  
It is not hard, hence, to guess the consequences of this problem in the social sciences. 
Criminology, being one of them, is even more vulnerable to the definition problem. 
Crime, for instance, is defined differently by different countries and different political 
and economic systems, as well as by different disciplines, although they observe the 
same phenomenon: ‗certain human behaviours‘.  
Thus, for the consistency of this study, we need to make our observations from the 
same reference point, and while choosing our reference point out of many, we had 
better embrace the notion of the excellence of it over others. This is a must for 
practical purposes. In physics, light speed perspective is very well known but 
impossible to attain. For that matter, we should be aware that applicability of some 
‗perspectives‘, although valid in theory, may not be always possible. This is a good 
reason to prefer one reference point and disregard others.  
The perspective taken in this study is the ‗rational‘ perspective as we evaluate every 
loss and gain of all the principles, applications, rules of certain financial systems. This 
study stands at equal distances from socialism, capitalism and Islamic systems of 
economics and finance. We assume that all of these financial systems may have 
relatively worse and better characteristics than others. As for the relativity of the 
concrete comparison group (certain financial crimes), this study has carefully chosen 
a group which is officially and legally defined as crime in all of these financial 
systems. 
The following section, hence, aims to provide a conceptual definition of ‗crime‘ 
within this framework. 
  
                                                 
7 While both arguments are correct the first one is of classical linear mathematics and (Newtonian) 
physics and the second one is of modern, non-Euclidian mathematics and quantum (Einsteinian) 
physics. 
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2.2 DEFINITION AND CONTEXT OF „CRIME‟ 
Interestingly enough, answering the question ‗what is crime?‘ is rather difficult 
(Tappan, 1960). Indeed, if there are few things that criminologists are in consensus 
about, the difficulty of defining crime is one of them.  
2.2.1. The „Word‟ Crime 
The word crime is from the 13
th
 century French word crimne and the Latin word 
crimen, gen. criminis; which literally means, `sinfulness`, ‗accusation‟, ‗charge‟, 
`indictment`, ‗fault‟, „ offense‟ (Crime, 2011) but, as the French root (crimne = 
sinfulness) suggests, there has been much equivalent and mostly religious vocabulary 
in existence far earlier than the 13
th
 century about crime, as ―all human societies … 
held notions of right and wrong‖ (Schmalleger, 2009: 125). 
Varieties of the definitions of crime are prevalent in criminology and these varieties 
correspond to different perspectives on defining crime.  Every academic field, for 
instance, defines crime in a way that is comfortable for it (Tappan, 1960) and all legal, 
political, administrative systems, likewise, have different definitions of crime. 
There seem to be two major reasons for the various definitions of crime. Firstly, 
crimes are formulated by many nation states with different world views as well as 
through a variety of cultural, political, economic, religious, historical, spatial etc. 
reference points. Secondly, they are formulated by ―authorities of significantly 
different training and orientation‖ (Tappan, 1960: 3).  
For instance, socialist societies consider crime as a by-product of power relations, 
while medical, clinical people see it as a ‗pathology‘ with biological and psychiatric 
reasons behind it; and for sociologists it is just anti-social behaviour; for still others 
like legal professionals, however, it is, merely, breach of law.  
Thus, one needs to point out the context before giving the definition of crime, as 
Tappan (1960:7; emphasis added) does: ―from the viewpoint of ideal policy 
formulations, crime is in fact what the state through its legislature and courts says it 
is‖. 
For criminology, it is fortunate that there exists a neat, succinct collection of the 
perspectives or approaches in the literature. Although the number of approaches is not 
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certain (Hale et. al., 2005; Siegel, 1995; Tappan, 1960; Sumner, 1906) the most 
encompassing one, among those, is Hagan‘s (1987) categorization; but we need to 
make additions to his classifications in order to make it all encompassing.  
2.2.2. Approaches to the Definition of Crime 
Crime can be defined in different ways to correspond to different moralities, relative 
understandings of societies, and perceptions. Defining it legally is one of them. In this 
sense, socialist, capitalist and Islamic governments have different preferences for 
choosing legislation. That is why some religious books were forbidden in the Soviet 
Union, Das Kapital in the USA and sex magazines in some Islamic countries, but not 
vice-versa. This relativity is an example of the legal approach only but John Hagan 
(1987) provides six more different possible approaches to defining crime relatively: 
(i) The Legal-Consensus Approach 
(ii) The Socio-Legal Approach 
(iii) A Cross-Cultural Approach 
(iv) A Statistical Approach 
(v) The Labelling Approach 
(vi) A Human Rights Approach 
(vii) A Utopian-Anarchist Approach 
Nonetheless, this list is not complete without ‗a religious approach‘ as the 8th 
category, because a huge number of people are either totally religious or ideologically 
affected by religious dogma and their definition of crime is significantly different 
from the other seven approaches listed by Hagan (1987). The following sections 
provide details of these categories.  
2.2.2.1. The legal-consensus approach 
Defining crime as a derivation of law makes criminology a derivative science which 
has to lean on another: ‗law‘, but this is the prevailing perspective across the world.  
Tappan is the forerunner of this approach, but some describe this approach as 
―esoteric‖ (Zedner, 2004: 61; Schur, 1969: 10), because ―no criminal law [means] no 
crime‖ and because this definition does not ―help tell us why certain conduct is 
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defined as criminal‖ (Zedner, 2004). According to Tappan, crime is ―what the state ... 
says it is‖ (1960: 7). ―Crime is an international action in violation of the criminal law 
... committed without defence or excuse and penalized by the state‖ (1947: 100, 
emphasis added).  
Williams (1997: 11) is another example who primarily values the authority of the state 
that is eligible to enact law and thus, crime. Tappan sees law as a ‗reliable guide‘ to 
what is consensually defined as criminal in any given society (Hagan 1987: 43). This 
view is inherent is criminology, though the criminologists are aware of the negative 
consequences (Newburn, 2007: 8). The legal perspective, however, envisages a static 
society and circumstantial (Ritchie, 1986) crime and does not take into account the 
fact that the criminal legislation process, which contains onset, aftermath, revision and 
abrogation of criminal law, is a living thing.  
It should be noted that financial crimes are more prone to the negative consequences 
of a static view because they are most of the time self regulated, due to the 
governments‘ crawling efforts to adapt legislation to ever changing market 
mechanisms, structures and concentrations of national economies.  
It is hard to scientifically make sense of crime when it is legally defined because 
scientists, then, would let politicians decide on what they should be studying as crime. 
This is the correct definition of law and not criminology, as criminology cannot be 
relegated to law due to the fact that it is a scientific, multidisciplinary field of study 
which assumes a stable essence of deviant behaviour. Law does not necessarily share 
this assumption (Dönmezer, 1994). 
If we rely on Tappan‘s definition of crime and begin studying a specific deviant 
behaviour, all our efforts would be obsolete when governments decide to abolish 
legislation. This approach, thus, seems to be putting government and politics in front 
of the science. It should be the science which should be shaping the governmental 
policies and not vice-versa. Besides, legal definitions do not clearly reflect social 
consensus on the definitions of crime. For instance (Hagan, 1987: 42 emphasis 
added): 
Federal criminal code in the United States [was] widely regarded as being 
remarkably outdated but nonetheless [was] stubbornly resistant to change ... 
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Congress [was] on record as seeing the need for a new code, but unable to 
agree on what exactly that code should contain. 
Sovereign political societies are self-sufficient but only partially in consensus 
Williams (1997: 15). So is the legislation.  
Crime is geographically varied and not uniform across place and time, but if we 
ignore the political dimensions of law, we have to deny the soft, incremental, spatial 
move of crime along with national and international borders, as a social phenomenon.  
From the legal perspective, researching about transnational crime would not be 
scientifically viable because some of the adjacent governments would be black holes 
on the international narcotic routes such as the Netherlands. 
Hagan (1987: 43) agrees that: ―A salient difficulty with Tappan‘s approach is that it 
systematically ignores much of what many criminologists today wish to study, 
behaviours that are on the margins of criminal law and rarely prosecuted, including 
such things as unethical business practices and pollution of the environment‖.  
For specific countries such as the USA, UK, Russia, China, though, claimed 
consensus in federal and federal-like systems, especially on criminal matters, is not 
realistic, for which there are reasons. In the USA, every state has its own criminal 
codes under their own constitutions which are as intellectually far from each other as 
allowing or banning capital punishment. In Britain; England, Ireland, Wales and 
Scotland have different social formations and cultures and China, Russia, Germany, 
Italy, Malaysia, almost all the cases we study, have similar make-ups. Therefore, it is 
not wise to assume that the criminal codes represent even national consensuses about 
at least some definitions of crime. 
Secondly, the major policies of the federal state can change dramatically over time, as 
seen in the 1990s by ‗tough on crime‘ policies which filled up otherwise relatively 
empty prisons rather quickly. In the USA, matters of criminalization or 
decriminalization like same-sex marriage, pro-choice (abortion) vs. pro-life, 
marihuana use, determine the governing parties with a small percentage and this has 
very little to do with consensus on the definitions of crimes. Consequently, a legal-
consensus approach to defining crime is not viable for our cross-cultural study. 
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2.2.2.2. A cross-cultural approach 
Sellin (1938) looks at the society as not a single entity in consensus but a mixture of 
cultures making it up, and he argues that these cultures have their own rights and 
wrongs, which form the notion of ‗conduct norms‟. ―For every person, then, there is, 
from the point of view of a given group of which he is a member, a normal (right) and 
abnormal (wrong) way of reacting, the norm depending upon the social values of the 
group which formulated it‖ (Sellin, 1938). 
When we attempt to define white collar crimes, by means of this perspective, we 
come up with two major cultures in the society that are in conflict about their 
collection of conduct norms, the rich and the poor. For the first, asserted financial 
crimes are either minor, unethical behaviours or necessitated by a fiercely competitive 
and global business environment. The second group claims that those behaviours of 
the first group should be criminalized and punished.  
2.2.2.3. A statistical approach 
Wilkins (1964: 46) suggests that ―at some time or another, some form of society ... 
has defined almost all forms of behaviour that we now call ‗criminal‘ as desirable for 
the functioning of that form of society‖ and ―it may be supposed that the model given 
by the normal frequency distribution shown in this chart represents the distribution of 
ethical content of human action.‖ (Wilkins, 1964: 47). Wilkins gives the following 
behavioural distribution depicted in Figure 2.1. By this figure, Wilkins (1964), unlike 
Durkheim, shows that criminal behaviour is ‗not‘ normal because this behaviour is at 
the extreme end of the normal distribution. Crime is (or is seen as) an extreme act in 
its environment. 
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Figure 2.1: Statistical Approach for the Definition of Crime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Wilkins, 1964: 47) 
 
However, ―a purely statistical approach underestimates the role of societal groups in 
selecting from infrequent acts those that are considered criminal‖ (Hagan, 1987: 45). 
So, the mechanisms of selection, despite their paramount importance, are disregarded 
by this method. We need to understand the reason why those societal groups had 
chosen certain behaviours in order to answer the ‗why‘ question about committing 
crime. We cannot simply override it if the aetiology of crime is an issue for us. 
2.2.2.4. The labelling approach 
Becker is the doyen of this approach and his approach affected criminology and 
criminal justice greatly, as well as political science. In his view, ‗deviant‘ is ―the one 
to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that 
people so label‖ (Becker, 1963: 9).  
In Becker‘s approach, if there is a label there should be some ‗labellers‘ and ‗labelled‘ 
ones and their interrelations should be very important at the time of the definition 
process. However, it is also correct that ―this definition considers crime as an ―all 
societal response and no deviant stimulus‖ (Bordua, January 01, 1969: 210), and 
―characteristically assumes a passive subject plays little or no part in eliciting a 
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response‖ (Hagan, 1973: 210), which is hard to accept for e.g.. serial killers. In this 
perspective, crimes are ‗not behaviours but labels that are attached to certain 
behaviours of people‘. Similarly, according to Salinger (2005: viii) crime is ―viable‖ 
only when ―committers perceived of themselves as criminals‖.  
This is an unpleasant fact for this study though, because white collar criminals are the 
same ones who have the power to attach the crime label and, as Ernest Burgess (1950) 
and Geis (1967) showed, they do not see themselves as criminals. If we define crime 
by this approach, financial crime would become even less detectable, as such crimes 
can be easily justified by the ‗committers‘ as not crime. 
2.2.2.5. A human rights approach 
 As the name suggests, the human rights approach asserts that ―all persons must be 
guaranteed the fundamental prerequisites for well-being, including food, shelter, 
clothing, medical services, challenging work and recreational experiences, as well as 
security from predatory individuals or repressive and imperialistic social elites.‖ 
(Herman and Schwendinger, 1975: 145) 
Serious, inherited, ‗social conditions‘ such as (Herman and Schwendinger, 1975: 
147):  
imperialism, racism, sexism and poverty are abbreviated signs for theories 
of social relationships or social systems which cause the systematic 
abrogation of basic rights, then imperialism, racism, sexism, and poverty can 
be called crimes according to the logic of our argument.  
Herman and Julia Schwendinger (1975: 148) protest price-fixing as follows:  
Isn‘t it time to raise serious questions about the assumption underlying the 
definition of the field of criminology while agents of the state can, with 
impunity, legally reward men who destroy food so that price levels can be 
maintained while a sizable portion of the population suffers from 
malnutrition. 
This approach has not been adequately developed in the literature, which has not left 
much scope for research. 
2.2.2.6. A utopian-anarchist approach 
For Taylor et al. (1973) ―deviance is normal ... The task is to create a society in which 
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the fact[s] of human diversity ... are not subject to the power to  criminalize‖ . 
Humanity is ―recognizing that diversity is critical to earth‘s survival and to human 
survival. As these continue, appropriation, crime, and prospective legality will 
diminish, and in their place will be a continuous process of anarchy and justice‖ 
(Tifft, 1949: 400). 
According to Hagan, the human rights approach should warn us because of ―the 
possibility that some behaviour (e.g. disorder offenses, political crimes, and some 
property offenses) may be called ‗deviant‘ or ‘criminal‘ because they are offensive or 
threatening to [a] privileged segment of society‖ (Hagan, 1987). 
This approach, however, fails to recognize that personal freedoms do overlap and that 
one cannot justify serious crimes like murder, rape etc. as politically incorrect 
behaviours to be identified as crimes. This is a rather naive approach, naive, in terms 
of the nature of human-beings.  
2.2.2.7. Religious Approach 
―Substantive rationality cannot be measured in terms of formal calculation alone, but 
also involves a relation to the absolute values or to the content of the particular ends 
to which it is oriented‖ (Weber, 1976: 185). These orientations of rationality could be 
many different phenomena but an important one of them is the belief systems of the 
individuals. Criminology seldom refers to such rationalities despite the fact that many 
people are affected by these rationalities while they are restraining themselves from 
crimes or while encouraging themselves. Hagan (2010) uses the term `demonological 
theory` to refer to spiritual explanations of crime but in his early works (Hagan (1987) 
does not include a religious approach in his list of approaches to defining crime. 
However there exist some cultures who define crime very statically and according to 
religious scripts (Qur‘an, Bible, Torah etc.) and religious philosophies (i.e. of 
Confucius, Buddha) and not necessarily with reference to bad spirits.  
Sumner (1906) informs us about two Latin phrases: ‗mala in se‘ behaviours that 
seriously violate a given social group‘s values and are wrong in and of themselves and 
‗mala prohibita‘, considerably less serious and time-honoured customs, traditions. 
Those who argue for the existence of mala in se offenses … usually point to 
some fundamental rule, such as religious teachings (the Ten 
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Commandments, the Qur‘an and so on), to support their belief that some 
acts are inherently wrong. Such a perspective assumes that 
uncompromisable standards for human behavior rest within the very fabric 
of lived experience. (Schmalleger, 2009: 125)  
2.2.2.8. The socio-legal approach 
Society‘s own perception and understanding of crime is at least as important as the 
legal definition of crime, because ―law is often nullified in practice by lack of 
sufficient public or official support. This has been the experience with ... innumerable 
pieces of minor legislation‖ (Tappan, 1960: 6-7). 
One cannot even declare that [legal] crimes are always more serious in their 
effects either on the individual or on society.  For example, the negligent 
manufacture and marketing of a product which turns out to be dangerous 
may be far more injurious to both individuals and society than the theft of a 
pencil, yet the former would normally only constitute a tort whereas the 
latter is criminal. There are similarities: each is a wrong, each is a breach of 
a legal obligation or rule. (Williams, 1997: 11) 
This approach facilitates studies of more than one jurisdiction, culture, society, class, 
belief system and is a product of white collar crime studies. Its theoretician, Edwin 
Sutherland, earlier president of the American Sociological Society, is the leading 
figure of the applied sociology of crime. According to him, ―just as there is 
justification for writing of ‗crimes known to the police‘, and ‗unsolved crimes‘, there 
is justification for writing of ‗unapprehended criminals‘ and ‗criminals at large‘8 
(Sutherland and Cressey, 1970: 18). This definition is similar to the following 
analogy: just as there is justification for ‗pending legislation in senate‘, there is 
justification for the ‗predicted/suggested crime definitions of criminology‘ before the 
legislation. Sometimes, governments even choose to punish crimes before they define 
them. Maltz (1985) gives ‗organized crime‘ as an example. 
Sutherland‘s definition of white collar crimes is a nice example of ‗predicted‘ or 
‗suggested‘ crime because there was no definition of white collar crime (thus no 
official crimes and criminals of such kind) before him. After his research though, it 
was proven that such crimes were existent and pervasive.  
Thus, he has proven that criminologists should not feel bounded by legislation and 
                                                 
8
 See Donald R. Cressey, ―Foreword‖ to Edwin H. Sutherland, White Collar Crime, new ed. (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 4-8 
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that  ―the criteria which have been used in defining white collar crimes are not 
categorically different from the criteria used in defining other crimes‖ (Hagan, 1987: 
43). He has proven that ―it is possible to consider “criminal” many unethical business 
practices handled in the civil and criminal courts‖ (Hagan, 1987: 43, emphasis 
added). 
According to Tappan (1960: 6) though, crime as an antisocial behaviour ―is overly 
simple, for conceptions of what is antisocial vary greatly among reformers and 
moralists‖. 
It‘s highly desirable that there be real consensus on the dangerousness of the 
conduct involved and the appropriateness of applying criminal sanctions for 
purposes of control; it is not reasonable officially to penalize a conduct that 
is commonly approved or that is not in fact injurious to important social 
interests (Tappan, 1960: 6).  
Tappan has a valid point here and he is right that we should not punish deviant 
behaviour officially if there is not a firm consensus about its harm. However, 
applicable laws of any given society have the same flaws Tappan complains about. 
Current laws have been legislated by the considerable efforts of famous scholars
9
 and 
high officials
10, among whom the dichotomy of ‗reform‘ and ‘morals‘ prevails. Thus, 
since the best alternative has the same flaws, we should not worry much about this 
criticism. 
Besides, even if we contemplate the formation of political consensus on society and 
the democratic foundations of it, we should recognize that reformist and moralist 
representatives are either totally excluded
11
 or represent their community only 
partially at the polls and legislation ballots.  
When we ponder on the implications of the legal approach in various economic 
systems we have to accept that different but similar legal definitions exist for each and 
every one of them. For capitalism and socialism and Islamic finance, legal codes 
initially existed in the books and speeches of founding fathers which have then been 
codified by politicians who are taught their definitions.  
                                                 
9
 i.e John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith 
10
 i.e George Washington, Alexander Hamilton 
11
 Rules such as ―winner gets all‖, ―MPs chosen by parties rather than electorates‖ can be considered 
examples of this notion. 
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Besides, the social fabric of the society indeed precedes the legalization procedure. 
No one can enact and apply a law which has no acceptance and no  relevance in the 
society.  
Consequently, Sutherland‘s approach is the best approach for the purposes of this 
study and thus it will be deployed throughout this text. However, even though we 
have not chosen to use the previous legal-consensus approach, this study would not be 
affected much by the shortcomings of it because the specific financial crimes we 
choose are agreed upon by almost all of the financial systems and jurisdictions we 
study with small variations.  
2.2.3. Socio-Legal Approach to Crime:  Explained in Depth 
Although at first look there seems to be a certain approach corresponding to every 
financial system (i.e. utopian-anarchist approach to socialism; religious approach to 
Islamic finance; legal approach to market finance etc.), multiplicity of reference 
points would be of no use for a scientific study, nor would choosing one of them and 
judging others by using its criterion be objective. Still, these pairs notify us of the 
underlying relativity between economic systems and choosing the appropriate 
reference point is an issue. 
How to define crime? ―There is an element of fashion involved in attempts to answer 
these fundamental issues, but the underlying rationale is largely governed by the 
traditional ethos and ethics of the society‖ (Williams, 1997:14). The reasons behind 
the variations in definitions can be the notion of ‗crime as a proviso‘ but this study 
focuses on certain behaviours of people that are defined either as crime or as very 
unethical acts in the compared political economic systems and the countries deploying 
them because  ―we need a definition that considers behaviours that are both actually 
and potentially liable to criminal law‖ (Hagan, 1987: 49), because ―scientists cannot 
afford to permit non-scientists to fix the terms and boundaries of the scientific study 
of crime‖ (Sellin, 1937: 114). 
It should be noted that the socio-legal approach – unlike the cross-cultural and 
statistical approaches - is subtler and more easily quantifiable and that contributions to 
and participation of other disciplines, like law, sociology, psychology and politics, are 
more available in this approach as well.  
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According to Williams (2012: 26), new parameters like ―economics, politics, public 
administration, public order and public safety all play a part‖ in the formation of 
recent crimes like ―modern social welfare, moral improvement and traffic offences‖. 
In this sense, choosing the socio-legal approach should yield even more common 
features between the subjects of the research compared to all other perspectives. 
Morrison (2002: 219) agrees that this is the case especially in the era of very frequent 
law-giving and law-repealing, because ―[m]uch law-making follows the social and 
political agendas of elected governments‖, and gives an example from the US: 
―Legislators can get it wrong, of course. The prohibition law in the US in the 1930s, 
banning alcoholic beverages, met widespread opposition and had to be repealed‖. 
In a similar vein, books such as The World`s Stupidest Laws (Crombie, 2005) claims 
that it is not always wise to rely on legal codes as the definitions of crime because 
they may not reflect even a considerable consensus in the society. 
 
2.3. DEFINITION, SCOPE AND CONTEXT OF „FINANCIAL CRIMES‟ 
Before delving into the definition of ‗financial crime‘ literature, it is wise to weed out 
the similar and confusing periphery terms. This is indeed a necessity because there is 
a lot of confusion about the terminology in the literature and financial crimes are 
closely related to other kinds of economic crimes. 
In the classical literature of criminology, criminal behaviour seems to be confined to 
working-class people only. This is a delusion and an accumulating number of criminal 
corporations and financial scandals like Enron, WorldCom, Madoff, Barings, BCCI, 
Daiwa, Sumitomo, Credit Lyonnais, Bre-X, Lloyds, NASDAQ, Savings and Loan, 
Parmalat etc. clearly show that crime is not confined to a specific social class.  
Newburn (2007: 373) agrees that criminal statistics that are bent in favour of the 
powerful is a ―false picture‖, the reason for this picture is ―the unequal application of 
the criminal law‖ because white collar people are ―secure in [their] quilted armor of 
lawyer-spun sophistries‖ (Ross, 1907: 32). Hence, although there is not a consensus 
about the social status of financial criminals, most of the respected scholars (i.e. 
Coleman, 1994; Sutherland, 1945) agree that the context of financial crime is best 
understood by focusing on economic crimes, elite deviance, white collar crimes and 
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the like. 
We may then put financial crime in this depiction as in Figure 2.2 and spot the relative 
position of financial crimes in this depiction (Figure 2.3): 
 
Figure 2.2: Overlapping Terminology of White Collar Crime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coleman (1914) 
 
Figure 2.3: Locating the Relative Place of Financial Crime in the Terminology of 
White Collar Crime 
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Before focusing on the definition of white collar crime, it is reasonable to discuss why 
it is not adequate to choose one of the titles below as the foundational basis of our 
study.  
 
2.3.1. Alternative Definitions of Financial Crime 
Similar to any other social science concept or paradigm, there is no consensus on the 
alternative definitions of financial crime, as each disciple and sub-disciple produces 
their own definition. Due to limited space, this section provides only a general 
understanding for the definition of financial crime categories. 
2.3.1.1. Organizational crime 
Organizational crime ―refers to crime committed on behalf of and for the benefit of a 
legitimate organization (Hagan, 2010: 226). These crimes are ―perceived to be less 
‗criminal‘ than those of individuals‖ (Croall, 2001: 12) and often ―against institutions 
rather than people‖ (Abercrombie et al., 2006: 455). 
When organizations are economically motivated we name their crimes ‗corporate‘ or 
‗business‘ crimes. Hagan (2010: 251) believes that being an employee of a given 
organization is a requirement for naming culprits‘ behaviours as ‗organizational 
crimes‘ because this term refers to crimes ―by businesses or officials on behalf of the 
employing organization‖. Box (1983) and Doig (2011) include ‗bureaucracies‘ as 
criminals or victims of such crimes as well. This description can be extended to 
include crimes that are committed by individuals and organizations that are not 
employed but motivated by criminal organizations as well.  
―Organisational culture and practice are important elements in understanding 
corporate‖ (Newburn, 2007: 376) and financial crimes in all capitalist, Islamic and 
socialist systems. Even in socialism, organizational crime is almost completely equal 
to corporate (business) crime because there are no private corporations in socialist 
systems. 
Organizational crime is not chosen as the base definition of speculation, manipulation, 
competition crime, fraud and tax evasion because we are not interested in the group 
behaviour of people in a formal setting. Instead we seek to know whether we may 
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come up with the individualistic foundations of financial crime, because financial 
criminals are committing crime by themselves, for example Leeson, Madoff etc. 
There are other financial crimes such as Enron, Arthur Anderson etc. but even in these 
situations crimes were not planned and executed by the whole organization, the whole 
business, but rather a few CEOs in a group deceived others most of the time.  
Yet, one had better differentiate between organizations with mistakes and 
misdemeanours and organizations with a dedication to crimes.  The principle could be 
focusing on their goals, because criminal organizations have unstated goals along with 
their official, stated goals (Schrager and Short, 1978) and these goals mostly define 
what they really are. 
2.3.1.2. Organized crime 
White-collar-financial criminals may sometimes have connections with organized 
crime because their crimes ―include prostitution, gambling and obscenity and supply 
of illegal drugs and alcohol‖ (Scheb, 1999: 232).  
Violence is usually the distinguishing parameter between organized crime and white-
collar-crime and by simply changing the emphasis from ‗work‘ to ‗crime‘ we switch 
between the definitions of organizational and organized crimes respectively which 
leaves us with ―work as crime‖ Ruggiero (1996) versus ‗crime as work‘. 
When the criminals are still organized but not legally recognized, we name them 
‗organized‘ criminals. This type of crime is not a one-instance crime occurring with 
random frequency but a ―continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit 
from illicit activities that are often in great public demand‖ (Albanese, 2004: 3). 
Organized criminals commit mostly economic and not financial crimes. The most 
`financial` crime they commit is often money laundering and some other illegal 
transfers of money. However the literature on `financial` crime usually focuses on 
these and some other, relatively unimportant, non-white-collar crimes of organized 
criminals as if they were financial criminals. 
Actors of organized crime include ―corrupt business executives, members of the 
professions, public officials, or members of any other occupational group, in addition 
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to the conventional racketeer element‖. (National Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals, 1976: 213). 
2.3.1.3. Political crime 
In general, crime itself is ―highly politicized‖ (Newburn, 2007: 12), but political crime 
to Hagan (2010: 255) is a criminal act, committed for ideological purposes. In this 
sense, financial crime can be political crime at the same time as well.  
Definitions of political crime may seem to be very distinct, even unrelated to the 
discussion of the central theme of financial crime and white collar crime. 
Nevertheless, all the terminology we have discussed up to here reduces to political 
crime in socialist countries. This is why political crime is comparable to white-collar-
financial-crime in our comparative perspective. 
It is possible to categorise political crime according to the central political figure: the 
government. Governments can be either perpetrators or victims of political crimes. As 
a perpetrator, the following crimes can be committed by governments: state crime 
(Doig, 2011), secret policing, human rights violations, patriarchal crime, genocide; 
while as a victim, governments can face the following: protest and dissent, social 
movements, assassination, espionage, political ‗whistle-blowing‘, terrorism (Hagan, 
2010: 259-290).  
Scarcity of publications on both subjects is another similarity between political and 
white-collar-financial crimes. Up to 2010, Hagan (2010: 256) enumerates only twelve 
publications about political crimes. 
2.3.1.4. Cyber crime 
―The relationship between crime and technology is by no means new and that the 
potential for creating harm never seems to be far away from any apparently beneficial 
technological development‖ (Wall, 2007: 12). 
According to Wall (2001) there are four types of cybercrime: cybertrespass, 
cyberdeceptions and thefts, cyberpornography and cyberviolence. Under 
cyberdeceptions and thefts, Wall (2001) lists stealing money or property (e.g.. credit 
card fraud) and intellectual property violations, but such crime can be more severe 
and can affect the whole market because ―[t]he typical picture of frantic trading on the 
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floor of stock exchanges is now becoming outdated, with the rise in electronic trading 
systems, which facilitate global trading. The New York Stock Exchange now handles 
40 per cent of its volume through SuperDOT, its computerized trading system‖ 
(Morrison, 2002: 316) since 2000.  
In fact, after 2010, The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has become obsolete 
because of these electronic trading systems and many banks and financial 
corporations have abandoned the place because the ‗money‘ is indeed the electronic 
money in recent decades and the crime of illegally reaching it must involve 
cybercrime.   
―The advent of e-commerce, which facilitates almost instantaneous securities 
transactions around the globe, benefits investors, but is also vulnerable to market 
abuse‖ (Morrison, 2002: 317).  
Figure 2.4 shows how intangible the money has become, ultimately making it possible 
for it to be processed by electronic means only. Even some entities such as the OECD 
(2002), have written about networks as markets or vice versa, markets as networks in 
the new era of electronic money. 
Obviously, in such a world, computer illiterate people, usually blue-collar, or 
computer literates with no access to certain IT facilities of finance, will have no or 
considerably less opportunity of committing financial crimes and thus building a more 
advanced, derived form of white-collar crime, probably ‗gold-collar‘ crime. One of 
the main reasons is the level of abstraction in financial markets and instruments as 
shown in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: Growing Abstraction of Market Instruments 
 
Source: Global Electronic Finance (in OECD, 2002) 
 
Nevertheless, scrutinizing financial crime with a focus on electronics and information 
technology perspectives would produce more technical results and not be appropriate 
for a political economy research project.  
2.3.1.5. Economic crime 
Economic crime is not a specific crime but a criminological term to name a category 
of crimes, which includes not only both commercial and financial crimes but white-
collar and working-class (or blue-collar) crimes as well. In this sense we may argue 
that the financial white collar crime that we study in this research is part of economic 
crime because financial markets benefit from derivative markets of the economy and 
they belong to the economic sphere. 
It should be noted that trading crime, money laundering, drug trafficking, selling 
to/buying from under-aged children, environmental crimes, labour crimes etc., while 
being distinctive in nature, can be listed under economic crime. 
The literature indicates that there are misconceptions and misunderstandings about 
economic crime. The term is, for instance, used in place of white collar and corporate 
crime most of the time. For instance, Sjögren and Skogh (2004: 1) define it as a 
―crime[,] committed to gain profit within an otherwise legitimate business‖. This is 
the exact definition of corporate (business) crime but the macro nature of the term 
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suggests something more general then this. Using this term as a synonym of corporate 
crime causes confusion, terminological contamination and inability to name all 
encompassing ‗economic‘ crimes.  
Sjögren and Skogh (2004: 1) use ―illegal pollution, brand name infringement and tax 
evasion‖ as examples of economic crime. Price Waterhouse Coopers, on the other 
hand, correctly lists a mixture of crimes from organized crime to occupational crime 
as well as financial and corporate crimes under the same term: ―asset 
misappropriation; accounting fraud; bribery and corruption; IP infringement; money 
laundering; tax fraud; illegal insider trading; market fraud involving cartels; colluding 
and fixing prices; and [industrial] espionage‖ are listed under the title ‘economic 
crimes‘ (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009: 3). 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Relative Weights of Some of the White Collar Crimes  
 
Note: IP denotes ‗intellectual property‘ 
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers (2009) 
 
 
 
37 
 
2.3.1.6. Commercial crime 
Commercial crime is a narrower term than economic crime (Tiryaki and Gursoy, 
2004: 54) and like other definitions of economic crimes, it ―can be categorized 
according to the interests, benefits it aims to protect‖ (Tiryaki and Gursoy, 2004: 54).  
Because of such crimes, suretyship has existed since thousands of years ago in 
markets of various kinds. In financial markets, surety bonds in the 1900s and fidelity 
bonds during the industrial revolution have been the by-products of such crimes in the 
market (Marmor et al, 2005: 2). Cheng (2011: 1) counts tax evasion under 
commercial crimes, which may cause some confusion in the literature but obviously 
many of the financial crimes are commercial as well. 
2.3.1.7. Professional (occupational) crime 
Occupational crime refers to ―violations that are committed for self-benefit during the 
course of a legitimate occupation‖ (Hagan, 2010: 251) and ―to the criminal behaviours 
of persons within their occupational status‖ (Clinard and Quinney, 1973). 
Such offenders ―are frequently committing crime, not taking the law seriously and 
ethically not condemning their colloquies. They are recidivists but only few of them 
are prosecuted‖ (Sutherland, l956: 93-95).  
It should be observed that there are relationships between particular types of 
crime and some occupations offer greater opportunity and temptation to 
crime than others. Thus, embezzlement is found very commonly among 
cashiers and other thefts among clerks and truckers who have access to goods 
and money. ... An occupation does not directly cause criminality, of course, 
but whether a vulnerable person will succumb depends in considerable part 
upon his opportunities rather than upon his motives alone. (Tappan, 1960: 
214) 
 
White-collar-criminals, thus, are responsible for most of the professional 
(occupational) crimes (PWC, 2009). Abercrombie et al. (2006) agree that white-collar 
employees are the ones that commit occupational crime at work 
Newburn (2007: 376) distinguishes occupational and corporate crimes very simply 
by calling the former as ―crimes by people within corporation‖ and the latter as 
―crimes by corporations‖. Keeping in mind the unrealistic `culprit-organizations` idea 
with no real body to suffer, pay or be sorry, one may argue that Newburn‘s (2007) 
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supposedly distinct definitions are indeed identical. However, if we simply focus our 
attention on the semantics of the words used, we can make the distinction easier. If 
there are two employees/employers, one working in a non-profit organization or 
government and the other working in a for-profit organization like a corporation, we 
could label the former as a ‗professional criminal‘ while labelling the other ‗corporate 
criminal‘ when they commit crime. By the way, we had better notify here that we 
could use ‗professional crime‘ for both of the situations when we do not bother with 
the non-profit or for-profit division of the crimes. 
Hagan (2010: 305), on the other hand, argues that ―occupational and corporate crimes, 
together forms white-collar crime‖. He gives the examples of pilfering and fiddling 
expenses. His definition is in conflict with Sutherland‘s (1940) definition. Besides, the 
literature is in consensus that ‗white collar criminals are not unemployed‘. If this 
premise is correct, Abercrombie‘s and Hagan‘s definitions are tantamount to saying 
that white collar crime is equivalent to occupational crime. Moreover, from a 
pragmatic perspective, it is reasonable to say that when thinking about offending we 
―must cast our gaze upwards‖ (Punch, 1996: 1). 
Considering an offender as a dynamic agent may help us differentiate the economic 
crime related terms. If an offender changes his occupation from ‗blue collar job A‘ to 
‗white collar job B‘ and commits crimes in both, we accept these crimes as 
occupational crimes because being a manager is an occupation as well but only the 
second crime becomes a white collar crime, because of the affluent position of the 
perpetrator. Similarly, only if the second job B is offered by a for-profit organization 
can we call the crime committed at the latter job a ‗corporate crime‘. And if the 
second criminal goes to a meeting to represent his/her corporation to fix the price of 
certain goods in the market, then we can call the second crime an organized crime.  
From the point of view of the ‗institutionalization` of crimes, we may identify the 
differences in some economic crimes better. If, for instance, a crime is committed in a 
capitalist or mixed economic system, and the perpetrator is a white collar worker, 
employed by a corporation, then the crime is a corporate crime while the same crime 
would be named as an organizational or political crime in a socialist system.  
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This study prefers to use Sutherland‘s terminology here because it is suitable to 
assume that the more we climb higher up in the corporation, the more we come up 
with people who represent the corporation better.  
Despite our efforts at theoretical clarification, ―in practice, distinctions between 
corporate or white-collar crime and other forms of offending are themselves far from 
clear, and point to general attributes rather than specific differences‖ (Newburn, 
2007: 377, emphasis added).  
2.3.1.8. Labour Crimes 
Corporations are run by labour and most of the people in any given society are 
employed. One of the main reasons for labour violations is to minimize the costs in 
market economies, but in socialist economies labour or the wage that stands for it are 
the whole thing the economy runs on and thus make the only financial crime possible 
in a socialist system.  
In market economies as well, wages are the most costly cost of production and 
corporations try hard to curb them down sometimes with no caution or care. Indeed 
there is more to that explanation because discrimination, unfair treatments, sexual 
harassment, firing without a proper cause and the like are harder to explain by profit 
motivation, but this portion of the subject is beyond our scope. 
Among the kinds of crimes perpetrated by corporations against employees are pretty 
bloody ones (see: Frank, 1985). Berman warns that the real picture of corporate labour 
crimes could be more sorrowful because ―[c]ompanies‘ insurance ratings are based on 
injuries, illnesses and deaths in the workplace and this fact gives incentives to 
corporations to cover up their violations which make it harder to expose them‖ 
(Berman, 1978: 108). 
Although researchers report huge percentages and numbers of labour violations in 
capitalist countries, it would not be wrong to argue that in an economic system that 
relies solely on labour, one would expect many financial crimes to be either 
committed by or through labour or through wage manipulations.  
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2.3.1.9. Corporate (Business) Crime 
 
“The best way to rob a bank is to own one”  
William Crawford,  
California Savings and Loan Commissioner
12
 
Albanese (1995) and Hagan (2010) categorize corporate crime as a subordinate term 
to white collar crime. Focusing on the behavioural nature of the concept, corporate 
crime can be defined as ―dangerous or unjust actions in the conduct of business 
prompted by the desire for profits‖ (Albanese, 1995: 108). In an institutional sense, it 
is ―a type of organizational crime committed in free enterprise economies and thus 
involves criminal activity on behalf of and for the benefit of a private business or 
corporation‖ (Hagan, 2010: 226). 
It is mostly unnoticed that corporations cause a lot of damage to societies as well as 
the benefits they bring. ―Business has a dirty side. On those occasions when the veil 
of corporate respectability and probity is lifted, we are able to witness a world where 
managers lie, cheat, manipulate, dissemble, and deceive‖ (Punch, 1996:1). The 
damage done by corporations is the operating ground of corporate crime researchers. 
Clinard and Yeager (1980) conducted the most comprehensive research on corporate 
crimes, working on corporate crimes charged against 447 of the largest US 
manufacturing firms. They found that 60% of the corporations were convicted and 
42% were recidivists (Clinard and Yeager, 1980: 116). Similarly, according to 
Calavita et al. (1997: 156–157), from October 1, 1988, to March 18, 1992, ―more than 
1,000 defendants had been charged by U.S. attorneys, in major S and L cases. Of 
those 580 had been sentenced, 451 (78%) to prison‖. So, we may argue that decades 
after Sutherland, corporate crime was still pervasive. 
Corporate crime takes many forms, including ―price fixing, kickbacks, commercial 
bribery, tax violations, fraud against government‖ (Blankenship. 1995), deceptive 
advertising, environmental law violations, health care fraud, securities fraud 
―infringement of copyright, unfair competition, unfair labour practices‖ (Abercrombie 
et al., 2006: 455), obtaining property by false pretences etc. 
                                                 
12
Quoted in Pizzo et al. (1989: 318). 
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Organized crime, on the other hand, can be grouped in various different ways but 
Albanese (2003: 108) presents a succinct one: ―administrative, environmental, labour 
and manufacturing violations, and unfair trade practices‖.  
Since corporate crime is so pervasive (Sutherland, 1956; Clinard and Yeager, 1980), 
―[a]ll the other forms of criminal behavior together do not equal the costs of 
occupational and organizational (corporate) crime‖ (Hagan, 2010: 251). Compared to 
their huge, harmful impact, corporate crimes are very superficially enforced and 
punished in minuscule proportions if punished at all. 
Despite growing public pressure for more severe treatment of higher 
occupational and corporate offenders, the likelihood of prosecution and 
conviction remains rare. When offenders are convicted, the penalties remain 
rather minuscule, considering particularly the economic loss to society. High 
recidivism rates among such criminals continue. (Hagan, 2010: 226) 
Thus, in many ways, corporate criminals are invisible in almost all economic and 
financial systems but only in capitalist economies it is wise to use the adjective 
‗corporate‘ before the crime types that occur in corporate settings, because using 
corporate crime as the base term is not appropriate in a comparative study which 
includes socialism, because socialism accepts no corporation in the sense of the 
Western World. In capitalist societies such crimes may always appear in. political 
settings (i.e. state-corporate crime (Michalowski and Kramer, 2006) or be committed 
by, for example, individual offenders too. 
2.3.1.10. Financial crime 
After the preceding discussions on the types of financial crimes, we may conclude 
that financial crimes can be committed in many contexts and structures and by many 
different types of offenders but the nature of the crime, that is its involvement with 
finance, investment etc. allows us to combine and analyse them under a single title: 
financial crime.  
Of course there are white-collar and non-white-collar financial crimes but we focus on 
white-collar financial crimes only in our study, which may appear in corporate 
settings (as discussed specifically under ‗corporate financial crimes‘), political 
settings (as discussed under ‗political crime‘) and by white-collar individuals (as 
discussed under ‗occupational crime‘). We refer to these different types of white-
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collar criminals as the three main perpetrators of financial crimes in three main 
environmental settings, that is, political, organizational and individual or social 
settings. 
2.3.2. Scope of Our Study: „White-Collar‟ Financial Crime 
 ―Now a very great man once said that some people 
rob you with a fountain pen‖  Bob Dylan, 
Talking  New York, 1962 
The prior section on precisely defining financial white collar crime and spotting its 
position in the literature is not unnecessary as it secures a correct conveyance of the 
terminology, an important problem in social sciences (Reynolds, 2006). This research 
tries to go beyond the restricting ‗dictionary definitions‘ and get closer to universal, 
‗real definitions‘ (Reynolds, 2006) that are missing (Hagan, 1989) in this field, despite 
the fact that ―the most important feature of any scientific term, used to indicate a 
concept, is the degree of agreement about its meaning, agreement about the nature of 
the concept‖ (Raynolds, 2006: 48) especially in a study which spans radically 
different ideologies such as Capitalism, Socialism and Islam. 
Unlike many ‗concrete‘13 definitions of the ‗crime‘ and related terms in Eurocentric 
literature, ‗abstract definitions‘14 (Raynolds, 2006) were produced by this research in 
order to accommodate diverse viewpoints in the same scientific study. Realising that 
‗crime‘ is an ‗abstract‘ concept, one could easily spot the consequences of using 
‗concrete definitions‘ (Raynolds, 2006) of it.   
Hence, one needs to be prepared for the hardship of the upcoming chapters by careful, 
real, abstract definitions. Let us now turn our attention to the inner circles of white 
collar crime from its outer circles and make distinctions between the ‗financial crime‘ 
and other subordinate terminology of WCC. 
The term ‗white-collar crime‘ (WCC), as mentioned, was first introduced to the 
literature by Sutherland in 1939 in his presidential address to the American 
Sociological Society (ASS) meeting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, but before him, 
there had been some awareness about crime in business: for example by Veblen in 
                                                 
13
 Referring to their limited applicability over time or place (Raynolds, 2006) such as all legal, 
biological, social, psychological etc. definitions of crime and relevant terminology. 
14
 Or ―universally applicable‖ (Popper, 1957). Popper uses the word ‗universal‘ to refer to ―abstract 
concepts or statements‖ (Raynolds, 2006: 49).. 
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1912.  
According to Sutherland, white-collar crime is ―a crime committed by a person of 
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation‖ (Sutherland, 
1949: 9). Narrower and clearer definitions were possible and were not out of the reach 
of Sutherland but he purposefully preferred to use broad and all-encompassing 
definitions for WCC. 
Salinger (2005) criticizes this approach and prefers very specific definitions for WCC. 
He blames unclear definitions and claims that offenders do not identify themselves as 
criminals because of vague definitions. His definition of WCC is (Salinger, 2005: viii, 
emphasis added):  
Any behavior that occurs in a corporate and/or individual occupational 
context; and, that is committed for personal and/or corporate gain; and/or, 
violates the trust associated with that individual‘s and/or corporation‘s 
position and/or status; and that is a violation of any criminal law, civil law, 
administrative law, rule, ruling, norm, or regulation condemning the 
behavior.  
Thus, Salinger (2005) does not include the social status of the offender in the 
definition. But Sutherland (1949) does, who is also aware that lower status people 
could commit white collar crime (Sutherland, 1940: 51) but this is an insignificant 
factor to him. Salinger (2005: ix) agrees that ―given the diversity of the behaviors that 
have come to be described as white-collar and corporate crime, it is difficult to create 
a succinct definition without necessarily excluding some of the tangential 
behaviours‖. Therefore, this study accepts Sutherland‘s definition of white collar 
crime as ―crime in relation to business‖ (Sutherland, 1956: 78). 
Apart from his definition of WCC, Sutherland‘s studies on the same subject area 
launched vocal discussions among academia as well. Eventually a plethora of 
definitions began to emerge in the literature, stemming from the idea of ‗white collar 
crime‘ and making it an umbrella term, covering all others beneath it.  
Among these definitions are; ‗corporate corruption‘ and ‗abuse of corporate power‘ 
(Clinard, 1990), ‗crimes of the powerful‘ (Pearce, 1976), ‘organisational deviance‘ 
(Punch, 1996), ‘occupational crime‘ (Quinney, 1977), ‘business crime‘ (Clarke, 
1990), ‗elite crime‘, ‗abuse of occupational trust‘ (Shapiro. 1990), ‗state-corporate 
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crime‘ (Michalowski and Kramer, 2006), ‗corporate crime‘ (Clinard and Quinney, 
1986), ‗avocational crime‘ (Geis, 1974), ‗economic crime‘ (American Bar 
Association, 1976), ‗elite deviance‘ (Simon, 1999), ‗the criminal elite‘ (Coleman, 
1994), ‗occupational crime‘ (Clinard and Quinney, 1986; G. Green, 1990), 
‗organizations crime‘ (Schrager and Short, 1978), ‗professional crime‘ (Clinard and 
Quinney, 1986), ‗upperworld crime‘ (Geis, 1974).15 
There are various categorizations of white collar crime as well. Croall (2001) provides 
the following one: theft at work, fraud, corruption, employment offences, consumer 
offences, food offences, environmental crime. Michalowski and Kramer (2006) add 
‗state-corporate crime‘ to this list which could include ‗state crime‘ as well. 
Overabundance of terminological variations and numerous categorisations after 
Sutherland is a proof of his success. He has affected criminological thought probably 
more than any other scholar. He has been the pioneer of sociological theories of 
criminology as well.  
Recognizing his overreaching success, Volk (1977: 13) portrays Sutherland‘s effect as 
comparable to the Copernican revolution in sciences and Mannheim (1965) believed 
that if there were a Nobel Prize in criminology, Sutherland would deserve one for his 
efforts. He caused a ―paradigm revolution‖ (Kuhn, 1962) because he shifted the 
pendulum from deprived, poor, working-class crime studies to ‗rich and poor‘, ‗upper 
and lower classes‘ bilateral studies. 
It should, however, be noted that the phrase ‗white collar‘ was not invented by 
Sutherland. He used an existing term from business. It ‖is used in the sense in which it 
was used by President Sloan of General Motors, who wrote a book entitled The 
Autobiography of a White Collar Worker‖ (Sutherland, 1956: 79). And this term has 
not been chosen ―for definitive reasons but for convenience‖ and ―merely to call 
attention to crimes which are not ordinarily included within the scope of criminology‖ 
(Sutherland, 1983: 9). 
Further, in spite of the alleged shortcomings of the term ‗white collar crime‘ it ―is 
shared and understood by ordinary folk as more meaningful than occupational crime, 
                                                 
15
See also: Albanese (1995); Blankenship (1995); Friedrichs (1995); Jamieson (1995); Schlegel and 
Weisburd (1992). 
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corporate deviance, commercial offenses, economic crime or any competing concept‖ 
(Braithwaite, 1985:3).  
Sutherland‘s definition has been broadened by later researchers and other middle-
class crimes have been included in it by e.g. Edelhertz and Overcast (1982). This 
attempt has overridden the emphasis of Sutherland on the ‗status‟ of the delinquent, 
although it was not necessary (Geis, 2007) because lower and middle class crimes 
were already represented and enforced enough by governments and scholars but the 
upper class crimes were not. Between these positions at extreme ends, there are others 
like Nelken`s (1994), who argues that the status of the offender is partially important. 
Friedrichs (2007: 165) gives a better reason why we don‘t need a certain, concrete 
definition. ―[T]he term white-collar crime is best treated as a heuristic term, to which 
various specific forms of illegal and harmful activity are best viewed as cognate, 
hybrid, or marginal forms of white collar crime‖.  
As regards the nature of white collar criminals, they are usually employed and the 
crimes they commit are related to their profession, but the real distinction is that non-
white collar people don't have the means (like knowledge, money) and the proper 
environment (like position) and certain professions to commit such crimes. One can 
argue that non-white collar crimes are easily committable by an average person but 
not white collar offenses, because of the lack of opportunity and ability. 
The opportunity to commit white-collar crimes is often determined by one's position 
in society. One cannot embezzle funds without first holding a position of financial 
trust, nor can one commit regulatory offenses without holding a particular position in 
business or industry. Thus, access to financial or governmental or institutional 
resources provides the opportunity to commit white-collar offences. 
Street crimes are characterized by the use of force or stealth, which is 
required for homicide, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, or arson. In 
contrast, white-collar crimes are characterized by planning and deceit. 
Planning and deceit are required for successful conspiracy, fraud, extortion, 
embezzlement, forgery, or regulatory offenses. (Albanese 2003: 105, 
emphasis added). 
As for the ‘stereotype‘ of white collar criminal, it is hard to give a definitive 
prescription because there are conflicting ideas: ―advantaged older men from stable 
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homes living in well-kept communities‖ (Weisburd et al. 1991: 47) and ‗relatively 
junior employees‘ (Levi, 1988). Newburn (2007), however, agrees with the first 
stereotype and refuses the second by explaining why it is not the correct picture of 
junior employees: ―in part because they enjoy less protection as a result of their social 
status, but also because their offending behaviour is often easier to investigate -
crudely, their frauds are ‗simpler‘ (Newburn, 2007: 388). We may add the implicit 
hierarchical forcing of junior employees to conduct crime by seniors but not vice 
versa. Leeson, a famous white collar criminal, employed by Barings Bank of England, 
confessed to the existence of such an effect on him (Curtis and INPUT, 1997).  
Assuming that both stereotypes are correct, we may solve the conflict by saying that, 
among white collar criminals, there is more than one level of high status and the lower 
ones are more similar to conventional stereotypes of criminals. They are more visible 
than the upper level and are less protected, less guarded. Thus, they are easier to 
criminalize than white collar criminals but harder than petty criminals. 
In stereotyping, it is observed that white-collar criminals are predominantly male, 
generally rich, employed, clever, successful people living in the heart of the cities 
with no significant biological, psychological, neurological, social disorder.  
 
As for the offenders, Sutherland focused on business managers and executives but 
also accepted that people from lower classes can commit white collar crimes, but they 
are exceptions and can be undermined for practical purposes (Sutherland, 1940: 51). 
Despite the fact that he did not discussthe judicial, artificial personality of 
corporations in his writings, ―in research, he included corporations as offenders as 
well‖ (Salinger, 2005: vii).  
In his landmark research, Sutherland could not use the crime statistics of government 
because higher strata of the society were not presented in the statistics. Thus he 
conducted his own research in 1949 on 70 large US corporations over 40 years and 
consulted independent commissions‘ investigations, courts and regulatory agencies. 
Sutherland (1949) found that crimes of business executives and organizational crimes 
of corporations as legal entities were not only valid but pervasive.  To be specific, 
―every one violated at least one law and had an adverse decision made against it for 
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false advertising, patent abuse, wartime trade violations, price fixing, fraud, or 
intended manufacturing and sale of faulty goods. Many of these corporations were 
recidivists with an average of roughly eight adverse decisions issued for each.‖ 
(Hagan, 2010: 201). So, white collar criminals were not only committing crime but 
were recidivists, incorrigibles. 
Although widely appreciated and celebrated by the criminology literature, there exist 
criticisms made against Sutherland‘s studies, particularly on his definition of white 
collar crime, which include Nelken, (2007), Levi (1988), Slapper and Tombs (1999), 
Salinger (2005), Clinard (1990). 
One of the most important critics of WCC was Tappan, but like others, he was not 
criticising the importance or relevance of the definition of WCC either. Rather he was 
criticising the vagueness of the term. This aspect of Tappan‘s views is not appreciated 
enough in the literature. He has been introduced as if he was against the ideas of 
Sutherland; however he once said:  
The important criminals, those who do irreparable damage with impunity, 
deftly evade the machinery of justice, it is maintained, either by remaining 
technically within the law, or by exercising their intelligence, financial 
prowess, or political connections. In seeking definitions of WCC, one finds 
a rather remarkable diversity, but characteristically the definitions are loose 
and sometimes doctrinaire. (Tappan, 1960) 
The adjectives used by Tappan are not restricted to being loose and doctrinaire, while 
criticizing the inadequate definition of crime he uses some vocabulary like ‘not 
consistent‘16 and states that the interpreters of Sutherland are in confusion (Tappan, 
1960). His criticism may be misunderstood and, being aware of this possibility, he 
himself stated that: ―since there has been some misconstruction of [my] view in 
literature on the subject, that [I] believe white collar crime, properly and precisely 
defined, to be not only a legitimate but an important phase of criminological inquiry‖ 
                                                 
16
 Tappan refers to the following publications for inconsistency: Edwin H. Sutherland ―White Collar 
Criminality‖, American Sociological Review, vol. 5, pp. 1-12, 1940; ―Is White Collar Crime Crime?‖ 
Am. Sociological Review, vol. 10, pp. 132-139, 1945; ―Crime of Corporations‖ in Cohen, Lindesmith, 
and Schuessler (ed.s), The Sutherland Papers, pp. 78-99, 1956; White Collar Crime, 1949 and Marshall 
B. Clinard‘s, ―Criminological Theories of Violation of Wartime Regulations‖, American Sociological 
Review, vol. 11, pp. 258-270, 1946; The Black Market, 1952; 
Frank E. Hartung‘s, ―White-collar offenses in the Wholesale Meat Industry in Detroit‖, American 
Journal of Sociology, vol 56, pp. 25-35, 1950 and Walton Hamilton and Irene Till‘s, ―Antitrust in 
Action‖, TNEC Monography No: 16, 1941, reprinted in part in Kenneth Culp Davis, Cases on 
Administrative Law, 1951, pp. 37-48. 
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(Tappan, 1960: 7). 
Tappan (1960) could be right in this criticism but one cannot expect a very recently 
defined term to have matured in a very short while in a few decades. On the other 
hand, this kind of criticism could be diverted to almost every term in the literature, 
because for every argument a counter-argument can be found and therefore criticisms 
of the precision of definitions are easy to contest and refute. 
2.3.2.1 Characteristics of WCC 
It should be stated that there are a lot of academic and practical difficulties concerning 
white collar crime and crime fighting, such as its invisibility in the literature, in law 
enforcement institutionalization and crime statistics. Since these difficulties are 
intimately related to similar concepts, in our case corporate and financial crimes, we 
can deduce that these difficulties are inherent to them.  
First one may argue a definitional immaturity of white collar crime because of its 
multifaceted nature (Benson, 2012). Secondly, tolerance and leniency exist 
towards white collar crime ―among officials of the subtler and more complicated 
offenses they commit than of ordinary theft or burglary, for example, and there is 
a greater likelihood of ‗getting away with it‘ (Tappan, 1960). 
Invisibility and leniency are very big problems that prevent the enforcement of these 
offences. Again, this is important for this study, because attributes of WCCs are 
inherent to financial criminals too, as  
White collar crime sanctums such as corporate board-rooms are generally 
impervious to first hand observation; even the Mafia (whatever that group 
is) seems to abide more by the spirit of the Freedom of Information Act than 
does the corporate world. Nobody is tapping the telephone at General 
Motors and making the transcripts available to a prurient public. And neither 
the FBI nor the CIA is employing undercover agents to infiltrate the 
Chrysler Corporation of Alcoa to discover what alleged conspiracies are 
being hatched in violation of the criminal law. (Geis and Meier, 1977: 3)  
Thirdly, scarcity of information is another problem with white collar crime. Since 
these facts about WCC make the information flow scarce, ―[t]he information on 
white-collar crime that becomes available to social scientists from congressional 
committee investigations or court cases tend to be fragmentary and rather 
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impressionistic in regard to fine points of criminological theorizing‖. (Geis and Meier, 
1977: 3). 
Fourthly, financial crimes are serious crimes. Just to give an impression of the relative 
importance of white collar crimes, we may compare two major incidents from both 
sides, white collar and non-white collar:  
[T]he cost of the Savings and Loan scandal of the l980s was estimated at 
$500 billion, while the celebrated Great Brinks Robbery netted only $2 
million. The latter is much better known and has received more publicity than 
the former, even though 250.000 Brinks robberies would be required to equal 
the cost of bailing out the S and L‘s. (Hagan 2010, 248) 
2.3.3. The Context of White-Collar Financial Crimes 
Financial crimes are among the terms that are ―uniquely defined as white-collar 
crimes, like antitrust violations, bid rigging, price fixing, money laundering, insider 
trading, tax fraud" (Scheb, 1999: 232) and have received increased attention in the last 
decade (Europol, 2006; Gilinskiy, 2006). 
It is hard not to agree with Scheb (1999) on the financial crimes‘ representation in the 
white collar crime make-up. Financial crime properly represents WCC as a term 
denoting capital power abuse by high status people. Additionally, WCCs are best 
represented by financial crimes in the prior discussions of ‗leniency‘, ‗invisibility‘, 
‗pervasiveness‘ and ‗seriousness‘. 
After these clarifications, the aim of this study should be clearer; as this study is 
referring to financial crime it implies ‗financial‟ crimes and we limit our scope by 
excluding all the financial crimes that do not fall into the category of white-collar 
crime.  
It should be noted that there are many categorization attempts in the literature on 
white-collar, corporate, financial etc. crimes. Some of them are published by Bloch 
and Geis (1962), Hale et al. (2005), Albanese (2003), Newburn (2007), Edelhertz 
(1970) and Hagan (2010), but we prefer using an original categorization which is, 
unlike almost all alternatives, not prepared for a clear organization of all possible 
variations of the term under a manageable number of categories. Rather, this research 
categorizes them under three different scopes, ranging from micro-scale to macro-
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scale. In this way, one can address the distinguishing features and covariance between 
micro and macro scale concepts, definitions and theories. 
Since many crime theories utilize the fundamental research findings of mainly 
psychology, sociology, politics, economics and business, this study argues that the 
categorization of the crimes studied in this research should be distinguished by the 
parameters which differentiate deviance under FWCC (financial white collar crime). 
This parameter is the number of interacting and conscious individuals. The nature of 
one, single individual‘s deviance is considerably different than the group of 
interacting, conscious, organized individuals who commit the same crime and these 
two are different from the big crowds who have a higher consciousness such as being 
a member of the society, race, religion etc.   
Within this framework, we see FWCC committed mainly by only three categories of 
offenders: individuals, groups (or organized groups) and crowds (or public, or 
organized crowds such as states, countries etc.). One by one, we consider these agents 
as both perpetrators and victims of FWCC and exemplify them. 
Because the ‗new perspective‘ of financial crimes ―is obtained by viewing the 
corporation as an entity participating in financial markets, i.e., as an active, strategic 
trader manipulating the market to its shareholders' advantage‖ but ―the corporation is 
also viewed as taking certain actions to prevent its shares from being manipulated by 
others‖ (Cherian et al. January 01, 1993: 200).  
When we delve into the details of our comparative study, it will be appreciated that 
analyzing the offenders of FWCC in such a way is not unnecessary because of the aim 
of accommodating many extreme cases. 
We are aware that group behaviour and thus group deviance is different than 
individual behaviour and individual deviance. Similarly, societal behaviour and crowd 
deviance is very much related to culture, anthropology, belief system, geography and 
many other parameters. All the same, we tried to give some extra explanations for the 
varying behaviours from the standard behaviour we formulated for the individual.  
Below, all possible agents of financial crimes are grouped in three main clusters of 
individuals, organizations and public for each one of the crimes intended to be studied 
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in this research. 
Figures in this part of the text depict the FWCC along with possible offenders and 
victims of different volumes and kinds. The same depiction is presented for all the 
financial crime types we include in our study, namely, fraud, speculation, 
manipulation, tax evasion and competition crimes. Beneath them are the examples for 
the depictions. 
2.3.3.1. Fraud 
As Figure 2.6 shows, fraud as a FWCC occurs in various levels from the most micro-
level to the most macro-levels. One can give the ‗individual‟ as a would be FWC 
Criminal at the most micro-level, different size of organizations at the average-level 
and societies, states at the most macro-level would be offenders.  
 
Figure 2.6: Possible Offenders and Victims of Fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since all of these would-be-offenders have significantly different characteristics 
specific to their own level, distinguishing them and putting them into different 
categories are critically important. In this way, one can isolate a specific level (in this 
research the individual at micro level) in order to conduct ‗scientific17‟ research on it 
before researching other parts and their relations. 
                                                 
17
 As is well known in scientific research, it is crutial to control the effects of the unobserved 
phenomena on the observed one. In this research the effects of the organization and the society on the 
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Let us now exemplify different kinds of ‗fraud‘ as FWCC that occur at and in between 
different levels of analysis or scopes. For instance Ponzi schemes may occur at 
individual level, the most micro-level, while one person is financially deceiving 
another for an illegal financial gain. 
(i) Ponzi Schemes  
(ii) Nick Leeson of Barings Bank 
(iii) John Perkins‘ (2004) Accusations 
(iv) Enron 
(v) Arthur Andersen 
(vi) Alleged US dollar forging and use by Iran  (Independent, 03 July 1992) 
 
2.3.3.2. Speculation 
For instance high-net-worth individuals may speculate against each other (1) at 
individual level or corporations at organization level (2) for financial gains that are 
considered to be something bad in Western societies and incriminating in some others. 
 
Figure 2.7: Possible Offenders and Victims of Speculation 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(i) High-net-worth individuals speculate against each other; 
                                                                                                                                            
individual are observed and analyzed separately at different levels and their relations are formed as a 
grounded theory. 
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(ii) High-net-worth individuals speculate against corporations; 
(iii) This is a common practice of individuals such as day-traders who invest in the 
derivatives based on the whole index, sometimes for minutes only; 
(iv) This is the daily practice of almost all investment funds such as shorting; 
(v) Corporations which have short and very short term government bonds in their 
portfolios or the ones which use Internet search engine based, automatic, 
instantaneous investments; 
(vi) i.e. governments speculating about other governments‘ bonds. 
 
2.3.3.3. Manipulation   
For instance high-net-worth individuals may manipulate against each other (1) at 
individual level or corporations at organization level (2) for financial gains that are 
considered to be unlawful in almost all societies. 
 
Figure 2.8: Possible Offenders and Victims of Manipulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(i) High-net-worth individuals can manipulate some of the assets against each 
other; 
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(ii) High-net-worth individuals can manipulate against the corporations i.e. they 
want to buy; 
(iii) i.e. Nick Leeson against Nikkei Index; 
(iv) This is a normal practice of manipulation in the stock market against certain 
corporations; 
(v) Some corporations, banks can manipulate considerably weaker currencies; 
(vi) Governments or big banks can manipulate the bonds of some municipalities. 
 
2.3.3.4. Tax Evasion 
It is not possible for individuals to evade tax from each other (1) at the most-micro 
level or from corporations at the average level (2). Likewise, corporations cannot 
evade tax from corporations (4) but they can evade tax from governments (5). Let us 
now exemplify possible offenders and victims of tax evasion as a FWCC. 
 
Figure 2.9: Possible Offenders and Victims of Tax Evasion 
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(i)  A:  The most common way of tax evasion by individuals against the public;                      
      B:  Printing more than enough money and creating inflation is unfair taxing of 
individuals and criminogenic; 
(ii) A:  The most common way of tax evasion by corporations against the public         
B:  Printing more than enough money and creating inflation is unfair taxing of    
corporations and criminogenic; 
(iii) By means of tax havens, governments usually allow other governments‘ citizens 
to deposit funds that are saved from the tax money. 
 
2.3.3.5. Competition Crimes 
Figure 2.10: Possible Offenders and Victims of Competition Crimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antitrust violations can occur in all the micro and macro levels, some of which are 
exemplified below: 
(i) Individuals may singlehandedly monopolize some smaller, local markets against 
other individuals; 
(ii) Relatively richer individuals may monopolize some small markets against 
corporations; 
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(iii) Some high-net-worth-individuals may monopolize the whole national market of 
some specific industries in developing countries; 
(iv) This is the most common form of competition crime. Corporations may for 
instance discriminate in prices or wage price wars by dumping the prices of the 
goods and services they sell, in order to prevent market entry of newcomers; 
(v) Indeed in all actualized dense markets are committed crimes against the public; 
(vi) For instance some countries subsidize some firms of great reputation and income 
in order to protect them against rival corporations in other countries. e.g.. Boeing 
and Airbus. 
 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we: defined crime, after listing all the possible approaches to defining 
crime, and put the term ‗financial crime‘ into its greater context, under white crime 
criminality, and eliminated the terminological misconceptions and misunderstandings. 
As for the definitions of crime, in general (legally) financial systems are not in 
consensus; however they are almost in complete consensus from the point of view of 
Sutherland‘s socio-legal definition of crime, about the definitions of financial crimes 
we study. In all three financial systems, and the representative countries of these 
systems, speculation, manipulation, monopoly and other competition crimes, tax 
evasion and fraud are defined as crimes.  Therefore, conducting a comparative 
scholarly study on financial crimes between market economies, socialist economies 
and Islamic economies is feasible, do-able and necessary. 
This chapter aimed to establish a better consensus on the definitions that are used in 
this study. Assuming that this aim has been fulfilled, we may now move on to clarify 
the position and perspective of this research in criminological theories 
57 
 
Chapter 3  
 
THEORIES IN CRIMINOLOGY AND FINANCIAL 
CRIMES IN ECONOMIC REGIMES: A SURVEY 
  
 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
After identifying the conceptual definitions in Chapter 2, this chapter aims to provide 
a review of the criminological theories in three categories in accordance with their 
usefulness to explain financial white collar crime. In this attempt, these theoretical 
models are expanded to include alternative ontological and epistemological 
understandings of criminology by referring to socialism and Islamic views. To have 
less confusion and a clearer comparison of the Eurocentric theories and the alternative 
paradigms, the conceptual definitions provided in the previous chapter are expected to 
be useful. 
It should be noted at the beginning that criminology is a very rich discipline in terms 
of its theoretical foundations with its history of being a 200-years-old (sub)discipline 
(Hale et al., 2005: 86). There are numerous different theories that are applicable to 
various kinds of crimes that are committed in various environments by various 
culprits. It should be noted that usually, criminology and criminal justice text books 
begin their academic journeys with the classical school of criminological thought. 
However, chronologically religious ideology and criminological thought, although 
criticized, precedes all other criminological theories. Through a critical reflection, 
needless to say that religious dogma is not science and its principles are not scientific 
theories: they are claimed to be the ultimate rules of the societies in the first place. 
However, in the era of postmodernism, we cannot also claim that all of the principles 
they laid down were false solely because of their origin. A sensible and sensitive 
approach would be to say that they ‗may‘ have sound principles. 
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After a quick reminder of the intermediary role religion played between the 
crime/criminal and penology/punishment, we may proceed to providing reasons as to 
why criminological theories, other than rational choice theory, are not going to be 
utilised in this study focused on financial crime.  
 
3.2. CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES RELATING TO FINANCIAL CRIME 
There are various criminological theories to explain the crime as a ‗phenomenon‘ and 
some of them are more useful than others to explain some specific kinds of crime such 
as financial crime. In this chapter, all the crime theories are categorized according to 
their relevance to and explanatory power about financial crimes. The criminological 
theories are investigated under three main categories  
(i) theories that are distant, not relevant to financial crimes; uncultivable theories; 
(ii) theories that are cultivable and somewhat relevant; and  
(iii) theories that are very relevant, probably
18
 suitable to explain the deviant 
behaviours of financial criminals.  
Now, let us begin with the first category of theories: theories that are distant from 
financial crimes.   
3.2.1. Criminological Theories Being Distant from Financial Crimes 
3.2.1.1. Positivist school 
The Positivist school may come under many names and it has many sub-branches
19
. 
Some of the distinctive ones are: ‗early positivism‘, ‗genetic transmission theory‘, 
‗bio-social perspective‘, ‗socio-biological theory‘, ‗social ecology studies‘, and 
‗constitutional theories‘. According to this cluster of theories, people are born as 
criminals and crime is considered as a deformity and a sickness. To solve the crime 
problem, thus, positivist school theoreticians looked at defective body types, unusual 
skull dimensions, weird bones, lower IQs, nervous system defects and other similar 
biological faults and dysfunctions; yet it is almost impossible to come up with such 
                                                 
18‗probably‘ because the theories develop through the course of time and the researcher may realise an 
opportunity of developing it while applying it. 
19
These categories and types of positivist school and involving academics are derived from 
Schmallager (2009), Siegel (1995) and Hale et al. (2005). 
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people among highly educated, clever, presentable bankers, insurance company 
managers, brokers, dealers etc. The latter type of individuals do not have biological 
problems and they are not handicapped or neurologically disabled, nor are they 
suffering from lower IQs etc. However, as Sutherland (1956: 88) asserted:  
We have no reason to assume that General Motors has an inferiority complex 
or Alcoa Aluminum Company a frustration-aggression complex or U.S. Steel 
an Oedipus complex or Armour Company a deathwish, or that Dupont wants 
to return to the womb. 
Many criminologists have ―doubted‖ (Williams, 1997: 140) genetic explanations of 
crime because little is known about their interactions (Bryson, 2004), and research on 
the ‗epigenome‘ which turns genes on and off depending on the various 
environmental factors shows that our physical being is partially built by our 
environment as well. Besides, biological theory is ―an admission of hopelessness‖ 
(Williams, 1997: 140). 
3.2.1.2. Social conflict theories 
Social conflict theories basically claim that crime takes place because the society is 
based on ‗class conflict‘. If it were only based on a classless society or on a society of 
planned and distributed uniform power, conflict would be erased and we would not 
experience crime. Accordingly, crimes are considered as ―acts perceived by those in 
power as direct or indirect threats to their interests and that are defined as criminal 
through a political process‖ (Sheley, 1991: 40). Nevertheless all such societies 
experienced a significant number of crimes (see for instance, Buchholz et al., 1974). 
Conflict theories ―view crime as a rational choice for the oppressed‖ (Williams, 1997: 
455; Qinney, 1974) but they fail to explain why the higher strata of the society, 
despite all the power they have, would commit crimes, mostly white collar crimes. 
Why would they infringe the same laws they created, or to put it in other words, why 
would they enact the laws that way in the first place, if they would violate them? 
Then, the crime is not only a rational choice of the oppressed but also a rational 
‗choice of the oppressor‘. Nevertheless, conflict theories do not provide this balanced 
ground of discussion, as they favour one, the oppressed. Thus, social conflict theories 
can be considered as inappropriate to properly explain financial white collar crime 
(FWCC) and crime in general for that matter; because white collar crime (WCC) is 
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undoubtedly an important part of the general concept of ‗crime‘, leaving it 
unexplained is partially leaving the crime itself unexplained.  
There is no doubt, however, that they have contributed to the criminology literature 
greatly because they provided a unique perspective and, in a way, opened the doors 
for the whole concept of white-collar-criminality and released some of the unmerited 
blame from the shoulders of the street criminals.  
It should be noted that various specific ideas have created many sub-branches of 
conflict theory. Some of them are: ‗Marxist criminology‘, ‗peacemaking 
criminology‘, ‗radical criminology‘, ‗feminist criminology‘, ‗left-realist criminology 
(left idealism)‘. However, these are not considered for discussion in this chapter. 
3.2.2. Criminological Theories that are Useful to Explain Financial Crime 
3.1.2.1. Psychological/psychiatric theories 
Discussion of the psychological origins of crime can be traced back to the beginning 
of the 18
th
 century (Oleson, 2007). There are a number of psychological/psychiatric 
theories such as:  ‗Modelling Theory‘, ‗Forensic Psychiatry‘, ‗Attachment Theory‘, 
‗Behaviour Theory‘, ‗Frustration-aggression Theory‘, and ‗Self-control Theory‘ 
among others. However, we need to be aware that most of the ―psychological theories 
associate crime with abstractions like mental illness, intelligence, or personality‖ 
(Oleson, 2007). 
We can categorize psychological theories into two main categories: (i) cognitive and 
(ii) behavioural theories. It should be noted that both ‗cognition‘ and ‗behaviour‘ are 
concepts relevant to financial crimes, and their explanatory tendencies at the time of 
the criminal‘s decision-making is undeniable, because financial crimes are all about 
deviant ‗behaviour‘. 
Similar to Pinel, Weiner (1992), Rush (1812) and Maudsley (1867), many 
theoreticians argue that criminality is ‗linked to the forms of insanity‘ or ‗equivalent‘ 
to it, and indeed a form of escape from being mad (Oleson, 2007). Even this approach, 
that crime is a rescue from madness, sees crime as a rational choice. Therefore, it does 
not deserve to be the foundational theory of our study because there is a standalone 
rational choice theory in the first place. 
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Before psychological theories, deterrence was the main argument of criminal justice 
policies, but these policies, in time, shifted to the rehabilitation of offenders. However 
rehabilitation programs failed to prevent or lessen future criminal activities 
(Martinson, 1974).  Murray and Cox (1979) also reported that rehabilitation programs 
were inferior to deterrence based ones. This, indeed, is one of the reasons why we will 
not prefer psychological theories in debating financial crimes. Because there are very 
few theories that governments consider building public policies upon and 
psychological theories were given this scarce chance. They served as government 
policies especially after the second half of the 20
th
 century but they failed. Many 
governments abandoned using rehabilitative means of punishment, incarceration, and 
moved to more punitive means based on rational choice.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that psychological theories are important for our 
study in an indirect way because they research whether or not the offenders possess 
the requisite criminal intent
20
 while committing the crime
21
. 
3.2.2.2. Social structure approaches 
Social structure theoreticians usually take the ‗consensus‘, rather than ‗conflict‘ side 
of the dichotomy of social construct. They do not think that the society is in conflict in 
general but the social structure may not be constructed properly. They focus on the 
structure and functions of the society, the way it is socially, physically, culturally 
constructed, and the way the functions and internal groups of the society interact.  
There are four main branches of this approach, namely, ‗Anomie Theory‘, ‗Social 
Disorganization Theory (Chicago School)‘, ‗Culture Conflict‘ and ‗Strain Theory‘. 
It should be noted that social theories are strong in criminology literature. Although it 
is one of them, social structure theory‘s viewpoint on crime is rather different from 
social conflict and social process theories, because they do not consider crime as 
something harmful, something ‗evil‘. On the contrary, they sometimes see it as a 
normal, or even ‗useful‘, ‗needed‘ phenomenon (Hale et al., 2005: 68) and sometimes, 
as an inevitable result of urbanization and modernity. 
In theorising, it is argued that people are social creatures and there is no doubt that 
                                                 
20
 Better known as ‗mens rea‘ 
21
 ‗actus reus‘ 
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their behaviours are linked to and affected by others‘ behaviours. Moreover, if we are 
talking about social functions and structures and thus, social institutions like family, 
school, workplaces etc., their effects on individuals are undeniable, making them good 
places to research crime.  
However, the social structural view treats crime as a social ‗function‘ and criminals as 
a ‗separate‘ entity in the society. This is most likely because the theoreticians of social 
schools refer to street criminals when they talk about crime. Financial white collar 
criminals‘ behaviours though are not explicitly considered to be socially anomic by 
those theoreticians. Maybe because they are not observed to be under more strain than 
street criminals, their neighbourhoods are also not disturbed much, as suggested by 
Chicago School, but they still commit crime.  
The crime definitions of social structure theories rarely mention white collar crime, if 
they mention it at all; and this is indeed why the literature needs better theoretical 
explanations, explanations that do not fail to include an integral part of crime. 
Strain Theory specifically, for instance, builds all its arguments on the ‗strain‘ people 
feel when they claim too much and get less within the proper mechanisms of the 
society. This argument and similar arguments of Social Disorganization Theory are 
valuable contributions to criminology, but they do not offer clear explanations about, 
for instance, corporate crimes like Enron, Arthur Andersen etc. It is hard to believe 
that people involved in Enron and similar corporate crimes have been affected by their 
socially disorganized neighbours‘ boys as it is claimed by Shaw and McKay (1942: 
166) but again, it has some relevance because criminal corporate culture can be 
infectious inside and outside the economic systems.   
Social structure theories generally talk about the flux of social groups, social functions 
etc. at the time of change and crime, but white collar criminals seems to be the ones 
who initiate, manage, and profit from the change. Why would they commit crimes to 
change it? They are supposed to be happy about the way the society operates and the 
way it is constructed. 
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3.2.2.3. Social process theories 
Social process theories do not necessarily claim that the society is in consensus, in 
conflict or that the fundamental structure of the society is defective but they still 
emphasise societal means of crime. ‗Conformity‘ to law and order in this viewpoint is 
ahead of the ‗deviance‘, unlike positivist, psychological and social structural theories.  
For instance, control theory claims that ―every individual is born free to break the law. 
It is criminality which is natural and conformity needs explanation‖ (Williams, 1997: 
370; Hale et. all, 2005: 82). In a similar vein, according to the ‗interactionist school of 
process theories‘, deviance does not cause social control but ‗social control causes 
deviance‘ (Lemert (1951). It is hence argued that people commit crime as rebels 
against the control, or when their freedom is breached.   
Some of the main branches of social process theories are ‗Social Learning Theory‘, 
‗Social Bond Theory‘, ‗Social Control Theory‘, ‗Dramaturgy‘, ‗Labelling Theory‘. 
According to this theory group, some major factors of conformity are attachment, 
commitment, involvement, belief and self-control. Theoreticians of this school focus 
their attention onto the social development of human-beings and they analyze the 
effects of certain social institutions like family, school, peer groups etc. on the 
individuals in a dynamic, long-term, developmental manner. We include Labelling 
Theory and the Social Interactionist School under this title, because labelling itself is 
a dynamic, social process and it is not as politically overwhelming a cause of conflict 
as class conflict suggests. Otherwise it would be better to enumerate it under the 
conflict school. However, opposing ideas exist (i.e. Jones, 2006: 232). 
Among the theories in this group, the impact of social learning and social bond 
theories are significant. The social learning school argues that criminality is learned 
by long term interactions and communications with criminal social environments. 
However, social learning and social bond theories cannot explain the initial states of 
different types of crimes. By definition, however, first formations of crimes cannot be 
learned from somebody else. 
Control theory, on the other hand, being another type of structural theory, is said to be 
unstable (Hale et al., 2005: 84), because of the tautology of the ―propensity towards 
crime and low self-control‖. In other words, control theoreticians claim that 
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criminality is normal and conformity should be questioned but their study of low self-
control still seems to be referring to a defect in human beings which is a deviance 
from, say, psychological averages and norms and very similar to the study of crime, of 
deviance. This, however, refers to a contradiction. If crime were the norm why does 
the lack of the norm represent crime? Why does it stand as a deviance from the 
averages if the society has not turned upside down? Or if it did what does ‗deviance‘ 
mean in today‘s society? 
As for Labelling Theory, Box (1981) shows that ―white collar offenders are often 
labelled‖ and gives the following example from Geis and Meier (1977: 3): 
A General Electric official, for instance, complained that he was exposed to 
―relentless publicity‖ and that the newspapers ―used some terms which I 
don‘t think are necessary – they don‘t use the term ‗price fixing‘. It‘s 
always ‗price rigging‘ or trying to make it as sensational as possible.‖22  
But Labelling Theory suggests that the ‗powerful‘ decide which labels will be 
attached to whom and it is always working class people who receive bad labels. White 
collar criminals seem to be an exception to this assertion though because a labeller 
would not label himself/herself with bad labels. This constitutes a contradiction 
though. As the above example from Geis and Meier (1977:3) shows, white-collar 
criminals are labelled by the society as well. Thus, white-collar bad labels exist. It 
should be noted that from the point of view of label theory, there are supposed to be 
no or a minimum number of labels attached to the white collar criminals including 
financial white collar criminals. This is why white collar crime as a phenomenon is 
unexplainable by label theory because Sutherland (1956) has proven that their number 
is at least as many as street criminals. 
Overall, social process theories are valuable, as they provide a unique perspective and 
help us to realize that the social environment around us is a very important parameter 
of deviance regardless of whether the society is in conflict or not. 
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 Gilbert Geis' (1967) ―The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of 1961‖ 
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3.2.3. Criminological Theories Helping to Explain Financial Crime 
3.2.3.1. Classical school
23
 as a foundation of rational choice theory 
The Classical School emerged in the late 18
th
 century, when ―the law was the will of 
the powerful, applied to the lower members of the society. The administration of 
justice was based on inflicting pain, humiliation, and disgrace to those accused of 
offenses‖ (Lanier and Henry, 1998: 65). 
According to the Classical School, crime is a result of rational choice and since it is a 
rational choice, it can be reduced in the short-run. If for instance it was a result of a 
discretionary measure such as human biology, psychology, sociology etc. it would be 
difficult to detect and fix people with defects in their genes, minds, social interactions, 
but if it is a rational choice, it is indeed good news for the public because it would not 
be so difficult to ir-rationalise such actions by for instance punishing them more 
severely. In many ways, the Classical School and its sister theories are the name of 
‗hope‘ in criminology unlike Labelling Theory, Anomy Theory, the Marxist School 
and other radical schools (i.e. the feminist and anarchist schools).  
Many criminological theories now share the same basic ideas that the Classical 
School established. Einstadter and Henry (2006), for instance, enumerate the 
following theories which were developed, adapted, clarified or even re-created from 
the Classical School: Neoclassicism, Humanitarian Rationalism, Administrative 
Criminology, Justice model, Just Deserts Model, Due Process Model, Economic 
Theory of Crime, Wealth Maximization Theory, Time Allocation Theory, Rational 
Choice Theory, Situational Choice Theory, Routine Activities Theory. 
Beccaria (1963: 8), being the foremost representative of the classical school, wrote in 
1764 that the laws must be designed so that ―the greatest happiness [is] shared by the 
greatest number‖ and he advocated equal justice for all by demanding from the justice 
system no tolerance for the powerful, rich and affluent and appealing rights to higher 
courts of law. Packer (1968) claims that his ideas brought the ‗presumption of 
innocence‘ to the justice system too. ―To maximize the possibility of justice and 
deterrence, Beccaria believed that punishment should fit the crime in being 
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 Einstadter and Henry (2006) make convincing arguments that the classical school was not a 
conservative approach but was an approach against the classical, conservative, ‗crime control‘ model of 
the pre-Enlightenment. 
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proportionate to the harm caused‖ (Lanier and Henry, 1998: 69). In other words, he 
believed that the impacts of crimes should determine the ‗severity‘ of punishment, as 
he argued that specific deterrence should be preferred to general deterrence, meaning, 
punishment may not be a discouragement for the whole society in general but may 
prevent individuals from committing crime by calculating its costs. 
Most of the modern ideas of the neo-classical school were presented by the founding 
fathers of the classical school. For instance Beccaria (1963) claimed that the 
punishments should be ‗certain‘ if they are to be effective on calculating human-
beings, and also stated that ―The certainty of punishment, even if moderate, will 
always make a stronger impression than the fear of another which is more terrible but 
combined with the hope of impunity‖ (Beccaria, 1963: 58). Lanier and Henry (1998: 
69) elaborate on this important concept by giving an example from 18
th
 century 
London of pickpockets who stole in the crowd at the public execution of pickpockets.  
‗Celerity‘ and ‗severity‘ were other requirements for effective punishment. Beccaria 
rightly touched on these by saying: ―the more promptly and the more closely 
punishment follows upon the commission of a crime, the more just and useful will it 
be‖ (Beccaria, 1963: 55). In the literature, these three qualities, certainty, severity and 
celerity, are widely seen as primary qualities of rationality in committing crime.  
Bentham (1963) theorized that people seek pleasure and happiness and try to avoid 
pain. As reported by Hale et al. (2005: 63), Bentham followed Beccaria and said that 
―prevention was the only justifiable purpose of punishment‖ and he recommended 
that ―penalties be fixed so as to impose an amount of pain in excess of pleasure that 
might be derived from the criminal act‖, because ―[n]ature has placed mankind under 
the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to 
point out what we were ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do‖ 
(Bentham, 1982: 1).  
The impact of the ideas of Beccaria and Bentham was tremendous; almost 
singlehandedly, they caused a big shift from an era of arbitrary, unequal punishment 
to the new, rational, equity based deterrence era. Beccaria‘s book had been translated 
into many languages and sold many thousands of copies, but was eventually banned. 
In the course of time, their principles have not been totally abandoned but interest in 
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them was lost for a while until the early rational choice theory re-emerged in the 
1960s. 
Realizing the continuum of it, Lanier and Henry (1998) rightly analyze the 
development of rational choice theory in four steps
24
: (i) pre-classical, (ii) classical, 
(iii) neo-classical and (iv) post-classical eras. Recent rationality based theories, such 
as ‗routine activities theory‘ and ‗situational crime prevention theory‘ are post-
classical era theories and they provide many technical details of crime and its 
environment.  
3.2.3.2. Rational choice theory (or post-classical school) and its development 
Pure Science Era of Neo-Classical School 
After Beccaria, Bentham and other Enlightenment era intellectuals (like John Howard 
and Samuel Romilly), ―with the help of the sweeping impact of the ‗science‘ 
movement‖, ―the focus of criminal justice shifted from the criminal act and how equal 
individuals chose it towards what kind of individuals would choose such acts and why 
other kinds would not‖ (Lanier and Henry, 1998). Consequently, researchers tried to 
find out who were those criminals. Were they choosing to commit crime because their 
brains were defective or nervous systems malfunctioning or genes simply bad etc.?  
This ‗pure science chasing would-be-criminals‘ movement continued for decades and 
failed. In the 1970s, post-classicists, seeing this injustice, proclaimed a return to 
classical norms of equal punishment and equality before the law ―protesting that 
discretion based on the dubious claims of science and social science had gone too far‖ 
(Lanier and Henry, 1998: 71). 
Back to Rationality 
Rationality indeed is one of the obvious factors in crime-causality. Many studies show 
that burglars commit crime after a rational decisions process they go through (Bennett 
and Wright, 1984; Bennett, 1986; Rengert and Wasilchick, 1985; Nee and Taylor, 
1988). For instance, burglars prefer two-exit-residences with obscuring vegetation at 
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 The majority of the literature categorizes this school of thought under two main titles: (i) Classical 
School and (ii) Rational Choice Theory.  
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the rear and avoid dogs and alarms (Nee and Taylor, 1988; Felson et al., 1990). Even 
violent crimes, such as rape (Felson and Krohn, 1997), murder and serial killing 
(Hickey, 1991) suggest rationality. After these varieties of crime, Siegel (1995: 114) 
argues that it is not surprising that white collar criminals ―exhibit evidence of 
rationality‖. 
As a matter of fact, theorists of rational choice are in consensus that the ‗rationality‘ 
under our scrutiny here is not a ‗pure rationality‘ (Clarke and Cornish, 1983, 1985; 
Cohen and Felson, 1979; Cohen and Machalek, 1988) and this idea of ‗limited‘ or 
‗bounded‘ rational decision making receives ―considerable empirical support‖ 
(Gibbons, 1994: 124).  
According to rational choice theorists (Lanier & Henry, 1998: 77, emphasis added), 
―offenders ... use free will and weight the perceived costs against the potential 
benefits. This weighing is called choice structuring. Offenders choose to engage in 
criminal acts if their rough calculation suggests the action might result in net gain‖.  
Cornish and Clarke (1986) refer to ‗limited rationality‘ or ‗partial rationality‘, ‗soft 
rationality‘ and not about ‗pure rationality‘. As a matter of fact, Akers (2000: 58) 
argues that the assumption of pure rationality has no empirical validity, as Akers 
(2000: 12) states that ―the primary criterion for judging a theory is its verification or 
refutation by empirical research‖.  
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the empirical assessment of rational choice theory 
by Lanier and Henry (1998: 80). 
3.2.3.2.1. Justice theory 
After the positivist and post positivist school eras, what experiments, variables, 
measurements, laboratories brought about was new individual and social differences 
based on, this time, psychological and neural defects and social maladjustments along 
with biological differences, and if people were different in terms of their abilities to 
conform with law and order, they should be treated differently and ‗punished‘ 
differently, reasoned laboratory scholars, and governmental policies changed to 
follow them.  
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Table 3.1: Empirical Assessment of Rational Choice Theory  
Author & 
Year 
Sample 
size 
Sample 
Type
1 
Main Findings Support 
(+) 
Negate (-) 
Theory 
Paternoster 
& Simpson 
(1996) 
96 Grad 
business 
student& 
corporate 
execs. 
High moral inhibitions to corporate 
crime negate cost-benefit analysis. 
Weak inhibitions deterred by formal 
and informal sanctions 
+  - 
Nagin & 
Paternoster, 
(1993) 
699 CS Criminal propensity to commit 
crime, and target attractiveness, low 
cost/ risk and perceived benefit 
related to decision to offend 
+ - 
Bachman, 
Paternoster 
&Ward, 
(1992) 
94 MCS Decisions to commit sexual assault 
on female affected by fear of formal 
sanctions only where there was low 
moral inhibition to offense. 
+ - 
Shover & 
Honaker, 
1992 
60 Persisten
t 
Property 
Offender
s 
Criminal decision making sustained 
by lifestyle characteristics with 
maintenance goals that create a 
―bounded rationality‖ that discounts 
risks. 
-+ 
Corbett & 
Simon, 
(1992) 
893 Drivers Supports limited rational choice for 
unlawful driving + - 
Grasmick, 
Bursik & 
Cochran, 
(1991) 
 
304 Resident
s 
Self-imposed shame has greater 
deterrence effect on tax evasion 
decisions than social shaming -+ 
Schneider & 
Ervin, (1990) 
867 Juvenile 
offenders 
Sense of citizenship deters 
decisions to commit crime, 
perceptions of certainty and 
severity of punishment do not 
- 
Paternoster, 
(1989) 
1,250 HSLON Some offence decisions affected by 
certainty (but not severity)of 
punishment but far less than effects 
of social costs and other factors 
leading to limited rational choice 
model. 
-+ 
Philips & 
Votey, 
(1987) 
12,686 Y (14-
24) 
LON 
Those who experiment with and then 
desist from crime learn from police 
contact to desist offending only when 
provided with alternative legitimate 
income. 
-+ 
Piliavin et 
al., (1986) 
3,300 LON Supports reward component of 
rational choice model but not cost 
or deterrent component. 
-+ 
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Note: 1- F = Female, M = Male, B = African American, W = White, Y = Yellow, HS = 
High School Student, CS = College Student, UCR = Uniform Crime Report Data, NCS = 
National Crime Survey Data, NYS = National Youth Survey Data, BCS = British Crime 
Survey Data, LON = Longitudinal Survey Data. 
Source:  Lanier and Henry (1998: 80; emphasis added) 
 
Policies were now favouring treatment instead of deterrence and were discretionary 
because the justice system was punishing two convicted individuals differently, 
despite the fact that they committed the same crime. This was done on scientific 
grounds. Some would be treated with ―wide disparities in charging and sentencing‖ 
according to Heumann and Loftin (1979: 393), because of their defective genes, social 
or psychological requirements etc. ―For example, one juvenile offender might get sent 
to a detention centre, another to probation and a third to boot camp, all for the same 
offense, because some social worker‘s report claimed that each individual offender 
had different needs‖ (Lanier and Henry, 1998: 72).  
The differences in punishment reached a point where rational decision making was 
not even possible for the would-be criminals because criminals decided about their 
punishments ‗after‘ they commit crime. After becoming more acquainted with the 
individuals, experts would decide about the ‗severity‘ of their punishment so that the 
punishment would be adjusted to the rehabilitation needs of the individuals. However, 
as Bottomley (1979:127) put it, rehabilitative justice ―culminated in the entire notion 
of the indeterminate sentence coming under attack for its therapeutic pretensions in a 
situation where not only was hard evidence of therapeutic effectiveness lacking ... but 
where indeterminacy created unacceptable tensions―. 
Critics of these inequalities before the law advocated, developed and promoted a ‗just‘ 
theory: ‗justice theory‘ some criminologists call it. Justice theoreticians saw 
‗punishment‘ as ―a desirable value and goal in its own right‖ (Bottomley, 1979: 139).  
Fogel (1998) announced his ‗just deserts‘ concept in 1975, which was proposing a 
return to classical ideas like ‗determinate sentences‘ with only small variation to fit 
the circumstances of crime. According to Lanier and Henry (1998: 74), the justice 
model of Fogel contains four elements:  
―(1) limited discretion at all procedural stages of the criminal justice system; 
(2) greater openness and accountability; (3) punishment justified by the last 
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crime or the series of crimes (neither deterrence goals nor offender 
characteristics justify punishment); and (4) punishment commensurate with the 
seriousness of the crime, based on actual harm done and the offender‘s 
culpability‖. 
Statistics show that determinate sentencing policy reduced sentencing disparity 
(Blumstein et al., 1983: Tonry, 1988) and increased prison populations (Mays, 1989), 
but could not have been implemented completely. Realising this fact, ‗plea bargain‘ 
was recommended to be eliminated from the justice system by the National Advisory 
Commission in the US in 1971, but none of the states except one responded 
positively. Lanier and Miller (1995) found that more than 90% of criminal defendants 
receive less than the original sentences by pleading guilty in the US and this figure 
goes even higher with early parole release and reduced sentences, argue justice 
theoreticians. 
In sum, circularly, departure from the classical thought brought about a similar 
environment to that in which the rational choice theory emerged and emerged for not 
mere ideological reasons. The ‗resurrection‘, as some call it, of classical school ideas 
appeared because, with few exceptions, all rehabilitation attempts have failed. 
Rehabilitative programs could not lower crime rates because, as Martinson (1974: 25) 
put it, they ―had no effect on recidivism‖. After the failure of the ‗rehabilitation‘ era, 
‗deterrence‘ reappeared, as explored below. 
3.1.3.2.2. Deterrence theory 
Behind the idea of deterrence is the assumption that people fear apprehension and 
punishment and will try to avoid it. At the heart of this theory are ‗certainty‘, 
„severity‘ ‗celerity‘, „proportionality‘, ‗general deterrence‘ and „specific deterrence‘ 
(Zirnring and Hawkins, I973; Gibbs, 1968; Wright, 1993).   
Deterrence theory is like an auxiliary theory of Classical School and Rational Choice 
Theory because Rational Choice Theory holds that the number of crimes decreases as 
the available punishment increases and if the deterrence is severe, certain and swift 
enough, and that even the general idea of punishment, the very existence of it, is a 
discouragement to the public in general, regardless of their criminal backgrounds and 
motivation. 
The criminal justice world, indeed, seems to be relying upon deterrence, regardless of 
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the discrepancies in the political or economic systems they operate in. Large studies 
are conducted to test deterrence theories such as the Kansas City preventive patrol 
experiment in 1974 (Kelling et al., 2003).  
The role of deterrence in financial crimes is almost undeniable. The famous market 
manipulation and fraud case of Barings is a good example. The managers of the bank 
explain that Leeson, the culprit, was not deterred at all, there was no real audit in the 
bank. Peter Norris, chief executive of Barings Investment Bank, stated that ―There 
was a culture which said that businesses of that type operated far better in an informal 
environment than a formal environment. I think that was a significant error of 
judgement... Leeson was not completely wrong.‖ (Curtis, 1998, emphasis added). He 
was not deterred at all. 
Deterrence, or keeping people away from crime by enforcement and punishment, can 
be categorised into general deterrence and specific deterrence. General deterrence 
theorizes that there is a negative correlation between the crime rates and the certainty 
(generally arrest and conviction), severity (generally type and amount of punishment), 
and celerity (generally the elapsed time between the crime and penalty) of the 
punishment. Succinctly, deterrence theory suggests that when the ‗possibility‘ of 
getting X value of punishment overweighs the ‗possibility‘ of getting Y value of 
benefit out of crime, people decide not to commit crime. 
Specific deterrence is the same concept as general deterrence but directed to 
individual offenders only. The aim of specific deterrence is to discourage certain types 
of criminals from committing crime rather than trying to create a fear of crime in the 
whole society. 
After presenting the deterrence theory and the continuum of the classical school of 
thought, the following section continues on the modern status of the rationality 
argument in criminology. 
3.2.3.2.3. Situational choice theory 
Also called ‗Situational Crime Prevention Theory‘, situational choice theory can help 
to explore and explain a wide range of crimes (Burke, 2005: 43).  
There exist specific crime prevention tactics of situational crime prevention theory, 
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specifically designed for certain crime types (Siegel, 1995: 115). Three main tactics, 
increasing the effort, increasing the risks and reducing the rewards, are depicted in 
Table 3.2. as presented by Clarke (1992: 13): 
Table 3.2: Techniques of Situational Prevention 
Increasing the Effort Increasing the Risks Reducing the Rewards 
Target  Hardening Entry / Exit Screening Target Removal 
Steering locks 
Bandit screens 
Slug rejector device 
Vandal-proofing 
Toughened glass 
Tamper-proof seals 
Border searches 
Baggage screening 
Automatic ticket gates 
Merchandise tags 
Library tags 
Electronic point of sale 
Removal car radio 
Exact change fares 
Cash reduction 
Remove coin meters 
Phone card 
Pay by check 
Access Control Formal  Surveillance Identifying Property 
Locked gates 
Fenced yards 
Parking lot barriers 
Entry phones 
ID badges 
PIN numbers 
Police patrols 
Security guards 
Informed hotlines 
Burglar alarms 
Red light cameras 
Curfew decals 
Cattle branding 
Property marking 
Vehicle licensing 
Vehicle parts marking 
PIN for car radios 
LOJACK 
Deflecting Offenders Surveillance by Employees Removing Inducements 
Bus stop placement 
Tavern location 
Street closures 
Graffiti board 
Litter bins 
Spittoons 
Bus conductors 
Park attendants 
Concierges 
Pay phone location 
Incentive schemes 
Closed-circuit TV systems 
―Weapons effect‖ 
Graffiti cleaning 
Rapid repair 
Plywood road signs 
Gender-neutral phone listing 
Park Camarro off street 
Controlling Facilitators Natural Surveillance Rule Settings 
Spray-can sales 
Gun control 
Credit-card photo 
Ignition interlock 
Server intervention 
Caller ID 
Pruning  hedges 
―Eyes on the street‖ 
Lighting bank interiors 
Street lighting 
Defensible place 
Neighborhood Watch 
Drug-free  school zone 
Public park regulations 
Customs declarations 
Income tax returns 
Hotel registrations 
Library checkout 
Source: Clarke (1992: 13) 
 
There seems to be no doubt in the criminology literature that rational choice theories 
are the best theories to explain and analyse financial crimes. Therefore, the relevant 
literature encourages researchers to deploy rational choice theory for the specific 
financial crimes we are focusing on in our study.  
In relation to the validity of rational choice theory, it should be noted that white collar 
criminals calculate and act decisively. Siegel (1995: 114) thinks that ‗fraud‘ is a good 
candidate to show their intelligent crimes, because ―[w]hen prominent bankers in the 
savings and loan industry were indicted for criminal fraud, their elaborate financial 
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schemes not only showed signs of rationality but exhibited brilliant, though flawed, 
financial expertise‖. Besides, for almost all crime types, ―[f]rom the criminal justice 
policy perspective, unless offenders think rationally before committing their crimes 
there is little point to the deterrence argument‖ (Lanier and Henry 1998: 81, emphasis 
added).  
As for ‗manipulation‘, in the context of rational choice theory ―[t]he stock market 
manipulations of Wall Street insiders, such as Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, ... 
demonstrate a reasoned analysis of market conditions, interests and risk‖ (Siegel, 
1995: 114). However, the main target of the financial crimes is the financial 
resources, which are very hard to remove without making dramatic changes to the 
financial mechanisms frequently used by modern finance. Besides, focusing on the act 
and disregarding the actor would not yield a proper theory of crime to explain white 
collar financial crime. 
3.2.3.2.4. Routine activities theory 
Routine Activities Theory identifies crime patterns and links them to daily social 
patterns, social interactions of human beings. Finance is full of those patterns and 
some of them, after the realization of their weaknesses, are targeted by criminals. 
These patterns, undoubtedly, differ in various financial systems and thus produce 
different degrees of vulnerability. 
Apart from being a variation of Rational Choice Theory, Routine Activities Theory is 
a sub-branch of environmental criminology as well. Most of the time, environmental 
criminology is taken as the geographical, spatial, physical surroundings of the run-
time events related to crime. This is relevant to financial crimes too but financial 
crime has some additional characteristics it brings to environmental criminology 
because it operates mostly in electronic environments such as FOREX. 
Unlike other criminological theories, including Classical School, Deterrence Theory, 
Justice Theory and Situational Crime Prevention Theory; Routine Activities Theory 
focuses on ‗crime‘ and the situation, the environment in which it is committed and not 
on the ‗criminal‘ and his/her characteristics. Routine Activities Theory properly 
explains some of the white collar crimes, such as, copyright infringements, employee 
related crimes, corporate crimes, competition crimes. 
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Clarke and Cornish (1983: 8) claim that ―choices and decisions [are] made within a 
context of situational constraints and opportunities‖ and by doing so they determine 
the challenges for their theory: discovering environmental opportunities for crime and 
changing the ―opportunity structure‖ to prevent it. 
As we can see from Table 3.3, routine activities theory is supported predominantly 
and scarcely could be negated by scientific research. 
Table 3.3: Empirical Tests (Assessments) of Routine Activities Theory 
Author Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Type
1 
Main Finding Support (+) 
Negate(-) 
Theory 
Osgoode et 
al. (1996) 
1,782-
1,840 
HS (age 
18-26) 
Juveniles who spend more time in 
unstructured social activities strongly 
associated with criminal behavior, heavy 
alcohol use, use of marijuana and drugs, 
and dangerous driving 
+ 
Rountree & 
Land (1996) 
5,090 Residents 
victim 
survey 
Perceived risk of crime different from 
crime-specific fear for burglary, the latter 
better predicted by routine activities 
theory. Neighborhood Integration 
decreases perceived risk (fear of crime) 
but increases burglary- specific fear 
+ - 
Rodgers & 
Roberts 
(1995) 
 Statistics 
Canada 
Survey 
Proximity, exposure and guardianship 
had limited to no connection with 
women‘s non-spousal multiple 
victimization 
- 
Pettiway,Doli
nsky & 
Grigoryan 
(1994) 
441 Repeat 
offenders 
(age 17-
49) 
Criminal activity related to participation 
in a wide range of recreational and social 
activities including drug use. 
+ 
Lauritsen, 
Laub &  
Sampson 
(1992) 
 NCS 1976-
1978 
Youth engaged in delinquency experience 
highest risk of assault and robbery but 
few conventional activities when 
background factors considered. 
-+ 
Bennett 
(1991) 
 52 nation 
cross-
national 
study 
Routine activities theory given qualified 
support but shown to be property crime 
specific, applying less to personal crime. 
+ - 
Kennedy & 
Forde, (1990) 
74,463 NCS Risky settings, out-of-home activities 
increase risk of crime, in-home activities 
decrease risk. 
+ 
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Stahura & 
Hollinger 
(1988) 
 UCR Motivation, opportunity and guardianship 
have direct and / or additive effects on 
arson rates. 
+ 
Stahura & 
Sloon (1988) 
 UCR Motivation opportunities and 
guardianship are found to have direct and 
/or indirect additive effects on violent 
and/ or property crime rates, for property 
offenses but not for violence. 
+ - 
Lasley & 
Rosenbaum 
(1988) 
850 & 
250 
BCS Multiple victimization associated with 
high alcohol consumption, going out 
Friday or Saturday night, irregular work. 
+ 
Sampson & 
Wooldredge 
(1987) 
10,905 
 
BCS Highest victimization among young, 
single who frequently go out at night, 
leaving homes empty, crime-specific 
offenses of burglary and theft related to 
community-level variables. 
+ - 
Garofalo, 
Siegel & 
Laub (1987) 
373 NCS School related victimizations stem from 
escalation of peer activities during routine 
activities, which can be prevented by 
presence of capable guardian. 
+ 
Miethe, 
Stafford & 
Long (1987) 
107,678 NCS Routine activities/ lifestyle variables have 
relatively strong direct and mediational 
effects on individuals‘ risk of property 
victimization but not for violent 
victimization. 
+ 
Jensen & 
Brownfield, 
(1986) 
3,644 & 
550 
HS Collective fun-pursuing activities are 
more victim-ogenic than passive activities 
and delinquent activity is positively and 
more strongly related to victimization 
than non-delinquent activities. 
+ 
Note:  F = Female, M = Male, B = African American, W = White, Y = Yellow, HS = High 
School Student, CS = College Student, UCR = Uniform Crime Report Data, NCS = National 
Crime Survey Data, NYS = National Youth Survey Data, BCS = British Crime Survey Data, 
LON = Longitudinal Survey Data. 
Source: Lanier and Henry (1998: 84-85)  
 
There are three main conceptual bases of the theory: (i) Suitable targets, (ii) absence 
of capable guardians and (iii) motivated offenders. If all of these factors occur in a 
certain place and time, the crime is very likely to occur.  
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Figure 3.1: Reasoning Criminal of Routine Activities Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cornish and Clarke (1986)  
 
According to the Rational Choice Theory, specifically Routine Activities Theory 
(RAT), the rational actor thinks and acts as in Figure 3.1. This is a good place to begin 
Reaction to Chance Event 
Easy opportunity;  
Argent need for cash; 
Persuasion by friend(s); 
Gets drunk, quarrels with 
(spouse). 
 
Background Factors 
 
Psychological: temperament; 
intelligence; cognitive style 
Upbringing: broken home; 
institutional care; parental crime. 
Social and demographic: sex; 
class; education; neighborhood 
Previous Experience and Learning 
 
1. Direct and vicarious 
experience of crime 
2. Contact with law 
enforcement agencies. 
3. Conscience and moral 
attitudes. 
4. Self- perception. 
5. Foresight and planning 
Solutions Evaluated 
 
1. Degree of effort. 
2. Amount& immediacy of reward. 
3. Likelihood& severity of punishment. 
4. Moral costs. 
Generalized Needs 
 
Money, sex, 
friendship, status, 
excitement. 
Perceived Solution 
 
Legitimate: work, 
gambling, marriage 
Illegitimate: 
burglary in m.c.s; 
other burglary; 
other crime. 
Readiness 
 
To commit burglary 
in a middle-class 
suburb. 
Decision 
 
To commit burglary 
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the discussion of the motivated offender. As can be seen from the top of the chart, 
they assume psychological factors, upbringing factors and social and demographic 
factor such as temperament, intelligence, cognitive style, functionality of home, 
institutional care, parental crime, sex, class, education, neighbourhood. 
These factors, along with the notion of ‗limited rationality‘, bring many social and 
psychological factors into the theory and force us to take into account the major 
characteristics of financial systems and the implementing countries‘ cultures, belief 
systems, religions and ethical positions in order to compare their motivations. 
Nevertheless, RAT does not render explanations about the motivation towards crime 
but assumes an automatic motivation in case of opportunity which is disputable by 
many examples (i.e. pickpocketing despite severest punishment, Lanier and Henry‘s 
(1998: 69) research). 
3.2.4. Criticism of Rational Choice Theory 
One can divide the critics of Rational Choice Theory, or any other theory for that 
matter, into two groups: sound and just critics and rhetoric and unreasonable ones. 
The latter can be exemplified by the following rhetoric: ―professionals under 
government patronage prefer to think that crime is an outcome of an opportunity‖ 
(Burke, 2005: 43), because this viewpoint fails to realize that economic and financial 
issues are all about calculation and criminals are used to doing this  in their everyday 
life. Thus, it should be taken as very realistic to assume much credit on a lot of 
calculation especially for financial criminals.  
Sullivan (1973) argues that ―[in] the first instance, ...  the amateurish criminal who 
makes wildly inaccurate estimates is no less a rational being than a consumer who 
runs up huge debts‖. Trasler (1986) agrees and emphasises the similarity between 
criminals‘ decision making and the economic decision making in marketplaces. 
In reflecting on the economic analysis aspects of criminality as identified in Rational 
Choice, Lanier and Henry (1998: 79) call the assumption that ―the benefits of one type 
of crime are not equally available from another or from the same crime in another 
place‖ (crime displacement) as a ―dubious assumption‖ and they claim that ―one 
neighbourhood‘s cleanup can become another‘s crime problem‖. 
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Indeed, Cornish and Clarke (1987: 935) do not deny this possibility. According to 
them, crime substitution, rather than crime avoidance, is possible if ―alternative 
offences share characteristics which the offender considers salient to his or her goals 
and abilities.‖ However, as Bennett‘s (1986) research showed, opiate users do not 
displace because drug cultures that are appealing to certain criminal groups are not 
that appealing in other places.  
Siegel (1995: 118, emphases added) raises the following criticism against situational 
crime prevention which is confirmed by research from Stanford University: 
Crime reduction programs may produce a short term positive effect but benefits 
dissipate as criminals adjust to new conditions. They learn to dismantle alarms 
or avoid patrols, they may become motivated to try new offenses they had 
previously avoided. For example if every residence in a neighbourhood were 
provided with a fool-proof burglar alarm system, motivated offenders might then 
turn to armed robbery, riskier and more violent crime. 
Clarke and Weisburd‘s (1994) response to this criticism is the compatibility of the 
positive effects of the same concept with the negative effects of it. They call it 
‗diffusion of benefits‘. Criminal justice policies may aim to deter one specific type of 
crimes but unintentionally, their efforts may prevent other kinds as well. For example, 
street cameras in front of banks may aim to deter crimes against ATM machines, but 
they prevent violent crimes around the cameras as well. However, the diffusion effect 
is only a peripheral advantage and does not make the core of the theory stronger. 
Akers (2000: 60) criticizes rational choice theory on the grounds that the limited 
rationality approach reasons the functioning of factors other than rationality in the 
decision making process of offenders. He claims, when factors like morality, family 
ties and peer groups are accounted for, the rational decision-making process can be 
questionable. Eventually, Akers argues that rational choice theorists may not be aware 
that social learning and bond theories demonstrate that the impact of these factors are 
indeed greater than the impact of rationality. Akers‘ (2000) criticism is a strong one 
and an improvement of rational choice theory lies in the attempts at responding to this 
and similar other criticisms. 
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3.3. COMPARISON OF THE ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS OF 
(FINANCIAL) CRIME  
Every culture has its own vistas of crime, financial or otherwise. We define culture as 
a nationally common conceptualization, common understanding, and disregard the 
sub-cultures in a given culture while discussing it. The ontological sources of each 
culture provide distinctive norms related to every aspect of life including crime. For 
instance different cultures have not only different definitions of crimes but also a 
different paradigm to be used while defining, researching, investigating, prosecuting, 
punishing, rehabilitating them. For instance, a few decades ago, using US dollars was 
a crime in Cuba, while it was not in the US for obvious reasons. On the other hand, 
going to Cuba for a visit was a crime in the US but visiting the US was not in Cuba.  
 
In many ways, ‗criminal acts‘ are related to the dynamic meanings of ‗norms‘ and 
‗alternatives‘ to the norms. Examples of using money or travelling to foreign 
countries are given above. These acts are not ‗norm-ally‘ crime, however, some of 
the alternative acts are elevated to the functions of ‗norms‘ in the modern world such 
as international travel unlike other ‗alternatives‘ like a ban on visiting Cuba or 
banning the use of US Dollars. This alleviation process makes these alternatives mere 
‘deviations‘ from the international norms. Nevertheless, their unpopularity or lack of 
appreciation by a Eurocentric viewpoint does not make them unjust or irrational. On 
the contrary, making better sense of the international norms is possible by critically 
and continuously comparing them with the alternative paradigms, because all the 
discourses are reinterpreted and evolved in the course of time and it is very hard to 
separate criminology and criminal justice from the power sphere of politics (Shelley, 
1979a: 622) in the world. It is, then, a must for all the paradigms of crime to 
continuously check themselves with the available, compatible others in order to learn, 
benchmark, adapt from them and by doing so, keep their vigour.  
Additionally, the aetiology of crime is not only internationalized (Taylor, 1998), but 
also interculturalized. Many countries used to represent a more different set of moral, 
ethical, religious, philosophical differences and differences of lifestyles and 
worldviews. Recently however, geographical globalization has brought about cultural 
resemblance, cultural unification of human conduct through convergence. Crime is, 
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no doubt, being affected by these mutual effects and hence, alternative paradigms are 
more relevant than at anytime else in the history of science in recent decades.  
The following sections provide a brief discussion of alternative criminological views 
of ‗crime‘ by the criminological intellect in major financial systems. In doing so, only 
paradigms that are relevant to the case studies in this research are referred to, in order 
to keep relevance and to beat time and space constraints.  
3.3.1. Criterion of Comparison between Criminological Perspectives 
There are many factors can be utilised in comparing different criminological 
perspectives. Berger (1988: 281-282) for instance mentions their ―theory of social 
change, [their] causal explanation of criminal behavior, [their] conceptualization of 
law and crime rates, and [their] view of the relation between collective political 
behavior and crime‖. There is no doubt that each of these criteria of comparison 
would yield valuable results; however, the needs of operationality and feasibility 
restrict us to using the following comparison parameters only, in order to evaluate 
default and alternative perspectives of crime and criminology:  
(i) Fundamental methods of criminologists,  
(ii) their positions in relation to the individual,  
(iii) to society and  
(iv) to the material world. 
As an essential criterion, the individual‘s place is crucial in all capitalist and Islamic 
discourses, criminological or otherwise. Similarly, study of individuals along with the 
society is the main aspects of criminological research in socialism (Buchholz, 1974: 
3) as well. Societal effects are not disregarded in Capitalism and Islam, but not 
emphasized as much as in Socialist discourse. Position in relation to the material 
world is also critical for presenting the distinctions of the criminological systems. In 
Islam, the material world is considered to be a cause of ignorance (Kimball and 
Teaching Company, 2008) and accepted but not praised as much as in Capitalism. 
Socialism in its most core position, though, opposes private property and unbalanced 
delivery of material values between different strata of the society. 
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In addition, the ‗information processing habits‘ of these systems or discourses are 
useful for distinguishing them as well. However, we may basically differentiate them 
by saying that in Capitalism, information is processed by and for the benefit of 
individuals in this world, in Socialism, by central authority and for the benefit of the 
society in this world, and lastly, in Islam by the individuals for the benefit of initially 
individuals then societies in this world and the hereafter too. 
3.3.2. Default Criminology Literature as the Representative of Market Economy 
The Eurocentric literature on criminology can be regarded as the representative of a 
market economy‘s views and perspectives of crime as a phenomenon and problem. 
According to the preponderance of the Eurocentric literature, crime is a problem but it 
is normal to have this problem. Either faulty biological or psychological bodies or the 
malfunctioning parts or processes of the society will cause crime. 
This literature has attracted a great deal of attention from all over the world probably 
because it spread into many diverse areas and extended the boundaries of criminology 
as a multi-disciplinary field of study. However, it is hard to say that the Eurocentric 
approach has a consensus on the causes of crime, even on a circumstantial basis. The 
main characteristic of this approach then would be the ‗conflicting ideas‘ about the 
possible causes of the ‗problem‘ of crime.  
Crime rates are very high in market societies. According to the figures of the 
International Centre for Prison Studies (2012), the US tops the international list with 
730 inmates per 100,000 of population. Mainstream criminologists see crime as a 
consequence of modernity and claim that the higher the achievements of a country in 
terms of modernity and prosperity, the higher the crime rates will be. So, according to 
the market view of crime, deviant behaviour is mundane: it happens very frequently 
and there is nothing spectacular about it (Durkheim, 1965).  
According to the Socialist view, however, the existence of crime in society is very 
surprising, even unexplainable (Buchholdz, 1997). Socialists do not even accept the 
existence of crime as a problem in socialist societies; to them, crime should not exist 
in such societies at all. The religious view also sees crime as normal but still as a 
problem. According to the Christian, Jewish and Islamic tradition, Adam descended to 
the Earth from Heaven because of the crime he and Eve committed. Many established 
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world religions see the world as a place of test after which some fail. Thus, failure to 
obey secret law is expected by at least some of the members of the society in religious 
viewpoint but it is still a problem. 
3.3.2.1. Fundamental methods 
Both on the national and international level, the method  market society uses to deal 
with crime is ‗reactive‘ rather than being ‗proactive‘. This may indeed be one of the 
reasons why market societies do not agree on certain reasons of crime causality 
because crime, to them, is a problem of modernity, a consequence, and thus, 
inevitable. In Capitalist countries, people should choose between two alternatives: 
―high standards of living with a high crime rate or a low standard of living with low 
crime rate‖ (Buchholz, 1974: 7-8).  
This is why the Market Society usually focuses on policies rather than the proactive 
precautions against crime. Unlike market societies, both the Socialist and the Islamic 
views of the crime are proactive, these systems try to eliminate crime via ideal, 
functioning, good society, rules and social structure. Market Society is pragmatic and 
non-ideological, non-idealistic, but both Socialist and Religious Systems act on 
certain sets of idealistic, ideological rules, on common conceptions which affect the 
social structure and organization of the society. According to Hayek and Caldwell 
(2007) market societies do not have such collective purpose and this is an advantage 
for a free society because uniting people under such common purpose in liberal 
societies is not possible. Hayek (1997: 184) wrote ―it is the great merit of a liberal 
society that it reduces the necessity of agreement to a minimum compatible with the 
diversity of individual opinions which will exist in a free society.‖  
This fact about market society is valid on the trans-national level as well. Crime 
fighting is mere policing (after-crime-measures) in many of the market societies, 
whereas in Islam policing as an institution to seek, find and report crime does not 
even exist (Quran, 49: 12
25
). 
In this sense, Islamic solutions are usually preventive, proactive solutions and Market 
                                                 
25
 ―O you who have believed, avoid much surmise; surely some surmise is a vice. And do not spy on 
each other, (literally: some of you on some others) nor backbite one another; would any of you love to 
eat the flesh of his brother dead? So you would hate it! And be pious to Allah; surely Allah is Superbly 
Relenting, Ever-Merciful.‖ Translation by Dr. Ghali  
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solutions are a posteriori solutions even on the international level, as shown by 
Ruggiero et al. (1998). 
―Market-liberal rhetoric recognises the trans-national character of a selection of 
crime problems discussed in the public sphere – specifically, trans-national 
criminal trades in drugs and other illicit substances and the trans-national 
movement of criminals themselves – but speaks only to trans-national police 
responses‖ (Ruggiero et al. 1998: 32).  
Asutay (2007: 12) summarizes the fundamental methods of the market economy and 
says that the market society is based on ‘market exchange‘. ―The point of departure 
[of market society] is methodological individualism‖ because it is made up of ―self-
interest oriented individuals who a) seek their own interests, b) in a rational way, and 
c) try to maximise his/her own utility‖. 
Asutay (2007) rightly puts individualism at the heart of market society because the 
main concern of market society is the happiness of the individual and the utility 
maximisation of the individual. The discussion about the maximization utility 
discussed by Mill (1972), Bentham (1982) and others are relevant facets of this 
individualism. 
Market society perceives crime in the mechanisms and functions of the market. These 
‗problems‘ of crime are the ones that need specific services. There is a demand for 
security in the society and there are institutions that are entitled to provide relevant 
services to fulfil that demand. If they are not successful enough to satisfy the demand, 
then, ―the preferred response of the market liberal [societies] to serious crises of 
crime, and to other unfolding problems of individual and social dislocations and harm, 
is to see them as challenges to managers of particular, segmented markets‖ (Ruggiero 
et al., 1998: 29).  
The method of overcoming this problem and leading the unsuccessful management 
―in respect of crime and fear of crime is to separate out statistics on the severity of a 
particular crime problem from their immediate and historical context, and to make the 
reduction of that statistic the object of managerial strategic thinking and action‖ 
(Ruggiero et al., 1998: 29). Ultimately, a better service is produced and offered to the 
market society for consumption. If the demand lessens, relevant institutions of market 
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society will understand that they are successful in dealing with crime. 
Taylor (1998) claims that losing against the criminals but after an honourable struggle 
is favourable for FBI and similar police organizations. This and similar arguments can 
be taken as doubts about the reliability of the market institutions and the data they 
produce on crime rates. However, we also need to remind ourselves that transparency 
is taken seriously by market societies. 
The Eurocentric view, especially since the Reagan – Thatcher era, is liberal in many 
ways. Its position in regard to religion is mostly agnostic and/or under the mild 
influence of the Judeo-Christian belief system (Williams, 1997: 14; Singer, 2000). 
Crimes in market economies take place in such an environment and may be affected 
by it de facto but not necessarily de jure. Many crimes or unlawful acts in Christianity 
and Judaism do not exist in the criminal codes of the market system (i.e. interest).  
The Eurocentric viewpoint accepts the existence of conflict in their society and they 
also claim that this conflict is necessary for the advancement of the society. Thus, 
conflict, as a methodology of existence of modes of production and social formation, 
is considered to be the source of sustenance of capitalist societies, as argued by 
Marxism. As an extension, success should be rewarded and failure should be 
punished, similar to the Darwinian viewpoint, so that society will be transformed into 
a more advanced form of the society. Similar to Socialist societies, Market societies 
are mostly positivist and materialist, which is in coherence with the Darwinian view 
of conflict and dialectics. 
Especially dialectics seems to be pervasive in the criminological discourse of market 
societies, although not emphasized as much as by socialists, because there is no 
consensus between the schools of criminological theories. The historical development 
of the theoretical works shows that almost all of the schools came into existence by 
criticizing the earlier theor(y)ies and not appreciating the scientifically sound 
components of their scientific (!) predecessors.  
This position of market society also shows its standpoint about ‗change‘, which is 
similar to the socialist view: ‗sudden change‘. Islam on the other hand advocates 
incremental change as reported in one of the sayings of the Prophet of Islam (Muslim, 
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Repentance, 37: 6642
26
). 
3.3.2.2. Position in relation to the material world 
Accumulation of wealth is arguably the raison d'être of Capitalism and Market 
Society, which dates back to the East India Company, trading between India and 
England, which was owned by many investors in England. Indeed many more 
examples exist in the past.  
In terms of distribution of wealth and income, a rich – poor dichotomy is visible in 
capitalism and is not seen, as in Socialism, as a shortcoming but as a motivation 
mechanism. 
As regards to the philosophical foundations, compared to Socialism, Capitalism is less 
positivistic but more materialistic. The material world is not eternal in the past 
because most of the European and American institutions and societies believe in the 
Big Bang and Thermodynamics Theories in physics. The living world, according to 
capitalist societies, evolved by means of Darwinian mechanics and is still evolving.  
In the market economy, material products satisfy the needs of people and please them 
by supplying utility. Thus, consumption, a way of reaching utility maximization, is 
very important for both individuals and societies in the market system. Inevitably, 
with such consumption attitudes, there are certain parts of the society which cannot 
achieve enough material goods and services as they need or like and this is said to be 
the prime reason of crime in market societies, that is, deprivation of needs or wants. 
Thievery, burglary, stealing, robbery, pick pocketing, shoplifting, larceny, pilfering, 
and many more different forms of acquiring materials unlawfully exist and are 
articulated in market societies.  
                                                 
26
 ―Abu Huraira reported from Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) that his Lord, the Exalted 
and Glorious, thus said. A servant committed a sin and he said: O Allah, forgive me my sins, and Allah 
(the Exalted and Glorious) said: My servant committed a sin and then he came to realise that he has a 
Lord Who forgives the sins and takes to account (the sinner) for the sin. He then again committed a sin 
and said: My Lord, forgive me my sin, and Allah, the Exalted and High, said: My servant committed a 
sin and then came to realise that he has a Lord Who would forgive his sin or would take (him) to 
account for the sin. He again committed a sin and said: My Lord, forgive me for my sin, and Allah (the 
Exalted and High) said: My servant committed a sin and then came to realise that he has a Lord Who 
forgives the sins or takes (him) to account for sin. 0 servant, do what you like. I have granted you 
forgiveness. 'Abd al-A'la said: I do not know whether he said thrice or four times to do what you 
desire". The hadith has been narrated on the authority of 'Abd al-A'la b. Hammad with the same chain 
of transmitters.‖ 
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3.3.2.3. Position in relation to individual 
In market economies, individuals are buyers (consumers) and sellers (producers). 
They are self-interest seekers, utility maximizers; as they have a free will. In market 
societies, this means that they are free to choose between alternative choices of many 
products and services. Individuals are in competition with each other for the best price 
profitable for them, for the available positions of work etc. 
As mentioned by Asutay (2007: 182), the ―individualistic attempts at maximising 
personal interest became the prevailing norm,‖ in market economies. Society and its 
conflicting relations to the individual - especially when possible restrictions to 
freedom are concerned - are usually disregarded for the sake of individual freedom 
but, of course, dispositions of individuals are – at least partially – controlled by the 
market because ―there is a market liberal interest in encouraging a certain level of 
anxiety in individuals‖ (Taylor, 1998: 22). Fear of unemployment, for instance, is 
needed in order to hire a hard-working employee for a reasonable wage; fear of not 
having certain material goods is needed for the continuous consumption.  
Libertarianism is very relevant in this regard. Market societies are liberal in many 
senses because this is needed to ensure freedom of choice and individual 
independence and liberty. Compared to other individuals in alternative systems, the 
individual in a market system has a different risk behaviour (Keat and Abercrombie, 
1991) and ―the willingness to take risks, especially of a financial kind can be thought 
an essential attribute in the character-armour of the market entrepreneur‖ (Taylor, 
1998: 21, emphasis added). 
One continuing feature of the culture of the market in the 1990s is the emphasis 
which is placed on the widening of such risk-taking capacity or interest to a 
wider section of the population, as for example when taking out insurance, 
borrowing monies for the purchase of a home or entering directly into dealings 
in the stock and bond markets.  
3.3.2.4. Position in relation to society 
Discussion of social good or the relationship between individual and society is not 
completely irrelevant to market societies, but only slightly mentioned and appreciated. 
For instance one of the important figures of the market system, Bentham (1995), 
refers to Joseph Priestly and says: ―Priestley was the first […] who taught my lips to 
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pronounce this sacred truth: - That the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the 
foundation of morals and legislation‖. 
Market economies are mostly multi-party, parliamentary democracies, which compete 
for votes in elections and form a colourful parliament, which then interact, competing 
on certain policies. Politicians provide a public service and if they can sell their 
service before the election time to the public, they are re-elected, if their managerial 
service is not liked by the voting public they are replaced by another, rival service 
provider, namely another party. 
In market economies, market forces define ―the kinds of expectations placed on 
elected politicians and on different public and private agencies (schools, hospitals, 
police) responsible for the delivery of specific services in the market society‖, and 
customers are entitled to receive services like good policing and good justice (i.e. state 
regulation vs. regulation by market) from different providers in the market (Taylor, 
1998, emphasis added). The state is only one of those providers and this is why we 
see incorporated police services (i.e. in the US, the EU, Turkey etc.) and private or 
autonomous regulatory services (i.e. the EU market regulatory authorities) in market 
societies. In socialism, such private services are not possible because all the 
individuals are considered to be ‗comrades‘ who constantly work for the good of the 
society. This is why socialist institutions for the public are very rarely replaced by 
others if replaced at all. 
Institutions of market society, including a police force, are needed only for functional 
reasons, because they supply a product or service for the society and these services 
should be tailored according to the desires and appreciation of their societies. In case 
of their failure they are either reorganized or are seen as a piece of the non-functional 
whole and replaced altogether by the replacement of the governing party 
Companies compete to increase their market shares and profits in national and 
international markets. Countries are in conflict as well and they try to maximize their 
security and prosperity (usually as GDP) in the international market.  
3.3.2.5. Position in relation to financial crimes 
Theoretically and from a comparative point of view, ‗financial‘ crimes are more 
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important in market societies than alternative systems for obvious reasons. Financial 
services play a crucial role in Market Societies as in the US and the UK, for example, 
and this is why financial crimes are punished, but adultery for instance is only 
discouraged, whereas in Islam punishment of adultery is severer than of financial 
crimes because ‗iman‘ (salvation of the soul) and related institutions are the main 
concerns. Similarly crimes against solidarity (i.e. being against the revolution) are 
considered to be more critical compared to financial crimes in Socialism.  
However, interestingly enough, the criminology literature of market societies does not 
articulate much about this phenomenon despite its great - probable and realized - 
effects on public utility loss, affecting millions in some instances.  
Market society‘s punishments of financial crimes are considerably lenient compared 
to other alternative systems too. This is probably because of the market system‘s 
perception of the free and evolving individual in a process of utility maximizing 
efforts. In a sense, codes of behaviour or the definitions of specific crimes are 
evolving, dying and emerging along with the evolving individual and the society in 
market societies unlike Islam and Socialism where solid, long lasting and stable 
definitions of crime exist. 
3.3.2.6 Seeking a consensus/standard for criminological discourse of market 
societies 
Many academics follow criminology literature back until Becceria in Italy and 
Bentham in the UK in the late 1800s. Preceding these, religious and spiritual crime 
theories were being used in Medieval Europe, while the Enlightenment period in 
Europe shifted many perceptions and understandings about crime and the science of 
criminology flourished afterwards. 
Modern definition of crime is rather pragmatic in market economies. Whatever fits 
into the required field of crime definition for the survival of the market society is 
enacted by governments as crime.  
As for a standard theoretical discourse, we may repeat that the Eurocentric paradigm 
has a dispersed picture of crime and criminal. Criminologists that are harvesters of 
this paradigm have distant ideas ranging from Durkheim (crime is mundane and 
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functional) to Marx (crime is extraordinary and is a result of class conflict, 
unfunctional). By referring to this multiple-causality-approach of the Eurocentric 
criminology one can argue that in a market society, almost every kind of deprivation 
or deficiency, ranging from the DNA, neurons, hormones, genes to family ties, peer 
groups and economic conditions can be considered as a cause of crime.   
However, the classical school has almost always been preferred and favoured by 
governments and many of the policies regarding crime are based on this theory and its 
follow-up theories. We may then take the classical and neo-classical schools that are 
mainly based on utility
27
 as the default perspectives of Western criminology, with 
some limitations of course. This view is also in accordance with the pragmatic, 
adjustable crime definition of market societies changing according to the dynamic 
nature of the society and calculated rationalities of individuals in those dynamic 
societies who refrain from or commit crime. 
As for the number of definitions or the density of crime in public life, many market 
societies do not suggest unregulated anarchy in markets but they allow only few 
definitions of crime especially in finance. Despite all the discourse of liberalism, 
individualism, freedom, choice and market, they are aware that at least a loose form of 
regulation is needed. As Taylor (1998: 21, emphasis added) suggests, in Britain, 
one of the most difficult problems for market individualists in the 1980s and 
1990s has been that of deciding on the optimal acceptable level of regulation 
of such financial services markets. This is a continuing and unpredetermined 
issue within free-market societies. Even in the aftermath of a series of money-
laundering, long-term frauds, and insider-trading scandals in Britain - the 
prospect for survival of the Serious Fraud Office, set up in the 1980s 
specifically to regulate this kind of various economic fraud, is looking slim.  
In Italy, similarly, ―struggles between Silvio Berlusconi‘s Forza Italia Party and the 
Clean Hands judiciary can also be understood as a (very vigorous) debate about the 
appropriate parameters of legitimate business and government practices in 
competitive market environments‖ (Taylor, 1998: 21). 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Please note that these theories are based on the main conception of utility just like many of the 
institutions of the Capitalist/Market society. 
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3.3.3. Socialism and Crime 
‗Socialist‘ criminology has many similarities to its Eurocentric counterpart, namely 
the Market System. It can be regarded as an alternative, self-sufficient criminological 
discourse, because, unlike the Eurocentric approach, in socialism, the definitions of 
crime and possible causes of it are commonly agreed upon (Buchholz, 1974: 2; Streit, 
1968: 3). In other words, socialist criminologists are in consensus about the root-
causes of crime: the causes are ‗social‘ (Streit, 1968: 3) in „social‟ ism.  
Although it has been subject to criticism, because of lacking diversity, socialist 
criminology had some achievements that are distinct in many ways. Some researchers 
even claim that its ―diversity and level of sophistication of crime research has been 
duplicated on a mass scale in the West only in the post-World War II period‖ 
(Shelley, 1979a: 391). Socialist criminology also pioneered studies of victimology, of 
the effects of movies on criminality, glorification of negative heroes, overemphasis on 
sexuality (Shelley, 1979: 394).  
Socialist criminological discourse is rather unusual in its approach. Unlike its peers, 
socialist criminologists announce the immense difficulties of studying criminology. 
For instance, Buchholz et al. (1974: 1), at the very beginning of their book ‗Socialist 
Criminology‘ write that: ―criminality is, in the final analysis, a complex and 
complicated phenomenon, internally diversified and structured, a phenomenon which 
cannot be correctly or comprehensively understood in its origins and causes‖.  
There is little doubt
28
 that all the socialist countries have been copycats
29
 and imitated 
the Soviet template of socialism, which implicitly makes the principles of Soviet 
criminology a must to refer to. Salas (1979: v) criticizes this understanding but also 
argues that Soviet criminology represents much of socialist criminology. Reichel 
(1999: 101) as well writes that ―[t]he role Russian law played in creating a socialist 
legal tradition is relevant to other socialist countries to the extent that it helped form 
Soviet Law‖. We may then confidently argue that ‗sociologist criminology‘ has been 
initiated in Soviet Russia, in 1917 by the establishment of the first criminological 
                                                 
28
 For instance the claim in one of Chomsky‘s TV speeches that Soviet Russia has never been a 
socialist state because it offered nothing for the workers although it was supposed to deliver the means 
of production to them, is a valid one but then one can talk about theoretical socialism‘s superiority over 
its application. 
29
 Reichel (1999: 101) believes that some of ―the new socialist countries were anything but duplicates 
of the Soviet legal system‖.  
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research centre in Petrograd. Then Moscow, Leningrad, Saratov, Rostov followed 
Petrograd by opening up new institutions in which criminologists like Gertsenzon, 
Utevskii, Shirvindt began studying crime. In 1917 again, the first criminology journal 
‗Proletarskaiarevoliutsiiaipravo‟ appeared (Shelley, 1979a: 615). 
3.3.3.1. Fundamental Methods 
Adapting from Asutay (2007: 12), we may form methodological fundamentals of 
socialism. In socialism, ‗the point of departure‘ is society, while the ‗behavioural 
postulate‘ of it is common interest oriented individuals who a) do not seek their own 
interests but the society‘s interests, b) in a rational way, and c) try to maximise 
society‘s collective utility; in a centralized way and as a pure-monopoly of all 
economic activities.  
Fundamentals of socialist methods are based mainly on ‗positivism‘ and related 
terminology like ‗determinism‘, ‗materialism‘, ‗scientism‘. Socialists are strictly 
against religion
30
 and spiritual ideology. They rejoice in atheism in the state and 
society and embrace positive sciences even for the advancement of social sciences in 
its Marxist form. China for instance is officially an atheist state (Lewis et al., 2009). 
Indeed, this was obvious in Russian socialism in practice and theory in the writings of 
Marx, Engels, Lenin and other socialist scholars (Lenin, 1933). 
It is hard to encounter much statistics and mathematics talk in Eurocentric 
criminological discourse, but in socialist criminology the literature is full of 
mathematics, statistics, numbers and logic. Berstein, a critic of socialist reasoning, 
describes the basic tenets of Marxist socialism similarly as ―science‖, ―material 
conception of history and historical necessity‖ and ―class conflict‖ (Berstein and 
Tudor, 2002: 9-29).  
As for the discussion of the ‗class conflict‘ in capitalism versus ‗classless society in 
consensus in socialism‘, it can be argued that socialist ideology is aware of the 
existence and important role of conflict in society, probably by observing conflict-
based-societies in history, but they seem to claim the elimination of it by means of 
eliminating private property. In a way they realize the tensions the conflicts produce 
                                                 
30
 There were religious offenses described in the criminal code of 1922 Soviet Russia. 
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in the society and try to eliminate the tensions (such as crime) by eliminating the 
conflict via creating a homogenous society with arguably less potential energy. 
Socialist criminologists, thus, are positivist in methodology despite accepting the 
social nature of crime because they believe in social determinism (Carrabien et al., 
2005: 73 agrees that socialism is deterministic), which reveals itself in the studies of 
behavioural science. To Buchholz (1974: 139) for instance, ―[i]n order to comprehend 
criminality in its social determination one has to start from the social determination of 
social behaviour generally‖. It is, for instance, very common, in socialist discourse, to 
come up with the adjectives like statistical, dialectic, kinetic; probabilistic, stochastic, 
deterministic, materialistic etc. 
Thus, although studying ‗left realism‘ is useful for understanding the socialist 
concepts, conceptualizations and perspectives, it is not enough even to understand the 
real, applied socialist theory of Socialist Criminology. In this respect, one can argue 
that studying Marxism also would not help much in commenting on applied, current 
processes and problems and theories of socialist criminology because applied socialist 
criminology sometimes diverged from Marxism too, for instance by studying 
biological (non-social) aspects of criminality.  
3.3.3.2. Position in relation to material world 
According to Marx and his followers the material world is eternal both in the past and 
in the future and the whole history of mankind is shaped by its position in relation to 
the material world. Socialists are extremely positivist too, but arguably they are the 
least materialistic among all three systems we compare.  
Socialist societies do not produce and consume much when compared to market 
societies and they ban private property, making material gains very undesirable and 
mundane in the society because nobody has anything special to offer or to be attracted 
by. This fact is portrayed by Hank Rogers, a software trader in Soviet Russia in 1989: 
―One big impression in Moscow I have got at the time was there is no colour 
anywhere. There is no advertisement. Nobody is trying to sell you anything‖ (Temple 
et al., 2005). 
Socialists see the history of mankind as a history of materialist relations and structures 
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competing one over another. Historical materialism is widely used by Marx in many 
of his and his followers‘ works. 
3.3.3.3. Position in relation to individual 
The sphere of the individual is very small in socialist countries. The individual is, 
mostly, referred to only in relation to society in the sense that crime is considered 
socially constructed (Horz, 1968: 327). Individuals after committing crimes are 
considered to be the victims of the social debris of capitalism in socialist society. 
Personal, individualistic studies exist but they are understood in the context of and in 
relation to social facts and functions. For instance, Buchholz (1974: 3) argues that  
The personal aspect focuses criminological research on the exploration of .. 
personality features ... This makes it possible ... to identify attitudes and 
social behaviour dispositions, as well as thought and living habits which 
have developed in the process of social and personal development, and these 
in turn make it possible to draw conclusions about the system of social 
prevention, of early diagnosis, of treatment and of integration. 
Central planning of the economy is another reason why the individual is not 
emphasised in Socialism, as individuals do not have many choices and alternatives in 
centrally planned economies. They should, therefore, enjoy whatever is offered to 
them by the central planner.  
This notion of ‗un-individuality‘ implies that individuals when they claim alternative 
choices are either seen as a sub-mechanism of a social force or a threat to central 
planning. For instance in Soviet Russia, embezzlers, when it was realized most of 
them were orphans, were seen by the criminologists as a signal of a social problem 
and their crime was viewed as ―a form of compensation for the difficulties they 
encountered in early life‖ (Shelley, 1979: 392) while in Cuba, for some time, burglary 
was ―redefined as a political crime‖ (Salas, 1979: 3). 
Nevertheless, principles of rational choice theory are not completely abandoned by 
socialist criminology. Buchholz (1974: 16) for instance recommends principles that 
are very similar to the modern situational crime prevention and routine activities 
theories: 
a structural analysis can, moreover, be bracketed with distribution in time, 
such as season, month, week or even time of day, and this - correlated with 
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other parameters - may provide valuable information for time-oriented 
preventive and crime-fighting measures. Analogous information may be 
obtained on spatial distribution in a narrower sense. 
Indeed the ‗rational choice theory‘, which is not socially but arguably individually 
based because it relies on the rational calculations of individual perpetrators, has 
not been appreciated by socialist discourse, probably because of the latter‘s heavy 
devotion to Marxist social theories, but it is also not alien to socialism since it is all 
about rationality, science and calculation.  
3.3.3.4. Position in relation to society 
Unlike their capitalist counterparts, socialist societies and institutions are in 
consensus. They do not compete for market shares or extra profit. They see other 
world governments as big worker unions and they aspire to a unification of all of 
these state-unions under a big confederation of unions. 
It should also be mentioned that socialist societies are the societies of commonality. 
Whatever people have it is considered to be everybody‘s property. There is no private 
property or intellectual property other than the state‘s properties. For instance, 
―individual ideas [are] owned by the state to be shared by everyone‖ (Temple et al., 
2005) or sold to the outside world by the state for the society with no return to the 
original inventor, producer, author other than a salary planned beforehand.  
Socialism is based on a society which uniformly distributes power and wealth and 
condemns private property. Consequently, all the people living in a socialist country 
are supposed to be equal to one another. In socialist countries, the state is visible in 
every part of human conduct; social, economic, bureaucratic or otherwise. 
Socialist scholars believe that until the society becomes completely communist, there 
is a need for courts, laws, police, prisons etc. but once this aim is achieved people will 
stop committing crime and there will be no need for law at all (Terebilov, 1973). 
Despite these enormous differences, socialism retains the remaining Western 
philosophy. They for instance refer to the same people in their intellectual history, 
such as Hegel, but with different interpretations.  
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3.3.3.5. Position in relation to financial crimes 
As for financial crimes, which are studied under the main branch of white collar 
crimes in Capitalism, they are not accepted as a valid phenomenon in Socialism. For 
instance, to Buchholz (1974: 7), concepts like the ―‘crimes of affluence‘ ... are 
designed to manipulate people‘s minds.‖ 
In recent years, however, white-collar-crime is an accepted phenomenon in Socialist 
societies despite ―draconian regulations designed to prevent white-collar crime‖ 
(Financial Times, May 20, 2011). WCC is named as „guayabera‟ (a kind of 
distinctive dress) crime in Cuba, which is a country that  
is fertile ground for corruption. After 20 years of economic crisis, and with state 
wages worth around $20 a month – a level that the government admits does not 
cover necessities – almost all Cubans engage in illegal activities to survive and 
the huge disparities between peso salaries, worth just a few dollars a month, and 
the influx of strong currencies, even in very small amounts, create extremely 
strong incentives to become corrupted. (Financial Times, May 20, 2011) 
The whole terminology of mainstream criminology becomes obsolete in classical 
sociological discourse. Most of the time, the usual terms convey the exact opposite 
meaning in socialism. For instance, there is a crime related to monopolies but this can 
be committed by individuals who act against the power of monopolies. Nevertheless 
modern China has a competition authority in the classical Western sense. 
Speculation and violation of government monopolies were crimes in Soviet socialism 
in 1922, 1926 and following criminal codes (Shelley, 1979a: 616-617) and some 
journals like  ‗Institutugolovnoipolitiki‟ and ‗InstitutSovetskogostroitel‟stvaiprava‟ 
were focusing on speculation, along with a few other kinds of crimes (Shelly, 1979: 
627).  ―After the revolution and during the civil war, the overall amount of violent 
crime increased and the economic crimes of speculation and theft of personal and 
state property rose dramatically‖, peaked in 1924 and continued until the end of the 
decade (Shelley, 1979: 393). 
The term ‗corporate crime‘ is another example. There are no private corporations in 
socialism but only state enterprises. Thus, all corporate crime, which is ―done for the 
benefit of a private business‖ (Hagan, 2010: 223), becomes either ‗organizational 
crime‘ or ‗political crime‘ in socialist countries.  
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White collar criminals are most of the time political people in socialist countries and 
although regular rates of crime are generally low in socialist societies white collar 
crimes are not very rare. For instance in Cuba, in 2010,  
the Cohiba-puffing Manuel García, the long-time vice-president of Habanos 
S.A., a joint venture with London-listed Imperial Tobacco and the exclusive 
distributor of the island‘s famous cigars, was arrested along with a number of 
other executives and staff‖ and in 2011 ―hundreds of senior Cuban Communist 
party officials, state managers and employees [lost] their jobs and sometimes 
their freedom‖ because of guayabera crime because especially in the external 
sector, ―foreign trade and off-shore activities make corruption easier‖ (FT, May 
20, 2011). 
3.3.3.6 Seeking a consensus/standard for criminological discourse of socialist 
societies 
Socialism‘s definition of crime is similar to both the ‗Socio-Legal Approach‘ of 
Sutherland and to the ‗Legal-Consensus Approach‘ of Tappan, because whatever is 
coded as crime by the state is crime but the codes are enacted for the benefit of the 
society only, sometimes even disregarding the rights of the individual. Nevertheless, it 
is arguable whether or not criminal codes are of the society or enacted to socially 
engineer the society. In this regard it can be put under a separate title of a ‗mere legal 
approach‘ to crime.  
Socialist criminologists accept that legal codes cannot always address the social 
problems in advance. This is correct the other way around as well. According to the 
German interpretation of socialism for instance ―[t]he criminal law ... has a decisive  
influence on the structure of general criminality‖ (Buchholz ,  1974: 15). 
As for a standard theory of crime, one can argue that the principles of socialism force 
socialist criminologists to utilize only social theories like ‗label theory‘, ‗social 
learning theory‘, ‗social disorganization theory‘ etc. Especially social structure 
theories of crime are of great interest to socialist criminologists because like Cuba, in 
some socialist countries ―[c]ausation is viewed in terms of institutional failure rather 
than societal faults― (Salas, 1974: 8). 
Interestingly socialist criminologists exclude the ‗social conflict theory‘ of Marxists 
like Bonger, Turk, Quinney etc. while discussing the aetiology of crime because the 
socialist way of life should have eliminated the conflict that is criticized in capitalist 
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societies. But conflict theoreticians‘ theories can be taken as the preconditions or 
initial stages of socialist criminology as argued by: ―the abolition of capitalism and 
the redistribution of wealth and power would restore a favourable environment and 
eliminate crime followed almost entirely as a matter of political logic‖ (Lilly, 2006: 
152).  
Thus, Socialism, as studied by the Marxist Theory of crime, sees the class conflict, in 
other words a badly designed society which is based on conflicting classes of uneven 
power and wealth, as the foundational reasons of crime. Some of the criminologists 
prefer to put the names of the founding fathers of socialism explicitly at the heart of 
criminology. According to Buchholz (1974:8) for instance, ―Socialist criminology 
sees the Marxist—Leninist concept of the causes of crime as its principal scientific 
foundation‖. The second part of the duality, arguably, may change to Maoism or 
Castroism in other socialist countries but the Marxist component, of which the main 
aim is to find out the crimogenic conditions of social reality, would be constant as 
indicated by Buchholz et al. (1974: 2),  
[t]he development of the causal theory concept of socialist criminology as a 
methodological tool led to clarity about the fact that the central task in 
studying the causes of crime is the discovery of the statistical laws which 
operate or operate in part, between the material and spiritual sets of 
conditions of social reality and certain criminal phenomena. 
Very explicitly, socialists announce that the fundamental theory of criminology 
should be socially founded. For instance, Streit (1968: 3) enumerates ―basic beliefs‖ 
of ‗them‘ as follows: ―1- Criminality is a social and historical phenomenon. 2- 
Criminality is a phenomenon alien to the nature of socialism‖. Streit (1968) also 
describes socialist criminology as a ‗diversified‘ system and ―a specific system of 
differentiated social phenomena‖ which is purely deterministic because it ―must be 
seen and investigated as, among other things, reflections of definite determinants‖ 
claims Streit (1968: 3).  
Among these social causes, Soviet criminology for instance examined ―changing role 
of sexes, population movement, the economic policies of the NEP, agricultural 
collectivisation and the destruction caused by the revolution and the Civil War‖ 
specifically in the 1920s (Shelley, 1979: 393). This is why socialist criminologists, 
such as Fedoseyev (1970: 9), blame the remaining debris of capitalism in their society 
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for the causes of crime. Theoretically, there should be no crime in a classless society 
because the cause of crime, private property and material imbalance, has been 
removed from the society.    
Evidencing this, Salas (1979: 8) gives ‗characteristic‘ examples from the Cuban 
media: 
[a] door which was not properly closed allowed the theft of clothing, 
electrical appliances and other articles... The negligence of the administrator 
or the employees of this unit allowed the criminal act to take place. This act is 
an attack against the right of the workers and the families in the 
neighbourhood to acquire consumer goods as a result of their work‖.  
Label Theory can be noteworthy among social theories here. Indeed, the above 
example of theft is published in a paper, titled ‗Labelling Deviant Behaviour‘, by 
Schur (1974). According to the label theory, crimes are nothing more than ‗bad‘ labels 
attached to the socially powerless by the socially powerful and before they are defined 
there is no objective basis for the morality. According to Bonger, for instance, crime 
fell into the category of immoral actions and definitions of morality are varied. This 
view also holds that there would be no crime in power-balanced-societies because 
labellers would be incapable of attaching ‗bad‘ labels to their peers, because this idea 
―assumes that there is no universal consensus concerning moral values or what is or is 
not deviant‖ (Salas, 1979: 2). Besides, in a society of no religion, there would be no 
religious or moral reasons for condemning others in a power-balanced society as well.  
As many believe, Socialism is idealistic. In Cuba for instance, Salas (1979: v) argues 
that: ―[t]he means adopted for social control and the instillment of the new ―socialist 
morality‖ are at the crux of the ideology adopted in the quest for the ―New Man.‖ This 
idealism can be observed easily in Socialist criminology as well. For instance, there 
have been studies of the aetiology of crime in diverse disciplines like biology, 
psychology, philosophy, education, medicine etc. (Buchholz, 1974: 20; Shelley 
1979a, 621) in Germany, Soviet Russia and other Soviet countries but these were 
either abandoned completely in a very short time (e.g. in Soviet Russia after only two 
decades) or have been studied in relation to the society only  (e.g. in East Germany in 
the 1970s), leaving Marxist (social) aetiological research on crime as the sole valid 
theory of crime. In some Socialist countries (e.g. Soviet Russia) scholars were 
criticized by the state and some of them, like Gertsenzon, agreed with it by saying that 
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―Marxism provided the only appropriate view of the etiology of crime‖ (Shelley, 
1979a: 620).   
3.3.4. Islam and Conceptualising Crime 
Some scholars like Scalek (2002) consider criminology to be ―a ‗modern‘ discipline 
that has often bypassed the issue of religion‖. Vold et al. (1998), however, unlike 
others, group criminological theories under one of the following categories: 
‗spiritual‘, ‗natural‘, ‗classical‘ and ‗positivist‘, which recognises religious knowledge 
as a source of epistemology. 
Islamic criminology theory is not a spiritual theory, although the first impression may 
suggest so. Many religious frames of reference in relation to crime hold a spiritual 
perspective but there are great disparities between different religions too. For instance, 
Christianity holds such a viewpoint and sees among the causes of crimes the role of 
bad spirits, the devil and witches (Newman, 1978: 97; Ericson, 1966; Barnes and 
Teeters, 1945; Teeters, 1955).  
Hagan (2010) uses the term ‗demonological theory‘ to refer to the supernatural 
explanations of crime which ―dominated thinking from early history well into the 
eighteenth century‖ but the perspective of Islam is completely different from any such 
thinking. 
To give an example,  
Spiritual explanations of crime appeared in the New World in the Puritan colony 
on Massachussetts Bay. During the first sixty years of its existence this colony 
experienced three serious "crime waves" thought to be caused by the devil. The 
most serious of these ―crime waves‖ occurred in 1792, when the community was 
thought to have been invaded by a large number of witches‖ (Vold, et al., 1998: 
5) 
In Islam however, bad spirits and the devil have no significant effect on individuals 
(Qur‟an, 4: 7631). Islam‘s understanding of crime is similar to classical, rational 
definitions because free-will plays an important role in Islam. There are even some 
schools of thought in Sunni Islam like the Mutazilah School which accepts free will as 
the sole agent of all kinds of acts and behaviours in the world. Although the Mutazilah 
School can be considered as an extremist one, mainstream Sunni schools have not 
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 ―Surely the plotting of Ash-Shaytan has (always) been weak.‖ Translated by Dr. Ghali 
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denied the role of free will. Mainstream Sunni Muslim scholars state that everything 
(including the criminal event) has been created by Allah but after the inclinations, the 
free-will of people. Shia Islam is also very rationalist in its belief system. In sum, the 
Islamic belief system holds predominantly a rationalist belief system.  
It is observed that in Muslim countries, crime rates are low. For instance, Iran, the 
most inmate populated Muslim country, had 333 prisoners per 100,000 population in 
2011, listed as the 24
th
 most populous, while Saudi Arabia is listed 86
th
 with 160 
prisoner per 100,000, Malaysia as 104
th
 with 138 inmates per 100,000 and Sudan as 
197th with only 45 inmates per 100,000. Mean values of these rankings are below the 
means of the other cases we compare.  
Low figures may probably be due to frequently encouraged and enforced morality by 
the state institutions and laws. Actually this is not the case in some secular Muslim 
countries, at least the enforcement is not practiced by official institutions, as in 
Turkey, but informal discouragement does exist in the society and the crime rates are 
still considerably low, as indicated by the statistical evidences. 
3.3.4.1. Fundamental methods 
Islamic moral economy (IME) is ―a modern definition of divinely ordered rules and 
principles related to economic and financial activities, instruments, contracts and 
choices‖ (Asutay, 2010a: 35) which developed mainly in the last quarter of the 20th 
century. The first Islamic bank (IB) was established in 1975 and took the ‗commercial 
form‘ as opposed to the ‗social banking‘ example of Mit Ghamr in Egypt in the 1960s 
(Asutay, 2013). Since then, many Islamic financial institutions and products have 
been developed. At the heart of Islamic law are ―[t]he concepts of ‗adalah‘ or ‗justice‘ 
and ‗haqq‘ or ‗right‘ (Asutay, 2013: 57)  which emerge basically from the Holy book 
Qur‟an and the teachings of Mohammad, or hadith.  
Islamic law prohibits riba and gharar. Riba is from the Arabic root ‗r-b-w‘ which 
means growing, increasing, rising, swelling (Saeed, 1999: 20). Every kind of interest, 
even exchanging regular wheat for a fine one, is considered to be riba in Islam (Abu 
Muslim, 2014). Gharar on the other hand is the risk or cheating (tadlis), fraud 
(ghubn). It is ―uncertainty regarding future events and qualities of goods‖ (Al-Gamal, 
2006: 35). 
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This law is usually denoted by the term shari‟ah or the path, the correct path. The 
aims of Shari‟ah (maqasid al Shari‟ah) or Islamic way, including law, are, as 
explained by al-Ghazzali (Chapra, 2008: 4): 
to promote the well-being of the people, which lies in safeguarding their faith 
(din), their self (nafs), their intellect ('aql), their prosperity (nasl), and their 
wealth (mal). Whatever ensures the safeguard of these five serves public 
interest and is desirable, and whatever hurts them is against public interest and 
its removal is desirable.  
Thus, the aim of law including criminal law is to uphold human well-being as defined 
by the al-Ghazzalian interpretation of Shari‟ah. 
Methodologically, Islam conceptualises the individual as a ―socio-tropic individual‖, 
―for whom not only individualism but social concern is a prerequisite‖ (Asutay, 2007: 
12). Muslims are ―socially concerned, God-conscious individuals‖ who ((Asutay, 
2007: 12): 
(i) in seeking their interests are concerned with the social good; 
(ii) conduct economic activity in a rational way in accordance with Islamic constraints 
regarding the individual and social environment and the hereafter; and  
(iii) in trying to maximise their utility seek to maximise social welfare as well by 
taking into account the hereafter.  
These social and afterlife concerns of Muslims can be seen in the everyday 
mechanisms of the market as well. ―Market exchange is the main feature of economic 
operation in the Islamic system; however, this system is filtered through an Islamic 
process that produces a socially concerned environmentally friendly system‖ (Asutay, 
2007: 12). Thus, social and spiritual accountability (through the hereafter) aims to 
shape individual behavioural norms. 
In this regard, we may argue that Muslims appreciate the social and monetary 
dimensions of the world as suggested by the socialist and capitalist systems, however 
in addition to their concerns, Islamic thought seems to be adding the third dimension 
to the equation: the effects of the hereafter or spiritual accountability with the aim of 
achieving ihsan (beneficence) and adalah or social justice, which is considered to be 
an essential element of Islamic thought. As Asutay (2009: 12) suggests, then, in a 
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three dimensional calculation, an ordinary Muslim is ―trying to maximise his/her 
utility [and] seek to maximise social welfare as well by taking into account the 
hereafter‖. Asutay (2007: 12) also explicitly favours the use of ―multi-dimensional 
utility theory‖. 
However, in the globalized world, the theoretical principles of Islam are not entirely 
and adequately followed by Muslims (Arif, 1989), which makes the additional 
dimensions of the multi-dimensional utility function weaker. Muslims allocate their 
resources in a rational way and this rationality includes the hereafter as well as the 
material world. However, ―to be a Muslim is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
to be a tab‟ay‖ (Arif 1989: 91). In order to be tab‟ay sufficiently, Muslims should 
―operationalize Islamic principles in every aspect of their life‖ (Arif, 1989: 91). 
The ontological source being the divine knowledge and articulation of such divine 
knowledge through spiritual accountability via the hereafter distinguishes Islam from 
the other systems. Positivism for instance becomes obsolete in Islam despite the fact 
that the universe is predestined because the majority of Sunni Muslims (Scalek, 2002: 
6) believe that God did not set the clockwork universe intact, from His interventions 
such as revelations, miracles, and answers to prayers. However, individual and group 
behaviours are predictable with great accuracy if alims or scholars acquire the deep 
knowledge of Allah and of His universe (positive sciences) together. 
Unlike both Socialism and Capitalism though, Islam does not apply a dialectic 
method. Its methods may be named as cumulative, additive, evolutionary or 
expansionary because it is very rarely that famous alims reject each other‘s ideas and 
even if they do so, they do it not on crucial points or the foundational aspects: they try 
to build up one, complete, agreed-upon theory instead of having many contradicting 
theories.   
In terms of conceptualising and articulating crime, in Islam, there are three kinds of 
crime and criminality: crimes against Allah, against people and against individuals 
themselves (Qur‘an, 39: 5332). Breaching the rights of others is punishable by both 
Allah (in both worlds) and by the state. The state cannot intervene in the rights of 
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 ―Say: O my servants! who have acted extravagantly against their own souls, do not despair of the 
mercy of Allah; surely Allah forgives the faults altogether; surely He is the Forgiving the Merciful.‖ 
Translated by Shakir. 
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Allah or their forgiveness for that matter and does not regulate that area but educates 
people. The aetiology of all of these crimes is the same because criminality can be 
rephrased as a ‗breach of rights‘ in Islam, either of Allah, of people or of self. And 
being free from crimes against Allah is not enough for salvation (Qur‘an, 5: 933).   
One can argue that there are three main causations that are tied to three different types 
of individuals in an Islamic society, which are enumerated in the very beginning of 
the Qur‘an: (i) nonbelievers, (ii) nonbelievers who deny their position or (iii) 
believers. For the first category of nonbeliever, either in an Islamic society or of a 
standalone society, Islam does not disagree with the modern criminological theories. 
For instance, huge discrepancies between the rich and poor in a class based society 
may have aetiological effects on criminality. Islam does not disagree with this idea. 
Nor does it disagree with the idea that individuals learn deviant behaviours from each 
other in corrupt social groups. The second category, namely, nonbelievers who deny 
their positions, are unpredictable (Qur‘an, 4: 14334) in the society in terms of their 
criminological behaviours but obviously criminal against Allah. For the last category 
which includes believers, one may argue that the main reason of criminality is the 
distance of the individuals from the ‗faith‘ or ‗iman‘ because Islam holds that the 
more one gets closer to Allah, prays to Him, obeys His books and His prophets, the 
harder it is for one to go astray and commit crime.  
It should be noted that these categories are not predetermined and not statically 
continuous though. Nonbelievers can be believers in the course of time and believers 
can be nonbelievers. Nobody can be sure of their status anytime in their life and thus 
states cannot be sure about their citizens as well and thus must act as if everybody is a 
pious Muslim (Qur‘an, 2: 7835).  
The sources of law and hence knowledge in Islam are the Qur‘an, the tradition and 
sayings of the Prophet, qiyas or comparison and ijma or consensus. While as 
suggested by the ontological sources Islam is not positivist, the legal tradition of Islam 
or fiqh is quite positivist, because it evolves by regulating contemporary disputes by 
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 ―Allah has promised the ones who have believed and done deeds of righteousness (that) they will 
have forgiveness and a magnificent reward.‖ Translated by Dr. Ghali, (emphasis added). 
34
 ―Wavering between that (and this), (belonging) neither to these nor to those; and whomsoever Allah 
causes to err, you shall not find a way for him.‖ Translated by Shakir 
35
 ―And among them are illiterates (who) do not know the Book except (only) fancies, and decidedly 
they do (nothing) except surmise.‖ Translated by Dr. Ghali 
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extending verdicts from the earlier texts and/or legal decisions.  This methodology, 
however, does not care whether or not the verdicts produced or new Islamic legal 
rules prevent future disputes or cause further problems in another course of everyday 
life of the society. The spiritual dimension and aims of the society like ‗falah‟ or 
salvation, ‗insan-i kamil‟ or the complete human being and ‗maslahah‟ or public good 
(Asutay, 2010a) especially, most of the time are overlooked by fuqaha or the religious 
scholars. 
Islamic knowledge is constructed around the concept of tawhed, which, semantically, 
means oneness; it implies that everything in the universe should be understood within 
the creation and power of God. Islam, therefore, refuses every kind of secondary 
power, including the devil‘s power like ditheists, bitheists, dualists suggest against the 
one and only God, or Allah. Islamic teaching suggests that Allah is the sole owner and 
practiser of power apart from the ones who, by His permission, exercise limited 
power. According to Obaid and Ahmed (1971: 1) ―the salient features of Muslim 
political thinking that distinguish it from the political thinking of the Western 
philosophers are the Sovereignty of God, Law above the State, emphasis upon the 
attributes of the head of the State and not the State as ethics and basis of politics‖. 
Theodicy according to Sunni Islam is explained by Abu Haanifah (1900) as follows: 
Allah, despite His pure beauty, created (and/or creates) ‗moral evil‘ after the 
dispositions of people towards it but He does not desire evil to happen. He creates it 
despite His hate because behaviours themselves are not evil
36
 and this is a must in the 
world of the test, the test of fate, that is, if there is no evil everybody must go to 
jannah (heaven) with their fates untested.  
Similarly, ‗natural evils‘ like floods, hurricanes and earthquakes are not evil in Islam 
because dying enables souls to enter the true, eternal world. Finally, evil is relatively 
defined and dependent on the good. Evil is not itself created but comes into existence 
by the disappearance of good. 
In Islamic teaching, the individual is considered to be the khalifah or the vicegerent of 
Allah on earth; and this khalifah position in Islam is also unique. In addition, the 
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 For example, inserting a sharp knife into the neck of somebody, is not an evil act if the agent is a 
surgeon, a soldier in a just war or a butcher when killing an animal for feeding people.  
106 
 
society is expected to be run by a khalifah, or the leader, who has to make the same 
calculations as the ordinary Muslim does and he/she has many responsibilities. They 
do not run for elections, elections are supposed to be initiated by the society and the 
khalifah, before his/her important decisions, has to consult the ummah (the society) 
and obey their common idea. There are many important terminologies to understand 
Islam as a system such as adalah, ikhsan, fardh etc. but we refer to these when 
necessary. 
3.3.4.2. Position in relation to material world 
Islamic societies are not positivist, determinist, materialist but they appreciate the 
partial correctness of the concepts these terms refer to. For instance, Islam requires 
her members to obey the worldly natural laws that are laid down by God and they 
believe that the material world is mortal and that the universe will one day be 
annihilated.  
In terms of materials in the framework of materialism, Islam recognizes private 
property and allows its followers to be rich and thus to be poor. But it also orders the 
rich to take care of the poor by means of zakah (or compulsory alms giving), infakh 
(social welfare contributions) and qard al hassan or lending with no expected 
repayment, and the poor to work hard to achieve enough money to live in dignity. A 
hadith or saying of the Prophet, for instance, suggests that being a healthy, prosperous 
person rather than being weak and poor should be preferred in Islam (Abu Davud, 64 
(Supporting the Family)
37
: 269; Tirmizi, Da'avat 68, (3477); İbnu Mace, Dua, 2 
(3831)
38
; Ebu Davud, Salat 145, (850); Tirmizi, Salat 211, (284); İbnu Mace, Salat 23, 
(898)
39
).  
3.3.4.3. Position in relation to individual 
There is an implicit notion of situational causality and arguably individuality of 
different deviant behaviours in Islam (Qur‘an, 2: 2 – 2: 8). Individuals‘ free wills are 
so valued that victims for instance are given the right of allowing or pardoning some 
of the most important punishments such as capital punishment after killing. Indeed 
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 ―The best alms is that which you give when you are rich, and you should start first to support your 
dependants‖ 
38
 That Mohammad (pbuh) prays for richness 
39
 That Mohammad (pbuh) teaches his daughter to pray for richness 
107 
 
forgiving in such situations by the relatives of the victims ―is considered to be the best 
course of action‖ (Qur‘an, 42: 40) in Islam. These facts should imply that there is a 
great deal of emphasis on individuality in Islamic criminology.  
Islamic normative knowledge essentialises free will as fundamental. People, in a 
sense, cause the divine creation of acts and universal circumstances of the behaviours 
by using their free will. Especially in recent times young Muslims act as ‗micro-
mujtahids‟ or interpreters and easily switch between different religious interpretations 
(Yılmaz, 2004). 
Islamic theology suggests that people are created as innocent from birth, but are given 
the ability to choose between the deepest of the deep evil or the highest of the high 
good (Qur‘an, 95: 1-8). They choose between these two by using their free will (juz al 
iradah). The role of free will is very significant in Islam and it should be because 
justly deserving heaven or hell cannot be explained properly otherwise. In Islam, it is 
believed that free will (juz al iradah), self, ego, endurance, patience and some other 
qualities of the individuals are constantly tested during their lifetime.  
In Islam, the accountability of individuals is higher compared to other religious 
systems (Kimball & Teaching Company, 2008). For instance in many forms of 
Christianity, Christians go to Heaven when they die, even if they commit crimes 
against others and/or against God. Similarly, in Judaism, Jews go to Heaven with 
other believers but their status will be higher (Kimball & Teaching Company, 2008). 
Muslims, on the other hand, believe that they will go to  Hell if their evils weigh 
higher than their goods even if they believed in God as Muslims. There are some 
sayings of the Prophet (ahadith) informing us that the people of iman (belief) will be 
transferred to Heaven after suffering enough in Hell but the existence of iman  is not 
statically defined in Islam and it is a fear in many Muslims to lose it before they die.  
Apart from these beliefs, the belief in an afterlife with detailed (Kimball & Teaching 
Company, 2008) processes applies pressure on Muslims. For instance, Muslims 
believe that all their sins will be showed to all humanity, including their beloved ones, 
in the hereafter and that before the judgement day, they will suffer in their graves if 
they had many sins, crimes in the world. Fear and love of God is another reason of 
crime discouragement in Islam because some Muslims seek to achieve the „reza‟ 
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(consent) of Allah, meaning that he/she, by living a pious life, is loved by Allah. 
These and similar future frames of shame, and suffering, thus disturb Muslims and 
arguably restrains them from committing more crime. 
These various reasons for refraining from crime also show the multidimensional 
nature of the rational decision making process of the homo islamicus (Asutay, 2010). 
In terms of idealism, Islam can be considered to be in between Capitalism and 
Socialism because Socialism is very active in changing its human element, evident 
from history, and Capitalism on the other hand is very reluctant to impose any kind of 
control, regulation, any kind of authority on the society. Famous capitalists even 
suggested ―[t]hat government is best which governs least40‖ (Thoreau, 1993). 
3.3.4.4. Position in relation to society 
There are mainly two distinct understandings of Islam among Muslims. The first one 
encompasses all the religions that are ordered by God (Allah), including the religions 
of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad and of many more known 
and unknown, sent by God. In this sense Islam is the religion beginning with Adam 
and ending with Muhammad. The second understanding or the second scope of Islam 
is the one that excludes earlier messengers, earlier books and history. This narrower 
understanding can be denoted by the seldom used term ‗Mohammedanism‘. In this 
sense, Islam is restricted to one book, one messenger and a history since the 700s. 
Nevertheless both of these understandings indeed refer to the same thing but 
emphasise greater or narrower scopes of the religion which may be important for legal 
ramifications. 
Crime definitions slightly differ between these two understandings of Islam (Kimbal 
& Teaching Company, 2008); for instance, some scholars (e.g. Karaman, 2008) 
believe that people believing the earlier messengers in a Muslim society have a 
different and more lenient legal set of rules. This distinction brings about interesting 
implications about the position of Islam in relation to society. Islam, although very 
slightly, changes its set of rules according to the characteristics of societies, nations, 
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 Usually, incorrectly attributed to either Thomas Jefferson or Thomas Paine. 
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races (Qur‘an, 4: 16041). This should imply that biological and social causes of crime 
that have been studied for more than a century now by Western criminologists should 
not be alien to Islamic criminology.  
In Islam, it is considered that societies have their own unique characteristics. This 
basically means that the rules of the social conduct and the mechanisms of society are 
not generalizable to all. Societies should be analysed separately and crime fighting 
should be done by taking the differences into consideration. Even inside the same 
country, this diversity is acknowledged in Islam by multi-jurisdictions based on faith 
(of i.e. Jewish and Christian Law) under the same legal framework. 
Individual salvation is almost not possible in Islam. ―For instance, individuals are 
urged to spend of their wealth and substance on: (i) family and relatives, (ii) orphans, 
(iii) the poor, (iv) the travelling homeless, (v) the needy, (vi) freeing of the enslaved. 
Such acts define a Muslim‘s responsibility to develop a social conscience and to share 
individual and communal resources with the less privileged.‖ (Nanji, 2000: 106). 
Responsibility of the society extends to criminal behaviour as well. For instance in 
fiqh, the circumstances of crimes are taken into consideration. If a starving person 
steals or steals to feed his/her starving family, his/her punishment is either removed or 
lessened. This reflects the moral dimensions of the legal system in Islam. 
In Muslim societies, crime is not talked about much either because veiling others‘ bad 
deeds is strongly encouraged and searching for other people‘s crimes is discouraged 
in Islam. Acceptance of the convict back into society should be easier as well because 
sins and crimes are not extraordinary in Islam and almost all sins are forgivable by 
Allah after a sincere apology (Qur‘an, 39: 5342). 
3.3.4.5. Position in relation to financial crimes 
The main difference in Islamic business is the elimination of interest. Qur‘an has very 
clear explanations of the ban on interest and on several industries dealing with 
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 So, for the injustice (on the part) of (the ones) who have Judaized, We have prohibited them good 
things that were lawful to them, and for their barring from the way of Allah many (people), 
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 ―Say, (This is addressed to the Prophet) "O My bondmen who have been extravagant against 
themselves, (i.e., who have committed sins) do not feel despondent of the mercy of Allah! Surely Allah 
forgives guilty (deeds) all together; surely He, Ever He, is The Ever-Forgiving, The Ever-Merciful.‖ 
Translated by Dr. Ghali. 
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alcohol, pork, pornography, gambling and several other products and services. Along 
with these bans, financial crimes such as hoarding, speculation, manipulation, tax 
evasion, monopoly and other similar positions such as duopoly, cartel etc. are all 
defined as crimes under Islamic law, fiqh. Every kind of deceiving, thus fraud, gharar 
(not providing the necessary information at the time of the trade in the form of 
speculation) are also forbidden in Islam. 
As for the taxes, Islam has a different system of tax collecting. The word ‗kharaj‟ in 
the verses 23:72, 18:94, 2:267 refers to ‗tax‘ and a majority of Islamic scholars 
support this idea (Kallek, 2004: 8).  It is mandatory to pay tax. Zakah is also 
considered as another form of tax but according to a tradition which is formed after 
Othman, the third Right Guided Khalif, the zakah from the accumulated currency is 
left to the individual to decide although it is included under the tax books of the 
scholars after him (Kalek, 2004: 13) in addition to the state tax.  
In simple terms, Islam calls for an open market with many competitors working in 
cooperation who can bring the unprohibited products and services to the market with 
no restrictions and buy from the market with no harm or disadvantage. Any kind of 
accumulation or withdrawal of money or product or service from the market with the 
aim of profiting more in the future is banned in Islam. In this sense, Islam is fairly 
sensitive about unnatural attempts at affecting the market dynamics.   
3.3.4.6. Seeking a consensus/standard for criminological discourse of Islamic 
societies 
Since crime is not spectacular in Islam, we may argue that Muslim criminology would 
accept a certain degree of criminality in financial sectors of Muslim countries. This 
view is not acceptable from the point of view of a truly socialist country but is 
acceptable with even higher expectations in capitalist countries because of its function 
(Durkheim, 1965) or because the higher degree of modernity of the society requires 
this. 
This view of Islam makes routine activities theory operable in Muslim countries and 
in the financial context as well. Indeed, from the point of view of Islam, routine 
activities theory is even more operable because fiqh reasons that the owner of a given 
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property has to keep it in secure places otherwise the punishment is lessened. This 
gives some arguments of the theory, namely the capable guardians and unavailability 
of suitable targets, a legal recognition.  
These arguments may suggest a lower financial crime rate in Islam because the 
―[c]reation of human centric economy‖ (Asutay, 2007) is the central aim of Islamic 
economics, and Islamic finance specifically aims to be ―the operational tool of Islamic 
economics‖ (Asutay, 2007: 172). In other words, the Islamic system suggests an 
embedded financial system, which is embedded in the real economy. Nevertheless, 
Islamic finance literature is claiming a convergence with conventional financial 
systems (Asutay, 2011a). 
In Islamic societies, individuals have distinct motivational stimuli as well. Many of 
the additional stimuli like ‗God‘s will‘, ‗reminders of his presence‘, ‗assurance of 
paradise‘, ‗respect within society‘, ‗genuine obedience‘, ‗achieving higher heavenly 
rank‘ (Asutay, 2010) work as a preventive cause against crime and thus should 
decrease the number of motivated offenders. ―[I]n sum, the origins of motivation in 
Islamic teaching are attributed to ‗fear‘, ‗transaction- reward‘ and ‗love-the highest 
level of motivation‘‖. 
In Islam deviant activity is always discouraged
43
 but people are not deprived of the 
ability to commit crimes so long as they are not seen as a threat to the survival of the 
society. For instance, we see Abu Hanifah, father of fiqh, going to the prison and 
helping his drunken neighbour to be released from the prison and behaving softly 
against him. This could be taken as the awareness of Islam about the existence of 
deviant behaviour in society (Abu Hanifah, 1900).  
In a similar vein, it can be confidently argued that, somewhat similar to routine 
activities theory and the Durkheimian view, crime is not something surprising in 
Islam because ―Abu Ayyub Ansari reported that Allah's Messenger (pbuh) said: If you 
were not to commit sins, Allah would have swept you out of existence and would 
have replaced you by another people who have committed sin, and then asked 
forgiveness from Allah, and He would have granted them pardon.‖44.  
                                                 
43
 Hz. Ali says: ―become an average person inside the people just like one of them‖. 
44
 Muslim, 37: 6621 
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3.4. CONCLUSION AND LINKAGE 
3.4.1. Review 
In the realm of criminology, all major alternative paradigms are important because we 
live in a globalized world, in which ―the market and not the nation state is sovereign‖ 
(Taylor, 1998: 24). It is becoming harder to make distinctions between the 
worldviews of default and alternative paradigms of criminology but rational choice 
theory has had a big impact on all viewpoints and thus is very useful and operational 
for our study, for exploring the varied effects of different financial systems on 
financial crimes.  
Bentham, being a criminologist and economist at the same time, is an important figure 
to show the connection between the effects of a utilitarian approach to crime in 
market economies. Similarly, Marx, Weber and some other sociologists‘ study of 
capitalism and criticism of capitalism (socialism) suggests a bridge between the 
aetiology of crime and the socio-cultural foundations of economics. As these contexts 
suggest, Rational Choice Theory is appreciated by Eurocentric criminology as well as 
socialist and Islamic criminology. Other theories of crime are either inadequate to 
explain deviant behaviours in financial markets or they are not feasible for a 
comparative study of this magnitude. Some are even irrelevant, such as biological and 
genetic theories - as Sutherland proves. If biologically normal and successful people 
are committing the same crimes bad genes or DNA cannot be responsible for the 
deviant behaviour. 
It should be noted that ‗rational criminal‘ is the common denominator of all the three 
financial systems but the theory explaining rationality has some confusions about the 
effects of the motivation on the theory and this is why it would be a great contribution 
to the literature if it were further developed. 
In this chapter we explained all major criminological theories, and chose ‗rational 
choice theory‘ as the base theory to roughly circle our theoretical perspective. We 
explained in detail why the current ‗rational choice theories‘ were inadequate for the 
comparison of various financial systems despite being the most suitable. In addition, 
we explained why the opportunity is not enough to explain criminality and why the 
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literature needs a new or a developed theory as a continuum of rational choice theory 
after illustrating alternative paradigms of criminology. 
3.4.2. Conclusion 
The researcher, then, has no choice but to form a new grounded theory for a better 
explanation of the phenomenon of white-collar financial crimes. This is a must if one 
wants to compare certain financial systems because the researcher has to have certain 
criteria for the causes of financial crimes to compare. Using the current rational 
choice theory with its weak motivational arguments does not provide adequate criteria 
of comparison. It is very likely to reach unsound results with such an attempt. This is 
why we first attempt to form a better criminology theory that is based on the 
assumption that human beings are rational beings. Afterwards, in the following 
chapter, we compare the financial systems based on these criteria. 
Before beginning to improve the rational choice theory of criminology we need to 
give detailed explanations about the methodology we used, along with our qualitative 
and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis, to reach our grounded 
theory, and this is explained in the following Chapter. 
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Chapter 4  
FINANCIAL CRIME TRENDS 
IN COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
After identifying the criminological aspects of the main economic systems and 
comparing them on a number of criteria through theoretical understanding, this 
chapter aims to compare the nature, trend and development of financial crimes in 
these economic systems with the objective of drawing some conclusions therefrom. 
However, it is not really possible to obtain quantitative data on financial crimes since 
the 1980s for the cases we study. This is why comparative discursive analysis with 
qualitative data is used; however, whenever quantitative data were found, they were 
utilised to substantiate the argument. 
In the preceding theoretical literature review chapter, it was established that the best 
available theory to explain financial crime is the modern Rational Choice Theory or 
neoclassical school. The modern view of the rational choice perspective conceives 
financial crimes as a by-product of increasing opportunities. 
This chapter aims to respond to this assumption by comparing the rate of opportunity 
change and the rate of crime change in various economic regimes. There is little doubt 
that more opportunities increase the likelihood of taking illegal advantage of those 
opportunities; however, it is not certain whether or not there is a third variable 
effecting both opportunity and crime simultaneously or even whether the assumption 
that ‗financial crime follows financial opportunity‘ holds everywhere in the first 
place.  
If the assumption fails in some cases or if the existence of a third intervening variable 
is indicated, then we need to either completely abandon or modify and refine the 
classical Rational Choice Theory via many methods of theory building.  
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The following sections, hence, present the trends in financial crimes in the ‗market 
economy‘, ‗socialist economy‘ and ‗Islamic oriented Muslim economy‘. 
 
4.2. FINANCAL CRIME TRENDS IN MARKET ORIENTED/CAPITALIST 
SYSTEM 
Both proponents and critics of market society and market financial systems agree that 
crime figures are very high in the market system. For instance, criminologist 
Crawford (1998: x) argues that the market society
45
 is ―increasingly preoccupied with 
crime and with criminal justice. Despite increasing affluence in the post-war period, 
crime has continued to rise — often at an alarming rate‖. Burke (2005: 43) also 
argues that ―[g]overnments, essentially, lost patience with the failure of criminologists 
to solve the apparently never-ending explosion in the crime figures‖ in industrialised 
democracies including in the UK. This, for example, led the UK‘s public expenditures 
since the 1980s to be devoted ―more to finding and evaluating pragmatic solutions to 
particular offenses‖ (Burke, 2005: 43; emphasis added. 
In a similar vein, Marx and Engels (Marx and Engels, 1845/1975: 248), well-known 
critics of ‗market society‘,46 argue that ―[e]ven now crimes of passion are becoming 
fewer and fewer in comparison with calculated crimes, crimes of interest — crimes 
against persons are declining, crimes against property are on the increase‖. 
Similar to Marx and Engels, Bonger thinks that capitalism is a criminogenic society. 
As reported by Carrabine et al. (2005: 72), Bonger ―suggested that major shifts in 
crime come with the emergence of capitalism‖, and Bonger (1996: 72) concluded that 
the capitalist system ―weaken[s] the social feelings, breaks social bonds and makes 
social life much more egoistic‖. And its egoistic culture encourages ―insensibility to 
the ills of others‖. 
                                                 
45
 He is from the Centre for Criminal Justice Studies, University of Leeds. 
46
 We use this term here in order to show its incorrectness. Societies are usually not ‗capitalist‘ but 
‗market oriented‘ because the word ‗capital‘ means accumulated money to invest. In order for this 
word to be a characteristic of a society, the society must possess it at least in a majority but statistics of 
today show that the best representatives of the capitalist societies, namely the US and the UK, do not 
accumulate money in large amounts, and thus are not socially capitalist. Indeed the US and UK 
populations do not even spend the money they own but live on credit with very little savings. This is 
why it is more appropriate to use the phrase ‗market society‟ instead of „capitalist society‟. 
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Nevertheless, we cannot derive a comparative result from these claims. Even if the 
arguments are comparatively correct, it does not follow from them that the trends in 
financial crimes match the general crime trends. However, one partially useful 
method of indirectly reaching some initial conclusions about financial crimes could be 
the crimes against property.  
For the time being we may look at the crime trends of the systems in transition and tie 
these figures to the financial trends. As Table 4.1 shows, at the time of the Russian 
transition from socialism to a market economy property crimes were on the rise. Rates 
of larceny-theft and robbery more than doubled during the ten years between the mid-
1980s and mid-1990s. 
Table 4.1: Number of Property Crimes in Russia between 1985 and 1996 
 Robbery Larceny - Theft 
 Number Rate Number Rate 
1985 42,794 29.9 464,141 324.7 
1986 31,441 21.8 380,582 31.441 
1987 30,441 21.0 364, 511 30.441 
1988 43,882 29.9 478,913 372.2 
1989 75,220 51.0 754, 824 512.1 
1990 83,306 56.3 913,076 616.8 
1991 101,956 68.8 1,240,636 837.3 
1992 164,895 110.0 1,650,852 1,110.2 
1993 184,546 127.3 1,579,600 1,065.2 
1994 148,546 100.4 1,314,788 888.4 
1995 140,597 94.7 1,367,866 888.4 
1996 121,356 81.9 1,207,478 814.8 
Source: Ruggiero et al.  (1998: 235) 
 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 visualize these statistics. They clearly show the effects of the 
transition from a socialist system to a market system because of the peak exactly in 
1989, the year the socialist USSR collapsed. The peak for robbery begins in 1987 and 
theft and larceny figures follow the same pattern except for 1987 and 1989. This is 
indeed a predictable trend because a superpower does not decline immediately; it 
happens over a duration of some years, and during these years Soviet Russia was in 
an era of change, which was led by Gorbachev, namely, the Perestroika (rebuilding) 
and Glasnost (publicity)
47
 periods between 1985-1987, which meant loosening some 
                                                 
47
 Usually and incorrectly (Hamburg & Teaching Company, 1997) translated as ‗openness‘. 
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of the strict economic rules of  Socialism, such as from a reduction in price fixing 
from 150,000 products and services down to 15,000 and this time by factory 
management
48
 instead of the central office (Hamburg & Teaching Company, 1997).  
Figure 4.1: Number of Robberies in Russia between 1985 and 1996 
 
 
 
Source: Ruggiero et al.  (1998: 235) 
Figure 4.2: Number of Larceny-Thefts in Russia between 1985 and 1996 
 
 
Source: Ruggiero et al.  (1998: 235) 
                                                 
48
 This was not a real change because factory managers were members of the Communist Party just like 
planning officers. Thus only the place of the plan has changed and mildly loosened but still these 
policies made the effects of the transformation milder. 
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The trend of increase in crime against property in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 can be 
explained by the ‗expanding opportunity and opportunity space‘ in the society, 
because socialism does not allow private property and the wealth in socialism is 
equally distributed. Nevertheless, the Russian case does not follow the opportunity 
structure especially at the time of the transition period and the aftermath; see Figure 
4.3. 
Figure 4.3: Russian GDP Per Capita between 1990 and 2006 
 
Source: Taylor & Teaching Company (2008) 
Indeed, if crime follows opportunities and opportunity spaces, Figures 4.2 and 4.1 
should be decreasing before 1993, because the per capita GDP of the Soviet economy 
fell by roughly 50%, worse than the impact of the Great Depression (Taylor & 
Teaching Company, 2008). From 1991 to 1993, the marriage rate declined by 20% 
and the birth rate fell by 12%, life expectancy for men fell from 64 years in 1989 to 
57 years in 1994 with coronary disease, suicide, alcoholism and murder each playing 
a role (Taylor & Teaching Company, 2008). Indeed it is hard to argue that the 
financial opportunities increased during this era, but this can be explained by the lack 
of defensive institutions at the time, which is in parallel to Rational Choice Theory, 
but opportunity and opportunity space should be explored in detail. It is not mere 
abundance of wealth. Indeed entropy could be an alternative variable to explain 
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financial crime in Russia during the transition, along with the lack of deterrence. 
If the figures of crime statistics against property are relatively stable in the market 
societies or at least increasing but not dramatically so, we may conclude that crimes 
against property are a result of ‗opportunity‘ because of the cases we use to represent 
market societies which did not have such a dramatic change at the time. Even if these 
examples of market societies had considerable social changes at the time, it is very 
unlikely that these changes produced an immediate and profound increase of 
opportunity spaces, because socialism is a no-private-property system and capitalism 
is the representative of the systems heavily based on private property and wealth 
generation.  
The following section analyses the same time period for market societies in relation to 
crime trends. As can be seen in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5, crimes against property 
such as burglary and robbery were on a dramatic rise in the United Kingdom from the 
1980s until 1995. Crawford (1998) agrees with the same figures, according to him 
―[c]urrently, there are more than 5 million recorded crimes per annum in England and 
Wales. This represents more than a doubling of the official crime rate since 1979 and 
a tenfold increase on the l950 figure‖ (emphasis added). 
 
Figure 4.4: Robberies per 100,000 in England and Wales (Continuous Line
49
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ruggiero et al.  (1998: 379) 
 
                                                 
49
 Dashed line stands for Sweden 
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Figure 4.5:  Burglaries in a Dwelling per 100,000 in England and Wales 1970 – 
1995 (Continuous Line
50
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ruggiero et al.  (1998: 380) 
 
The peak observed for Soviet Russia in 1989 is also observable in the crime trends for 
the UK, as a market system economy. This is surprising because it is hard to assume 
that the UK experienced such a dramatic increase in crime opportunities in 1989. 
Thus, a systematic analysis is needed. Do these figures follow the opportunity 
increase in the same period? Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 show the increase in the GDP 
and stock index in the UK, respectively, to situate the economic performance as an 
indication of the changing nature of opportunity.  
                                                 
50
 Dashed line stands for Sweden 
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Figure 4.6: Trends in the UK GDP (1981-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/elmr/explaining-
economic-statistics/long-term-profile-of-gdp-in-the-uk/sty-long-term-profile-of-
gdp.html) 
 
Figure 4.7: UK Stock Market Increase (1989-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/statistics-
definitions) 
 
0
500.000.000.000
1.000.000.000.000
1.500.000.000.000
2.000.000.000.000
2.500.000.000.000
3.000.000.000.000
UK GDP in US$ (2011) 
GDP US$ (2011)
0,00
500,00
1.000,00
1.500,00
2.000,00
2.500,00
3.000,00
3.500,00
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
FTSE All Share 
FTSE All Share
122 
The same increasing opportunities are observable for the USA in the same period as 
well, as can be seen in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10. However, the trend of crimes 
against property, interestingly, does not follow the opportunities, unlike the UK. 
 
Figure 4.8: US Violent and Property Crime Rate since 1960 
 
Source: FBI, Uniform Crime Reports as prepared by the National Archive of Criminal Justice 
Data and available online at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/Crime.cfm 
 
One may argue that the downward move in the crime trends in the US can be 
attributed to the ‗zero tolerance‘ policies, but ―zero tolerance policing is often equated 
with the recent changes to police practices in New York City only‖ (Marshall, 1999: 
3), which was home to 1/35th of the US population in 2000.  Even if New York City‗s 
impact on federal policies is greater than other states‘ impacts, such practices at least 
initially are supposed to increase the statistical trend instead of decreasing it, because 
it basically means being ‗tough‘ on crime and applying less leniency. Besides, Bratton 
became Police Commissioner of New York City in 1994, but the statistics show an 
already declining figure at the time. Indeed, the demise of the Soviet Union must had 
had positive effects on US opportunities, as seen from the opportunity figures. 
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Figure 4.9: US GDP in US$ (1980 - 2011) 
 
Source: World Bank, 2011 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD) 
 
Figure 4.10: US Stock Market Increase (1980 – 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wilshire.com (https://web.wilshire.com/Indexes/calculator/) 
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It is very clear from the trends that crimes against property in the UK followed the 
volume of opportunity, measured by GDP and stock index. Nevertheless, the same 
kinds of crimes did not follow the volume of opportunity, measured by the same 
variables, in the US. Indeed, crime trends against property are the exact opposite of 
the opportunity trend in the US between 1989, the fall of the Soviet Empire, and 1995 
and so on. 
The most relevant criminological theory about financial crimes in the literature,  that 
is Rational Choice Theory, holds that crimes against property and thus financial 
crimes follow the opportunity structures in a given system. These figures though 
prove that this claim does not hold for some systems or in some time periods
51
. The 
fact that both the UK and the US are laissez faire market systems but have their crime 
trends completely opposite in the same time period suggests that the claim about the 
causality between the opportunity and crime trends against property should not be 
generalized at least through initial descriptive statistics. 
Indeed, the generalization across all financial systems is obviously not correct 
because the Russian crime rates against property follow a very similar trend to the UK 
in the same time period and then fell down after a while (Figures 4.1 and 4.2) unlike 
the UK trends. Nevertheless, Russian trends show a very dramatic breaking point 
from no private property, equal distribution of wealth, completely state controlled 
economy, to a free market, private property and unequal wealth-distribution economy. 
It is, indeed, very strange to observe similar rates of change between Russia‗s and the 
UK‘s crime trends against property in the same time period. Therefore, the claim 
about the causal relation between the opportunity and crime should not be generalized 
to socialism at least by using initial descriptive analysis. 
What is more interesting is the fact that it is not really possible to generalize the same 
claim even for the market economies either. Since the UK‘s and the US‘s crime trends 
against property are completely opposite, one cannot reason that crime trends follow 
opportunity in market economies as well. 
                                                 
51
 One may argue that the decline in the US‘s crime figures was due to the ―zero tolerance‖ policy in 
the US after the 1990s but one should note that this policy was specific to New York City only and not 
nation-wide. This is why it is not likely to spread its effects to the whole federal UCR crime figures of 
the FBI.  
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However, even if the claim of causality between financial opportunity and financial 
crime is correct, crime rates in different financial systems would still not follow the 
volume of change in the financial opportunities. They would indeed be considerably 
different, because, in financial crimes, opportunity cannot be used as a face value, in 
real terms. For instance, the GDP per capita might fall but because of a diversifying of 
the economy other opportunities could happen through displacement. For instance, 
the amount of real or nominal value of opportunity may decrease in a given financial 
system (e.g. total profits of all the corporations in all industries in a given year) but 
the heterogeneity of this very opportunity (e.g. the concentration ratios in certain 
industries) may increase in terms of increasing the likelihood of experiencing more 
competition crimes or manipulation crimes.  
Map 4.1 shows the comparative positions of countries towards competition related 
crimes. Thus, the quality of the opportunity is crucial along with the quantity of it. 
Amount of gross world product (GWP) may be the same in the following year in Map 
4.1 but it does not mean that the competitiveness will not be weakened by monopolies 
in the same period of time, despite the fact that the global opportunity stayed the 
same. Thus, even ‗stable‘ figures may hide opportunities on smaller scales, smaller 
dimensions. For instance, according to the CIA (2012) and DeLong (1998), the GWP 
were very similar in 2000 and 2010, despite the whole decade of economic 
performances of all of the countries. Rational Choice Theory may take this stable 
financial picture as a stable financial opportunity and thus opportunity for financial 
crime; nevertheless, Map 4.2 clearly shows that on a smaller scale, some countries 
had a different competition crime opportunity compared to their status many decades 
ago. For instance it is clear that China had consistently more financial opportunity 
increase for the last three decades but according to Table 4.2 both competitiveness 
scores and rankings for China get better. This is not what Rational Choice Theory 
would predict. Indeed, these statistics provide an important realization, that unfair 
competition is ‗crime‘ in transitional socialist economies and that they improve their 
position in the fight against unfair competition despite the fact that they constantly 
have greater financial opportunities. The simple fact that we have transitional 
economies moving from seeing companies as industries (monopolies) to companies as 
independent economic entities must convince us that financial crime does not follow 
financial opportunity so long as these economies reach higher economic 
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performances, because mere privatization means a decreasing level of monopolies 
which were once  forced by government itself. 
 
Map 4.1: Annualized World GDP Growth Per Capita Between 1980 – 2010  
 
Source: United Nations (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selbasicFast.asp) 
 
Table 4.2: GCR Index Scores and GDP Per Capita PPP of China Between 2000-
2014 
Years China‘s 
GCR Scores 
China‘s GCR Ranking in 
the World 
China‘s GDP Per 
Capita PPP in $ 
2013 – 2014  4.84 29 10,046 
2012 – 2013  4.83 29 9,142  
2011 – 2012  4.90 26 8,382 
2010 – 2011  4.84 27 7,550 
2009 – 2010  4.74 29 6,792 
2008 – 2009 4.70 30 6,185 
2007 – 2008 4,57 34 5,547 
2006 – 2007 4,20 35 4,746 
2005 – 2006  - - 4,102 
2004 – 2005  4,29 46 3,614 
2003 – 2004  - 44 3,217 
2002 – 2005  - - 2,881 
2001 - 2002 - 39 2,616 
2000 – 2001  - 40 2,378 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook and World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Indices 
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Thus, opportunity itself is a complex phenomenon. It is not just a rise in positive 
financial data. In fact, in the modern, fast and risky global financial system, rising 
financial figures are not the sole representation of opportunity, declining figures are 
opportunities as well (e.g. call options).  
 
Map 4.2: Global Competitiveness Index, 2012- 2013 
 
Source: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf 
For instance, as Table 4.3 shows, in the UK we should expect more competition 
crimes in the finance sector, because the opportunity to commit such crimes has 
grown since 1992 in this sector. 
 
Table 4.3: Composition of the top 15 FTSE 100 companies 
 
Type of company   1992 January   2006 January 
 
Banks      0     6 
Manufacturers    10     5 
Oil and gas     3     3 
Retailers     1     0 
Services     1     1 
 
Source: Statistics.gov.uk, 2011, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/economic_trends/   
             ET635Mahajan_Concentration_Ratios_2004.pdf 
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Looking at the figures for manufacturers in the list of FTSE 100 companies in 1992 in 
the UK, one may argue that the opportunity space has narrowed down for the 
manufacturing industry, because five of the biggest firms have dropped off the list 
and thus the crime rates would slope down following the trend of less opportunity in 
this industry. Nevertheless, if the reason that the number of companies has halved 
since 1992 in the manufacturing sector is the increased homogeneity of the market, 
then it is hard to argue that the opportunity space for committing crime has indeed 
decreased. We may then deduce that we need far more complex explanations of 
financial crimes than mere volume of opportunity change. 
As Table 4.2 shows, it is not only the overall financial opportunity that concerns us 
but the density or heterogeneity of the opportunity in any given case that matters for 
financial crimes, because agents may have a superior position compared to their rivals 
in certain markets in terms of their ability to commit financial crimes such as forming 
a monopoly and manipulating. As is obvious, one has to gain a higher potential 
position before monopolizing or manipulating the market. 
As Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 show, the heterogeneity in the financial markets in the 
US was increasing from the 1980s, which casts some doubts on the opportunity 
increase in the same period. Does it really matter what the volume of opportunity is 
for the monopoly/monopsony in the monopolized market or for the manipulator?
52
 
Figure 4.11: Density Proportions of 10 Biggest Bank Concentrations and ROE 
between 1980 and 1998 in the US 
 
Source: Rhodes (2010: 29-30). 
                                                 
52
 For instance, Nick Leeson tried to manipulate the whole National Market while it went down. 
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Figure 4.12: Taken Over Bank Assets and Big Mergers in the US (1980 - 1998) 
 
 
Source: Rhodes (2010: 19). 
 
Nevertheless, there are still many criticisms to which the claim that ‗crime follows 
opportunity‘, has to respond. For instance, from the point of view of Rational Choice 
Theory (everything else being equal), there is still the effect of individual motivation 
that has not been taken into account (automatically assumed) along with the volume 
of opportunity in rational choice theories. As explained earlier, many criminologists 
do not accept the idea that opportunity, solely, creates the motivation. Indeed, this is 
an everyday observation. Everybody passes down the same street but only burglars 
break into houses. If it were the opportunity creating its own motivation then 
opportunities would be taken advantage of by everyone who is aware and there would 
be no examples of the courtesy of bringing back the lost property, lost wallet, to the 
owner, no altruistic behaviour in the society. This is only one reason why opportunity 
is not enough to explain the trends in crime against property, as shown in the US and 
Russia cases above. 
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4.3. CRIME TRENDS IN TRANSITIONAL/SOCIALIST SYSTEM 
It can be argued that due to the nature of the economy and the financialisation of the 
economy, there are comparatively fewer opportunities for financial crimes in socialist 
and Islamic systems. Therefore, we would not expect the same crime trends in 
socialist countries, from the point of view that financial crime is a by-product of 
financial opportunity. Table 4.4 clearly depicts the opportunity asymmetry between 
the group of cases we analyse. 
General crime rates are substantially lower in socialist countries (Buchholz, 1974: 8) 
such as Soviet Russia. Similarly, China
53
 held the 117
th
 place in the international list 
of inmates with only 122 person per 100,000 but Cuba‘s statistics are higher with 297 
per 100,000 in 2004 (Walmsley, 2004) as seen in Map 4.3; nevertheless none are 
lower than the US or present day Russia with her market orientation. 
Map 4.3: World Prison Population Rates per 100.000 of the national population 
in 2009
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 Hong Kong 109
th
 with 133 per 100.000 and Macau 78
th
 with 171 per 100.000 
Source: International Centre for Prison Studies at 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/law/research/icps 
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However some scholars claim that crime statistics were artificially lowered by some 
socialist states like Soviet Russia (Shelley, 1979: 393) and Cuba (Salas, 1979); and 
also similar claims are made for the United Crime Reports (UCR) of the US (Siegel, 
1995) as well and not all deviance related statistics are low in socialist countries. For 
instance, Cuba is a world leader in divorce and suicide (Salas, 1979: 9) and 
considerably high in prison inmates (Walmsley, 2004).  
Table 4.4: Accumulated Stock of Outward Foreign Direct Investment as 
Percentage of GDP in 2005 (selected countries)   
 
Country % 
Norway 123 
Switzerland 107 
Belgium 104 
Netherlands 103 
Sweden 57 
United Kingdom 56 
France 41 
Canada 35 
Germany 35 
Italy 17 
United States 16 
Japan 9 
World  24 
Source: United Nations, Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2007) World 
Investment Report 2007: Transnational Companies, Extractive Industries and Development. 
Geneva, UNCTAD 
 
Another important reason for lower crime rates would be the nature of economic and 
financial opportunity in socialist countries, as people have a very restricted 
opportunity in socialist countries. Although such a term as ‗lack of affluence‘‖ is 
harshly rejected by some socialist criminologists, who accuse the critiques of being 
―intended to brainwash the public of the capitalist countries against socialism‖ 
(Buchholz, 1974: 7-8). 
Herfindahl Index and the first 5 and first 10 banks concentration for China and Cuba 
along with Merger & Acquisition activities since the 1980s compared to market 
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economies and Islamic systems can give a better picture of the comparative applied 
nature of financial crimes and opportunity spaces. As clearly seen from Tables 4.9 
and 4.10 socialist economies have comparatively fewer opportunities compared to a 
market system. As seen from Table 4.5, among the 500 MNEs in the world, China, as 
a socialist country, has 20 companies and no other socialist or Islamic economies are 
represented in the list. 
Table 4.5: Share of the World‟s Top 500 MNEs by Revenues, 2005 
 
United States 170 
France 38 
United Kingdom 38 
Germany 35 
Netherlands 14 
Italy 10 
Spain 9 
Sweden 6 
Belgium 4 
Finland 2 
Denmark 2 
UK/Netherlands 1 
Belgium/Netherlands 1 
Ireland 1 
Luxemburg 1 
Total EU 162 
Japan 70 
China 20 
Canada 14 
Switzerland 12 
South Korea 12 
Australia 8 
India 6 
Brazil 4 
Mexico 5 
Russia 5 
Taiwan 3 
Norway 2 
Other Countries (one each) 7 
Total 500 
Source: Fortune Global 500, 2006  
 
However, there is no country in the world which has an Islamic financial system 
prevailing as the sole system except for Iran and Sudan; these countries have 
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Islamised their economies. The rest of the Muslim countries have adopted dual 
banking systems, having Islamic and conventional financial system running together 
in the economy.  Thus, the majority of the Muslim countries have adopted a market 
economy and some of them after experiencing socialism and nationalism have also 
turned to market capitalism. Thus, Islamic finance has been developing mainly within 
the paradigm and framework of a capitalist economy. 
Table 4.5 can be referenced to show the comparatively smaller size of the financial 
opportunities in Islamic systems, especially in fully Islamized systems such as Iran 
and Sudan. 
 
4.4. ISLAMIC FINANCE AND ISLAMIC ECONOMY 
In recent years, the emergence of Islamic finance has been observed, and it has been 
expanding beyond the Muslim countries. With about $US 2 trillion and having 
operations in over 75 countries (The Banker, 2013), Islamic banking and finance has 
become an alternative financing system with an emphasis on ethical and religious 
norms. Such foundational aspects have implications for crime and also financial 
crises, as its ethical nature substantiated by Islamic law is expected to reduce financial 
crime and increase resilience towards crisis.  
The major players in Islamic finance happen to be our cases: Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Malaysia and Turkey. Below, Figure 4.13 represents Iran‘s stock index since 1999 
and the figure clearly shows that Iran has an increasing financial opportunity space; y 
using the terminology produced by this study in Chapter 7, the ‗dynamic‘, 
‗immediate‘ ‗financial‘ opportunity space in Iran gets bigger but the space for Saudi 
Arabia is in decline since 2005 (see Figure 4.14). 
Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 depict the rise of the financial positions of major Islamic 
Finance actors and their rising regional shares respectively. 
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Table 4.6: Top 25 Countries by Shari‟ah-Compliant Assets 
2009 2010 2011 
2012 
Rank Country  
Shari’ah-
Compliant 
Assets $m 
Rank Country  
Shari’ah-
Compliant 
Assets $m 
Rank Country  
Shari’ah-
Compliant 
Assets $m 
Rank Country  
Shari’ah-
Compliant 
Assets $m 
1 Iran 293,165.80 1 Iran 314,897.40 1 
Iran 387,952.57 1 Iran 465,574.92 
2 
Saudi 
Arabia 
127,896.10 2 Saudi Arabia 138,238.50 2 
Saudi Arabia 150,945.43 2 Malaysia 221,025.52 
3 Malaysia 86,288.20 3 Malaysia 102,639.40 3 
Malaysia 133,406.38 3 
Saudi 
Arabia 185,223.00 
4 UAE 84,036.50 4 UAE 85,622.60 4 
UAE 94,126.66 4 UAE 89,309.38 
5 Kuwait 67,630.20 5 Kuwait 69,088.80 5 
Kuwait 79,647.85 5 Kuwait 78,587.25 
6 Bahrain 46,159.40 6 Bahrain 44,858.30 6 
Bahrain 78,857.47 6 Bahrain 62,171.53 
7 Qatar 27,515.40 7 Qatar 34,676.00 7 
Qatar 52,322.38 7 Qatar 45,301.30 
8 UK 19,410.50 8 Turkey 22,561.30 8 
Turkey 28,015.20 8 Turkey 29,292.86 
9 Turkey 17,827.50 9 UK 18,949.00 9 
UK 19,041.79 9 UK 18,605.43 
10 
Banglades
h 
7453.3 10 Bangladesh 9,365.50 10 
Sudan  12,139.45 10 Indonesia 15,963.97 
11 Sudan 7151.1 11 Sudan 9,259.80 11 
Bangladesh 11,677.10 11 
Banglades
h  12,572.97 
12 Egypt 6299.7 12 Egypt 7,227.70 12 
Indonesia 10,531.61 12 Sudan 9,825.23 
13 Pakistan 5126.1 13 Indonesia 7,222.20 13 
Syria 8,690.20 13 Egypt 8,296.32 
14 Jordan 4621.6 14 Pakistan 6,203.10 14 
Egypt 7,888.22 14 Pakistan 7,328.34 
15 Syria 3838.8 15 Syria 5,527.70 15 
Switzerland 6,582.48 15 
Switzerlan
d 6,551.37 
Source: Asutay et al. (2013) 
 
Table 4.7: IBF-Regional and Global Growth Totals ($ million) 
Source: Asutay et al. (2013) 
 
  2006 2007 
% 
Change 
2008 
% 
Change 
2009 
% 
Change 
2010 
% 
Change 
2011 
% 
Change 
GCC 
127,826. 
60 
178,129.    
60 
39.4 
262,665.
40 
47.5 
353,237.
50 
34.5 
372,484.
20 
5.5 
434,893.
10 
16.75 
Non-
GCC 
MENA 
136,157. 
60 
176,822.    
20 
29.9 248,264 40.4 
315,090.
50 
26.9 
337,948.
20 
7.3 
416,382.
20 
23.21 
MENA 
Total 
263,984,2 
354,951.    
70 
34.5 
510,929.
40 
43.9 
668,328.
50 
30.8 
710,434.
00 
6.3 
851,275.
30 
19.82 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
3039.        
3 
4708 54.9 
6662.    
1 
41.5 
8369.    
7 
25.6 
10,765. 
10 
28.6 
13,711. 
10 
27.37 
Asia 
98, 709.    
6 
119,346.    
50 
20.9 
86,360. 
30 
-27.6 
106,797.
30 
23.7 
130,904.
10 
22.6 
166,652.
80 
27.31 
Australia
/Europe/ 
America 
20,300.   
20 
21,475.      
70 
5.8 
35,105. 
20 
63.5 
38,654. 
80 
10.1 
42,779. 
50 
10.7 
53,939. 
10 
26.09 
Global 
Total 
386,033. 
30 
500,481.     
90 
29.7 
639,076.
90 
27.7 
822,135.
10 
28.6 
894,882.
70 
8.9 
1,086,46
2.90 
21.41 
% of 
MENA 
total to 
Global 
Total 
68.                  
4 
70.            9   
79.         
9 
  
81.         
3 
  
 79.      
39 
  
78.       
35 
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Figure 4.13: Tehran‟s TEDPIX All Share Price Index Between 1999 and 2011 
 
Source: Tehran Stock Exchange; Available at <URL: 
http://www.iranbourse.com/Default.aspx?tabid=70> 
 
Figure 4.14: Saudi Arabia Stock Market Index with Trend Between 1994 - 2014 
 
Source: Tradingeconomics.com 
136 
 
Figure 4.15: Malaysia Stock Market (FTSE KLCI) Index Since 1977 
 
Source: Tradingeconomics.com 
 
Table 4.8: Volume of Trading in Khartoum Stock Exchange by Sectors (2003–
2009) 
 Volume of Trading (SDG millions) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Banks 39.7 7.8 11.1 91.4 139.7 135.8 81.5 
Insurance 0.1 0.01 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.8 0.1 
Commercial 1.9 39.3 18.3 22.3 22.0 6.2 15.1 
Industry 0.01 39 48.2 57.0 4.0 0.8 25.4 
Agriculture 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Communication - - - - 432.2 320.1 122.5 
Services - - - - 0.8 7.6 0.9 
Funds 7.4 2.8 47.1 120.2 130.3 123.5 164.8 
Certificates 62.7 113.7 194.4 799.9 1068.5 1283.2 1836.3 
Others 132.3 245.1 897.7 977.3 0.1 0.04 0.0 
Total 244.1 447.7 1216.8 2068.1 1799.6 1879.04 2246.6 
Source: Ahmed and Suliman (2011). 
 
Looking at the stock exchange figures of Iran (Figure 4.13), Sudan (Table 4.8), Saudi 
Arabia (Figure 4.14) and Malaysia (Figure 4.15), it is easy to conclude that the 
financial opportunity space in Islamic Finance has increased since its emergence. 
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Data on bank capital to asset ratios of Saudi Arabia and Malaysia are also drawing a 
similar picture about the financial opportunity trend in Muslim countries. Figure 4.16 
represents this data. 
Figure 4.16: Bank Capital to Asset Ratios 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
 
In a similar vein, Table 4.9 shows a similar picture which can be used to show the 
non-existence of Islamic capital in world financial markets and thus the very small 
opportunities to commit crime outside national borders of Muslim countries because 
their share in the FDI flows is less than 4%, indeed the exact number is far below 4%, 
and the same picture is valid for socialist countries, only less so for China. 
  
Malaysia 
Saudi  
Arabia 
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Table 4.9: Percentage Shares of Estimated Stock of Accumulated FDI by 
Country of Origin, 1980 – 2005 (%) 
 1980 1990 2000 2005 
United Kingdom 15 13 14 12 
United States 42 24 20 19 
Germany 8 8 8 9 
France 5 6 7 8 
Netherlands 8 6 5 6 
Other Western Europe 9 16 22 17 
Japan 4 11 4 4 
Rest of the World 9 16 20 25 
 100 100 100 100 
Source: Based on Dunning (1992) and Nobes and Parker (2008) 
 
Obviously, partially Islamized cases have comparatively better opportunities then 
fully Islamized systems, namely Iran and Sudan. However, even partially Islamized 
countries, namely Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, have very few opportunities compared 
to the countries with a market system. According to some of these researchers, 
"[c]rime in Saudi Arabia is relatively low when compared to some developed nations, 
but may be increasing due to higher levels of foreign workers and higher levels of 
unemployment among Saudi residents." (Wilson, 2008) 
Similarly, Quraishi (2005: 22), argues that Muslims are traditionally under-
represented in criminal justice statistics and he emphasizes that special attention is 
required to this under-representation in non-Muslim countries such as the UK: 
―However, if a minority population has been perceived to have experienced prolonged 
periods of relative conformity, law-abiding behaviour and stability amidst social 
circumstances often cited as conducive to deviance, law breaking and instability, then 
surely this warrants detailed academic attention?‖ 
Ali (1985 in Reichel 1999: 50) found in his comparative research in 1981 between 
Saudi Arabia and Ohio in the United States that property offences and violent crimes 
in Saudi Arabia were far lower than in the United States (159 versus 5625.9 in every 
100.000). According to Ali (1985: 54), Souryal (1987) and Stark et al. (1982) these 
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extremely low crime rates are the result of ―profound internalization of Islamic 
religious values among Saudi people‖ or the penetration of religion in general in the 
communities.  
Saudi Arabia‘s GDP per capita was US$1,600 in 1981and in the US GDP per capita 
was $2,300 in the same year. Since the difference in the volume of national financial 
opportunities is in no way comparable to the national crime rates one can deduce that 
variables other than opportunity play a determining role in deviance against 
properties. 
In another comparative study, the cultural and moral environmental effects on crime 
are studied by Groves et al. (1987) as well, who used 14 Muslim (excluding Saudi 
Arabia) and 33 non-Muslim countries and reached the same conclusion as Ali (1985), 
Souryal (1987) and Stark et al. (1982).  
Groves et al. (1987: 500) found out that fraud and theft rates were ten times lower in 
Muslim countries, but by using other variables such as GDP per capita they concluded 
that ―it is a high level of economic development that is strongly related to high crime 
rates‖. This point is very popular in financial crimes literature and we somewhat agree 
with Groves et al. (1987) and others who argue that more opportunity brings about 
more crimes but this point needs clarification because it is difficult to explain murder, 
rape and other violent crimes by means of increased opportunity
54
. We address this 
point in our grounded theory chapter and show the correlation between motivational 
differences between socio-economic systems and increased opportunities.  
In addition to this moral and socio-cultural environment, Ali (1985: 54) also claims 
the effects of legal environment, the ―uncompromised implementation of the Islamic 
penal code‖. The effects of the legal environment solely, in isolation from the 
religious, ethnic and cultural environment, is supported by Souryal (1987) as well 
because Souryal (1987) showed lower crime rates in Saudi Arabia than in the 
neighbouring Muslim countries which have effected but not fully adopted Islamic 
law. Kuwait has been the main isolation factor because it does not fully apply Islamic 
law and has almost the same ethnic, cultural, religious, geographical environments as 
                                                 
54
 For instance Shichor (1990: 74) found in his comparative study that ―homicide rates were negatively 
correlated with indicators of modernization‖ such as public health and communication. 
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Saudi Arabia; despite these similarities, property crimes were 15 times more in 
Kuwait compared to Saudi Arabia. 
Souryal‘s (1987) study is more comprehensive and compared Saudi Arabian crime 
statistics with that of the world average (using UN Surveys between 1970 - 1975). In 
this study, Souryal (1987) compared property crimes as well and reached similar 
results. For property crimes, he reached the rate of 1.4 compared to the 908.5 of the 
world average.  
 
4.5. CRIME TRENDS FROM THE HISTORY of WORLD ECONOMY 
There are scholars who claim that historical analysis of crime statistics shows they do 
not follow the volume of opportunity. According to McDonald (1982)  for instance, 
even for the – said to be – criminal prone layers of the society, eras and areas of 
revolution like the Industrial Revolution, scored no increase of crime although these 
were the primary places Durkheim predicted to be ―in a state of upheaval and 
anomie‖(Williams, 1997: 345). 
There are recent examples from the history of the economy that point to the 
inconsistent claims of Rational Choice Theory on crimes following opportunity. Japan 
could be an example. As Figure 4.17 depicts, United States‘ and Japan‘s financial 
positions have been very similar in both trend and volume in the last decade; 
however, there is a vast discrepancy between their financial positions and their 
positions on property crimes. Figures 4.18 and 4.19 clearly show this discrepancy in 
both volume and trend in burglary and theft and motor vehicles theft respectively.   
As seen from Figure 4.18 there is a big difference in crime rate between the United 
States and Japan despite the fact that their indicators of economic and financial 
opportunity are similar. If crimes follow opportunity we would not expect such a vast 
difference in property crime rates between these countries. 
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Figure 4.17: USA and Japan GDP Per Capita in US Dollars Between 2000 - 2013  
 
Source: World Bank 
Figure 4.18: Burglary and Theft Rate Per 100.000 in USA and Japan Between 
2003 - 2008  
        
Source: UNODC, International Burglary, Car Theft and Housebreaking Statistics 
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Figure 4.19: Motor Vehicle Theft Rate Per 100.000 in USA and Japan Between 
2003 - 2008  
 
Source: UNODC, International Burglary, Car Theft and Housebreaking Statistics 
 
As figure 4.19 depicts, there is not only a huge difference (almost eight fold) in the 
volume of motor vehicle theft between the United States and Japan but also, the trend 
is in the opposite direction, compared to the financial opportunity trends as 
represented by GDP per capita Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Thus, looking at these 
data, crime does not seem to follow opportunity. 
In fact, comparison of two cases may hide special circumstances even when compared 
in a longitudinal way, in our case, 5 years. In order to check these figures one may 
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look at the aggregate data of the whole world. Based on UNODC Burglary, Car Theft 
and Housebreaking Statistics and the World Bank‘s financial data we compare the 
financial opportunity space and crime trend in the last decade in the following Figures 
4.20 through 4.24.  
Based on the intersecting data between 2004 and 2008 (four years) the World‘s GDP 
per capita is on the increase (see Figure 4.20) but burglary (see Figure 4.21) and 
motor vehicle theft (see Figure 4.23) are in decline. Again, contrary to the arguments 
of Rational Choice Theory, trends in theft of private cars (see Figure 4.22) and 
burglary/housebreaking (see Figure 4.24) are completely different, compared to the 
financial data in the same period. 
 
Figure 4.20: World GDP Per Capita PPP Between 2000 - 2008  
 
Source: World Bank 
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Figure 4.21: World Burglary Rate Stacking Chart Per 100.000 Between 2003 - 
2008  
 
Source: UNODC, International Burglary, Car Theft and Housebreaking Statistics 
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Figure 4.22: World Private Cars Theft Rate Stacking Chart of Per 100.000  
Between 2003 - 2008  
 
 
Source: UNODC, International Burglary, Car Theft and Housebreaking Statistics 
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Figure 4.23: World Motor Vehicles Theft Rate Stacking Chart Per 100.000  
Between 2003 - 2008  
 
 
Source: UNODC, International Burglary, Car Theft and Housebreaking Statistics 
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Figure 4.24: World Burglary/Housebreaking Rate Stacking Chart Per 100.000  
Between 2003 - 2008  
 
Source: UNODC, International Burglary, Car Theft and Housebreaking Statistics 
 
Consequently, we may confidently argue that financial crime opportunity may not 
simply be tantamount to positive financial data. Different dimensions, different levels 
of analysis reveal contrary realities even when the opportunity seems to follow 
positive financial data.  
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Table 4.10: Trends in Juvenile Property Crime Penal Code Offenders in Japan 
(aged 14–19) 
 2001 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Robbery 1,670 892 757 713 696 565 
Larceny 81,260 62,637 58,150 52,557 54,784 52,435 
Intellectual 
offenses 
526 1,294 1,142 1,135 1,144 978 
Source: Japan National Police Academy (2010) 
 
Table 4.11: Trends in Investment Fraud in Japan 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Cases 
cleared 
17 12 22 29 31 
Suspects 
arrested 
73 86 117 125 110 
Corporations 
cleared 
4 3 4 7 10 
Victims 14,429 30,230 64,016 53,698 19,014 
Amount in 
damages 
¥43.7 
billion 
¥80.8 
billion 
¥158.0 
billion 
¥165.4 
billion 
¥18.0 
billion 
Source: Japan National Police Academy (2010) 
 
Figure 4.17 which depicts Japan‘s financial trends in the last decade is consistent with 
the ‗economic crime‘ trends in Japan as seen in Table 4.11. However, this is a 
simplistic approach to crime and opportunity. When we consider other aspects, other 
dimensions of the comparison, we do not get the same results. For instance, the same 
comparison between the financial trends (Figure 4.17) and crime statistics can be 
made by using juveniles‘ ‗economic crimes‘ as well. In fact, Table 4.10 gives these 
statistics for Japan and as the data suggest, the trend of these statistics is completely 
opposite to the opportunity trends represented by GDP per capita PPP. 
One may argue that GDP may not be a correct instrument to represent financial 
opportunity of economic crimes but both volume and value of the Tokyo Stock 
Market give the same financial patterns as seen in Figure 4.25. 
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Figure 4.25: Tokyo Stock Price Index (Nikkei) Since 1900
 
Source: Tokyo Stock Exchange at 
http://www.tse.or.jp/english/market/topix/history/index.html 
 
Nevertheless none of the indicators are perfect, for obvious reasons, it is possible to 
find some other financial indicators with different trends but these indicators would 
have their own shortcomings as well.  
The possibility of representing financial opportunity trend in various ways 
singlehandedly proves that what we mean by ‗opportunity‘ requires a careful 
reconsideration as well because according to the opportunity measure A, crime trends 
follow the arguments of Rational Choice Theory but opportunity measure B switches 
the results. Then, does Rational Choice Theory have an ‗ideal‘ definition of 
opportunity for every distinct case? The real meaning of opportunity in criminology 
in general and financial white collar crime in particular deserves a diligent, scholarly 
effort. Rational Choice Theory has a rather blunt understanding of opportunity and 
motivation. This is why opportunity deserves a deeper observation, a scrutiny of its 
components, its meaning, characteristics and consequences. This is what this study 
tries to accomplish in Chapter 7. 
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4.6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter made it clear that the claim ―financial crime is a result of financial 
opportunity‖ made by Rational Choice Theory is an oversimplified, blunt argument. 
We provided various strong and robust analyses to show that volumes and trends in 
crimes against property do not follow financial opportunity in many cases. In fact, 
what is meant by ‗opportunity‘ is debatable just like what is meant by ‗crime‘ or who 
are meant by ‗criminals‘ (e.g. we showed that regular economic crime statistics 
follow financial opportunity in some cases while they do not follow the same statistics 
for juveniles). 
Consequently, looking at these statistics and studies, we may argue that although 
financial opportunities appear to be one of the important environmental factors in 
financial crimes and crimes against property they are not the only factor. Indeed this 
is predictable from the point of view of Rational Choice Theory which - although 
lately and loosely - accepts the role of motivation as a separate factor. 
Following from these arguments, and statistical inconsistencies and complexities, 
then, one cannot see crime as a result of opportunity only, nor can one see it as a 
concept that is completely explainable by the current theoretical arguments of 
Rational Choice Theory or any other criminological theories for that matter.  
Up to this point, all the relevant preparations have been made to begin explaining the 
new criminology theory built by this research on financial white collar crime and  
opportunity spaces; this new theory seeks to show how criminals‘ decision making is 
affected by the environment of crime. However, let us first provide information about 
the scientific methods used by this research and about the data, how it is collected, 
analysed, synthesized, coded, recoded, linked, formulated and structured as a 
coherent, consistent, reliable body of knowledge in theoretical form.  
In Chapter 5, we give all the methodological details of the theory building process we 
used before exhibiting the whole theory (Chapter 6), its environment (Chapter 7) and 
its coding processes (Appendix 1). 
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Chapter 5  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
A very short history of the milestones of this research can be related as follows: In our 
initial attempt, we looked for significant differences in financial crime disposition 
among various financial systems by using a number of criteria. However, when we 
analysed the data, we realized that the criteria suggested by the literature are not 
appropriate to answer the research question, because of the extreme cases compared. 
In order to find the appropriate criterion to compare these extreme cases such as 
socialism and capitalism we decided to build a grounded theory to both solve the 
problematic issues of comparing extreme cases and to produce a developed version of 
the best available criminology theory in the literature. 
In order to build a theoretical explanation, we used the grounded theory as a 
methodological framework, which proved to have better internal consistency and an 
authentic approach, because it now includes criteria that are capable of comparing 
extreme cases and it recreates financial crime as a dynamic, generalizable, compact, 
quantitative phenomenon. Finally, by means of the newly produced criterion within 
the framework of the new grounded theory or model, a new attempt is made in this 
study to compare the financial crime dispositions, as a propensity to crime, of various 
financial systems in order to find out the most/least vulnerable system in the 
comparison. While the end result in the form of comparison is important, the main 
contribution of this study remains within the development of a grounded theory. 
During this process, in a nutshell, we conducted an inductive, embedded case study 
design research with data source triangulation from purposeful sampling of mostly 
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qualitative
55
 data in the form of text and discourses to build a grounded theory via 
comparative cases; for this Eisenhardt (1989) in providing a methodology was 
particularly important. For the later part of the study, we use the same data and the 
resultant grounded theory to form comparison criteria in an applied manner, which is 
collected and formulated under the title of ‗opportunity spaces and defensive spaces‘. 
The following sections, hence, detail the methodological issues of this study. 
 
5.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Methodology is a way of studying social reality (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 3) or, 
more explicitly, ―the strategy, plan of action, process, or design lying behind the 
choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the 
desired outcomes‖ Crotty (1998: 3). 
There are mainly two types of research methodology, namely, ‗quantitative‘ and 
‗qualitative‘ (or ‗positivist‘ and ‗interpretivist‘). These ways of conducting research 
are usually - and mistakenly - seen simply as choices for doing research, however 
their role is far more intricate. As rightfully put by Asutay (2008:  2), methodology is 
indeed ‗a way of thinking‘. 
Scientists have more than one way of thinking. These are in fact emerging from the 
philosophical debates between ‗positivism‘ and ‗idealism‘. Chronologically, 
positivism
56
 was the first, distinct research paradigm but as the social sciences 
evolved more interpretivist
57
 (or phenomenological) paradigms were developed and 
recognized on the ground that ‗social‘ issues are not ‗facts‘ and they are produced by 
various agents interacting.  
Positivism is associated with quantitative methods of analysis in an attempt to 
essentialise the objective nature of ‗reality‘, while interpretivism is mainly based on 
qualitative methods of understanding the social reality through the perceptions and 
involvements of the actors of a social reality. Colls and Hussey (2009: 73) list 
paradigms and the methodologies associated with these paradigms as follows:  
                                                 
55
 This study used many statistics, graphs, tables, figures of numerical data but these numbers are not 
used in a positivist way, the research is about the real, deeper meaning behind the numbers and not 
about the exact values of numbers themselves. 
56
E.g. Comte (1798-1857), Mill (1806-1873), Durkheim (1859-1917). 
57
 E.g. Kant (1724-1804), Dilthey (1833-1911), Rickert (1863-1936), Weber (1864-1920). 
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(i) Positivism: Experimental studies, surveys, cross-sectional studies, longitudinal 
studies;  
(ii) Interpretivism: Hermeneutics, ethnography, participatory inquiry, action research, 
case study, grounded theory, feminist theory, gender and ethnicity studies;  
(iii) Pragmatism. 
Nevertheless, we have to realize that these are only tentative categorizations. All the 
methodologies may appear under all paradigms but some appear under certain 
categories more than others. 
According to the ‗positivist‘ paradigm, ―knowledge is derived from ‗positive 
information‘ because every rationally justifiable assertion can be scientifically 
verified or capable of logical or mathematical proof‖ (Williman, 2001: 15) and is 
independent of the researcher or the agents involved (Creswell, 1998). Thus, 
quantitative research, ―embodies a view of social reality as an external, objective 
reality‖ (Bryman, 2004: 19). 
‗Interpretivists‘, on the other hand, believe that ―social reality is in our minds, and is 
subjective and multiple‖ and thus ―effected by the act of investigating it‖ (Colls and 
Hussey, 2009: 57). ―Whereas positivism focuses on ‗measuring‘ social phenomena, 
interpretivism focuses on ‗exploring the complexity‘ of social phenomena with a view 
to gaining interpretive understanding‖ (Colls and Hussey, 2009: 57, emphasis added). 
We may, therefore, argue that positivism is precise and produces valid results but it is 
impossible to do it without taking into consideration the meaning, the quality of it. For 
instance, it is impossible to correctly measure the exact length of the borders of any 
given country
58
, without taking into account the meaning of the results, because as we 
approach the border, more and more details appear, even to the boundaries of stones, 
sands, atoms etc. Thus, interpretivism is not a luxury but a necessity for the 
development of science.  
Strauss and Corbin (1998: 3) define ‗qualitative research‘ as a type of research ―that 
                                                 
58
This can only be done from a certain latitude and every measure, thus has to have the associated 
latitude mentioned with the numerical representation of it. In a way, this realization, forces us to accept 
the assertion that the question ―What is the length of the borders of country X‖ in itself cannot even be 
asked without mentioning the distance of the observation and the observer. If we appreciate this strong 
analogy between the altitudes and the points of views of the interpretivists we can appreciate their 
invaluable contribution to scientific progress. 
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produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or the other means of 
quantification‖. Qualitative research is usually conducted while studying cultures, 
behaviours, peoples‘ viewpoints (Bryman, 1996: 46), attitudes (Hakim, 1987: 26), 
lived experiences, social movements, organizational functionings, emotions and 
feelings (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 3) and social or human problems (Creswell, 1998: 
15) of people. On the other hand, quantitative research focuses on correlations and 
quantified research, which however usually increases the quantity and precision of 
knowledge in science.  
5.2.1. Research Methodology in Grounded Theory Research  
In the context of grounded theory research, Strauss and Corbin (1998: 11) refer ―not 
to the quantification of qualitative data but rather to a nonmathematical process of 
interpretation‖ while discussing qualitative research. Grounded theory is parallel to 
such a way of thinking because it is ―highly formulized and descriptive‖ (Eriksson 
and Kovalainen, 2008: 167). 
Grounded theory is tantamount to building causalities (Backman and Kyngas, 1999) 
and ―uses both induction and deduction‖ (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 156) and 
―involves various aspects of inquiry (induction, deduction, even verification)‖ 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 156). According to Strauss (1990), all of these 
aspects are essential in conducting grounded theory related research.  
It should be noted that ―[t]he original studies and thinking about grounded theory were 
established using objectives embedded in positivism, and this thinking is still present 
in the procedures and philosophy of grounded theory, even if much of the research 
done within grounded theory today is following constructivist assumptions‖ (Eriksson 
and Kovalainen, 2008: 156). 
In relating to the nature of qualitative study, it is clear that for this study, qualitative 
methodology is a must rather than an option because we not only aim at developing a 
new theory but also there is a shortage of quantitative data on crime, even for the 
countries which are known to be very good at transparently publishing and 
announcing every aspect of social life. For instance, the United States is one of those 
transparent countries, however, as Albanese (2003: 110-111) puts it, many research 
questions about white-collar crimes are not easily answerable by quantitative analysis 
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in the US ―because there are no regularly collected data for white-collar crimes as 
there are for street crimes. Victimization surveys count only rape, robbery, assault, 
burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The Uniform Crime Reports, however, 
include forgery/counterfeiting, fraud, and embezzlement in their tallies of arrests 
which represent only offenders who are caught‖ (emphasis added to show the scarcity 
of financial crimes in crime statistics of US). 
Importantly, this research aims to develop a new model to respond to the need of 
having an overarching theoretical model which can help to compare significantly 
different systems in terms of crime. Therefore, qualitative researches are -arguably- 
better candidates to build theories, because in qualitative research, ―the researcher 
builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, reports the detailed view of 
informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting‖ (Creswell (1998: 15), and thus 
provides a more flexible environment which is much needed especially while studying 
a very complex phenomenon such as crime. 
As for data types, both qualitative and quantitative data are used in this research to 
develop and substantiate the grounded theory or model initiated by this study. We use 
qualitative data, because such data ―provide a good understanding of the dynamics 
underlying the relationship, that is, the ‗why‘ of what is happening‖ (Eisenhardt, 
1989: 520) in theory-building researches. We also use mostly socio-economic 
quantitative data. In a sense, we are rather pragmatic in our use of different data types 
similar to Jick (1979) and Mintzberg (1979). As Yin (1984) puts it, ―case study 
research can involve qualitative data only, quantitative only, or both‖.  
Thus, this study is a qualitative
59
 research but the process has a ―positivist view‖ 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 546) in a response to the sophisticated nature of the issue 
problematised by this study. In our application, the process produced positivist results 
as well, as this study eventually put the analysis in the form of equations and 
functions.  
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 It is qualitative research, despite the considerable use of quantitative statistics, because mere use of 
numbers does not make the research process quantitative but the perspective on using the numbers 
does. 
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5.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Every project begins with a certain plan, a layout just like academic research projects, 
which begin with research designs. According to Vaus (2001: 9) research design is ―to 
ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as 
unambiguously as possible‖.   
It can be argued that research design is the second most important part of one‘s 
research after the formation of research questions because design is all about our 
research question and its implications (Bordens and Abbott, 1991). It turns ―research 
questions into projects‖ (Robson, 2002: 79).  
Research design is built around the unit of observation and unit of analysis, which, in 
this study, are cases of financial systems and countries along with a rational choice 
model respectively for the two different research questions in our study. 
It is useful to distinguish the types of questions while choosing certain types of 
designs. For instance in social sciences, researchers ask two fundamental questions: 
(i) What is going on?  and (ii) Why is it going on? As Vaus (2001: 2) puts it, ―[I]t is 
one thing to describe the crime rate in a country, to examine trends over time or to 
compare the rates in different countries‖ but ―[i]t is quite a different thing to develop 
explanations about why the crime rate is as high as it is, why some types of crime are 
increasing or why the rate is higher in some countries than in others‖. 
The first type of question, for instance, refers to descriptive research and the second 
type to explanatory research (Vaus, 2001: 1). In this study, the first research question 
begs an answer that is similar to the latter example: explanatory answers because we 
ask ‗why do people commit financial crime?‘. An explanation is necessary to answer 
this question to show the links between the causes (attributes of the criminals in 
various settings) and results of the phenomenon (financial crimes with various 
characteristics).  
Questions are important in design because the question itself presupposes that there 
exists a phenomenon known as ‗crime‘ and that the behaviours that are against the 
norms are distinguishable through scientific analyses. Thus the questions pave the 
way for certain options of design in scientific research.  
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Using research questions is common in theory-building research, just like hypothesis-
testing research, because it helps with focusing on the subject, but with the 
shortcoming of losing the data outside the sphere of focus. Similarly, Eisenhardt, 
(1989: 536) argues that research questions should be set “in at least broad terms … in 
building theory from case studies‖ because ―preordained theoretical perspectives or 
propositions may bias and limit the findings‖ and ―it is easy to become overwhelmed 
by the volume of data‖ (emphasis added). 
In addition to descriptive
60
 and explanatory
61
 designs, there are many other types of 
designs, such as exploratory
62
, diagnostic
63
 or experimental designs
64
 (Robson, 2002), 
which answer the following question in different ways:  ―given this research question 
(or theory), what type of evidence is needed to answer the question (or test the theory) 
in a convincing way?‖ (Vaus, 2001: 9).   
Yin (1984) also argues that ―case studies can employ an embedded design, that is, 
multiple levels of analysis within a single study‖. There are many examples of such 
designs (see among others: Pettigrew, 1988; Mintzberg and Waters, 1982).  
Following this principle, as articulated by Gersick (1988) and Bettenhausen and 
Murnighan (1986), we began our study by asking ‗which financial systems are more 
vulnerable to financial crimes than others?‘ but ―by taking advantage of serendipitous 
findings‖, we decided to ―to switch [our] research focus to a theory building study‖ 
(Eisenhardt, (1989: 536) and asked the tentative question of ‗why do people commit 
financial crime?‘. Consequently, as Yin (1984) suggests, we decided to ―employ an 
embedded‖ and flexible, rather than fixed (Robson, 2002) design to allow multiple 
analyses and reconcile the needs of theory building research respectively. 
Case study designs are used in the literature for satisfying many different aims such as 
generating (see: Gersick, 1988), describing (i.e. Kidder, 1982) and testing (i.e. 
Pinfield 1986; Anderson, 1983) theories. Eisenhardt, (1989: 535) gives the following 
examples of inductive case studies with different aims in business (see Table 4.1).  
                                                 
60
 Usually while determining the unknown details of a known, established phenomenon. 
61
 Usually while linking the causes and results of a certain phenomenon. For a quality discussion about 
explanatory research please see Given (2008). 
62
 Usually while conducting the initial research in new areas of study or while answering questions 
about ill-defined or unclearly defined problems. 
63
 Usually after a clear realization of the problem. 
64
 Usually after a solution, a finding to test (i.e. new ways of working in police organizations). 
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Table 5.1: Examples of Inductive Case Study Research
65
 
Study Description of 
Cases 
Research 
Problem 
Data Sources Investigators Output 
Burgelman 
(1983) 
6 internal 
corporate 
ventures in 1 
major corporation 
Management of 
new ventures 
Archives 
Interviews Some 
observation 
Single 
investigator 
Process model linking 
multiple organizational 
levels 
Mintzberg& 
McHugh (1985) 
1 National Film 
Board of Canada, 
1939-1975, with 6 
periods 
Formulation of 
strategy in an 
adhocracy 
Archives Some 
interviews 
Research team Strategy-making themes, 
"grass roots" model of 
strategy formation 
Harris & Sutton 
(1986) 
8 diverse 
organizations 
Parting 
ceremonies during 
organizational 
death 
Interviews 
Archives 
Research team Conceptual framework 
about the functions of 
parting ceremonies 
for 
displaced members 
Eisenhardt& 
Bourgeois (1988 
8 microcomputer 
firms 
Strategic decision 
making in high 
velocity 
environments 
Interviews 
Questionnaires 
Archives  
Some observation 
Research team 
Tandem 
interviews 
Mid-range theory linking 
power, politics, and firm 
performance 
Gersick (1988) 8 project groups 
with deadlines 
Group 
development in 
project teams 
Observation  
Some interviews 
Single 
investigator 
Punctuated equilibrium 
model of group 
development 
Leonard-Barton 
(1988) 
10 technical 
innovations 
Internal 
technology 
transfer 
Interviews 
Experiment 
Observation 
Single 
investigator 
Process model 
Pettigrew (1988) 1 high performing 
& 1 low 
performing firm in 
each of 4 
industries 
Strategic change 
& competitiveness 
Interviews 
Archives 
Some observation 
Research teams In progress 
Source: Eisenhardt (1989: 535, emphasis added). 
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989: 548) the whole research process of building theories 
from case studies is appropriate to use when ―serendipitous findings in a theory-
testing study suggest the need for a new perspective‖. This is in fact what we 
experienced while studying our initial question. As presented in the literature review 
chapter, many criminologists criticize rational choice theory for saying nothing 
substantial about the motivations and qualities of offenders and the environment
66. ―In 
these situations, theory building from case study research is particularly appropriate 
because theory building from case studies does not rely on previous literature or prior 
empirical evidence‖ (emphasis added). This is why we formed our second question 
and tried to explain ‗why do financial criminals commit crime?‘ and aimed at 
improving the rational choice theory in criminology. 
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 Examples were chosen from recent organizational writing to provide illustrations of the possible 
range of theory building from case studies. 
66
 It may sound odd to accuse an environmental theory of abandoning the environmental effects but we 
showed that rational choice theory focuses only on micro and usually less important runtime effects of 
the environment. Well, rational choice theories are indeed proactive but they are proactive for the 
runtime only and they disregard the pre and post crime environments which are crucial during the 
development of deviant behaviour. Behaviours are (even only literally) not one-shot, instantaneous 
acts. 
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Thus, following Eisenhardt (1989), we compare four major theoretical financial 
systems and examine ten countries which use these financial systems as case studies. 
This is an embedded design, where we group some of the cases (countries) under 
some other, fewer cases (four major financial systems) in order to make ‗multiple 
analyses in case study‘ (Yin, 1984) research feasible. Following are the cases 
embedded under master cases: 
Capitalist/Market Economies :  United Kingdom, United States,  
Italy, Russia,  
Socialist/Transitional Economies : China, Cuba, 
Fully Islamized Economies  : Sudan, Iran, 
Partially Islamized Economies : Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, 
As for the appropriate number of cases, Eisenhardt (1989: 549) argues that there is no 
strict rule but ―a number between 4 and 10 cases usually works well. With fewer than 
4 cases, it is often difficult to generate theory with much complexity, and its empirical 
grounding is likely to be unconvincing, unless the case has several mini-cases within 
it (emphasis added)‖. In our study, obviously, there are not many distinct financial 
theories. Nevertheless, like Mintzberg and McHugh (1985), we used applications of 
financial systems as mini-cases in order to overcome the problem of sufficient number 
or samples. 
It should be noted that there may be some concerns about the fit of China into the 
socialist economy framework, but Wu (2011) provides some convincing survey 
statistics from East Asia Barometer Survey, as shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, along 
with some predictions in Figure 5.1, which can be used to rule out these concerns.  
According to Wu (2011), among the ―prerequisites for Chinese modernisation‖ are 
―keeping to the socialist road, upholding the people's democratic dictatorship, 
upholding leadership by the Communist Party and upholding Marxism-Leninism and 
Mao Zedong Thought‖. As can be observed from Table 5.2, the level of support for 
top-down policies has been on the increase during the last decade and from Table 5.3, 
while the level of support for rule of law and separation of powers are in decline in 
China since 2000. 
Table 5.2: Percentages for Values of Confucian Legacies in China 
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Source: East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave One: 2001, 2002 and Wave Two: 2006, 2008) 
 
 
Table 5.3: Percentages for Six Dimensions of Democratic Value in China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave One: 2001, 2002 and Wave Two: 2006, 2008) 
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Similarly, Figure 5.1 shows that both people and Communist Party support the 
maintaining of Communism and its values. 
 
Figure 5.1: Factors of Prediction that China will Maintain Her Current System 
 
Source: Wu (2011) 
 
5.3.1. Variety of Data and Research Design 
Just like Strauss and Corbin (1998), we think that the considerable differences 
between the cases are the main resources for producing sound inferences because 
―selection of an appropriate population controls extraneous variation and helps to 
define the limits for generalizing the findings
67
 … and clarify the domain of the 
findings‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 536). We need maximum variety in our study in order 
not to be trapped into a restricted domain which would not allow us to reach 
conclusions about a complex phenomenon.  
This is why, similar to Harris and Sutton (1986), we chose extreme cases, like Sudan 
and the United States (in terms of economic and ethnic variety) or Iran and Cuba (in 
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 This is indeed one of the main shortcomings of today‘s research community. Even when the 
researches are very restricted and can be generalized to one village only, they are announced as if they 
are conducted in such magnitude that they can be generalized to the whole of humanity, even 
sometimes to the past, present and future. 
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terms of political and geographical variety) or China and the UK (in terms of cultural 
and legal variety). These varieties provided a stimulating environment to improve, 
renew or refuse established criminological assumptions, some of which may claim 
generalizability over all systems despite their population with restricted diversion. 
Such selections, therefore, help build theories which can survive even when they are 
away from their ―country of origin‖ (Reichel, 1999: 52). Gersick (1988) and 
Eisenhardt (1989: 536) also agree that ―it makes sense to choose cases such as 
extreme situations and polar types‖ in inductive, theory-building researches. 
Nevertheless, we also used ―[m]ultiple cases within each category [which] allow 
findings to be replicated within categories‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 536, emphasis added), 
such as Cuba and China (in terms of economic similarity) or UK and US (in terms of 
cultural, economic, legal similarity) to produce more reliable results. Thus, our cases 
are chosen for ―theoretical, not statistical reasons‖ because the second best option, 
that is, ―random selection is neither necessary, nor even preferable‖ (Eisenhardt, 
1989: 536) in theory-building research study. Theoretical and purposeful sampling 
among the potential cases enabled our theory not only to be a more generalizable one 
but also a reliable one by means of both across and within-case comparisons for 
varieties and similarities at the same time. 
Another important issue in theory building is the use of earlier knowledge as an 
initiator of the new. Eisenhardt (1989: 536) believes, ―[a]priori specification of 
constructs can also help to shape the initial design of theory building research 
(emphasis added)‖. For this two main priories were referred to: firstly, realizing the 
rationality of financial criminals, like Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988), we used a 
blunt version of the main factors of rational choice theory in criminology, those are, 
‗motivation‟, „target‟, „guardian‟, and secondly, we used the ‗basic motivation model‘ 
of Rollinson, Broadfield and Edwards (1998: 149) as a priori which helped us save 
time and provided a strong beginning in our theory building process. Eisenhardt 
(1989: 526) also writes that using priori specification of constructs ―permits 
researchers to measure constructs more accurately‖ and probably this is why we could 
produce ―firmer empirical ground‖ and a rather positivist, clear-cut, straightforward 
theory in the form of equations and formulas. 
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5.3.2. Causality and Research Design 
Since we ask a ‗why‘ question and conduct an explanatory research, let as discuss the 
consequences of causality in research design. Causal explanations argue that 
phenomenon Y (e.g. income level) is affected by factor X (e.g. gender)
68
 and as Graph 
Figure 5.2 shows, there are three different types of them: direct, indirect and complex 
causal relationships (Vaus, 2001: 2-3). In our study theory, we are eventually 
proposing a complex causal relation between many variables.  
 
Figure 5.2: Causal Relationships of Explanatory Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Vaus (2001: 3) 
 
As mentioned initially, research design is the logical set-up of the research (Yin, 
2003: 29; Vaus, 2001: 9), which is probably the most important part of the 
methodological issues. So long as the ingredients that are collected are not themselves 
‗wrong‘, it is logically impossible for a study to reach incorrect results if the research 
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 In our research, ‗deviant behaviour‘ is affected by certain variables. 
164 
is designed correctly.  
The basic logical design for the first research question in this study is as follows: 
For the first research question: ―Why do white collar people commit financial 
crimes?‖ 
(i) Deciding the boundaries of the comparison criterion, that is ‗financial white 
collar crime‘, its definition and integral parts, in order to form a strong variable; 
(ii) Deciding which cases (financial systems) are to be included in the analyses; 
excluding all irrelevant cases and including all the relevant ones; 
(iii) Deciding which embedded cases (countries) would form the upper level cases 
(financial systems); 
(iv) Collection of qualitative and quantitative data on financial crimes of both 
embedded cases (countries) and upper level cases; 
(v) Forming the attributes of the upper level cases (financial systems) by using the 
similarities of the compared cases; 
(vi) Deciding which crime theory is the best available theory to explain the 
researched phenomenon: ‗financial white collar crime‘69;  
(vii) Deciding which differences were not explained by the current best available 
theory (i.e. inconsistent statistics of crimes against property vs. financial and 
economic statistics of opportunity of the same time interval and same 
geographical location); 
(viii) Finding the significant inconsistent explanations of the best available theory 
about the differences between ‗financial white collar criminality‘ of upper level 
cases (i.e. inconsistency between the automatic motivation assumption of the 
rational choice theory and the crimes-against-property statistics and opportunity 
statistics of the same time-interval, same location);  
(ix) Finally, using a sound, reliable, well-established, appropriate, scientific 
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 This is necessary for time-saving reasons. 
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method, that is ‗grounded theory‘, in order to explain the unexplained differences 
of financial white collar crimes between the upper level cases by using the criteria, 
techniques, procedures of this scientific method. 
For the second research question: ―Which financial system is the most/least 
vulnerable to financial white collar crime?‖ 
(i) Deciding the number of criteria of vulnerability based on the new grounded 
theory to compare upper level cases; 
(ii) Using these criteria to put the upper level cases in the order of vulnerability 
level. 
When the procedures are correctly done per se, the only logical weakness in our 
research design is the existence of additional financial systems that are distinct from 
the ones we analysed in our study. This is very unlikely, because we included all the 
extreme poles of the economic and financial systems that are known to the literature. 
In other words, there are insignificant differences between the financial systems we 
used as cases and the countries that apply them. 
All the same, in order to overcome the last probable argument for this weakness we 
refer to ‗state capitalism‘ and ‗market socialism‘ (i.e. Sweden and Turkey) when 
necessary. 
Thus, especially at the latter stages of our research, we continuously build and test a 
developing theory and complete the cycle of the scientific thinking which is depicted 
in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, as part of the procedures of the grounded theory method: 
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Figure 5.3: Levels of Analysis 
 
 
Models 
 
Concepts 
 
Theories 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Methodology 
 
Method 
 
Findings 
Source: Asutay (2008) 
 
Asutay (2008) gives the examples of functionalism, behaviourism, symbolic 
interactionism, ethnomethodology etc. to exemplify the ‗models‘; and crime, social 
classes etc. as ‗concepts‘. Referring to this depiction of the levels of analysis, we may 
argue that most researchers pick up a theory to test it through the concepts they are 
interested in and according to their worldview (or world model). When the test 
confirms the pre-existing theory they used, the research is completed, but when their 
test reveals divergence between theory and the test results, there is a doubt about the 
viability of the theory in terms of its usefulness in explaining the phenomenon in 
question. 
There are two options at this stage after making sure that no measurement mistakes 
have been made. First, the researcher may change his/her theory and conclude that the 
theory he/she used is not capable of explaining the concept in certain contexts and 
choose another theory from the existing literature. The second option is more 
cumbersome and takes more time, because this option is chosen when many pieces of 
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research, after their failing tests of a certain theory, suggest that the theory does not 
foresee the experimental reality. In this second option, these accumulated doubts force 
the science community to come up with a better or completely new theory about the 
concept under scrutiny and then comes the theory building level of the whole 
scientific process. We could multiply the circular process of Asutay (2008) and tailor 
it to pinpoint the theory building phase as in Figure 5.4 as follows: 
 
Figure 5.4: The Level of Questioning the Underlying Theory of Our Research 
after Reaching A Large Enough Number of Doubts
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Indeed, we could multiply the same process to reach ‗n‘ number of doubts about 
concepts and even models. For instance if no theory among many can explain why 
people commit crime ‗X‘ there is a good chance that the legal codes that define such a 
behaviour as a ‗crime‘ should be abandoned, because it means that it is highly likely 
that what is meant and what is understood by the ‗concept‘ of crime is wrong. 
Probably because we call some other ‗concepts‘ crime while they are not so in 
reality
71
 and vice--versa. This is an important point in theory-building based research, 
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 Inspired by Asutay (2008). 
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 Crombie (2005), even wrote a book on ―The World‘s Stupidest Laws‖ where he claims that in 
Scotland ―you are presumed guilty until proven innocent for certain misdemeanours‖. 
Negative test result - 1 
Negative test result -3 
Negative test result -2 
Negative test result -n 
Negative test result -4 
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because this reasoning reveals the fact that it is possible that a researcher may have a 
correct theory analysed under an incorrect concept. Thus, we should not be hasty to 
negate theories before checking the concepts we evaluate in relation to them.   
In this study, the process depicted in Figure 5.4 is followed in line with the process 
suggested in Figure 5.3 until the theory level, and then there is conducted a grounded 
theory research to reach a refined or developed rational-choice-based theory in 
criminology; while the third level of analysis steps down one dimension and continues 
testing the initial hypothesis in a continuous and iterative way as recommended by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Eisenhardt (1989). Thus, a multi-level design is 
conducted. 
To further contextualise the process, the next section discusses the research strategy 
pursued in this study. 
 
5.4. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
There are mainly two kinds of research strategies: inductive and deductive. According 
to Bryman (2001:8), in ‗deductive research‘, the researcher deduces, ―a hypothesis 
that must then be subject to empirical scrutiny‖, ―on the basis of what is known about 
in a particular domain and of theoretical considerations in relation to that domain‖. 
‗Inductive research‘ also produces a hypothesis but this time not to test it but to 
produce a higher level of abstractions, generalizations to be tested later on. Induction 
and deduction lead the research in opposite directions and indeed form a circular 
system. As Babbie (2004: 25) argues, ―deduction begins with ‗why‘ and moves to 
―whether‖, while induction moves in the opposite direction‖.  
In this study, an attempt is made to build a grounded theory which reaches certain 
scientific constructs through inductive reasoning (Backman and Kyngas, 1999; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 23). As mentioned in the research design section, the only 
logical weakness in the reasoning in this study is the exclusion of additional 
explanatory cases. This, as a weakness, however, is indeed inherent in all inductive 
reasoning studies.  
Vaus (2001) shows the involvement of the theory in the scientific reasoning process, 
parallel to the circular reasoning Asutay (2008) suggests. As depicted in Figure 5.5 
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from Vaus (2001), at theory level, theory-building research must use both inductive 
and deductive strategies iteratively. Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Eisenhardt (1989) 
agree the inevitable use of iterative and multiple strategies in theory-building 
researches. 
 
Figure 5.5: Theory Building and Theory Testing Approaches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Vaus (2001: 6) 
 
5.5. RESEARCH METHODS 
The preceding sections focused on the methodology, design and strategy of this 
research, but we did not state which methods would help us to reach these objectives. 
Therefore, certain scientific methods should be used to reach reliable answers for the 
research questions articulated in this study.  
―It is important to keep in mind that theory, is not a universal law-like product, but 
more a result of a procedure where rules guide the search for meaning and 
understanding in the production of a theory‖ (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 159). 
Thus, we need to use certain methods to guide the production process. 
Research method is defined as the ―set of procedures and techniques for gathering and 
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analyzing data‖ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 3) to convincingly answer our research 
questions. Research methods are usually cited under the main titles of quantitative or 
qualitative methods. Under ‗quantitative research‘, Colls and Hussey (2009) mention 
experimental studies, surveys, cross-sectional studies, longitudinal studies, and under 
‗qualitative research‘, they mention hermeneutics, ethnography, participative enquiry, 
action research, feminist studies, gender studies, ethnicity studies, and case studies. 
There are many quantitative methods in social sciences as identified in statistical and 
econometrics studies. Qualitative methods are also very diverse, including, archival 
research, content analysis, ethnography, focus group, life history, longitudinal study, 
morphological analysis, participant observation, unstructured, semi-structured and 
structured interview, textual analysis, narratology, storytelling, shadowing, grounded 
theory and many more. 
This research utilises grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1989) as a methodology 
with the objective of reaching a theory via comparative case studies (Eisenhardt, 
1989). It should, however, be noted that the explorative nature of the study in terms of 
providing content and substance to the grounded methodology should also be 
acknowledged.  
The following sections, hence, provides the details of the methods used to attempt to 
build our theory. 
 
5.5.1. Grounded Theory 
‘Grounded theory‘ refers ―both to the method and the end result of the research 
process‖ (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 154). Unlike conventional qualitative 
methodologies, grounded theory research does not begin with a certain hypothesis. It 
works as almost a ‗reverse engineering process‘, as it begins with data collection 
through various ways
72
 and reaches hypothesis and theories at the end of the research.  
Strauss and Corbin (1998: 12) define the result of the method as a ―theory that was 
derived from data, systematically gathered and analysed through the research 
process‖, but the same term is also defined by them as ―a general methodology, a way 
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 i.e. interviews, group discussions, observation, field notes, texts, pictures and other materials. 
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of thinking about and conceptualizing data … applicable to quantitative as well as 
qualitative studies‖ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 275, emphasis added). 
The aim of the grounded theory ―is to create new and theoretically expressed 
understandings‖ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 8) of a particular topic which needs 
further exploration as the topic studied in this research. Contemporary researchers 
believe that ―it is not one method, but many: different forms exist and are used today 
under the umbrella of grounded theory‖ (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 169).  
―Traditionally, authors have developed theory by combining observations from 
previous literature, common sense, and experience‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 532), but 
linking the theory to the data was weak (Perrow, 1986; Pfeffer, 1982) and yet 
essential (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) to produce a valid, testable, relevant theory. Thus, 
grounded theory helps to substantiate such a process. 
Grounded theory is very popular
73
, and is applied to very diverse fields in social 
sciences, such as marketing research (see: Hirshman and Thompson, 1997; Houston 
and Venkatesh, 1996; Goulding, 1998, 2000), business studies, tourism (see: 
Mehmetoğlu and Altınay, 2006), orgaization studies (see: Turner, 1988; Lang, 1996; 
Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), sociology, psychology, law, economics, finance 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008), organizational control (see: Czarniawska-Joerges, 
1988) and budgeting (Czarniawska-Joerges and Jacobsson, 1989).  
Sociologists Glaser and Strauss (1967)
74
 built grounded theory as a methodology and 
theory in the 1960s, when ―the social sciences were dominated by the logico-
deductive theory generation, analysis and method approach, and the idea of the 
grounded theory approach to a large extent reflects that time period‖ (Eriksson and 
Kovalainen, 2008: 158). They (1967:8) were motivated by the fact that this approach 
―strongly exaggerates the place of the theory testing in science‖ despite the fact that 
―the researcher does not approach reality as tabula rasa – that he or she must have a 
perspective to see relevant data and abstract significant categories from it‖.  
The original idea of grounded theory is expanded and elaborated in different forms of 
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Graham R Gibbs from the University of Huddersfıeld even gives some percentages of its popularity. 
To him, grounded theory makes up 50% of the whole qualitative research and discourse analysis, 
phenomenology and ethnography make up approximately 10%. 
74They published the book named ―The Discovery of Grounded Theory‖ in 1967. 
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methodology and terminology by Glaser (1992, 2002), Corbin and Strauss (1990) and 
Strauss and Corbin (1998), among others.  The details of the grounded theory, 
according to the contributions of these contenders, are, as a process, provided below: 
5.5.1.1. Main procedures 
According to Strauss (1990: 23), the main procedures for grounded theory analysis 
are: 
(i)  The concept-indicator model, which directs the coding; 
(i)  Data collection; 
(iii)  Coding; 
(iv)  Core categories; 
(v)  Theoretical sampling; 
(vi)  Comparisons; 
(vii)  Theoretical saturation; 
(viii)  Integration of theory; 
(ix)  Theoretical memos; 
(x)  Theoretical sorting. 
In terms of actual conduct, grounded theory process requires ―constant comparison‖, 
identifying the ―underlying and emerging uniformities in the indicators‖, ―produce a 
coded category or concept”, comparing ―these concepts with the empirical indicators 
and also with each other, in order to rephrase and possibly reformulate the definition 
of the concept and its properties‖ (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 159, emphasis 
added).  
Referring to Strauss‘s (1990: 23) procedures, and Strauss and Corbin (1998), we may 
give a mechanistic, iterative and simultaneous procedure for grounded theory as 
follows: 
(i) Determining the primary and secondary phenomena 
(ii) Using analytic tools to relate the phenomenon to events and happenings 
(iii) Come up with certain concepts. 
(iv) Determine the categories of the concepts 
(v) Determine the properties and sub categories of the categories 
(vi) Determine the core category 
(vii) Integrate the quantified and organized data ―into a coherent theoretical 
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formulation‖ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 75) 
(viii) Clarify the details 
(ix) Relate the grounded theory to the relevant literature and previous research. 
Indeed, Eisenhardt (1989: 533) gives a similar process in her work, ‗Building 
Theories from Case Studies‘ which includes many of the above procedures. 
Eisenhardt‘s procedures are preferable because they suit our design. We used her 
process along with the traditional grounded theory method, because Eisenhardt‘s 
(1989) work also ―synthesizes previous work on … grounded theory building (e.g. 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967)‖. Indeed, Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss (1990), the 
founders of grounded theory methodology, were a few of the initial authors 
contributing to building theories, using case studies. Table 5.4 provides a step-by-step 
roadmap for theory building by using comparative cases. 
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Table 5.4: Process of Building Theory from Case Study Research 
Step Activity Reason 
Getting Started Definition of research question 
Possibly a priori constructs  
Neither theory nor hypotheses  
Focuses efforts 
Provides better grounding of construct 
measures 
Retains theoretical flexibility 
Selecting Cases Specified population 
Theoretical, not random, sampling 
Constrains extraneous variation and 
sharpens external validity 
 
Focuses efforts on theoretically useful 
cases - i.e., those that replicate or extend 
theory by filling conceptual categories 
Crafting Instruments and 
Protocols 
Multiple data collection methods 
Qualitative and quantitative data 
combined 
Multiple investigators 
Strengthens grounding of theory by 
triangulation of evidence 
Synergistic view of evidence 
Fosters divergent perspectives and 
strengthens grounding 
Entering the Field Overlap data collection and 
analysis, including field notes 
Flexible and opportunistic data 
collection methods 
Speeds analyses and reveals helpful 
adjustments to data collection 
 
Allows investigators to take advantage of 
emergent themes and unique case features 
Analysing Data Within-case analysis 
Cross-case pattern search using 
divergent techniques 
Gains familiarity with data and preliminary 
theory generation 
 
Forces investigators to look beyond initial 
impressions and see evidence through 
multiple lenses 
Shaping Hypotheses Iterative tabulation of evidence for 
each construct 
Replication, not sampling, logic 
across cases 
Search evidence for "why" behind 
relationships 
Sharpens construct definition, validity, and 
measurability 
Confirms, extends, and sharpens theory 
Builds internal validity 
Enfolding Literature Comparison with conflicting 
literature 
Comparison with similar literature 
Builds internal validity, raises theoretical 
level, and sharpens construct definitions 
 
Sharpens generalizability, improves 
construct definition, and raises theoretical 
level 
Reaching Closure Theoretical saturation when 
possible 
Ends process when marginal improvement 
becomes small 
Source: Eisenhardt (1989: 533) 
 
Based on this procedure, the following section explains the terminology and tools of 
grounded theory along with their use during the research process. 
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5.5.1.2. Coding 
During grounded theory research, many analyses are made and codes are constructed  
as ―any possible product‖ of those analyses (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 164). 
According to Colls and Hussy (2009: 179), codes ―are labels which enable the 
qualitative data to be separated, compiled and organized‖. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) are more explicit about the coding and the procedures that 
produce codes. According to them, ‗coding‘ is ―the analytic process through which 
data are fractured, conceptualized, and integrated to form theory‖ or mere 
―conceptualizing, reducing, elaborating, and relating‖ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 3, 
12).  
According to Strauss (1990: 20), coding includes asking and answering questions to 
provide hypotheses about categories. In many ways, the coding process in grounded 
theory quantifies the qualitative data through an iterated process of summaries and 
compressions into codes, concepts, categories, properties, subcategories and finally 
theories.  
Some (such as: Charmaz, 2000) prefer using the term ‗categories‘ instead of 
‗concepts‘, but Strauss and Corbin (1998) see categories as higher order concepts in 
the data and we follow their definition in this specific case in order to increase the 
capability of branching throughout the coding process. 
There are mainly three types of coding: open coding, axial coding and selective 
coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 101). In practice, all three levels of coding 
processes are conducted simultaneously (Colls and Hussey, 2009: 179). 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1998: 13), coding procedures: 
(i) build rather than test theory 
(ii) provide researchers with analytic tools for handling masses of raw data 
(iii) help analysts to consider alternative meanings of phenomena 
(iv) be systematic and creative simultaneously 
(v) identify, develop and relate the concepts that are the building blocks of theory 
Strauss and Corbin (1998: 101) define these terms as follows: 
Phenomena: Central ideas in the data represented as concepts  
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Concepts: The building blocks of theory 
Categories
75
: Concepts that stand for phenomena.  
Properties: Characteristics of a category, the delineation of which defines and 
gives it meaning. 
Dimensions: The range along which general properties of a category vary, giving 
specification to a category and variation to the theory. 
Subcategories: Concepts that pertain to a category, giving it further clarification 
and specification. 
In theory-building research, we utilize all of this terminology and ―work with 
concepts rather than specifics of data or cases‖ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 81). We 
analyse, conceptualize, relate and construct the data at a higher level and produce a 
representation of the data that is related but distinct from the data. This representation 
or the code is ―not the specific incident per se but rather what the incident symbolizes 
or represents‖ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 81). 
5.5.1.2.1. Open coding 
Open coding describes what is taking place in the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), 
and is defined as ―the analytic process through which concepts are identified and their 
properties and dimensions are discovered in data‖ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 101). 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1998: 101), during the open coding process, the 
following series of activities are necessary: determining phenomena, concepts, 
categories, properties, dimensions and subcategories.  
The open coding process usually begins ―with an initial line-by-line analysis‖ 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 161) and usually researchers find key words, phrases 
or sentences during the open coding process (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 161), 
but this is not a feasible option for ‗building theories from case studies‘ (Eisenhardt, 
1989) like ours but rather for interview researches. 
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For instance Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) used performance and size along with other 
categories in their research on business. 
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5.5.1.2.2. Axial coding 
Axial coding is the ―restructuring of the data and developing various patterns with the 
intention of revealing links and relationships. The process includes the development 
of the properties of the concepts and categories of concepts and linking them at the 
dimensional level‖ (Colls and Hussey, 2009: 180, emphasis added). This process, 
―transfers the analysis away from description and towards linking codes together, in 
order to proceed with the explanatory categories‖. Generally, the axial coding is done 
by uncovering the relations via the method of looking for answers to questions such as 
why or how come, where, when, how and with what result. (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2008: 165). 
During axial coding, “the researcher will construct mini-theories about the 
relationships that might exist within the data and which need to be verified. Although 
the overall theoretical framework will not be discovered during axial coding, the mini-
theories can be incorporated into and form part of the overall paradigm model that is 
being developed alongside the research‖ (Colls and Hussey, 2009: 180, emphasis 
added). 
5.5.1.2.3. Selective coding 
In selective coding, researchers ―select one category that forms the basis for the 
theory‖ (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 161). This category, now named ‗the core 
category‘ is systematically related to other categories in selective coding by 
―validating these relationships and filling in categories that need further refinement. 
This process enables themes to be generated which can then, be ‗grounded‘ by 
referring back to the original data‖ (Colls and Hussey, 2009: 181). 
The researcher should be careful during the selective coding process. If the data or 
deductive reasoning does not suggest the formation of categories and sub-categories, 
the researcher should not force extracting such meanings and links (Colls and Hussey, 
2009: 157). 
5.5.1.3. Analytic tools 
Iterative ways of quantification and abstraction, the codes, are products of certain 
analytic tools that are used during coding processes in grounded theory. Strauss and 
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Corbin (1998: 87) define ‗analytic tools‘ as ―devices and techniques used by analysts 
to facilitate the coding process‖. There are mainly four analytic tools: ‗asking 
questions‘, ‗making theoretical comparisons‘ and ‗theoretical sampling‘ (Strauss and 
Corbin (1998: 73) and using ‗field notes‘. 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1998: 89), analytic tools are useful in many ways in 
the theory building process, for instance they: 
(i) Steer a researcher‘s thinking away from the confines of both the technical literature 
and personal experience 
(ii) Avoid standard ways of thinking about phenomena 
(iii) Stimulate the inductive process 
(iv) Focus on what is in the data and do not take anything for granted 
 (v) Allow for clarification or debunking of assumptions made by those being studied 
(vi) Listen to what people are saying and doing 
(vii) Avoid rushing past ―diamonds in the rough‖ when examining data 
(viii) Force the asking of questions and the giving of provisional answers 
(ix) Allow fruitful labelling of concepts, although provisionally 
(x) Discover properties and dimensions of categories 
The following sections explain the roles of these tools during the coding process 
further. 
5.5.1.3.1. Asking questions  
Strauss and Corbin (1998: 73, 90) define the analytical tool of ‗asking questions‘ as a 
device which is ―used to open up the line of inquiry and direct theoretical sampling‖ 
or to help ―a writer get past that initial block of not knowing where to start‖. 
They distinguish different levels of questions such as ―abstract and theoretical, 
substantive and mundane‖. Some questions for example ―stimulate further questions, 
which in turn stimulate further questions, in a chaining of extended investigation‖ 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998:75) while others ―turn out to be wonderfully productive‖ or 
so ―ideologically driven that they answer themselves, although incorrectly, shutting 
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off further enquiry‖.  
They also give categories of questions as tools. For instance: (i) sensitizing; (ii) 
theoretical, (iii) practical and structural, (iv) guiding questions; or (ii) temporal (i.e. 
frequency, duration, rate, timing), (ii) spatial (how much space, where, open or closed, 
circumscribed or not), (iii) informational (i.e. who, where) and (iv) questions about 
rules and cultural values, morals and standards (i.e. purity, quality) (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998: 77-78). 
After asking questions about certain comparative aspects of the phenomena, 
―stimulated‖ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 91), we then may use theoretical sampling of 
the same or of different data to answer our questions. 
‗Asking questions‘ is used immediately after the main phenomenon is determined, 
that is, ‗financial crime‘ in our study. So that many specific questions about the 
phenomenon emerge to explain how it relates to the events and happenings observed 
in the data. 
5.5.1.3.2. Theoretical comparisons  
‗Theoretical comparison‘ is defined as ―[a]n analytical tool used to stimulate 
thinking‖ or to enrich our understandings about properties and dimensions of 
categories‖ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 73). This analytic tool ―moves the researcher 
away from describing the specifics of a case … to thinking more abstractly‖ (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998: 83, emphasis added).  
There are mainly two types of comparisons: Type I and Type II. Type I comparison 
relates to an ―incident to incident or object to object comparison‖ (Strauss and Corbin 
(1998: 80). while the type II comparison (theoretical comparison) is a far-out, rather 
than close-in, comparison. 
By using comparisons, people ―draw on what they know to try and understand what 
they do not know… They take the properties of one object and compare them to those 
of the other. And in that way they discover what is similar and different about each 
object and thus define the objects‖ (Strauss and Corbin (1998: 80). 
But, when do we use theoretical comparisons?  Strauss and Corbin (1998: 80) answer 
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this question as follows: we use them ―when we want to think about an event or object 
in different ways (range of possible meanings)‖. And this is what we did time and 
again in our research.  We used theoretical comparisons in many possible ways (i.e. 
while defining our codes and finding out their characteristics).  
Theoretical comparison is a crucial part of the grounded theory research, as 
―theoretical comparisons are tools for looking at something somewhat objectively, 
rather than naming or classifying it without a thorough examination‖ but ―if the 
properties are evident within the data, then, we do not need to rely on these tools‖ 
Strauss and Corbin (1998: 94). 
At the time of the use of theoretical comparison as a tool, Strauss and Corbin (1998: 
94) recommend the use of ‗flip-flop technique‘, that is looking at opposites and 
extremes of the phenomena because comparison under various conditions may elicit 
the properties and dimensions. In this sense, this research benefited much from the 
purposeful choosing of the extreme cases: market economy, socialist economy and 
Islamic economy. 
5.5.1.3.3. Theoretical sampling  
‗Theoretical sampling‘ is also a critical feature of grounded theory research (Webb, 
2003; Becker, 1993), and is defined as a ―[s]ampling on the basis of emerging 
concepts, with the aim being to explore the dimensional range or varied conditions 
along which the properties of concepts vary‖ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 73). In a 
more explicit way, Glaser and Strauss (1967: 45) define theoretical sampling as ―the 
process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, 
codes, and analyses his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find 
them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges‟‖ (emphasis added).  
Theoretical sampling is carried out at certain stages of the grounded theory research 
process, where the researcher thinks it is necessary to gather sampling from certain 
subject areas or groups of individuals and this is led by the evolving theory. ―This 
means that the decisions regarding what data to collect are determined by the specific 
requirements of the theory‖ (Elliott and Lazenbatt, 2005: 50). 
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In a similar vein, in this research, we began collecting data for the fundamental 
concepts of current rational choice theory, namely, the most discussed ‗motivation‘, 
and therefore we delved into many properties and categories of this and other 
concepts one by one and collected necessary data for each one of the comparisons. 
However we did not confine ourselves to the priori conceptualization of the earlier 
rational choice theory, and, therefore, attempted to develop additional concepts of our 
own such as ‗offenders‘ and ‗environment‘ etc. in modifying the existing theory. 
5.5.1.3.4. Field notes 
Field notes are the notes researchers take during any stage of the research process 
with the aim of reviewing them when necessary, for instance, at the end of the 
research process to check the saturation of the theory.  
Eisenhardt (1989: 539) recommends ―to write down whatever impressions occur, that 
is, to react rather than to sift out what may seem important [and] … to push thinking in 
these notes by asking questions such as ―What am I learning?‖ and ―How does this 
case differ from the last?‖ 
According to Van Maanen (1988), field notes provide a continuous consciousness 
about the research. Just as grounded theory researchers foresee, towards the end of our 
study, many field notes
76
 had accumulated which provided a review of the crucial 
ideas, connection, ties, warnings, clarifications, confirmations about various parts of 
the studied material. These notes can be the focal point, though very small in size, of 
the relocating and renewing the process to extend, enlarge or restrict and focus the 
studied material. 
5.5.1.4. The dynamic process of grounded theory 
Glaser (1978) calls the dynamic nature of the grounded theory research an ‗emergent 
fit‘. Elliott and Lazenbatt (2005: 49, emphasis added), explain this dynamism by 
linking the aforementioned concepts and tools in a very succinct way as follows:  
The researcher starts analysing data as soon as it is collected and then moves on to 
compare the analysis of one set of data with another… As the research progresses, the 
researcher continues to review the categories as further new data is collected, so as to 
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 Some of which were in electronic locations in written format in note-taking software or spoken to 
voice recording machines and other electronic recording software. Still others were in written notes on 
papers. 
182 
ensure that data is not being forced into the categories but rather that the categories 
represent the data. This dynamic relationship between data collection and analysis 
enables the researcher to check if preliminary findings remain constant when further 
data is collected. Taken together, constant comparative analysis and data collection 
offer the researcher an opportunity of generating research findings that represent 
accurately the phenomena being studied.  
This study, likewise, commenced by recoding the financial and crime related facts 
about the compared countries but as the data on crime and related facts 
accumulated, the researcher realised that the definition of ‗crime‘ in one country is 
not the same in another. This comparative fact forced the study to research more 
about the approaches to the concept of crime before the definition of ‗financial 
crime‘. After researching the different perspectives on crime, the pure legal 
definition was abandoned in favour of socio-legal definition, because legal 
definition simply closes the door on this comparative research. Yet, the new 
definition forced us to realise that if social constraints and characteristics are 
important in criminology one ‗static‘ theory fitting all would not solve the 
theoretical question at all. Rather, a dynamic theory which both takes the 
environment into consideration and dynamically moves with the parameters of 
changing environment is necessary. Then, environmental data is collected from 
various aspects. 
This iterative process was run many times in many years during the research 
process and eventually produced a dynamic theoretical explanation, which is 
capable of differentiating, optimizing, maximizing, minimizing, opting out various 
variables of its own construct, its own processes in many scales, ‗concepts‘, 
‗dimensions‘, ‗categories‘, ‗sub-categories‘ etc. (please see Appendix 1).  
5.5.2. Data Collection and Analysis 
In grounded theory research, ‗data collection‘, ‗data analysis‘ (Corbin and Strauss, 
1990; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 1990, 2000) and ‗coding‘ (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989) processes are done simultaneously. The researcher 
begins the analysis process before he/she finishes the data collection process. 
Conventionally though, in most research, data collection and analysis are done and 
presented separately. All the same, we use separate titles in following this tradition, as 
in the following sections. 
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5.5.2.1. Data collection 
Data is a succinct and able representation of various phenomena, concepts, 
commands, information, communication, comment and calculations by means of 
numerical figures, text, voice, symbols, graphs, pictures etc. (Üstün, 2011). What 
Strauss and Corbin (1998: 11) mean about ‗data‘ is more relative than traditional 
literature According to them, ―some of the data may be quantified as with census or 
background information about the persons or objects studied, but the bulk of the 
analysis is interpretive‖ (emphasis added). 
As mentioned previously, there are many ways of collecting data in qualitative 
research: grounded theory, interviews, protocol analysis, repertory grid technique, 
diary methods, observation, focus groups, narratology, storytelling, classical 
ethnography, shadowing etc. are only a few of them which use interviews and group 
discussions, observation and reflection on field notes, various texts, pictures, and 
other materials and sources of data. 
In grounded theory research, the most common data collection method is interviews 
(Daymon, 2002), but other methods such as observations, surveys and discursive 
methods are also frequently used and ―[t]he literature is consulted as part of the 
iterative and continuing process of data collection, simultaneous analysis and 
emergent interpretation‖ (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 162), because in grounded 
theory research ―specific procedures are used … without commitments to specific 
kinds of data or specific theoretical interest‖ (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 155).  
The data collection phase of any research on white-collar crime, though, is almost 
impenetrable. Geis and Meier, (1977: 3) explain why: 
Those few white collar criminals who are sentenced to correctional facilities 
tend to be long gone from their cells before the sociological researcher, with 
questionnaire in hand, locates them. White-collar criminals, too, especially those 
from the corporate and political worlds, are quite as skilful and adept as 
researchers are, so that they can sidestep adroitly the kinds of invidious inquiries 
that often mark studies of traditional criminals. 
Lomborg and Kirkevold (2003) find the use of grounded theory efficient in such 
circumstances, because it produces very complex and dense theories (Cutcliffe, 2000). 
It should be noted that grounded theory is also very liberal in data collection, as 
―[a]ny data collection method associated with interpretive paradigm can be used in a 
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grounded theory methodology‖ (Colls and Hussey, 2009: 157: 158), but there exists 
the ―difficulty of dealing with the considerable amount of data generated and the 
question of the generalizability of the findings‖ (Colls and Hussey, 2009: 157: 158). 
We used secondary qualitative and quantitative data from the following economic, 
social, censual, financial, criminal databases and data warehouses: IMF, OECD, WB, 
UN; indices: Hofstede Culture Indices, Competition Index, Transparency 
International Index, Corruption Index, Human Development Index, statistics (i.e. of 
population, stock indices, crime etc.) and maps (i.e. of financialization, of prison 
populations, debt etc.). 
Unlike classical data collection and analysis methods, grounded theory ―has 
implications for the researcher preparing a research proposal insofar as the questions 
used for data collection or the sampling strategy cannot be pre-determined before the 
grounded theory research begins, but can emerge only from the data analysis.‖ (Elliott 
and Lazenbatt, 2005: 50). Since this study was designed as a case study, the collection 
and analysis of data is, hence, affected by this choice. We believe that this is the best 
design for gathering satisfactory data and analysing it to build a quality, saturated 
grounded theory in financial crime inquiry. Some may assume that case study 
enforces a particular way of gathering and analysing data under case study design, 
however Yin (2003, 32), among others, states that ―the method [case study] does not 
imply any particular form of data collection - which can be qualitative or 
quantitative‖. In substantiating this, Eisenhardt (1989: 534) agrees that ―[c]ase studies 
typically combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, 
questionnaires, and observations. The evidence may be qualitative (e.g., words), 
quantitative (e.g., numbers), or both‖ and exemplifies Sutton and Callahan (1987), 
Mintzberg and McHugh (1985), Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988). Thus, as this 
discussion indicates, ―[t]heory-building researchers typically combine multiple data 
collection methods‖ because ―the triangulation made possible by multiple data 
collection methods provides stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses 
(emphasis added)‖ Eisenhardt  (1989: 537). Data collection methods in such research 
range from mere observation (Gersick, 1988) to quantitative laboratory data 
(Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1986). 
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5.5.2.2. Triangulation 
As a mix method, triangulation in data collection is a more ambitious and more 
reliable method, as it increases the validity and reliability of the research by double 
checking and cross examination of the results - only if the multiple methods reach the 
same conclusions (Denzin, 1978).  
There are many types of triangulation: the use of multiple sources of data (Jick, 1979), 
multiple research methods, researchers (Colls and Hussey, 2009: 85) or theories 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991). This study uses data triangulation of 
descriptive, discursive
77
 qualitative and experimental, statistical quantitative data to 
produce a strong, reliable and valid grounded theory.  
This study, hence, focuses on a complex phenomenon of - financial - crime and 
especially while studying such phenomena we need to have many, instead of one, 
reference points in making sure that the research represents a robust approach. Indeed 
this is the theoretical background of the emergence of triangulation. One cannot find 
his/her place on earth by referring to one or two reference points
78
. We may refer to a 
famous analogy here: Describing the elephant by blind people. Since they touch only 
one part of it, they describe it either as a big leg, or a big ear or ….. but not as an 
elephant. Unfortunately this is a common picture in the research community. Usually 
only one type of data is chosen which may not always be useful to depict the 
complexities of social phenomena under scrutiny.  
The same issue is observed when someone looks very closely at a big advertisement. 
Meaningless dots would be seen, but far-away lookers also do not see the reality; they 
may think that the picture ‗is‘ the reality and not a false representation of it, made up 
of many dots. In order to see the reality, various points of view should be unified and 
presented by the same source, just like researchers using the triangulation successfully 
do. Moreover, since grounded theory requires ‗saturation‘ or completeness to end the 
research process, this is better accomplished by using more than one type of data. 
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According to grounded theory, when researchers get stuck in an ―analytic rut‖, they can pull 
themselves out ―through analysis of a word, phrase or sentence. This is especially valuable because it 
enables the analyst to raise questions about possible meanings (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 92, emphasis 
added)‖. 
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For instance this is how GPSs work, by gathering spatial information from at least three satellites.  
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―Indeed, a key feature of theory-building case research is the freedom to make 
adjustments during the data collection process‖ one of which ―can include the 
addition of data sources in selected cases‖ Eisenhardt (1989: 539). This study used 
this kind of adjustment in our study to provide uniformity in comparison
79
 because it 
was sometimes not easy to reach uniform data for these extreme cases.  
Eisenhardt (1989: 539; emphasis added) also explains why it is all right to make 
adjustments in the data collection process as follows: 
These alterations create an important question: Is it legitimate to alter and even add 
data collection methods during a study? For theory-building research, the answer is 
“yes,” because investigators are trying to understand each case individually and in 
as much depth as is feasible. The goal is not to produce summary statistics about a 
set of observations. Thus, if a new data collection opportunity arises or if a new line 
of thinking emerges during the research, it makes sense to take advantage by altering 
data collection, if such an alteration is likely to better ground the theory or to provide 
new theoretical insight. This flexibility is not a license to be unsystematic. Rather, 
this flexibility is controlled opportunism in which researchers take advantage of the 
uniqueness of a specific case and the emergence of new themes to improve resultant 
theory.  
5.5.2.3. Data Analysis 
―A striking feature of research to build theory from case studies is the frequent 
overlap of data analysis with data collection‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 538), which is due to 
the dynamic and the engaging nature of grounded theory. Nevertheless, data 
collection is an essential aspect of grounded theory as well. 
According to Eisenhardt (1989: 539; emphasis added) data analysis is at ―the heart of 
building theory from case studies, but it is both the most difficult and the least 
codified part of the process. Since published studies generally describe research sites 
and data collection methods, but give little space to discussion of analysis, a huge 
chasm often separates data from conclusions‖. After all, ―[o]ne cannot ordinarily 
follow how a researcher got from 3600 pages of field notes to the final conclusions, 
sprinkled with vivid quotes though they may be‖ (Miles and Huberman, 1984: 16). 
For the data analysis phase of building grounded theories from case studies, it may be 
argued that there are mainly two kinds of data analysis, those are, within-case analysis 
and across-case analysis. These are explained in more detail in the following section 
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 Usually to elevate the underrepresentation of less transparent cases to more transparent ones. 
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5.5.2.3.1. Within-Case Analysis 
As the name suggests, researchers focus on one specific case within case analysis.  In 
relation to this phase in this study, we analysed individual cases
80
 by utilizing write-
ups which are pure descriptions of the cases and are used to generate insights 
(Gersick, 1988).  
There are no certain formats of write-ups, even ―probably as many approaches as 
researchers. However, the overall idea is to become intimately familiar with each case 
as a stand-alone entity. This process allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge 
before investigators push to generalize patterns across cases‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 540). 
It should be noted that in case studies, the volume of the data is so big
81
 that as cited 
by Eisenhardt (1989: 540), some researchers, such as Pettigrew (1988), claim the risk 
of death by over exposure to data, data asphyxiation, and these analyses ―help 
researchers to cope early in the analysis process with the often enormous volume of 
data‖. Throughout the research process, we generated write-ups which encompass 
different aspects of the individual cases when combined in the final compilation. 
Since their volume is colossal it was not possible to attach it to the written text but it 
is electronically available on demand.  
5.5.2.3.2. Across-Case Analysis 
―Overall, the idea behind these cross-case searching tactics is to force investigators to 
go beyond initial impressions‖ Eisenhardt (1989: 541). The problem with the cross-
case analysis is that ―investigators reach premature and even false conclusions as a 
result of these information-processing biases‖ and the solution is ―counteracting these 
tendencies by looking at the data in many divergent ways‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 540). 
Eisenhardt (1989) also recommends using small tables to look at the data in divergent 
ways and we utilized this method after presenting the write-ups, after discussing the 
cases in many different, relevant ways, such as, culture, morality, ethics, legal 
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 During this process, at the initial stages of the study, the researcher utilized many audio-visual 
materials about the cases as well. Since it was not feasible to visit all the cases and have a first-hand 
experience, presentations, documentaries, advertisements, audiobooks, pictures, maps and other similar 
materials were utilized to have a familiarity with the cases for within case analyses.  
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 e.g., 383 pages of case history write-ups for Mintzberg and McHugh‘s (1985) research (Eisenhardt, 
1989: 540). 
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systems, political systems, financial systems, criminology perspectives, religion, 
geography, technology, health, wealth, debt habits, GDP and the like. 
In a second strategy, we compared data from different data sources to check our 
analyses because ―[w]hen a pattern from one data source is corroborated by the 
evidence from another, the finding is stronger and better grounded [and] [w]hen 
evidence conflicts, the researcher can sometimes reconcile the evidence through 
deeper probing of the meaning of the differences‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 541). 
This has been crystal clear while answering the second question in the sense of 
comparing the financial systems in order to put them into the order of financial crime 
vulnerability because we observed the same order time and again at the end of almost 
all the criterion of comparison save very few. Thus the results were very robust as 
they were confirmed many times by different but relevant other factors of 
comparative analysis. 
5.5.2.3.3. Shaping Hypotheses 
While shaping hypotheses, we ―compare systematically the emergent frame with the 
evidence from each case in order to assess how well or poorly it fits with case data‖ 
because ―close fit is important to building good theory‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 541). 
As the experience indicates through theoretical informed understanding, hypotheses 
are formed in a ―highly iterative‖ way and ―through constant comparison between 
data and constructs so that accumulating evidence from diverse sources converges on 
a single, well-defined construct‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 541, emphasis added). This 
process is ―similar to developing a single construct measure from multiple indicators 
in hypothesis-testing research‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 541, emphasis added) such as 
factor analysis.  
Miles and Huberman (1984) and Sutton and Callahan (1987) use tables for reaching 
such constructs, but we prefer building hypotheses in a gradual sense by first building 
the smallest and sometimes very obvious constructs and then linking them to a higher 
level of construct by using symmetries between very similar constructs. We shaped 
hypotheses sometimes by even utilizing some codes which can be considered 
unnecessary for some, such as ‗illegal punishment‘ and ‗legal targets‘ but we think 
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that these codes helped improve our understanding of the subject significantly and 
unexpectedly.  
Eisenhardt (1989) argues that ―careful construction of construct definitions and 
evidence produces the sharply defined, measurable constructs which are necessary for 
strong theory‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 542). This is indeed completely true for this specific 
research and the unexpected sharpness of the results even surprised the researcher. 
As a second phase in shaping hypotheses, Eisenhardt (1989) recommends verifying 
the fit of emergent relationships between the new constructs with the data and we 
present the evidence from the data confirming the relationships while presenting the 
codes and their definitions in Appendix 1. Indeed this process could be included in the 
main body of the text and indeed it deserves to be. Nevertheless, word limits upon an 
acceptable PhD thesis force us to put it in the appendices. Yet, this should not mean 
that the coding process, which shows the hypothesis building process and reveals the 
connections of the analyses and the data in a dynamic way, was secondary in 
importance.  On the contrary, it was an essential and more demanding part of this 
research, which required a large amount of time, as these codings determined the 
nature of this study. 
As part of the process, the verification process is done against each case as suggested 
by Yin (1984), where disconfirmation ―provide[s] an opportunity to refine and extend 
the theory‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 542). Similar to Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988), we 
found this phase very useful, because it helped us in developing and expanding our 
theory in many ways, probably because we have chosen fairly extreme cases many of 
which provided crucial insights about the consequences of generalizability of the 
emerging theory. 
It is no surprise that the text is large in size because ―researchers cannot apply 
statistical tests such as an F statistic. The research team must judge the strength and 
consistency of relationships within and across cases and also fully display the 
evidence and procedures when the findings are published, so that readers may apply 
their own standards‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 544, emphasis added). As mentioned, this 
chapter provides the details of the methodological procedures, while coding 
procedures and the outcomes are presented in the Appendix section, and most of the 
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important analyses are presented in Chapter 6. It is not possible to present the whole 
coding and analysis processes, field notes, write-ups and the whole collected 
data,because it would probably amount to thousands of pages. 
5.5.2.4. Time Framing 
Time is an important parameter for Rational Choice Theory because every crime has 
the same basic building blocks, namely, time, place, target and perpetrator of 
criminality (Cohen and Felson, 1979) and consequences change when the time 
changes. We confined our research to the period between 1980 and 2013.  
Due to the nature of this study, political, economic and financial movements and their 
timing are important for our study, because financial systems are affected by these 
movements and indeed they are in constant change. Naming some systems as 
‗transitional‘ is the obvious evidence of such an effect. However, although systems 
change over time, the socialist-capitalist framework of comparison has until 1990 
proven to accommodate the modest changes taking place in economic systems 
(Asutay, 2010). Since the advent of major political changes in the Soviet Union, 
beginning in 1985, unprecedented systemic changes have taken place in the USSR 
and in many of the formerly planned systems of Eastern Europe and China. 
Although the roots of the rapid changes now underway reach back to the 1980‘s, and 
earlier, the 1990s ushered in a new world order. Astonishing events of 1990-91 were 
(Asutay, 2010): 
(i) End of the Cold War 
(ii) German reunification 
(iii) The fall of the Communist governments of Eastern Europe 
(iv) Collapse of Japanese ―bubble economy‖ 
(v) Crisis in the Swedish Model of Welfare Socialism 
Considering these essential marking points, this study limited the time frame to the 
period from the beginning of 1980 to the end of 2013. 
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5.5.2.5. Enfolding Literature 
According to Eisenhardt (1989: 544) ―[a]n essential feature of theory building is 
comparison of the emergent concepts, theory, or hypotheses with the extant literature. 
This involves asking what is this similar to, what does it contradict, and why. A key to 
this process is to consider a broad range of literature‖ for increasing ―validity, 
generalizability, and theoretical level‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 544).  
It should, however, be noted that the literature does not direct the analyses in 
grounded theory, but even if it does, these links with the literature do not take place in 
a descriptive manner but rather at the conceptual level (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2008: 162-164). 
We presented this phase of the process in the concluding sections, while relating the 
theory to the literature and, like Leonard-Barton (1988), Burgelman (1983) and 
Gersick (1988), we found many confirmations and matches between our theory and 
other criminological theories in the literature.  
 
5.6. EVALUATION  
In grounded theory research, there is the phase of evaluation before the theory is 
finalized (Yüksel et al., 2007). Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008: 158) agree that this 
verification phase is regarded as important in grounded theory research. Elliott and 
Lazenbatt (2005) summarize the credibility measures of some researchers for 
qualitative research in general (including grounded theory) in Table 5.5: 
 
Table 5.5: Credibility Measures of Theories in Science 
Quantitative 
Criteria  
Qualitative 
Criteria  
Universal 
Criteria  
Original 
Grounded 
Theory  
Strauss & 
Corbin‟s 
Grounded 
Theory Criteria 
Validity 
Reliability 
 
 
 
(Sheldon, 1994) 
Credibility 
Transferability 
Dependability 
Confirmability 
 
(Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985) 
Validity 
Relevance  
 
 
 
(Hammersley,  
1992) 
Fit 
Work 
Relevance 
Modifiability 
 
(Glaser and 
Strauss,  1967) 
Two sets of criteria: 
- Research Process 
- Empirical 
grounding 
of findings 
 
(Strauss and Corbin, 
1998; Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990) 
Source: Elliott and Lazenbatt (2005: 49) 
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It should be noted that ―[v]alidation is done by generating hypothetical relationships. 
Categories may be refined and reorganized in the completion of the theory‖. In this 
process, ―data becomes the theory‖ (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 164). 
Some evaluation criteria are suggested for the evaluation of the grounded theory. For 
instance Glaser and Strauss (1967) and later Glaser (1978) included ―fit, workability, 
relevance, and modifiability‖ (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 169) and Charmaz 
(2006: 527) brings forward the criterion of saturation to criticize it and offers more 
concrete criteria: credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness. According to Colls 
and Hussey (2009: 157) saturation is reached when ―inclusion of new data does not 
add to your knowledge of the phenomena under study‖. 
According to Charmaz (2006: 528), ‗credibility‘ has the aspects of systematic analysis 
development, sufficient data and the researcher‘s familiarity, while ‗originality‘ 
means new, significant, challenging, refining and changing the current ideas in the 
literature and resonance is drawing novel meanings and interpretations and finally 
usefulness refers to the practical aspects. 
As Murphy et al. (1998) suggest, Hammersley‘s (1992) criteria (validity and 
relevance) are universal for all scientific studies both qualitative and quantitative. 
These criteria of Hammersley (1992) are thus gaining more recognition and many 
research organizations recommend them for assessment of the theories (Murphy et al., 
1998). 
Lastly, according to Eisenhardt (1989: 548), the resultant theory can be assessed by 
deciding ―whether the concepts, framework, or propositions that emerge from the 
process are "good theory.‖ After all, the point of the process is to ―develop or at least 
begin to develop theory‖ and she also accepts the criteria of Pfeffer (1982), namely, 
parsimony, testability, and logical coherence along with the “strength of method and 
the evidence grounding the theory‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 548). We opted for 
Eisenhardt‘s (1989) criteria for the evaluation of the resultant grounded theory 
because we followed her procedures and built our grounded theory using case studies. 
Hale et al. (2005: 92) writes that ―[c]learly some theories are deemed better than 
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others, for theory has its own forms of granting legitimacy and relevance. Instead of 
asking how theories should be judged, one can ask what matters in theory. What 
matters to, and among, theorists?‖ 
Following Eisenhardt‘s (1989: 548) criteria of ‘good theory‘ and asking Hale et al.‘s 
(2005: 92) ‗what matters‘ question in a ‗good theory‘ one can confidently claim that 
the resultant grounded theory of this research deserves the label of ‘good‘  
Eisenhardt‘s (1989: 548) theory, because what matters for criminologists working on 
financial white collar crime is;  
(i) a ‗rationality based‘ theory (see Chapter 3) which is free from the fallacy  that 
the crime follows opportunity (see Chapter 4), 
(ii) a ‗rationality based‘ theory which does not automatically assume crime 
motivation (see Chapter 6) but explains the process of increasing/decreasing 
levels of crime motivation. 
(iii) a theory of crime which does not neglect earlier theories‘ ‗scientific‘ research 
results and tries to find a way of including their findings in its own construct. 
(iv) A theory not of assertions, claims, arguments, but processes, 
(v) A theory which takes the greater and immediate environment into consideration 
in a flexible way to accommodate differences 
(vi) A theory which is not in conflict with ‗change‘, change in financial 
circumstances, change in behaviour, change in opportunity, change in law, 
society, security measures etc. 
(vii) A theory free from static discretionary characters of crime which does not label 
people with certain sustained characteristics but is aware of the fact that 
characteristics and thus criminality can change and the criminal in the final 
analysis may decide not to be a criminal. 
The grounded ‗theory‘, as a result of this research, deserves to be called a ―good‖ 
Eisenhardt‘s (1989: 548) theory because it fulfils the ‗what matters‘ Hale et al.‘s 
(2005: 92) question for the criminologist. 
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5.7. LIMITATIONS AND DIFFICULTIES 
This section aims to identify the limitations and difficulties faced during the conduct 
of this study in order to provide a better contextualisation. 
5.7.1. Reaching the Offender: Impossibility of Collecting Primary Data 
The subject of this study is white collar financial criminals, who are the most 
powerful criminals on earth. However, it is hard to reach them, speak with them, let 
alone interview or question them on the probabilities of committing certain crimes 
that sometimes ―exceed one trillion dollars82‖ (Schlegel and Weiburd, 1992: 195). 
This is why collecting primary data was the main limitation of this study. If we could 
obtain enough primary and original data from truly white-collar finance criminals, we 
could have reached a grounded theory with better ―saturation‖. 
5.7.2. Obtaining the Data 
While it was intended to conduct empirical analysis through quantitative data, 
quantitative data about financial crimes are also very scarce. This is indeed very 
frequently mentioned in the literature, as white collar crime figures in general are 
either not recorded at all or not available to the researchers. They are not publicized, 
unlike street crimes.  
In this research, we also tried to collect comparative statistical data, but we eventually 
realized that among all the databases that publish comparative crime statistics 
financial crimes are either completely absent or very scarce.  
According to Reichel (1999: 37) there are four main sources of comparative crime 
databases available for researchers which are: 
(i) Interpol,  
(ii) United Nations (UNODC),  
(iii) Comparative Crime Data File,  
(iv) Correlates of Crime.  
In addition, for the European statistics there is a fifth source, ―The European 
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For Savings and Loans fraud in the US which is equal to the total military budget of the US for 2012 
(White House, 2012). 
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Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice. And for the socialist and Islamic countries 
not only crime related data but even very basic data such as population are hard to get 
or do not exist at all‖ (Taylor and Teaching Company, 2008). 
However, some of the existing sources – despite the fact that they do not really 
contain substantial financial crime data - are not even available to the researchers. For 
instance we received the following message from Interpol when we attempted to 
obtain comparative financial crime data, we received a negative but indicative note 
from Interpol (the message can be found in Appendix B). Nevertheless, Interpol 
announces on its website that they are collecting information on financial crimes 
under the following titles, only one of which is in the spectrum of this research 
(financial fraud): 
 ―INTERPOL‘s chief initiatives in the area of financial and high-tech crime focus on: 
 Payment cards  
 Money laundering  
 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Programme  
 Counterfeit currency & Security Documents  
 New technologies  
 Financial fraud ‖  (Interpol, 2011)83.  
All the same, following Interpol‘s and Reichel‘s (1999) advice, we turned to UNODC 
who publish statistics under the title of UNODC Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics 
in the following areas: homicide, assaults, sexual violence, robbery, kidnapping, theft, 
motor vehicle theft, burglary, drug-related crime, trafficking in persons, and illicit 
trafficking in cultural property. It should, however, be noted that none of these are 
financial crimes. Therefore, we could use UNODC to show the general crime 
inclination only. 
The third option for comparative crime statistics would be Comparative Crime Data 
File published by National Criminal Justice Reference Service, US, which ―have been 
collected for five crime categories:  homicide, rape, assault, robbery, and theft‖ since 
1977 (Archer and Gartner, 1977), but these crime categories are not among the 
comparison criterion of this research either. 
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The last option is then, Correlates of Crime data but ―[t]he sample, however, does not 
include non-market nations such as the Soviet Union and China‖ (Bennett, 1989: 1). 
Correlates of Crime Data Set presents data for the following countries: Australia, 
Austria, Brunei, Burma, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, England/Wales, 
Fiji, Finland, France, Germany(W), Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Ivory 
Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Luxembourg, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Morocco, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, 
Philippines, Scotland, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syria, Tanzania, Taiwan, 
Turkey, United States, West Indies, Zambia. Countries in italics are the cases 
examined in this research. Besides, Correlates of Crime data is on the following 
crimes only: homicide, theft (major and minor) and fraud, which again are not white-
collar crimes. 
Due to these limitations on accessing comparative data, we use discrete, separate, 
standalone data and try to infer a comparative picture of the financial crime in 
different financial systems in fitting it into the grounded theory developed by this 
study. 
As Burke (2006: 43, emphasis added) argues, many crime prevention practitioners 
accept that ―crime is an outcome of the opportunity to offend‖ and ―[r]egardless of 
offender motivation, removal of that opportunity; it is argued, will reduce the 
incidence of crime‖ in the UK.   
Since we cannot compare crime figures by using the quantitative crime data, because 
there is no comparative financial crimes data for our cases and because data is very 
hard to get, then, we may compare our cases in an indirect way, that is, by using 
qualitative data, and we did so. 
5.7.3. Page Limit 
The second most important constraint for this research is the word limit, in particular 
in relation to the nature of this research. We studied ten countries, four economic and 
financial systems from various angles, it is not easy to analyse all these cases within a 
limited space as it involves getting rid of much of the data and presenting them in a 
relatively limited space.  
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5.7.4 Time Limit 
And finally, for grounded theory researchers the allocated time for the research is 
never enough because the theory must be ‗saturated‘. Despite spending a long enough 
time, we still think that saturation of our grounded theory can be reconsidered, but we 
may appease ourselves that theories must be ‗parsimonious‘ as well.  
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
Now that all the details of the methodological issues with our research are explained, 
our theoretical framework can be explained. In order to accommodate readers who are 
not familiar with the formal coding procedures of the grounded theory method, we 
have provided a rather long introduction to the theoretical framework and put the 
development process of the theory in codes in the appendix. In the initial parts of the 
following chapter, we have tried to show all important links of the upcoming 
theoretical discussions with the relevant arguments of the social sciences literature in 
general. Since criminology is truly multidisciplinary, it is likely that readers who have 
expertise in certain scholarly areas may feel alienated. The researcher has both tried to 
show the immense multi-disciplinary nature of the complex phenomena studied and 
wanted to refer to the existing literature from related fields which confirm the 
upcoming arguments of the research, so that the reader will sustain reading 
motivation, by eliminating the idea of apparent irrelevance. 
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Chapter 6  
THEORISING FINANCIAL CRIMES 
IN COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: 
AN ATTEMPT IN GROUNDED THEORY 
 
 
  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this first analytical Chapter, the grounded theory of financial white-collar crime 
(FWCC) is presented, which, as a theory, takes the individual and his/her inner 
motivational mechanisms, elaborates them with many authentic codes and relates the 
inner world of the individual to the immediate and distant environment both spatially 
and in the time dimension.  
The formal, inductive and positivist coding process and full details of the codes are 
presented in Appendix A. It should be noted that only important codes are explained 
in a conceptual way. Readers who lose the connection between various terms may 
refer to Appendix A, which may provide better comprehension, because the codes 
appear according to the order of the knowledge generation process.   
‗Theory‘84, according to Vaus (2001: 5) is an attempt to answer the ‗why‘ question 
and this research tries to answer the following ‗why‘ question: ‗why do people 
commit financial, white-collar crime?‘. As indicated in Chapter 3 though, this is not 
the initial intention of this study. The initial intention is to answer the following 
question: ‗which financial systems are the most vulnerable to and which ones are the 
strongest against financial crimes?‘. However, to reach this latter question, the former 
question has to be answered first. 
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Post factum theory (Merton, 1968) or ex post facto theorizing (Vaus, 2001: 5). 
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Nevertheless, the best available theory, that is, ‗rational choice theory‘ (RCT), was 
not suitable to answer this research question. Then, we took the responsibility of 
fixing this comparison problem in order to reach a more capable theory, which would 
not only enable us to answer our initial question but also let us contribute to the 
theoretical developments in finance, criminology and related literature. Since we 
already knew which theory was the best available theory, and which parts were 
incapable of comparison, we decided to develop the earlier best theory, instead of 
trying to build a completely new one.  
First of all, such an efficient theory must be grounded on the data and be applicable to 
the middle-range problem of financial crimes. This is why we decided to use 
grounded theory as a method of building theories. According to Eriksson and 
Kovalainen (2008: 154; emphasis added) grounded theory is equipped ―for curving 
out the inbuilt middle-range theory‖, which refers to the theories ―that are delimited to 
specific aspects of social phenomena, instead of broad, macro-level theories that deal 
with abstract entities such as society or the economy‖. Our subject area efficiently fits 
into this framework, because the models we are discussing are not as specific as 
‗whether certain crime rates, in city X, are rising or not‘ nor as general as the ‗general 
theory‘ of crime. We are dealing with certain financial, white collar crimes in certain 
time periods only. Nevertheless, this does not mean that further studies can improve 
and expand the resultant grounded theory into a generalizable theory of crime. 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1998: 12, emphasis added), in grounded theory 
research, ―a researcher does not begin a project with preconceived theory in mind 
(unless his or her purpose is to elaborate and extend existing theory)‖. Likewise, this 
research develops the best available theory by using some of the readily available, 
obvious codes of rational choice theory. Colls and Hussy (2009: 158) argue that in 
certain fields of the social sciences, ―there is continuing dissatisfaction with using 
priori theories‖ and ―one response has been to encourage the use of grounded theory 
methodology‖, because while generating the new theory, ―it is important not to 
impose boundaries set by prior theory‖ (Colls and Hussey, 2009: 157, emphasis 
added); this is why we were very critical about all the pieces of RCT in order not to be 
directed and/or limited by this priori theory. 
RCT presupposes ‗motivated offenders‘, which implies that when people come up 
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with net positive opportunity of financial crime
85
, according to the theory, they 
commit crime; but RCT ignores the fact that those offenders operate in a culture and 
cultures may have significant differences of opportunity perception. However, it is not 
rational to exclude these perceptional differences, while calculating rational choices. 
One thing rational for a specific person, in a specific cultural and physical 
environment, may not be so for another person. For instance, socialism does not 
assume an automatic motivation in relation to financial opportunity, because the 
society and the individuals forming it are supposed to be acting in solidarity, which is 
against the self-interest in the face of the illegal opportunity that belongs to others. 
This and similar other criticisms of RCT are provided in Chapter 3 in detail.  
This research, inevitably, will touch at times on social dimensions in depth but only 
for the sake of analysing certain agents in these cultures, namely, ‗people of state‘ (i.e. 
VIPs, politicians, bureaucrats, administrative staff), the corporate people (i.e. CEOs, 
managers, traders, brokers etc.), individual professionals (i.e. individual fund 
managers, traders, brokers etc.) and commercially important people (CIPs) as 
financial white-collar criminals.  
These groups‘ behavioural norms differ86 and they may also commit financial crimes 
in groups and as crowds
87
 (e.g.. state crime against other states).  Nevertheless, our 
research is limited to the ‗individually committed financial crimes‘ despite the fact 
that it may give some hints for the others committed in groups and as crowds. 
Focusing on individuals also restricts our research and ties it into the term middle-
range theory. 
There are four main components in this study and the first three of them come from 
the RCT: ‗motivation‘, ‗targets‟ and ‗guardians‟. We include the ‗environment‟ in 
this group of the main concepts because the different environments of the different 
financial systems affect the crime rates. Nevertheless, this is only a shallow 
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 This is a code built by our grounded theory and it stands for an opportunity of financial crime which 
yields a positive outcome after all the relevant calculations of a specific offender in a certain 
environmental setting. 
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 Because their environments and the roles, power levels, relations, expectations, needs etc. of the 
individuals in these environments differ. 
87
 It is a well-known fact in psychology that behaviours alone are different from behaviours in groups 
and in sociology that behaviours of crowds are different from the behaviours of both individuals and 
groups and all of these differences are important while researching financial systems in a comparative 
manner. 
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explanation because all the unearthed details of earlier terms and their relations are 
analytically and dynamically shown by our resultant grounded theory. 
To give a few examples, we may ponder about these main components. When we do 
that, we realise that the motivation per se is an abstraction of some other qualities of 
the offender, as without an offender there would be no motivation to commit crime. 
Then we may deduce that if it is necessary to research some characteristics of the 
offenders (e.g. motivation) maybe others are needed as well (i.e. amotivation
88
). 
These are discussed later on in this Chapter. 
In a similar vein, targets are owned by someone or some institution with various 
different attributes. This is why the characteristics of victims are also important for 
our theory, because the variations of these characteristics increase or decrease the 
probability of the financial crime being committed. So, targets can also be taken as a 
quality of the victim, that he/she owns less or more of valuable things. Within this 
perspective, one can see the guardians as either one of the qualities of the environment 
or the quality of others surrounding the crime.  
This is not a mere choice of agent-based versus concept-based comparison, because 
RCT‘s concepts are in no way complete about crime. RCT uses a mixed set of 
concepts in this regard, such as guardians as a code of agents and motivation as a 
conceptual code.
89
  
In any case, we analyse, vulnerability, motivation, guardians and opportunity in our 
study because these are the most important qualities of environment, offenders, others 
and targets respectively. In other words, these concepts are the cornerstones of the 
theoretical attempt that is made in this study through grounded theory. Nevertheless 
exclusion of other qualities of these agents would decrease the operationality of our 
theory with the shortcoming of parsimony concerns of course. In our study, we treat 
the characteristics of offenders, victims, and environment as a separate concept and 
relate their characteristics to the grounded theory but for the sake of parsimony we 
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 Abhorring material pursuit. This was common in pre-Enlightenment era Europe and India in both 
past and modern times for instance. 
89
 We may consider ‗target‘ as conceptual as well if we perceive it as ‗opportunity‘ but then we 
coincide the equal definitions of two different variables (motivation and target) in this theory because 
many RCT theoreticians argue that opportunity creates its motivation. 
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exclude the effects of these characteristics in the formula and the further discussion 
about it.  
Let us begin with the analysis of motivation first because different people who realise 
the existence of the same opportunity are not motivated the same way and this is why 
crime begins with motivation
90
.  
Our analysis of all criminological theories, that claim biological, social, 
psychological, gender, rational and similar other discretions looks for some 
characteristics of the offenders that causes crime motivation
91
. In this sense, , causes 
of motivation vary but the direction, the result does not. All criminological theories 
agree upon the existence and importance of motivation
92
. This is why it makes sense 
to begin with motivation and look for strong ties between rationality and motivation. 
This is indeed what this research observed in the course of the study: financial crime 
emerges as a continuum of motivation, usually of an extreme and/or urgent 
motivation. Nevertheless, the explanation is far more complex than these simple and 
quick descriptions.  
It is necessary to emphasise that our theory‘s most important distinction is its non-
discretionary nature. Many, if not all other criminological theories look for certain 
character traits and claim a profiling process which looks for these character traits. 
This simply means that people with positive traits are either criminal or very 
vulnerable to crime. Our theory does not look for any kind of such character trait. 
Instead, it simply suggests a dynamic process through which anybody can be a 
criminal or can be free from crime if and when their circumstances change. 
As for ‗motivation‘, it is about one specific component of economic and financial 
systems, namely, ‗the participant‘ (or financial agent), and it is described as ―a 
function which associates with each course of action the utility of its outcome to him 
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 This does not mean that we produce a theory of discretion. If the development of different levels of 
motivation is built in a very complex way and by the effects of various variables the resultant theory 
may not be a discretionary one. 
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 In RCT, bluntly, ‗opportunity‘ is the cause of motivation. In this sense, RCT is a discretionary theory 
with one distinction: it looks for discretion not at the offender but at the environment. 
92
 From the point of view of complexity theory, since  motivation is the focal point of all explanations 
of crime, ‗motivation‘ could be said to be the strange attractor of the complex system of crime and its 
dynamic, complex environment. 
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[emphasis added]‖ (Bornstein, 1971: 4). Such motivations affect the participants‘ 
‗responses‟ to these signals and among the responses are ‗criminal responses‘.  
As Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008: 155) point  out,―the grounded theory approach is 
not a mere method or technique for qualitative data; rather, its application in research 
has more ambitions towards theory development than empirical analysis‖. The 
discovery of grounded theory in the 1960s by Glaser and Strauss (1967) contrasted it 
with ―the logico-deductive approach, by arguing that, in principle, theory testing 
through hypothesis setting alone ignored the whole process of theory generation, and 
that variable-focused analysis was truly insensitive to the real-life problems‖ 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008: 155, emphasis added). 
In grounded theory, the resultant ―theory evolves during actual research and it does 
this through continuous interplay between analysis and data collection‖ (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1988: 158). While presenting the results of our grounded theory we decided to 
put them into the order of chronological emergence in the theory building process. 
This way of presenting the results would hopefully let the reader observe the whole 
theory building process as it evolves. Yet, the formal coding process is depicted away 
from the explanatory chapter (this Chapter) in order not to make the reader bored. Let 
us now present the resultant theory excluding runtime processes of data collection and 
analysis
93
.  
In this research the analysis of crime disposition in the realm of rational choice is 
presented with the assumption that potential offenders choose between the best 
alternatives of legal and illegal activities. At the time of those calculations, people 
take the following parameters into consideration (Becker, 1968): 
(i) legitimate opportunities of earning income and the amount of reward these 
opportunities offer  
(ii) the illegitimate opportunities of earning income and the amount of reward these 
opportunities offer 
(iii) probability of arrest 
(iv)likely punishment  
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 Details of this process could not be included in this text because they are colossal in size,but they can 
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Later on, rational choice theorists included ‗motivation‘ in these measures. The theory 
assumes that the financial offenders act on a one dimensional utility function: material 
utility. Nevertheless even a quick gaze at the literature is enough to convince many 
researchers that material utility is not the only available utility in this world. Thus the 
theory, probably because it inherits many of its arguments from the economics 
literature, lacks some important aspects of the overall discussion
94
 about delinquency.  
Utility is a very important concept in our study, because we are assuming that people 
are rational in the sense of maximising their utilities. Utility and crime can be 
considered to be the intersection in this regard between economics and criminology 
and many profitable scholarly products have flourished from this intersection. Jeremy 
Bentham in the 19
th
 century and Gary Becker in the 20
th
 century are the 
representatives of such a field of intersection. 
Bentham theorized that people seek pleasure and happiness and try to avoid pain. 
When talking about pleasure and pain, Bentham not only thought about physical pain 
but various other forms of pains like religious, ethical, moral, political pains in 
different intensities, duration, certainty and proximity (Bentham, 1982; Einstadter and 
Stuart, 1995: 48). We formulated these various kinds of pains (and pleasures) in three 
dimensions: material, social and moral dimension. Below, various dimensions of the 
utility functions are presented. The manifestations of these dimensions in various 
economic and financial systems are depicted in Figure 6.3 and distinguish different 
levels of emphasis on different dimensions of the utility function. 
In the case of more than one utility dimension, we have to realize that individuals do 
not usually try to maximize one single dimension of their utility function but optimize 
all three of them with a certain weighing of the emphasized dimension.  
In economics literature, utility ‗dimensions‘ are constructed differently. According to 
Bentham for instance, utilities are decided by optimization of the various dimensions 
of ‗intensity‘, ‗duration‘, and ‗certainty‘ of pleasure or pain (Spiegel, 1991). Based on 
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 The Eurocentric approach may consider other dimensions of rationality as not noteworthy but this 
does not help the research community while people with extreme ideologies prefer to act on such utility 
dimensions. Crime is not committable by solely Eurocentric people. If it were, then the current, one 
dimensional form of the utility theory would be enough to study crime.  
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this and similar ideas, the whole microeconomics literature is built and this is valid 
under this research. However, while using the term ‗dimension‘ we mean a higher 
abstraction of pains and pleasures. This is indeed what the comparative nature of the 
study forces us to do.  
According to Bentham, ―pleasure and pain come in degrees or quantities and … can 
be juxtaposed and compared on a single measuring scale‖ (Solomon and Stone, 2002: 
423, emphasis added). When we mean material pains and pleasures (only one of the 
dimensions in this research) singlehandedly, this is possible and all calculations under 
the microeconomics literature are valid. Since the context is usually material in 
‗economics‘ we seldom make mistakes; nevertheless our theoretical findings suggest 
that better, more complex, more precise utility calculations and rationality measures 
are possible by using multi-attributes theory
95
 in mathematics and other similar 
methods that allow more than one dimensional calculations in economics.  
Under the Benthamian view, juxtaposing the ‗intensity‘, ‗duration‘, ‗certainty‘, 
‗proximity‘, ‗fecundity‘ and ‗purity‘ of the pleasures and pains of earning US$ 20 for 
a certain number of man-hours work with certain difficulties and conditions, such as 
the amount of time devoted, is possible and rational under certain conditions. Also, 
the eye or the arm of a certain person, for instance, is undoubtedly far more valuable 
than a US$ 20 bill. Thus, a Benthamian rationality would rather lose the US$ 20 bill 
to a gangster with a knife who threatens to stab it into the victim‘s eye or arm. But 
under the moral utility dimension, for instance a Muslim, if the gangster with the 
knife kills the victim because he/she protects his/her belongings, according to the 
religious law, he/she goes to the paradise in exchange for the US$ 20 bill and in the 
world remaining after him/her he/she is called a martyr and the family is known as the 
family of a martyr (the additional social dimension‘s yield).  
As is obvious in the example above, the qualities (not dimensions in the context of 
this thesis) of the material and moral dimensions are in conflict. For instance, the 
duration of the pleasure of the US$ 20 bill is different in the material dimension 
compared to the moral dimension. The duration of the pleasure of the victim‘s moral 
dimension in the case of not giving the US$ 20 bill is infinite. On the other hand, the 
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duration of the pleasure of the victim‘s material dimension in the case of not giving 
the US$ 20 bill is the retainment of the US$ 20 bill for another week until he/she 
spends it. Is the duration of pleasure of not giving the US$20 bill in this case, one 
week or infinity?  
It is clear from this and similar discussions that one utility function does not fit all the 
different cultures, societies, beliefs; but a multi-faceted utility is necessary in cross-
cultural studies and for the precision in economics. 
While 2 billion people
96
 in the world have this belief system, and many more describe 
themselves as Christians, Judaist, Confucian etc. economics as a social science cannot 
make precise calculation by bluntly including them under one-dimensional linear 
measure.  
Still though, in every one of three dimensions (i.e. material, social, moral), 
Benthamian qualities of utility, those are ‗intensity‘, ‗duration‘, ‗certainty‘ and 
‗proximity‘, ‗fecundity‘, ‗purity‘ (Solomon and Stone, 2002: 423) are valid and when 
we state for instance ‗optimizing‘ we mean a collective optimization of all of these 
Benthamian qualities of utility under one or more utility dimensions. In this sense, 
this research proposes a far more complex utility optimization calculation for the 
individuals.  
It should be noted that if some or all of the utility dimensions are heavily dominated 
by a certain dimension, optimization usually, if not always, means maximization of 
that dominated utility. We may show the possible motivational choices of individuals 
in Figure 6.1.  
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Figure 6.1: Possible Motivational Choices of Individuals in the Society
97
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One should be aware that none of these dimensions are irrelevant to any individual
98
 
and that it is possible to be affected by more than one motivational dimension, but 
usually one dimension is dominant over others. This research assumes a materially-
dominated individual regardless of their social and moral environment
99
. Non-
materially dominated individuals are not the subject of this research because relatively 
they are not as vulnerable to financial crimes as people with materially dominant 
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question: ―How can we put the financial systems into the order of financial crime 
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utility functions, but they may be vulnerable to other kinds of crimes such as political, 
social or violent crimes etc. Further research can be conducted on the rational choice 
under the influence of the socially and morally dominated utilities and the linkages 
between these dimensions. Then, a more comprehensive and generalizable crime 
theory may emerge. 
For white-collar criminals for instance, material targets would be valued more than 
social and normative targets, and we could show this inclination of white-collar 
criminals in the depiction shown in Figure 6.2.  
As depicted in Figure 6.2, financial white-collar criminals are materially dominated, 
regardless of the countries they live in. The effects of social and moral utility 
dimensions either can be disregarded or are not strong enough to substantially change 
the motivation of the individual against illegal material targets. Thus a single line, 
instead of three to denote other (i.e. social and moral) dimensions is enough to 
simplify the motivational choices of the would-be financial white collar criminal. 
Nevertheless, this is only a primitive, initial depiction of the motivation process; as 
the motivation process is revealed further in this Chapter, the complexity of the 
phenomenon ‗motivation‘ is revealed too. 
 
Figure 6.2: Individuals with Materially-Dominant Utility Functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research realizes that material utility is not the only utility people act on, but it is 
obvious that financial criminals, predominantly, act on material calculations. Thus, an 
alternative approach is used to imply that there are other possible utility functions. 
Individual 
Financial Crime Target 
t0       .................................................................................................... t1 
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Therefore, the terms, dominant and recessive utility functions are used. Financial 
criminals are then referred to as people who act in a materially dominant utility 
function, because when motivated, they approach material targets but are partially 
governed by other dimensions‟ effects as well. 
Figure 6.3 depicts material (mt), social (sc) and moral (mr) dimensions. One of the 
most important distinctions between the utility dimensions is the quality of its 
duration. Material utility for a given individual has a possible duration of 100 years at 
most, while social utility transcends the human life-time and spreads through 
generations of many (e.g. for Alexander the Great 24 centuries) and the moral 
dimension transcends humanity and even the universe. Nevertheless, there have been 
some cultures in the world who believed that material wealth would transcend life on 
earth, as they buried their wealth with them to use it in the afterlife. Thus, 
anthropological applications require further awareness. Figure 6.3 also depicts that the 
term utility ‗dimension‘ used in this research is not like the linear utility dimension of 
the Benthamian view, where all the dimensions positive (pleasure) and negative (pain) 
aspects can be linearly juxtaposed (Solomon and Stone, 2002).  
 
Figure 6.3: Various Dimensions of the Utility Functions
100
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, when we realize that people are not acting rationally in a materially expected 
way in materially dominated cultures, it is probable that those people are not under the 
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dominant effects of the same dimension. They could be under the dominant influence 
of social and/or moral dimensions. People committing crime despite capital 
punishment and career criminals in materially-dominant systems can be examples of 
such criminals. It is highly probable that conventional mechanisms for dealing with 
crime in a specific system with certain dominant utility functions are not effective for 
such criminals because the punishments are almost invariably delivered from the same 
dominant utility dimension (i.e. material). For instance, governments seldom 
announce socially and morally-dominant punishments, as if assuming that there can 
be no individual who would rationalize committing crime in others‘ worlds101. 
Now that a crucial exclusion of very important paradigms in classical RCT are shown 
to prove the need for an improved theory based on rational choice, we can explain the 
details of our solution to satisfy this necessity, to fill the gap between classical RCT 
and a theory that is capable of comparing extreme cases based on rational choice. 
 
6.2 MOTIVATION AND OFFENDERS 
‗Motive‘ is developed from a Latin word ‗movere‘, which basically means ‗move‘. 
From a linguistic point of view, what we are focusing on is what moves people to 
reach a criminal financial gain. Motivation is, hence, ―the process involved in the 
initiation, direction, and energisation of individual behaviour‖ (Geen, 1995: 38) 
―either eagerly or reluctantly‖ (Miller, 1962: 249).  
Studying motivation is indeed studying the ‗why‘ of behaviour and this is tantamount 
to the whole discipline of psychology (Gross et. al., 2004: 331) and criminology. This 
is beyond the reach of our study. However, there are some important, comparative 
aspects of it which are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of rational decision 
making. 
Earlier rational choice theorists did not focus on motivation, but took it for granted. 
Actually this is obvious from the discourse of the RCT because ‗motivated offender‘ 
is a commonly used phrase in the literature and presumes an already set offender. 
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motivations theory, need theory, utility theory, stratification theory, theory of self and some other 
theories. 
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Indeed, this is exactly what Ekblom (2001: 264) stated while discussing the RCT: 
That [it] does not rely on past improvements in society, treatment regimes for 
offenders or early interventions in children‘s socialisation to reduce current 
criminality; or on the sheer aversive intensity of sanctions anticipated at some 
remote time in the future to deter
102
 or incapacitate present offending. It does 
not directly aim to change offenders‟ [emphasis in original] propensities or 
motives for crime at all. It takes these as given and, proceeding from an 
analysis of the circumstances engendering particular crimes, it introduces 
specific changes to influence the offender‘s decision or ability [emphasis in 
the original] to commit these crimes at given places and times [emphasis 
added].  
Crime motivation and deviance, hence, must be discussed because of the following 
reasons:  
(i) the role of the ‗motivation‘ has been expended at the latter stages of the theory 
(Burke, 2006); 
(ii) Even if the crime motivation can be taken for granted, it may differ among 
various financial systems and this surely affects criminality, which is something 
this thesis should address; 
(iii) Assuming a ‗motivated‘ offender is actually assuming a ‗bad‘ human nature, 
which is a debated issue in modern criminology; 
(iv) A better analysis and formulation of the motivation is needed in order to 
comply with the compared system‘s different specification (i.e. allowing both good 
and bad human natures in different situations). This is needed because some of the 
financial systems do not assume a ‗bad‘ human nature, thus leaving us with no 
choice but to discuss the comparative crime motivation.  
(v) Indeed this is also required for the internal validity and consistency of the 
theory because as the second main theme of this chapter we compare the four 
attributes of ‗suitable targets‘, namely, the value, inertia, visibility and accessibility 
of targets and the first attribute, value (of a crime target), is described (i.e. by 
Burke, 2006) as a subjectively calculated rational perspective. We find it neat to 
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deterrence theory assumes a motivation that can be affected and manipulated by the probable future 
punishment but other RC theories assume a given motivation. 
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discuss this subjectivity under the first theme of this Chapter, under ‗motivation‘. 
This subjective decision making of financial criminals is most of the time perceived 
as either individual or institutional subjectivity in the finance industry. Nobody can 
deny that institutional, social and psychological environments in a business affect 
the individuals they employ.  
However, financial crime motivation is all about individuals and not institutions or 
political positions; although political and commercial institutions can, like normal 
human-beings, be prosecuted and sentenced in the modern world, it is always the 
individual who make real decisions, including deviant decisions.  
This is indeed something central to white collar criminality (WCC) as Sunderland 
(1983) sees it. Because, he defines WCC as ―a crime committed by person[s] 
(emphasis added)‖ who are ―powerful business and professional men‖ (Sunderland, 
1983: 7). It‘s rather interesting that he uses a gender specific discourse. Such a 
discourse is probably preferred to give a profile of the WC criminals, because the 
word ‗powerful‘ fills in such a profile too. Similarly, the usage of ‗professional‘ 
along with ‗business‘ can be interpreted as the intent to include male politicians and 
bureaucrats in the context.   
It is clear from his writings that Sutherland (1983) is not discussing the artificial 
personality of corporations, while writing about 'corporate' crime, but the real 
personality of businessmen. At the time of a conference titled 'crime of corporations' 
in DePauw University, Tonybee Clup in 1948 he explained his ideas (Sutherland, 
1983: 7):  
... personal and social pathologies play no essential part in the causation of 
crime. I believed that this thesis could be substantiated by a study of the 
violation of law by businessmen. Businessmen are generally not poor, are 
not feeble-minded, do not lack organized recreational facilities, and do not 
suffer from the other social and personal pathologies. If it can be shown that 
businessmen, without these pathologies, commit many crimes, then such 
pathologies cannot be used. "I have used the term white-collar criminal to 
refer to a person in the upper socioeconomic class who violates the laws 
designed to regulate his occupation", in the sense in which it was used by 
President Sloan of General Motors, who wrote a book entitled The 
Autobiography of a White Collar Worker.  
In this sense, individual human ethics and individual motivations are more important 
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for our study than corporate ethics. Thus, we should make sure that the ‗motivation‘ 
of the motivated offender always comprises human elements and human behaviour. 
Even for institutional settings, criminological analyses of WCC and financial crimes 
should consider an individual crime motivation.  
As for the theory of motivation, like RCT, our research takes one of the best available 
theories of motivation and uses it as the base explanation. Afterwards we improve this 
theory by means of grounded theory methodology and therefrom a dynamic, multi-
layered depiction is developed along with many related codes of motivation. 
There are mainly three types of motives in psychology: biological, sensation-seeking 
and complex motives. Complex motives are learned motives and are ―aroused by 
psychological events‖ (Gross, 2004). Among the complex motives are: need for 
achievement, need for affiliation, need for power, need for approval. There are many 
psychological and criminological theories that have something to say on these 
complex motives.  
Since we limit ourselves to WCC only, we exclude the biological, sensation-seeking 
motives which may be useful to research on non-WCC such as thievery, rape, murder 
and then may be integrated into our theory by further research via filling the gap at the 
downstream needs of Maslow‘s (1954) hierarchical needs. 
We continue, hence, with the analysis of complex motives. Psychology provides us 
with the following theories of motivation that encompass complex motives: instinct 
theories, drive theories, optimum level of arousal theory, expectancy (incentive) 
theory, opponent-process theory, Maslow‘s theory and Freud‘s theory. 
Expectancy (incentive) theory is the fundamental psychological theory of RCT 
because it argues that ―the expectation of a desirable goal motivates us to perform a 
behaviour. The expectation of an undesirable goal motivates us not to perform a 
behaviour‖ (Gross, 2004, emphasis added). Theory also suggest that ―expectations 
and values affect whether a behaviour is performed or not‖ (Rotter, 1966, emphasis 
added) and that successful experiences in the past, produce higher expectations while 
unsuccessful ones produce lower expectations. Figure 6.4 depicts the important role 
expectations, goals and re-evaluation play in motivation with all other relevant 
components of it. 
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In a similar vein, Williams (1997:197) argues that the process of rational thinking in 
cognitive science is basically, the ―driving or compelling mental forces in the mind‖. 
Expectancy theory is consistent with cognitive science as well and if we use it, we 
may bring the reliable findings of cognitive science to our theory (by further research) 
and since we apply our theory to financial crimes, expectancy theory is also 
completely parallel to the arguments of microeconomics. 
It should be noted that the psychological view of Gross (2004) is a binary one, 
because it suggests something (desirable goal) and its negation (undesirable goal). 
This desirable/undesirable dichotomy is also consistent with the modified ‗carrot and 
stick‘ psychology and incentive mechanism of market economies. This is not 
surprising to observe because both of these theories are Eurocentric, and from, by and 
large, the same philosophers, although coming from different disciplines. 
We use Figure 6.4 of Rollinson et al. (1998: 149) as ―[a]priori specification of [our] 
construct‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 536) on motivation and elaborate it through further 
reasoning and comparative directive. 
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Figure 6.4: Motivation Process 
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 ‗Actual self‘ in Rollinson et al.‘s (1998: 149) model can be renamed as the 
―perceived‖ actual self when we discover the variations of the actual self. The 
adjective, ‗perceived‘, assumes the existence of a ‗real‟ actual self and apparently 
there is a discrepancy between those two. This gap between ‗perceptual‘ and ‗real‘ 
actual selves is indeed the error of one‘s understanding of him/herself or an unreal 
expansion, exaggeration (or downgrading) of his/her real self. In short, our research 
suggests that individuals sometimes fail to correctly appraise their position in their 
environment. Moreover they may also set unrealistic and unlikely ideals just as they 
set such fears for their future life. Various codes of these errors are also presented in 
this chapter. 
With new codes, these three components, ideal self, perceived actual self and real 
actual self are almost identical to the id, ego and superego of Freud respectively now 
and may help bring all the psychological concepts and related discussions about 
deviance into our theoretical framework. Lindzey et al. (1988: 383) describe the 
relationship between id and superego as a ―battle‖ for ―dominance of ego‖ or 
perceived real self in our grounded theory. This rivalry too, matches the modified 
version of Rollinson et al.‘s (1998: 149) motivation model depicted in Figure 6.5 
because perceived self can be described as something that is being stretched both by 
our idealized self and actual self, the first, to reach a potentially better place in the 
society and the second to show the reality and to calm down, to slow down the 
impulses. Stevenson (2003) provides a book size story of this battle. 
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Figure 6.5: Rollinson et al.‟s Motivation Model with the Addition of Real Actual 
Self (with its Relative Positions
103
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For now, we can argue that as the gap between our actual selves (perceived and real) 
get wider, the capacity of the agents to receive more insults, dangers, dilemmas, 
conflicts rise and thus we perceive more attack from outside.  
In the context of financial crimes, if the perceived self is above the real self, perceived 
loss of dignity, power, status could be mentioned among such attacks, which 
eventually may really affect crime propensity because such attacks may remind the 
would-be-financial-criminal of yet another source of lacking, scarcity, deprivation 
from his/her ideal self.  
The above motivation process in Figure 6.4 deserves praise for a succinct presentation 
of the process but also deserves criticism for representing one type/level of motivation 
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only. For the sake of symmetry and balanced representation of the human behaviour 
(because not all people are positively motivated, some are either not motivated at all 
or depressed, negatively motivated) another code to balance the ideal self is 
necessary. We coded this concept as ‗feared-self‘ as depicted in Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6.6: Rollinson et al.‟s Motivation Model with the Additions of Real Actual 
Self (with its Relative Positions
104
) and Feared Self 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A more operational depiction of the outstanding parts of the motivational model of 
Rollinson et al.‘s (1998: 149) and our additions can be seen in Figure 6.7. With this 
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figure, it is easier to grasp the relationships of many categories and subcategories we 
formulate and analyse in this study.  
 
Figure 6.7: Probable Positions of the Categories Regarding Motivation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now let us give details about these initial blocks of the grounded theory. This new 
terminology emerged after the coding process of the grounded theory methodology, 
which is presented in detail, in the Appendix Chapter. 
We begin introducing the main codes of the theory with one of the central codes, the 
self and its various forms. Later on we present the needs and introduce more 
additional codes of the theory thereof. 
6.2.1 Selves 
Earlier in this chapter we mentioned that people choose a combination of targets from 
material, social and normative targets and generally one or two of them are dominant 
over other targets. For instance, in capitalist countries, we may argue that material 
targets are dominant over social and normative targets, while in socialist countries, 
social and normative targets are dominant over materialistic targets and in Islamic 
countries normative and social targets are dominant over materialistic targets. These 
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presumptions are discussed in detail (within page limits) in Chapter 7 under the title 
‗passive capable guardians‘ but we repeat it here for the smooth flow of the subject. 
These possible targets are shown in Figure 6.8, below; along with the social levels at 
which these decisions are made.  
 
Figure 6.8: Possible Targets of Motivation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As seen in Figure 6.8, we are focusing on the top strata of the societies which are 
materialistically motivated. Decision making structures may be different in the lower 
layers but we are not interested in these differences in this study. Since we are 
studying financial crimes, naturally, we assume that these white-collar, top strata of 
capitalist, socialist and Islamic societies are materialistically motivated. Indeed, this is 
what RCT argues. However, RCT does not reveal the consequences of the differences 
in mixed motivational targets and cultures. Now let us attempt to reveal some of the 
fundamental consequences of those differences.  
In Figure 6.9, we make another addition to Rollinson et al. (1998: 149) and make the 
‗real‘ actual self explicit. 
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Figure 6.9: Basic Motivation Model Perceived and Real Actual Self 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified Version of Rollinson et al. (1998: 149). 
 
As seen in Figure 6.9, people mainly have two forms of self: ideal and real, but ideal 
self is not always correctly perceived and the perception error, shown in Figure 6.9, 
produces another self which could be named as ‗real‘ actual self. These three forms of 
self, that is ideal, perceived actual and real actual are almost equal, matches to id, ego 
and superego of Freud‘s conceptualization of self respectively. 
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Figure 6.10: Various Positions of Actual and Ideal Selves with Some Motivational Measures  
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When people‘s expectations of reaching their ideal selves are relatively lower (as seen 
in Figure 6.10, C) they are better motivated because they need to do better, perform 
better to reach their ideal selves and vice-versa. 
Existences of the ideal, perceived actual and real actual selves, presented in Figure 
6.9, require the psychological measures, ‗haste‘, ‗expectations‘ and ‗need gaps‘, 
presented in Figure 6.10. Two of these measures are already presented in the 
motivation model of Rollinson et al. (1998: 149) and the third one, ‗haste‘, is implied. 
In fact, even before Freud, English literature presented some good works on the same 
concepts (i.e. Stevenson, [1888] 2003).  
Figure 6.11 shows that the ideal and actual self construction processes are social 
processes and affected by others‘ relative positions in the same society and in other 
societies along with the good and bad labels the other individuals attach to symbols 
and phenomena in dynamic social learning processes. 
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Figure 6.11: Ideal and Actual-Self Construction Processes 
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According to behavioural finance theory, ―[h]uman interaction and peer effects are 
also important in financial decision making‖ because ―[t]he cues obtained about the 
opinions and emotions of others influence one‘s decision‖ (Nofsinger, 2011: 7) and 
Figure 6.11, therefore, shows few of these effects. 
Since the socialist science literature is not ontologically but only epistemologically 
different from capitalist science literature, we may assume that there are not 
fundamental differences in the socialist literature about these concepts and measures. 
However Islamic science has a different ontological source of knowledge which could 
be significantly different from the Eurocentric understanding, but Islam offers a very 
similar conceptualization of the selves. For instance Husain (2006: 15) uses ‗nafs‟ to 
denote ‗self‘. Burckhardt (1983) also uses almost the equivalent conceptualization of 
self presented above. As cited by Husain (2006: 15), Burckhardt (1983) describes al-
nafs  as ―the subtle reality of an individual, the ‗I‘‖ and to him, it ―appears in a 
negative aspect, because it is made up of the sum of individual or egocentric 
tendencies‖. This is a very similar definition to the perceived actual self because the 
perception is generally is more than the real self. 
Burckhardt (1983) provides two other definitions of self, similar to the real actual self 
and ideal self, that is, al nafs al-lawwamah and al-nafs al-ammarah bi al-su 
respectively. As cited by Husain (2006: 16), he defines al nafs al-lawwamah as ―the 
soul which blames, the soul aware of its own imperfection and al-nafs al-ammarah bi 
al-su as ―the soul which commands man to evil; the passionate; egoistic soul‖,  
Consequently, we can argue with confidence that there is a consensus in various 
literatures even from different ontologies and epistemologies about the existence of 
ideal and actual selves with a margin of error (between real and perceived selves). 
6.2.2 The Needs 
The needs are put in hierarchical order by many psychologists; Alderfer (1972), 
Herzberg (1959), McCleland et al. (1967) and Maslow (1954) are among them. These 
scholars suggested ‗ERT Theory‘, ‗Two-Function Theory‘, ‗Theory of Learned 
Needs‘ and ‗Needs Theory‘ respectively. These theories and their corresponding 
positions about hierarchical human needs can be seen in Figure 6.12.   
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Figure 6.12: Famous Ordinal Scales of Motivation in Psychology or the 
Relationship between Content Theory Categories
105
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rollinson et al. (1998: 163) 
 
In almost all of these models, basic needs, which are required for sustainable living 
conditions, are at the bottom of the scale. However this level of the motivation is not 
our concern, because financial white-collar criminals in all countries are at the upper-
most layers of the societies they live in. They are either business people, workers with 
high salaries or politicians and bureaucrats.  
The most famous of the theories of the hierarchy of needs is Maslow‘s needs theory. 
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As seen in Figure 6.12, the basic idea of this theory is supported by all other theories 
depicted in the figure. The bottom part of the Maslow hierarchy of needs comprise of 
material needs
106
 and the upper part of social needs
107
.  
Referring to the earlier motivation theory of Rollinson et al. (1998: 149) and the 
modifications and additions presented above, we may argue that at the beginning of 
the motivation processes, people first decide, observe, perceive who they are and 
define themselves in a certain layer of the society. Since we are focusing on WCC, the 
people concerned are at the top material layer of the society in all financial systems. 
We are aware that these people‘s composition is different in different societies and 
these differences may have consequences for financial crime vulnerability. In this 
specific layer, they choose an ideal self for themselves and the desire to reach that 
ideal motivates them. In this process, they extract or disregard some of the possible, 
better, higher ideal selves from their portfolio, because the expected probability of 
reaching them in a lifetime is not feasible or legally feasible. Nevertheless, some of 
them, still, may choose unaffordable ideal selves and be optimistic, take risks or work 
incredibly hard to reach them. Further research is necessary to discover how people 
set ideal selves, real and feared selves and why they make perception errors. 
6.2.3 The Expectations 
According to Burke (2006:43); ―[r]egardless of offender motivation, removal of that 
opportunity […] will reduce the incidence of crime‖. But it is also true that enough 
legitimate opportunity reduces criminality (Landau and Friedman, 1993). Then, 
motivation has many links to the time and situation before the crime as well. 
We may explain this by using an original testimony of a recidivist street criminal. The 
robber explains the rational choices he had but also explains that he had an earlier 
inclination (i.e. ‗gainful employment‘):  
I tried to stay away from crime ...  Nobody would hire me. I was an ex-con and I 
tried. I really tried to get gainful employment. There was nobody looking to hire 
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 Despite the fact that the lowest need is named in the Figures as ‗psychological‘ needs, it comprises 
of the needs like food, clothing etc. that are necessary for human survival and body functioning. The 
second layer at the bottom also represents material need like personal and financial security, health etc.  
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 Llewellyn (1940), Harris P. (1999), Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) and many others from various 
backgrounds also agree that ―every social group has some basic needs‖ (Harris, 1999: 4). This 
information can be used to link this research to other future studies that can extend the results to the 
groups of financial white collar criminals from individual financial white collar criminals.  
228 
me with my record. I went in as a juvenile and came out as an adult and didn't 
have any legitimate employment résumé to submit.  Employment was 
impossible. So, I started robbing‘ (Tunnell, 1992). 
When we focus our attention on this specific example, the phrase ‗gainful 
employment‘ stands out in the text, as a warning to us that the offender indeed is 
not happy with some of the jobs offered to him. Probably, despite his time in prison 
and his being a convicted person hence, he did not lower or lower enough his 
expectations.  
Some people, thus, set higher ideals than others but some set them even higher than 
their actual capacity allows them. There may be a cultural difference among 
different financial systems in this regard. If, for instance every person in a given 
society raises his/her expectations to the top level, compared to another society in 
which people normally distribute their expectations, simply because we cannot 
have enough of them, many people in the first culture must try to find ways of 
satisfying their expectations, probably by committing crime. If certain economic 
and financial systems are different in this general sense we have to consider it in 
our analysis due to its varied impact on deviance. 
6.2.4 Motivation, Haste and Greed 
Motivation of individuals toward an aim or a target can be conceptualised as depicted 
in Figure 6.13; this can be used to discuss certain variables about the financial crime 
motivation. In the figure, the motivation is non-deviant because the individual aims at 
a future position within the range of one ‗standard‘ deviation (tSD) away from his/her 
current position. 
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Figure 6.13: Standard Motivated Individual‟s Time Use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, standard motivation is the magnitude of motivation towards financial 
targets that the majority of the population follow in a specific social environment. 
Since crime is relative, and deviant, one has to consider would-be-offenders‘ positions 
relative to the norms, to normal, standard positions. In this regard, individual X in 
Figure 6.14 is a possessor of standard motivation and normally (not deviantly) 
motivated. 
 
Figure 6.14: Standard, Normal Individual with Perceived Ideal-Self 1 SD away 
(Higher) from Real Actual Self. 
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Figure 6.15: Hasty Individual‟s Condensed Time Use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hasty individual X with t x 2 time use to reach ideal self by risk or future spread is 
visualised in Figure 6.15. It should be noted that hasty individuals are not necessarily 
greedy individuals because their situation may be temporary, but greedy individuals‘ 
positions are usually permanent because they set an ideal-self more than their 
financial and social position suggests or allows, that is 1 standard deviation‘s (SD) 
better financial situation away from their current position. More explanation about the 
relevance of standard deviations follows in the upcoming parts but in order to increase 
comprehension here, we may consider one SD distance for an individual as a ‗safe108‘ 
distance to set goals, ideal selves etc. in a given society or financial environment. 
 
Figure 6.16: Greedy individual‟s Time use when Real Actual Self = Perceived 
Actual Self. 
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Figure 6.16 depicts that Greedy individual X with Need Gap (∆t = tn – t0) > (Real 
Actual Self (t0) + 1SD (∆tSD)) time use to reach ideal self by risk or future spread 
when Real Actual Self = Perceived Actual Self. 
 
Figure 6.17: Patient Individual‟s Time Use when Perceived Actual Self < Real 
Actual Self. 
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As for Figure 6.17, it shows that Patient individual X with Standard Ideal Self and 
normal (standard) time-use to reach standard ideal self when Perceived Actual Self < 
Real Actual Self. The implications of such individual self-perception is that even if 
the individual sets a slightly unrealistic ideal-self for his/her future life, his safer 
position in the self-perception (Perceived Actual Self < Real Actual Self) acts as a 
safeguarding mechanism against crime vulnerabilities compared to other people with 
positions such as Perceived Actual Self = Real Actual Self or Perceived Actual Self > 
Real Actual Self.  
Figure 6.18 depicts this individual‘s time perception as well. Patient individuals do 
not claim their targets in the same (e.g. mean) time-span. They would wait until the 
circumstances allow them to legally fulfill their material targets. Thus, it is all right 
for them to realize their ideal self in a slightly longer time compared to other 
individuals. 
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Patience and haste are indeed two sides of the same phenomenon
109
 and haste 
represents the positive side of the motivation, while patience represents the negative 
side. 
 
Figure 6.18: Patient Individual‟s Relaxed Time Use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.5 Feared-Self and Guarding Gap 
While calculating their choices, legal or illegal, people do not only consider positive 
opportunities but also calculate negative consequences of preferring certain 
opportunities. Indeed, knowing and predicting these calculations, governments aim at 
feeding people with negative consequences of using illegal means.  
This is why feared-self is the symmetric equivalence of the ideal self just like 
guarding gap, which is the symmetric equivalence of need gap. These two contracting 
and expanding forces are iterated throughout the deviance process and finally people 
are either positively or negatively motivated. This study is mostly interested in the 
positive motivation, because white-collar criminals are the end result of this process 
and their situation rationalized them to be positively motivated. Feared self is also a 
dynamic term and depends on the actual real self of the individuals, though feared still 
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represents white collar positions for many of the financial white collar criminals. 
In almost all societies there are many layers of material average. Many Western 
societies for instance accept four or five different strata in their societies. It is 
common sense to assume that people would like to be in a materially higher stratum 
and would dislike being in a lower stratum and guard themselves against the 
possibilities that certain things (punishments, labels, stigma, etc.) may happen and 
bring them the unwanted and feared position in the society. In fact, what is guarded is 
the current position and everything that holds individuals in that position. In this 
sense, all the material wealth between one standard deviation less income and current 
income is the amount of the guarding gap and what is feared is the loss of that 
property. 
This rationalization process is depicted in Figure 6.19, in which the downward arrows 
that pass one standard deviation below stand for the white-collar people whose fears 
of losing their status came true, who now need to live with people from lower strata of 
the society, who need to compromise some of the habits of the rich in the strata they 
used to occupy. Thus, these people failed to guard their guarding gap and reached 
their feared-self. Similarly, the upward arrows show white-collar individuals who 
reach the one standard deviation higher wealth position that they temporarily idealised 
before reaching the second and third positions that are two and three standard 
deviations away from their current position. 
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Figure 6.19: Rationalization Process in Materially Dominated Motivation 
 
 
 
6.2.6 Dynamicity of the Motivation 
When we look at the Figure 6.20, which provides an agreed-upon depiction of various 
levels of motivational factors, we have to argue that there are layers of motivation in a 
given society and it is possible for the individuals to climb up and down these layers 
in the course of time. Nevertheless, no rational white collar individual would 
rationally idealise themselves in the highest position in the society nor would they fear 
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to be in the worst position even in the case of bankruptcy. Usually what they idealise 
and what they fear to lose are within one standard deviation above and below their 
current position respectively. Thus, we theorise that material differences are not 
meaningful after/before one standard deviation in the specific environment in which 
the financial white collar criminals live unless the individuals are irrationally greedy.  
The motivation process represented by Rollinson et al. (1998: 149) in Figure 6.4 is 
valid in one single static layer of many possible motivational variations. We however 
would like to see a model which shows the whole process with the possibility of 
dynamism, that is, moving up and down the ‗needs pyramid‘, say, of Maslow‘s. This 
is possible with small variations in Rollinson et al.‘s (1998: 149) model. Figure 6.18 
shows such an addition to form a dynamic model of motivation. 
However, it must be noted that the layers shown in Figure 6.20 onwards are not the 
hierarchical need layers of Maslow. We theorise that inside every single hierarchical 
need, there are further layers. Since white collar criminals are at the top layer of the 
hierarchical needs, the layers shown in Figure 6.20 and onwards are the layer inside 
the same, top hierarchical needs of Maslow. 
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Figure 6.20: Dynamic Form of the Motivation Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Inspired by Rollinson et al. (1998: 149). 
 
As seen in Figure 6.20, crime motivation is departing from within the agents and by 
definition means that the motivation is stronger than the inner forces that are keeping 
the individual from deviance such as positive effects of social ties, family, school, 
education, culture, religion etc. which could be named as impeding forces. We can see 
these concepts in a visual form shown in Figure 6.20. It is obvious from Figure 6.20 
that for a sound comparison both attracting (negative) and impeding (positive) forces 
should be compared between various financial systems. 
Figure 6.20 is an important stage of this Chapter which combines many of the 
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arguments up to this point. Firstly, every one of the layers in Figure 6.20 depicts the 
internal, motivational position of the individual along with many implications for the 
future circumstances or crime vulnerability or inclination, although being static in the 
layer they belong to. These inner varieties of selves, their perceptions and perception 
errors go into a dynamic cycle from the current layers (blue) to possible upper (red) 
and lower (green) layers (socio-economic
110
 positions in the society) depending on the 
future decisions, circumstance and environments of the individuals. However, even 
higher and even lower layers can also be realized depending on the socio-economic 
conditions of the society, the abilities of the individuals and other inner and 
environmental circumstances. 
The context of this Chapter is ‗crime‘ but Figure 6.20 depicts only normal motivation 
to work and study in our routine professional and personal lives. It is not about crime 
motivation yet. This is one of the important distinctions between RCT and the theory 
built in this Chapter on crime motivation. This study, as seen, up to this point, 
explains crime motivation as a continuum of the normal, regular motivation. The 
method (i.e. grounded theory) of this study suggests that crime motivation is not a 
condition that immediately develops at the scene of the crime immediately after an 
opportunity for a financial white-collar crime occurs. Rather, following all the 
research of psychology, criminology, economics, law and related fields on motivation, 
there seems to be almost no reason to assume that crime motivation is a completely 
different phenomenon that is far from the regular meanings of the term individuals 
always have in them. Appendix A in particular shows how the regular motivation may 
develop into a strong motive for committing crime in many steps and alternatives for 
the individual. 
Some of these alternatives can be seen in Figure 6.20 as well. People in the current 
(blue) layer may climb the layers of the society as they fulfil their needs in that 
specific layer or may not if they fail to fulfil those or may fall down the layers if they 
break the law or take excessive risk. All the same, they do not have to make a material 
change in their material lives in order to be stronger/weaker against financial crimes. 
For instance the individual in the blue socio-economic position (with the perceived 
selves ready to reveal their implication in the future) may make corrections to his/her 
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 Socio-economic because not all the members of the society act on the materially dominant utility 
function. 
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perception errors of self, may change the environment in which he/she lives e.g. move 
to a far richer country where nobody has a car but he/she has or where everybody very 
harshly criticises and punishes white-collar criminals. These or similar future 
circumstances, everything else being equal
111
, would strengthen the individual against 
financial crime and make him/her less vulnerable to crime. Likewise, if the individual 
gains considerable (as much as the material gap between his current (blue) position 
and one standard deviation above his current position (red)) material wealth then his 
actual, real, ideal and feared selves are changed and adjusted to his new socio-
economic status and depending on the society and social strata he/she goes into, the  
self-perceptions and perception errors and motivation, now affected by the new 
circumstances of the environment (e.g. widened non-linear scale of standard deviation 
of wealth distribution in his new (red) position in the white-collar settings of the 
society.  
Nevertheless, individuals‘ time perceptions also play an important role in this 
dynamic setting. For instance, for some hasty people at the blue layer of the society, 
the ideal self could be more than the standard, normal, reachable (mean) ideal-self. 
Those people may aim at the ‗4th order ideal self‘ depicted by dashed lines at the 
upper and leftmost side of the Figure 6.20. These people, according to the norms and 
standards of the blue (current) layer, are at great risk in terms of financial white collar 
crime vulnerability because of their hasty time-perception, which makes them want 
the riches of the distant future in a relatively shorter time (one standard deviation time 
to reach the mean wealth level of the upper (red) level). 
In a sense, Figure 6.20 explains all the important aspects of the theoretical framework 
except for the financial and economic environment‘s motivational effects on the 
dynamic behaviour process which is explained in Figures 6.30, 6.32, 6.33 and 6.36 
under the title, ‗Motivation and Its Environment‘ and ‗Opportunity Spaces‘ explained 
in Chapter 7 and Appendix A. 
Following the point Figure 6.20 reached, Figure 6.21 simplifies this complex model 
into a simpler form to be carried on in the latter parts of the Chapter. In Figure 6.21 
the variations of inner self, self-perception and perception errors are abstracted as a 
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 That the socio-economic position does not change to move the individual to upper (red) or lower 
(green) positions in the society. 
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circle to depict a white-collar individual with all of his/her inner complexities, 
dynamicity and with many implications to be revealed under certain conditions and 
environments. 
The current position of the individual is depicted in the middle as a static being in 
Figure 6.21 but this static being lives in a financial and economic environment where 
the statuses, income, wealth of people above and below him/her have consequences 
and effects on him. For instance, if he/she does not work enough, or does not obey the 
rules, laws, regulations, ethics of his/her job he/she has the negative consequences 
which eventually bring about the status (green) below him/her or vice-versa. Thus, 
looking at the negative consequences of the green layer below him/her (left-hand side 
possibility in Figure 6.21) he/she is motivated and looking at the positive 
consequences of the red layer above him/her (right-hand side possibilities in Figure 
6.21) he/she is motivated further. Over motivation or the overarching dynamic of left-
skewed societies
112
 though may cause the individual to take more risk and let the 
feared self be realised. Nevertheless, we need to wait for the Figures 6.30, 6.32, 6.33 
and 6.36 to see how the wealth and time distances between the current (blue) and 
other (red and green) layers may dramatically differ in different socio-economic 
settings.  
 
 
                                                 
112
 Explained in the following parts of this Chapter. 
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Figure 6.21: Static Individual and Dynamic Motivated Offender Moving towards Ideal and Feared Selves 
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6.2.7 Offenders‟ Attributes Affecting White-Collar Criminality 
This research realizes that the source of the motivation is that the offender has certain 
character traits that cause variations in motivation because different characteristics of 
offenders, guardians, victims, targets, affect different parts of the criminality process.  
Those characteristics are presented throughout this chapter along with many other 
codes. Let us now begin with the characteristics of the offender, the originator of the 
motivation. While explaining, interactions between them and between other 
characteristics of victims, guardians and targets are pointed out.  
(i) Ability (power) of the offender stands for the force the guardians will encounter at 
the time of the criminal act and/or after the crime while prosecuting it. The power 
differences of the individuals are important because powerful individuals are not 
really punishable by the legal system. Big corporations for instance in weak countries 
can circumvent local restriction (Monks and Minow, 2004: 13) and this and similar 
other examples demonstrate that it is important to realize that the characteristics of 
the players change (expand or contract) as the environment changes. The strength of 
lobby groups is another evidence that big corporations and other big players are able 
to influence the laws and regulations or outwit them when they cannot. Indeed often 
they themselves prescribe the codes of law (e.g. competition laws, see: Rodger and 
MacCulloch, 2001). Thus, if the power of the offenders increases, their punishability 
decreases. 
(ii) Visibility (Untouchability) of the offender is important; as visibility of the 
offenders decreases, the effects of punishments on them decrease. For instance, it is 
harder to decrease tax evasion in offshore tax havens, because their operations are not 
visible to many guardians compared to financial institutions operating inside regular 
jurisdictions. For instance, in some countries, MPs are untouchable
113
 through 
political immunity so long as their election term continues. When people are less 
visible or more untouchable by the legal system, they are more vulnerable to financial 
crimes. 
(iii) Punishability of the offender is about people with mental disorders and illness. In 
                                                 
113Indeed the word ‗untouchable‘ is even more meaningful when we realise that an equivalent term 
exists in India to denote racially superior castes.  
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certain jurisdictions very old and very ill individuals are not prosecuted for their 
crimes. Children under certain ages are only partially punishable (by e.g.. parole etc.) 
which makes them very vulnerable to adult abuse by enthusing them to commit crime 
and then sharing or forcefully obtaining the gains. Therefore, we need to be aware that 
everybody is not punishable by the same punishment. For instance, the rich are not 
punishable by fixed (non-ratio) monetary punishments such as parking tickets or 
spiritual and religious people are punishable by un-earthly punishments. This fact 
reveals the interrelation between the characteristics of offenders and the 
characteristics of punishments. For instance, both real and perceived value and impact 
of the punishment is deteriorated or completely vanished for the unpunishables, 
because some offenders have the ability to compensate, while for some others it 
intensifies. When people are unpunishable, they are more vulnerable to crime. 
(iv) Applicability
114
 of the punishment to offender is an important characteristic of the 
offenders, because some kinds of punishment are not applicable to every kind of 
offenders. For instance corporal punishment, incarceration, sending into exile, are not 
applicable to corporate offenders or public institutions. It is applicable only to the real 
persons. When punishment is not applicable to the offenders punishment has no effect 
on them. 
(v) Liability of the offender also varies from offender to offender. For instance, 
individuals are fully liable but corporations‘ liability is limited, which creates a moral 
hazard problem and vulnerability. A corporation for instance, has the incentive to 
borrow much, pollute the environment, take unnecessary risks etc. with its limited 
liability. When offenders are more liable guardians have better effects on them.  
(vi) ―[C]lose proximity to valuable goods will increase victimization levels‖ Siegel 
(1995: 74). In this sense, accountants are the closest to tax evasion and dealers (now 
computers) are to speculation and corporations to price-fixing and manipulation. 
When agents are closer to the targets, they are more vulnerable to crime. 
(vii) Awareness of the offender is also varied. Some offenders are more aware about 
the changes in the environment than others, such as amendments in criminal codes 
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Please note the similarity of this property of the concept legitimate-punishment value to the property 
of inertia of the concept of illegal-target value. 
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and policies. Awareness in different utility dimensions is meaningful as well. For 
instance the authentic rules of one‘s morality have no effect on individuals who do not 
have a working knowledge of it or have misunderstood it. On the other hand, for 
others who operate on radical interpretations of their environment codes and 
regulations may have overdose effects on agents. Similarly, awareness in the social 
dimension is effective only if the individual has enough bonds with his/her social 
environment otherwise he/she cannot be affected by either appreciation and praise or 
by stigmatization and criticisms of them. 
(viii) As the nexus of the offender with other offenders increases while committing 
crime, punishability and visibility of the crime decreases. For instance, it becomes 
harder to track international financial transactions in tax evasion cases. Especially 
transnational corporations (TNCs) are able to move their assets quickly and decrease 
visibility for any specific guardians in any given jurisdiction. 
(ix) Ownership rights of the offender are important, because different levels of 
ownership cause differences in criminal behaviour. For instance, if the offender is in 
debt and the court is ordered to seize their future wealth, the offender is deprived of 
the ability to own things. In socialism, many things are owned in common which 
decreases the share of the real ownership. This characteristic may sometimes force the 
offender to change the crime target according to the target‘s characteristics. Thus, 
there are relationships between the characteristics of the offenders and the 
characteristics of the targets. In a similar vein, some countries have laws to confiscate 
the illegal gains from the offender even if the proceedings of crime are not proven to 
be in their wealth but some others do not have such a law. When things are owned 
more of their shares by less and owned better by victims, they are guarded better and 
when they are ownable by the offenders after the crime, there is more attachment to 
them.   
(x) Calculation ability of the offender is worth noting because different offenders have 
different calculation abilities. Cornish and Clarke (1986) do not talk about ‗pure 
rationality‘ but ‗limited rationality‘ or ‗partial rationality‘, ‗soft rationality‘. As a 
matter of fact, Akers (1994: 58) argues that the assumption of pure rationality has no 
empirical validity.  
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Burke (2006: 42), for instance, argues that ―it is clearly evident that many petty 
criminals are incapable of accurately balancing the costs and benefits of crime before 
committing an offense and many young men get involved in street fights with others 
like themselves without thought for the consequences of their actions‖. When the 
calculation abilities of the offenders are better, the policies of the guardians have 
better effects on the offenders. 
(xi) Life-time of the offenders differs. For instance, individuals‘ lives are certain 
because no incentive is more than the price of life, but the legal life of corporations is 
negotiable and political offenders‘ time-space for the financial opportunities are 
limited to their term in office. As the life-time of the offenders decreases their risk-
taking behaviour and short-term emphasis increase. 
(xii) Offenders may be living in multiple environments.  This is possible for some of 
the offenders. For instance, corporations, especially TNCs, can very quickly change 
their legal, cultural, ethnic, economic, financial etc. environment. Tolentino (1999: 
171) calls this characteristic of TNCs ‗shopping around‘ between countries and thus 
between different legal, economic, financial, regulatory etc. regimes. In financial 
environments, ―global companies now often seek listings outside their home countries 
in order to attract more international investors‖ (Morrison 2002: 316) and the 
investors are being attracted by them. When agents live in multiple environments, the 
effects of the guardians on them diminish. 
To sum up, our model assumes a dynamic individual motivation; however, we also 
analyse the individual motivation in an environment, which affects the behaviour. 
Therefore, it is not enough to lay down the main principles of the crime motivation, as 
we need to formulate the effects of the environment on these motivations or the 
motivational make-up, process, dynamics of the deviance. 
 
6.3 MOTIVATION AND ITS ENVIRONMENT  
With regards to the meaning of environment in this section, the environment of the 
crime is everything that affects crime excluding the offender, victim, and target, that 
is the circumstances, the system, the conditions of the crime. The environment of 
financial crime is worth analysing, because the legitimate and illegitimate means of 
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fulfilling the needs are the consequences of environmental opportunities and 
restrictions. In order for the offender to seize the target he/she first needs to pass the 
surrounding guardians of the target, assuming that the targets are well guarded.  
Similar to the offenders‘ attributes, there are some distinct characteristics of the 
environments. Among them are coordination mechanisms (from the point of view of 
crime and criminal motivations, acts), motivating power, accessibility, richness, 
stability. These characteristics distinguish one environment from another and 
significant differences in these characteristics may reveal the nature of being crime-
prone.  We provide more details about these characteristics in the following parts. 
6.3.1 Adaptation of the Motivation to the Environment 
In this chapter so far, we analysed and synthesized the positive motivation of rational 
people as a pretext for deviance. We presented this positive motivation in other 
relevant, non-deviant concepts such as haste, patience etc. Likewise we want to 
present this positive motivation and its relevant deviance process in its regular socio-
economic environment. We first analyse the economic conditions and present social 
stratum and class dynamics in the society and pinpoint our dynamic deviance process 
in this environment, again, in a dynamic way.  
Primarily, in this study, we consider motivation as both a major preceding factor of 
crime and a result of an opportunity, because we theorise that the motivation is not a 
fixed characteristic of the offender, it is dynamic and recalculated according to the 
payoffs of all possible positions, but it has different initial levels
115
 for different 
offenders.  
We just assume for simplicity that the up-most, few, complex motivations are enough 
to represent FWCC motivation in this study and we assume that there are many layers 
in these upper level hierarchical needs of Maslow. In Maslow‘s scale, these are ‗self-
actualization‘ and ‗self-esteem‘. We utilize these upper level factors of motivation to 
compare the need gaps between the actual (perceived) self and desired (ideal) self
116
, 
of various economic and financial cultures. 
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 In many ways, initial levels are the primary determinants of the crime disposition. From the point of 
view of complexity theory, dependence on the initial conditions is expected in complex systems and 
our theory is consistent with it. 
116
 In Rollinson et al.‘s (1998: 149) motivation model. 
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Indeed, the model Maslow proposes is mostly depicted in a pyramid form just like the 
figures criminologists use to show the proportions of different kinds of crime. Figure 
6.22 shows these similar understandings. 
 
Figure 6.22: The Criminal Justice “Wedding Cake” and Maslow‟s Hierarchy of 
Needs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Siegel (2010: 21), Walker (1983) and Maslow (1954).  
 
Then, the existence of upper and lower level motivating factors and the discrepancy 
between the perceived and actual levels of the factors are common and agreed upon 
knowledge in psychology. For instance, Göksu (2011) mentions both motivation 
literature and the needs hierarchy of Maslow in the same context under motivation. 
Agreeing these common understandings, we argue that as the gap between the 
perceived and actual levels of self-actualisation and self-esteem gets bigger, the 
financial criminals are more motivated and vice versa. Figure 6.12 above already has 
showed a clear correlation between the levels of need fulfilment and the amount and 
kinds of deviance. We follow this correlation between the upper level need fulfilment 
and the amount of crime in the upper level. Indeed, this correlation is appreciated 
implicitly by Sutherland too.   
Moreover, Figure 6.12 also reveals the relative size and importance of various needs 
in the society. Apparently, needs like food, shelter and other basic needs for survival 
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are making up most of the criminal wedding-cake. Likewise, the crimes that occur at 
upper levels are amounting to a relatively much smaller percentage of all crimes, 
because fewer people reach those levels after fulfilling the lower levels of needs.  
It is apparent that all upper level offenders leave the populations of the lower levels 
and settle in a smaller population in the upper levels. Then crime statistics are lower 
in upper levels in numbers, ceteris paribus. However it is very likely that the need 
gaps get bigger
117
 as individuals climb this pyramid of need fulfilment as seen in 
Figure (6.22), especially around the time of entrance to a new attainment of ideal self 
in the above layer. Then, the ceteris paribus assumption is wrong and since upper 
level need gaps are wider, crime rates are supposed to be similar to the lower levels. 
Crime is supposed to be normally distributed inside certain subsystems of the greater 
system, including the income or wealth distribution systems. After all, criminology 
literature could spot no crime causality between the economic conditions and crime. 
Sutherland‘s research shows that the crime rate is very similar in upper levels (Hagan, 
2010: 201), but apprehension is low. Nevertheless, actual statistics of WCCs are less 
and similar to the ‗wedding cake‘ (Walker, 1983) model of crime. Hale et al. (2005: 
267) argue that criminology literature as a whole even treats corporate crimes as if 
they are nonexistent, they call this ―relative invisibility of corporate crimes from 
popular and academic views‖, despite the fact that it is a ―legitimate area of 
criminological concern‖. What is more important, however, is not the amount but the 
impact of upper level crimes compared to lower level ones. There is a consensus in 
the literature that the upper level WCC has a big impact on the society.  
It is even more interesting to include the social class structures in  Figure 6.20, which 
results in the model presented in Figure 6.23. It is not surprising to realise that 
different social classes have different needs and that the hierarchical needs theory of 
Maslow is valid for societies as well as individuals
118
.  
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 Because the layers get smaller in population it means that there is even more competition in the 
upper levels compared to lower levels. 
118
 This information can be used in further research to include deviant behaviours in groups and in 
crowds in order to develop this theory further. 
248 
Figure 6.23: Hierarchy of Social Classes with Corresponding Needs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Existence of hierarchical social classes is a well-established concept in social 
sciences. Muslim scholars, such as Naqvi (1994: 74), also recognize the classes of 
―mustadafin‖ (oppressed) and ―mustakbarin‖ (oppressor). Nevertheless, it is hard to 
agree with Naqvi (1994), because Islamic law materially determines clear-cut break 
points between rich and poor and assumes the middle by a well known notion known 
as ‗nisab‟ or the ‗threshold income‘ above which one is subject to zakah, or 
mandatory alms giving. Nisab does not divide between rich and poor but between rich 
and not-rich because not all of the population below the nisab level.can receive zakah. 
Zakah is mainly given to poor people or people in need. In Islam, there is a big group 
of people in the society for whom the zakah discussions are irrelevant. When an 
individual has 90.18 gr. of gold or equivalent of money and wealth waiting for the 
whole year he/she gives zakah. However, if one has 75 gr. of gold and no more excess 
wealth waiting for the whole year except for the regular expenses this person neither 
gives nor receives zakah. Indeed the number of these people is not few in Muslim 
societies. This stratum of the society in Islam claims more than two distinct economic 
strata and thus negates Naqvi (1994), not for political reasons but for economic 
reasons.   
Until the criticism of Marxists and neo Marxists, detailed analysis of stratification was 
rather weak and studies were providing a blunt picture. For instance Berki (1975: 57) 
states that Marx‘s ―pivotal doctrine of the ‗class straggle‘ is but a more coherent, 
systematized expression of the classical conception of the conflict between the rich 
and the poor‖.  
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Thus, we theorise that motivation in the upper stratum of a given society is different 
than the motivation in the lower stratum. Further theoretical explanation is presented 
in the following sections regarding the characteristics of the society that affect the 
shape of the motivation in the upper and lower strata. 
6.3.1.1 Meaning of normality and normal distribution of wealth in social sciences 
The conception of Marx is not irrelevant to modern discussions because modern, 
everyday discourses like first class flight ticket, seat, service is not only about being 
rich, but the explicit social recognition, valuation and differentiation of it from the 
other members of the society. Berki (1975), Naqvi (1994) and similar others would 
agree that there is the super-rich (Irvin, 2008) and super-poor (Evatt Foundation, 
1991) in the society, along with rich and poor, at extreme distances, away from 
‗nisab‟, or wage labour. We may argue that as people climb upper levels of the power 
structures of their societies, their opportunity spaces get bigger and vice-versa. 
Macionis and Plummer (2008: 306) give the following distribution from Runciman 
(1990) about the social classes in Britain: Upper class is made up of upper-upper 
class: 0.2 – 0.1% and lower upper class: less than 10%; middle class comprises upper 
middle and service class: 15% and lower middle class: 20%, working class is made up 
of skilled working class: 20% and unskilled working class: 30%; underclass is 5%. 
When we combine them we come up with approximately 10% for upper class, 35% 
(15+20) for middle class and 55% (20+30+5) working and under classes. If we 
combine working class and underclass and attempt to visualize these numbers, we 
realize that it makes a pyramid as presented in Figure 6.23. We add some of the closer 
numbers together, because this is the trend in the literature. For instance, Giddens 
(2006) questions
119
 the existence of the underclass. Aside from the real numbers, 
suggested by many studies, the impression and the perception in the field of sociology 
is that the poor is not better than any class in the society and is worse than all others. 
The popularity of Maslow‘s pyramid shaped hierarchy of needs could be a reason for 
this trend. 
In any case, we normally expect that the distribution of wealth is not positively 
skewed, but normally distributed with a variety of different means and variances in 
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 While explaining all the classes one-by-one in his book, for the ‘underclass‘ only he uses a question 
mark (?) in the title, as follows: ‗underclass?‘. 
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market societies. Nevertheless, the position of the socialist societies is worth a second 
analysis, because they assume and want to realize an equal distribution, a rectangle 
shape in our case. All the same, since the 1980s, in the age of transitions to market 
systems, we could safely assume a normal distribution with very low variance for 
them. Thus, normal distribution must be the normal, the standard for distribution of 
wealth and income, because every ability of the individuals is normally distributed, 
and they are announced as living in meritocracies. However, this new statistical 
perspective points to another form of social stratification as presented in Figure 6.24 
and 6.25. 
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Figure 6.24: Social Classes and Their Corresponding Normal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: A: Inspired by Macionis and Plummer (2008: 306) Adapted from Runciman (1990) 
 
We may have a better comprehension from a superimposed view of these figures in 
Figure 6.25. 
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Figure 6.25: Social Classes and Their Corresponding Superimposed Normal 
Distributions and Non-Normal Distributions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 6.25, if we leave underclass (5%) as is suggested by 
Runciman (1990), remembering that the upper upper-class was .1 - .2 % only we may 
realize that there is (positive) skewed normal distribution here.  
Reminding ourselves that all social data are normally distributed, we expect the 
wealth distribution of healthy societies to be close to a normal distribution (a diamond 
in our case). This is very reasonable to expect, because all of the factors of 
accumulating wealth, such as abilities, IQ, EQ, labour, education, chance, and 
inheritance are all normally distributed. Besides, in our everyday lives, we see too few 
super-rich and terribly-poor just as we see few very low and very high IQ people, very 
strong and very weak people etc. and too many working people, normal IQ, normal 
strength, education etc. around us compared to the better (upper side of the centre of 
diamond) and worse (lower side of the centre of diamond) of the ‗normal‘.  
Nevertheless, as the percentages suggested by Runciman (1990) show, the diamond, 
based on the real values – of Britain - would be too skewed to name it as a diamond, 
or normal distribution. This could be the evidence that one should not expect a non-
normal distribution of wealth and income in socialist countries only. Market societies 
could have non-normal distributions as well. This and similar other statistical data that 
is presented in the following parts of the text could be another reason (other than 
Upper 
Class 10% 
Middle 
Class 35% 
Working and 
Under Class 55% Under Class 
Working Class 
Upper Class 
Middle Class 
Poor (Unemployed) 
Rich (Unemployed) 
253 
increasing financial crime frequencies) to look for mistakes in application or 
theoretical misinterpretation of the Western form of capitalism. 
 
6.3.1.2 Relationship between social stratification and hierarchical needs 
The normal curve may not be perfectly normal in real cases
120
 or may be completely 
non-normal
121
 as in socialist countries. Socialist countries with no real market would 
not provide an unskewed normal distribution, because the upper side of the diamond –
although argued to be not existing at all - would be pressed down in favour of the 
lower part of the diamond, or through the left, negative side of the normal bell curve 
and should be providing a diamond that is more similar to a rectangle. 
In the following parts of the analysis we present the relationship between the wealth 
distribution in the society and the hierarchy of needs. In this context, we chose not to 
use our original analysis in order to simplify it and because it is popular to use 
Maslow‘s (1971) model but we should mention that the normal, diamond shape 
suggested in our study is not contradicting the hierarchical nature of the needs, on the 
contrary it encompasses the previous knowledge of needs and enhances it by 
including the realization of the validity of the normal curve in the context.  
Financial agents, especially in the last few decades, are at the top of the pyramid of 
classes. There are mainly two reasons for that: (i) They manage the capital which is 
valued greatly very easily and in a very complex way compared to the past; (ii) They 
have the expertise of doing this. Knowledge, being an important power
122
 (Foucault, 
1980) especially in the last century, brings finance experts to the top power levels of 
the societies. Companies like LTCM with many expert PhDs, using techniques like 
‗algorithmic trading‘, ‗high frequency trading‘, are making the finance market so 
complex that only a few finance experts – who are most of the time mathematics or 
physics graduates in finance known as ‗quants‘ – really know the true milliseconds 
effects of the financial tools and mechanisms. This is another reason why it is not 
reasonable to have an upside down pyramid or a rectangle for the criminal justice 
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 Because economic and financial systems are complex systems and they usually give nested, 
repeating, fractal patterns (Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004). 
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 Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004) announce that they could not observe the expected complex 
patterns, in the financial markets they analysed. 
122
 Originally used in 1597 by Francis Bacon‘s (1924) ―Meditationes Sacrae‖ [Sacred Meditations].  
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wedding cake of Siegel (2010: 21) in financial crimes because, as conflict 
theoreticians argue, the powerful have the power to clean themselves off the crime 
statistics by controlling the ‗active guardians‘ (presented in detail below).  
To show the common motivators of the top groups in both pyramids in Figure 6.22 
and 6.23, we may refer to James (2008: 5): ―placing too high a value on money, 
possessions, appearances and fame‖. The words ‗appearances‘ and ‗fame‘ clearly 
show that the upper-level crimes of white- collar criminals are not crimes in isolation 
but crimes that have to occur relative to others, that is, in a certain society. Therefore, 
the comparison of social cultures is crucial, while studying WCCs in general and 
financial crimes in particular in a comparative study.  
‗Self-actualization‘, ‗self-esteem‘ and ‗expectancy‘ in economic and financial systems 
appear in mainly four levels in economies: international, national, group and 
individual levels. The factors we mentioned in Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.10 above and 
the mechanism we presented, motivate people to have deviant behaviours; however, 
these are positive effects only. Analysing just these factors does not provide reliable 
results unless we include the impeding forces and their (negative) effects on the crime 
motivation, namely, the effects of values and norms (or passive guardians).  
Let us remind ourselves that we analysed only motivation in the preceding sections 
and passive guardians are presented here because of their relevance to motivation. We 
analyse both positive and negative effects simultaneously in the following parts of this 
and following Chapters. 
Figure 6.26 combines the arguments mentioned to show the relationship between 
dynamic motivation in different layers (representing significantly different levels (1 
SD apart of the society) and corresponding hierarchical needs. 
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Figure 6.26: Dynamic Motivation in Layers, Corresponding to Different Levels 
of Maslow‟s (1954) Needs Theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, depending on the current position of the individual in the society the types of 
the crimes offenders commit vary because the needs and ideal and feared selves vary. 
Nevertheless, this is not the only differentiation factor. For instance, offenders with 
different dominant utility-dimensions may operate in different dominant utility-
dimension environments and commit different types of crimes.  
When we remind ourselves that the right-hand-side layers of Figure 6.26 depict 
regular motivation to work, study etc. in our regular professional and personal lives 
and that the upper layers are reached by the need fulfilment specific to that layer and 
excessive risk taking behaviour or the consequences of the financial and economic 
environment for the society the individuals live in force individuals to fall to the lower 
layers, it is easier to relate this figure to the needs hierarchy depicted at the left-hand-
side of the Figure 6.26. As this part of the figure shows, the dynamic meaning of the 
need in different hierarchical layers of the society, the figures in the right and left-
hand sides, perfectly match, showing us that as the individual moves up/down in the 
society, the things he does and needs or the things that are required from him do 
change, changing various circumstances of specific crimes and even the types of 
crimes the individuals are vulnerable to in specific layers of the society. For instance, 
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white-collar individuals are not really likely to be vulnerable to street crime such as 
murder. For instance Al Capone did not kill people because many of his men could do 
that for him while he had a holiday in Florida. 
Figure 6.26 also reveals the fact that white-collar people usually have enough material 
wealth and they are in need of self-actualisation and esteem needs. This does not 
mean that they would not commit financial white collar mischief but rather they 
would do it not for material gains but maybe so that people would know that they 
have the monopoly power in the market with great esteem. 
 Looking at the similarities of explanation in various contexts about the white-collar 
people and their criminal behaviour, one can give a brief profile of the financial 
white-collar criminal. These people are few in the society, they are always spoken 
about, they are well known in the society, they are rich or very rich, powerful, but 
they are not after some material pleasures such as expensive cars but rather after the 
pleasure of other, more abstract things such as fame, power, esteem, self etc. which 
can be reached by excessive wealth, they fear to be known as criminals and they are 
good at hiding their crimes as the wedding cake model shows. 
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Figure 6.27: Position of White-Collar Agents in Class, Need, Motivation and Crime Hierarchies 
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Dusuki and Abdullah (2007) argue that the same hierarchical needs are valid for 
Islamic moral understanding of the society as depicted in Figure 6.28. 
 
Figure 6.28: The Pyramid of Maslahah 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dusuki and Abdullah (2007: 35). 
 
Dusuki and Abdullah (2007: 15) give very similar explanations for the hierarchical needs 
in the moral dimension in Islamic law: ―The bottom level, which is represented by the 
essentials (darūriyyāt), constitutes the most fundamental responsibility to be fulfilled as 
compared to the other two categories, namely the complementary (hājiyyāt) and the 
embellishments (tahsinīyyat)‖.  
Consequently, we may argue that deviance follows a hierarchical, dynamic, rational 
and relative process, because offenders have different needs, need gaps, expectations, 
opportunities. 
6.3.2 Dynamicity of the Environment  
The model we suggest is an adaptive model and it adapts to various possible social, 
political, physical environments. We postulate that, depending on the qualities of the 
environments; the behaviour patterns would change accordingly.  
Let us now analyse the consequences of the normal distribution on our adaptive 
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model. We discuss the consequences for the material dimension only because our 
theory is confined to financial crimes, nevertheless other utility dimension do exist 
and affect the material dimensions and the model operating in it. 
6.3.2.1 Dynamicity under normal environments 
The normal economic environment and its effects on the formation of the ‗selves‘ (for 
financial crimes) can be denoted by various socio-economic distributions. Let us, first, 
consider the normal distribution of wealth as the first and foremost candidate. 
Socio-economic infrastructures where wealth is normally distributed share the 
common characteristics of normal distribution as shown in Figure 6.29: symmetry 
(half of the values are at both sides of the mean; mean, mode and median are very 
similar; in standard normal distribution they are the same); standard deviation 
deviates in equal proportions towards both directions, and this is what we are 
interested in for our analysis here. 
 
Figure 6.29: Standard Normal Distribution with .5 Standard Deviations 
 
 
Since the standard deviation departs from the mean and from other standard deviation 
points in equal proportion in both directions, an imaginary offender on the mean, that 
is who resides at the average position in the socio-economic infrastructure of the 
society, needs equal proportions of gains and losses to either go forward on the socio-
economic ladder of the society or backward. For instance a big loss (illegal or a-legal) 
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or punishment (official punishment) that is proportional to the fear-gap of an offender, 
when realized a few times, may bring the offender to the first feared, backward 
position in the social strata of the society. In normal infrastructures the same 
proportional gains (legal, illegal or a-legal targets) when realized, would then 
alleviate the offender‘s position considerably in the social strata of the society. 
Under normal distributions, there are two possibilities: (i) low-kurtosis distributions, 
(ii) high-kurtosis distributions. When the underlying distribution is wider and the 
kurtosis is low, compared to the same distribution with normal kurtosis, individuals 
would be more alert and responsive to both opportunities and threats, whereas in 
socio-economic infrastructures with high kurtosis people would be less responsive to 
both opportunities and threats, because the position they would reach as a 
consequence of the attempt that results either by gains or losses would not differ a 
great deal compared to their current positions.  
Since this effect is the same in non-normal infrastructural effects too, we may argue 
that the kurtosis of the socio-economic distributions may be translated as the volume 
of the response by the individual to the outside effects. 
6.3.2.2 Motivational threshold for crime 
The motivational threshold for crime is passed when perceived net value of the 
illegitimate target exceeds the need gap between real (material) self and ideal 
(material) self by hasty offenders but offenders that are not hasty but greedy can also 
commit financial crimes even when the perceived net value of the illegitimate target 
does not exceed the need gap.  
People can also fulfil their need gap with legitimate targets along with some 
illegitimate ones, but usually we call them ‗normal people with no deviance‘, because 
it is very rare that we come across people who commit zero crime. Some people 
disobey traffic laws and drive faster than the law allows or they fail to declare all tax 
responsibilities or tell their employer that they were ill, while indeed they can still 
work.  
This is why many of the illegal targets for normal people are ‗normal‘, because the 
state of people with no crime is almost unachievable. We can focus on the big crimes 
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of normal people, for the sake of parsimony and ease of understanding and 
comprehension.  
The need gap can definitely be filled by legitimate targets by the individuals who 
determine their positions correctly (that their actual real and ideal perceived real 
selves are equal, that they see themselves very close to where the society sees them) 
without involving any criminal activity.  
When their perceived actual self is higher than their real actual self though (we coded 
this status as ‗haste‟), they may commit relatively minor crimes, that is, crimes with 
relatively smaller values compared to their need gaps (increasing proportionately to 
their distance from their actual self). 
If these hasty people also define ideal selves that are more than 1 SD (standard 
deviation) away from their real actual self though (we coded this status as ‗greed‟), 
we may argue that these motivated, hasty and greedy (white-collar) individuals are 
likely to commit financial crimes. However, these vulnerable people still earn 
legitimate money and fill some of their need gap with this earning. Thus, we can 
deduce that the probability of committing financial crime for such individuals is 
limited to the part of the need gap that has not been filled by legitimate targets.  
Inversely, we may also argue that this remaining part of the need gap is very likely to 
be filled by illegitimate targets and nothing else because there is a good reason why 
the society puts these targets one SD away; because they are not really likely to be 
reached in normal, standard circumstances, standard time constraints, by legitimate 
targets
123
.  
Nevertheless, attractive targets with very low guarding can still induce some patient, 
content individuals. So, the process of becoming criminals is a rather complex and 
multi-attributed, multi-faceted dynamic process. 
We may summarise the relationship between categories of codes up to now in the 
following Figure 6.30: 
                                                 
123
 Our discourse is relatively positivist in some parts but we are aware that the crime motivation is not 
really very deterministic. When we take the other dimensions of the utility into consideration, we see 
that the deterministic nature of the discourse in the text is diminished substantively. The researcher is 
aware that people are not software controlled machines, theories with error rate of zero or close to zero 
are not realistic. 
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Figure 6.30: Motivation Process under Normal Circumstances 
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The thresholds we mention in this part are not restricted to normal, standard societies 
only. There are very well known examples of (mathematically and statistically) non-
normal societies and the process changes slightly under such environments. 
6.3.2.3 Dynamicity under high/low kurtosis environments 
Since the 1970s, in China, the kurtosis of the income distribution has been getting 
lower, as income is distributed more widely, which translates into more incentives for 
the people to reach new products in recently available markets in China. Around the 
1970s and 1980s though, the kurtosis of the normal distribution was so high that there 
were almost no real variations in the market, as shown in Figure 6.31. This is why we 
would expect less financial criminality in this society because everyone is financially 
alike and there are no big incentives to work for unavailable products in non-existent 
markets.  
According to Figure 6.31, in the 1980s close to 70% of the Chinese population had 
only $1,000 income and the whole population had only $5,000 income discrepancy. In 
such a society people have really no material incentive to work because of the high 
kurtosis of the income distribution.  
This is the typical income distribution of a socialist financial system but we need to be 
cautious about the WCC‘s opportunity space in this graph because it is interestingly 
high. Arguably the shapes in the 1970s and 1980s depict the favoured Communist 
party members. Their disproportionate number forces us to analyse WCC further 
before jumping to quick conclusions about the vulnerability levels of financial 
systems. 
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Figure 6.31: Chinese Income Distribution 1970 – 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Word Press (2012) 
 
As seen in Figure 6.32, people‘s efforts, including those of white-collar criminals, 
do not return anything proportional to their efforts and the risks they take in such 
socio-economic circumstances and thus we would expect less general motivation in 
such societies compared to societies with normal distributions.  
On the other hand, as the kurtosis gets lower, the social, relative value of the wealth 
continues to exist, even in excess, and people are very easily motivated because of 
a great variety in richness and poorness as well, as seen in Figure 6.33.  
From a theoretical viewpoint then, one can argue that the kurtosis of an ideal socio-
economic distribution should not be very high or low. 
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Figure 6.32: Consequences of Various Kurtoses in Distribution of Socio-
Economic Utilities 
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Figure 6.33: Low Kurtosis Systems  
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What matters in these analyses is the right hand side of the distribution (upper tail in 
our graphs), because we study white-collar criminals. Analysis of other parts of the 
distribution may reveal knowledge about other kinds of crime but what matters for 
this specific study is the variation after the first positive standard deviation. 
6.3.2.4 Dynamicity under non-normal environments 
Abnormal economic environments (for financial crimes) can be denoted by skewed 
and/or distorted normal distribution. Since the characteristics of such distributions are 
different than standard normal distribution it is better to first give the main parameters 
of asymmetric distributions shown in Figure 6.34. Nevertheless, it is still relatively 
correct that, ceteris paribus, as the kurtosis gets lower, individuals in these socio-
economic societies become more alert to the stimulus, they are more easily tempted 
by the opportunity and deterred by punishments. This factor, singlehandedly, does not 
affect crime vulnerability though. 
 
Figure 6.34: Main parameters of Asymmetric Distributions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-normal distributions are not mature in the statistics and mathematics literature 
yet. ―Many textbooks teach a rule of thumb stating that the mean is at the right of the 
median under right skew, and left of the median under left skew‖ (von Hippel, 2005: 
2) as shown in Figure 6.34. But:  
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This rule fails with surprising frequency. It can fail in multimodal 
distributions, or in distributions where one tail is long but the other is heavy. 
Most commonly, though, the rule fails in discrete distributions where the 
areas to the left and right of the median are not equal. Such distributions not 
only contradict the textbook relationship between mean, median, and skew, 
they also contradict the textbook interpretation of the median. (von Hippel, 
2005: 2) 
In such cases the parameters of the distributions are dynamic as shown below in 
Figure 6.35 
 
Figure 6.35: Dynamic Parameters of Non-linear Distributions  
 
 
Two normal forms of such societies are depicted in Figure 6.30 and 6.32, two non-
normal forms are depicted in Figure 6.36. There are various characteristics of these 
societies but for our study, the most important distinction is that they have different 
variations.  And the variations are differently distributed when differently skewed. The 
analysis of these variations is important for our theory because the comparative 
analysis of our extreme cases suggests that these different characteristics of variations, 
such as standard deviations (SD) in wealth distribution, affect financial crime 
motivation. The role of variation is depicted in Figure 6.36. 
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Figure 6.36: Major Concepts of the Theory Regarding Motivation and Their 
Adaptation to Different Socio-Economic Environments. 
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Let us now analyse these distorted normal distributions of wealth in different societies 
and their effects on human behaviour. 
 
Dynamicity under Positively Skewed
124
 Non-normal Environments 
We use skewed non-normal wealth distributions to represent the wealth distributions 
of various financial systems. As mentioned before, Macionis and Plummer (2008: 
306) provide the following percentages from Runciman (1990) about the social 
classes in Britain in Table 6.1. We can use the percentages in this table to graph the 
social classes in market societies as shown in Graph 6.1. 
  
Table 6.1: Distribution of Social Classes in Britain 
 Real Percentages 
Upper class .0015 
Lower upper class .10 
Middle class .15 
Lower middle class .20 
Working class .20 
Unskilled working class .30 
Underclass .05 
Source: Percentages of Britain social classes from Runciman (1990) 
 
Now we may graph this distribution to get the Graph 6.1 below. Please note that 
Graph 6.1 is very similar to a right-skewed non-normal distribution curve. Let us now 
elaborate this observation on other cases of market societies. Graph 6.2 is another 
example from the US and confirms our observation of right-skewed, non-normal 
wealth and social class distribution in the US where the variations of wealth are 
greater than the variations of poverty.  
  
  
                                                 
124
 These socio-cultural systems have more variations of rich compared to poor. 
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Graph 6.1: Distribution of Social Classes in Britain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Percentages of Britain social classes from Runciman (1990) 
 
 
 
Graph 6.2: Distribution of Personal Income in US in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: US Census Bureau, 2011 
 
Thus, in these socio-economic infrastructures, the median is not close to the average 
of the sum of all socio-economic gains as it is in normal (normally distributed) 
infrastructures. Standard deviations also do not repeat themselves in equal proportions 
but are denser when closer to the mean and broader when closer to the skewed tail of 
the distribution.  
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Thus, in our case, at right-skewed non-normal distributions, an average offender has a 
much bigger need-gap and much smaller fear-gap compared to the normal 
infrastructures because all the selves are relative, are socially constructed and 
meaningful when in comparison to someone else.  
For instance, an administrative worker in a corporation who envies the nearest social 
strata of the society, probably his/her first or second manager (depending on the 
circumstances) would have a bigger need gap in social infrastructures where the 
socio-economic distributions are non-normal and right-skewed because one standard 
deviation from his/her position to the next (i.e. the position where his/her manager 
resides socio-economically) is bigger compared both to the same interval in normal 
distribution and to his/her fear gap. In societies with normally distributed socio-
economic conditions though, standard need gaps and standard fear gaps are equal. 
Thus, in societies with positively skewed socio-economic conditions fear gaps were 
smaller compared to the need gaps, which makes individuals more motivated and 
relatively more fearless, and take more risks. In negatively skewed societies, on the 
other hand, fear gaps are bigger than need gaps and this fact makes individuals more 
fearful, less motivated and take fewer risks. 
Naturally, as the magnitude of skewedness get bigger the comparative discrepancy 
between these distributions and normal distribution gets bigger. More importantly, the 
discrepancy between the sizes of the need gaps and fear gaps of the compared 
individuals in those systems also gets bigger and in positively skewed societies 
intensifies the risk taking behaviour even more greatly 
Inversely though, fear-gaps of the average offenders in the same infrastructure would 
be narrower compared to the societies with normally distributed socio-economic 
infrastructures because all the selves and thus all the related gaps are socially 
constructed. For instance, an administrative worker in a corporation would have less 
fear of losing utility (legal, illegal and a-legal, i.e. losing his/her job) compared to the 
same worker in a society with normal infrastructures because standard deviations are 
narrower compared to the normal infrastructures. Thus, the gaps between the people 
who he/she is afraid to be like (i.e. wage labourers in factories) and their current 
positions are narrower in left-skewed infrastructures. In such cases, offenders have 
less to be afraid of apparently because the majority of the society is in very similar 
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positions and stigmatization from the society is very unlikely. 
Indeed, this reasoning, when combined with the opportunity spaces in modern 
societies, may explain much of the deviance in modern societies. All the same, we are 
not focusing on the average offenders, but white-collar criminals or socio-
economically higher strata of the society. Thus, we need to narrow down our 
observation to the rightmost side of the distributions but the main observation does 
not differ much in this part of the picture either. 
When we go further right, in societies with positively skewed socio-economic 
conditions, the standard deviations get bigger compared to the points closer to the 
dynamic mean or median in the same non-normal, positively skewed distributions. In 
these societies, the magnitude of the discrepancy between the need gap and the fear 
gap increases as we diverge from the dynamic mean and median.  
In left-skewed non-normal financial infrastructures though, the effects of the 
infrastructure are in reverse for the rightmost part of the distributions. That means, in 
such societies people have much to fear (have bigger fear gaps) and are less motivated 
to earn, because the closest standard deviation towards the positive side does not 
differ much but the closest one towards legal, illegal and a-legal targets on the 
negative side does. In such socio-economic conditions, people do not like taking risk, 
they are less motivated compared to the people in the right-skewed socio-economic 
conditions. 
Now let us discuss the consequences of our dynamic and adaptive model of right-
skewed distribution of socio-economic utilities (see: Figure 6.37): 
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Figure 6.37: Right (Positively)-Skewed Distribution of Socio-Economic Utilities 
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Please note that in the case of left-skewed wealth distribution, the variance increases 
when we move towards the positive end of the distribution. This is a crucial point for 
carrying our motivation model to the comparative financial systems and for showing 
the social dynamics of the motivation along with its psychological dynamics, 
analyzed beforehand, because our analysis shows that there is a social reason behind 
the motivational differences between different societies.  
Since the variance is increasing, compared to the standard normal distribution of 
wealth
125
, we would expect increasingly more motivation from the individuals who 
reside at the positive end of the wealth distribution. However, unlike standard 
distributions, in right-skewed distributions individuals have to work even harder in 
order to reach higher standard deviations which get bigger while moving away from 
their initial position towards the right end of the distribution and attract the individual 
into a spiral twister. 
In such societies, we expect more financial crime, because compared to the societies 
of normally distributed wealth these societies show a rich variety of targets of self-
realization to the public,
126
 which is not indeed possible in the societies of normal 
wealth distribution or societies of left-skewed wealth distribution. 
If the succeeding intervals between standard deviations are larger compared to the 
earlier ones (i.e. SD3 – SD2 > SD2 – SD1 > SD1), we expect a moving, building crime 
motivation that is proportional to the volume of the interval as the white collar 
criminal moves towards the right hand side of the distribution.  
Hence, using this knowledge, one may compare the motivational differences between 
different systems and sort them. If, for instance, the intervals between succeeding 
standard deviations of system X are getting larger but getting larger slowly, compared 
to another system Y (i.e.: SD3 – SD2 > SD2 – SD1 > SD1 in System X is 7 > 5 > 3 but 
in System Y it is 3 > 2 > 1) one may argue that individuals in System X are more 
                                                 
125
 This distribution must be used as a standard in this analysis as well because every psychological, 
social, biological, developmental ability, quality, defect etc. is normally distributed and there is no 
reason that the wealth would be distributed non-normally. 
126
 Since the society is structured accordingly, there are products and markets for the super-rich in such 
societies (BBC 2, 7 October 2008) and these products create a higher level of incentive, available 
utility and thus motivation for individuals. Other societies which are constructed differently do not 
have products like human skulls ornamented by precious jewelry because there is no market and no 
buyer. Thus, there is no incentive to produce such products, nor a reason to be motivated to own them. 
276 
motivated than in system Y.  
Regardless of whether the distribution is right-skewed, left-skewed or not skewed, 
looking at the variation only at the right hand side of the distribution we may 
determine the macro level of the motivation for white-collar-criminals only. 
One may reach some conclusions and generalizations based on these syntheses, such 
as that the systems with right skewed distributions are more motivated than left-
skewed distributions or that the systems with lower kurtosis are more motivated 
compared to the systems with higher kurtosis, but we need to keep in mind that these 
generalizations are theoretical and all generalizations are wrong at least in minor 
issues.  
This is why this research leads us to synthesise that the socio-economic distributions 
should be partially analysed for specific parts of the research. In fact, almost 
invariably, the data sets we analyse never produce a perfect curve and every detail that 
distorts the smoothness of the distribution hides a valuable piece of information about 
the system
127
.  
As for the left-skewed socio-economic distributions, we would expect little 
motivation as depicted in Figure 6.38. Since the focus of this research is white collar 
people, Figure 6.38 puts them on the upper side of the green, left-skewed distribution, 
after the distribution peaks, especially after the 1 standard deviation above maximum 
point. Compared to the same corresponding position of the normal distribution, which 
is coloured black, the green, left-skewed distribution‘s standard deviations are 
smaller. For instance all positive standard deviations in the left-skewed distribution 
can almost fit into one standard deviation of the normal distribution because the 
normal distribution‘s mean is far behind the left-skewed distribution. Thus, relatively, 
richness begins at later wealth stages in left-skewed distributions and has smaller 
varieties. This means that white collar people in left-skewed societies have relatively 
smaller distances, socio-economic positions, to travel in order to achieve the same -
relative - material positions in the society.  
  
                                                 
127
 Indeed, from the point of view of the complexity theory, this is the expectation: the iterative, 
repeating, fractal patterns. 
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Figure 6.38: Left-Skewed- Distribution of Socio-Economic Utilities 
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6.4 GUARDING FORCES AGAINST THE MOTIVATION 
This section turns the discussion in this modelling chapter to ‗guardian‘. Guardians 
have certain characteristics, which affect different parts of the dynamic deviance 
process and produce different preventive effects on the crime as shown in Figure 6.39. 
Let us explain these characteristics of the guardians: 
(i) The Ratio of Getting Caught (Pre-Crime Intervention): If the guardians are 
successful in their prevention and when the risk of getting caught is high, offenders 
may cease committing crime. This is extensively discussed in the RCT literature from 
the point of view of the offender. 
(ii) Normalization (Delivering Justice): Justice, when successfully delivered, brings 
about peacefulness and normalization to the society and to individuals. Because 
criminals, unfairly, gain things from others and unless these gains return to the 
society, a gap occurs between the new, unjust state of the society and the old one. This 
new status of the society, depending on the magnitude of the discrepancy, may 
convince individuals that the standard ideal self is not reachable by standard 
expectations because of the illegal interventions, jumps in the queue. As individuals 
observe injustice, they increase their need gaps by defining higher ideal selves by the 
now rationalized illegal earnings. Justice may help decrease these gaps and may 
normalize society, otherwise, ceteris paribus, crime self-propagates. If for instance 
nobody is prosecuted for corruption in a given society, officers‘ commercial 
behaviours adapt to this socio-economic environment and they assume that their 
salary is more than official documents declare. 
 
(iii) Punishing with Certainty: Certainty of the punishment is one of the most 
important parameters for the rational offender because it includes the level of the risks 
of receiving the punishment. The certainty of the punishment is directly involved in 
the decision to commit crime but only after the risk of getting caught.  
 
(iv) Punishing with Severity: If a specific guardian has the ability of punishing, and 
doing it with certainty, this is usually understood by the society before the crime 
occurs; the amount of punishment forms the ‗fear gap‘ and after the crime occurs, this 
fear gap is readjusted and becomes stable – ceteris paribus - through the experienced 
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punishment. One can perceive the fear gap as the accumulated wealth, the possessions 
of the individuals as well. From the point of view of a materialistically dominated 
society, the punishment is directed against this wealth and many forms of punishment 
are tantamount to either reduction in wealth or the inability to enjoy it, when 
imprisoned for instance
128
.  
 
(v) Punishing with Celerity: Since many financial offenders suffer ‗impatience‟ and 
‗haste‟ they rationalize the celerity of the punishment especially as a result of their 
short time focus. Research shows that offenders take celerity more seriously than 
certainty and severity. Thus, they may quit committing crime if the punishment is 
soon and vice-versa. 
 
(vi) Continuous Intervention: Some guardians‘ service is temporary while others‘ is 
continuous. If the guardians are passive and proactive in nature or continuous, it helps 
decrease the volume of ‗haste‟ before the crime.  
 
Figure 6.39: Various Forces Effecting the Motivation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
128
 In other dominant dimensions of the multi-dimensional utility function, the fear gap consists of non-
material belongings and usually the punishment targets such gains (i.e. reward or sawab or social 
credit) but since this research is FWWC we do not include these discussions in this text. Nevertheless, 
they can be integrated into this theory by further research to generalize this theory into a general theory 
of crime including crimes other than financial crimes. 
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Looking at our earlier analogy of forces affecting the would-be-offender, we may 
separate and differentiate these forces as shown in Figure 6.40. For instance, the 
positive characteristics of the guardians mentioned above can be depicted as the 
arrows pointing left between the target and the individual. The arrows at the left side 
of the individual, that is not between the individual and the target, stand for the 
informal guardians who act before the crime situation, its time and place. Those 
guardians can be referred to as proactive guardians but active guardians such as police 
also have minor proactive guarding capacity. When the defensive forces are higher 
than the attracting forces to the crime target, the environmental effect adds on to the 
internal motivation of the individual and to the motivation caused by the financial and 
economic systems with all of its non-linear implications for certain strata. 
Arrows pointing up and down are depicted thus because the financial and economic 
conditions are not about the criminal behaviour per se but about motivation in more 
general terms. Nevertheless, we mean that individuals under the effect or pressure of 
these forces may, if the circumstances allow, more easily commit financial crime in 
higher positions in Figure 6.39 and 6.40. 
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Figure 6.40: Separation and Identification of the Forces Affecting the Offender 
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Now let us analyse the guarding forces in this figure by beginning with environmental 
guarding forces, ethics and informal and formal guardians. 
6.4.1 Ethics 
Ethics can be described as an internal law. It applies a pre-crime, preventive force on 
would-be offenders and plays a role in rational decision making. It is a guarding force 
against financial crimes through norms and social pressures. 
Morality and ethics are the studies of ‗rights‘ and ‗wrongs‘. They are used129 and 
applied
130
 interchangeably; however, ethics ‖refers to the process of determining right 
and wrong‖ and morality ―refers to the actual content of right and wrong‖, the 
substance, ―the end result of ethical deliberation‖ (Rae, 2000). Ethics is sometimes 
called ‗moral philosophy‘, implying an attempt to put the substance in a form, to 
investigate the rules of the morality and moral decision making. 
According to Weiss (1994), there are mainly six ethical systems, namely, relativism, 
utilitarianism, universalism, rights, distributive justice, ultimate law. Utilitarianism is 
more compatible with RCT but we need to take into account the extreme ethical 
claims of our cases in this study. This is not possible unless we use the expanded 
version of the classical utility theory with the capacity of multiple dimensions of 
calculation. We present this multidimensional theory above. 
Basically there are two main claims about ethics in business. The first claim is the 
relevance of ‗non-instrumental‘ ethics (Quinn and Jones, 2010: 16), that is, ―whether 
ethical behaviour is profitable or not it must be adhered to‖ (Solomon 2010: 16). And 
the second claim is that ethics is relevant to business only if it is profitable. For 
instance, Sternberg (2004: 52, emphasis added) provides two criteria with one pretext: 
―Corporate conduct is ethical if it is directed at the corporate objective and respects 
‗distributive justice131‘ and ‗ordinary decency132‘‖.  
                                                 
129
 Especially in religious cultures, such as Islamic culture, ‗ethics‘ becomes a secondary concern of 
people and when used, usually refer to the moral rules and customs.  
130
 In some socialist countries, there was an attempt to install socialist ethics in the society as moral 
rules (Hamburg and The Teaching Company, 1997). 
131
 That ―those who contribute most to achieving the objective of the organization deserve most from 
the organization‖ (Sternberg, 2004: 52). 
132
 That corporate activities are ―conducted with honesty‖ (Sternberg, 2004: 52). 
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Depending on the society‘s choice of these ethical bases, their guarding capacity 
changes. Apparently, the second choice invites more financial crime. 
6.4.2 Formal Proactive Guardians 
All institutions that use a policing force on the financial system such as the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, FBI and IRS in the United States, the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce of China, the Shariah Advisory Council 
(SAC) of Malaysia and the like, are formal guardians. Formal guardians are the last 
resort before the actual crime takes place. If the offender passes the formal guardians 
it is very likely that they will commit crime. This is why formal guardians have little 
effect on crime prevention.  
There are many experiments to confirm this fact. One of the most cited researches was 
the Kansas City Patrol Experiment, which revealed that formal police have little effect 
on crime rates, if any. This is reasonable, when we return to our depiction of the 
forces affecting crime and the long and complex process of becoming deviant. In the 
course of this complex process, there are numerous institutions, individuals, 
organizations etc. that affect criminality either positively or negatively. 
Formal guardians cannot always react against financial crimes. Especially in the era of 
electronic markets and lightspeed finance designed by mathematics, computer 
programming and quantum physicist prodigies and professors, it may not even be 
possible to realise that a crime has indeed been committed, because government 
agencies and regulator do not and cannot employ them. 
For the WCC, the number and efficiency of the policing and/or formally guarding 
financial institutions against WCCs drop significantly. Competition crime prevention 
can be a good example to show this fact (Rodger and Macculloch, 2001). These 
accusations bring to the discussion the arguments about power and its checks and 
balances, which are questionable in all financial systems.  
Especially against financial white-collar crime the number of ‗capable‘ guardians is 
few. Their number and ability affect financial crime vulnerability in a considerable 
way. 
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6.4.3 Informal Proactive Guardians 
Many criminologists agree that perceived informal sanctions directed by friends, 
family members, relatives, neighbours, colleagues and peers rather than formal ones 
from government and other formal institutions have the greatest effect of deterrence 
(Hollinger and Clark, 1983; Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Williams and Hawkins, 
1989; Paternoster, 1989). Among them, the most effective ones are the intimate 
handlers. Intimate handlers are the closest people to the criminal. 
The discussion of intimate handlers indeed brings about all the discussions of the 
social criminology theories such as social structure and social process theories
133
. 
Following from their arguments, obviously, qualities of intimate handlers are the main 
concern.  As social learning theory claims, people raised in a culture where financial 
crime is the norm are likely to commit financial crime (Dönmezer, 1994). 
From the reverse side though, in ethical social environments where the close friends 
and family members value, praise and encourage ethical behaviours, it is harder to 
commit financial crimes. 
Interpreting the theoretical foundations of RCT, one may argue that RCT not only 
presupposes crime motivation, but also presupposes the existence of capable 
guardians. Indeed, this is what we experience in everyday life. One would deposit 
his/her money into a bank account and use banks and similar institutions as a 
safeguarding mechanism.  
Offenders, then, are under the negative forces of the crime motivation and the positive 
effects of the capable guardians in relation to financial crimes. As motivational forces 
overcome the forces of capable guardians then the mere existence of vulnerable 
financial assets would produce more delinquency; however, if motivational negative 
forces and guarding positive forces are balanced, then mere existence of financial 
opportunity would not produce financial crimes (see: Figure 6.41). 
                                                 
133
 More information about these theories is available in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 6.41: Various Codes of Grounded Theory, Their Relations and Their Effects to the Motivated Offender 
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Figure 6.41 depicts all the forces that are keeping the individual away from the crime 
both directly and indirectly with the empty arrow and all the forces badly affecting the 
individual in terms of financial white collar crime vulnerability are shown with full 
arrows.  
Figure 6.41 is important, because it combines the effects of the guardians in two 
separate forms, namely active (between the individual and the target) and passive 
guardians (denoted with blue and green stars respectively) with the inner self-
motivations, self-perception and perception errors. Furthermore, Figure 6.41 depicts 
the environmental forces of financial and economic conditions on motivation in 
certain strata of the society as well. These effects are depicted in glowing arrows. 
Throughout the Chapter these effects are depicted by normal and non-normal 
distributions of wealth and some of the characteristics of those distributions such as 
standard variance in normally and non-normally distributed wealth and income. 
Nevertheless, there are many other effects on the financial white collar criminals, 
some of which do not appear in this depiction for the sake of parsimony and 
comprehension, but details of other parameters and the relationship between them and 
other parameters mentioned and not mentioned in this Chapter are presented in 
Appendix A, the formal, step-by-step coding of the grounded theory methodology. To 
give an example, the value of the target, which is very important for the would-be 
criminal, does not appear in Figure 6.41 nor the expectation of the offender about the 
punishment coming true. 
 
6.5 TARGETS AND OPPORTUNITY SPACES 
Financial crimes are committed to reach certain financial targets. All targets have 
their values and popularity levels. The most important financial target is the ‗money‘, 
but financial criminals do not always target money in different forms. Sometimes they 
are after avoidance of possible losses (i.e. tax evasion) or after a dominant position in 
the market they operate in and not after the money per se. 
All the achieved targets, both legitimate (real) and illegitimate (real) are added to the 
real actual (material) self and thus decrease the need gap between perceived actual 
(material) self and perceived ideal (material) self. We explained most of these codes 
287 
while presenting the motivation and offenders earlier.  
Target is a category in our grounded theory and ‗properties‘ of the ‗category‘ ‗target‟ 
are three-fold: legitimate, illegitimate and a-legitimate target. A-legitimate target 
represents ordinary, periodic earnings such as monthly salaries. Properties of 
‗perceived‘ and ‗real‘ legitimate and a-legitimate targets can be explained as well but 
we only discuss the properties of illegitimate targets in this study. 
According to the classical RCT the target has the following characteristics: value, 
inertia, visibility, accessibility. We prefer dividing these characteristics into two: 
target value and target vulnerability and present vulnerability as a function of value, 
accessibility, visibility, inertia and other characteristics of both material targets and all 
other possible victims because target value has more than one function in the deviance 
process. 
This part of the attempted grounded theory deserves further research for more 
concrete results much of which are available under the umbrella of classical rational 
choice theories.   This study suggests that further details such as whether the targets 
are owned by certain bodies, their convertibility and the characteristics of victims, 
such as ‗ability to react‟ along with target characteristics can be some of the 
additional parameters of the function, accessibility. Let us explain these 
characteristics of the targets in short. 
(i) Value (attractiveness), according to Burke (2006: 46) is ―calculated from the 
subjective rational perspective of the offender‖.   
Target values are also relative, since the illegitimate-target value error is different 
from offender to offender, there is no agreed upon perceived value of any target. 
Miller (2006: 82) agrees that according to the RCT, value depends on the offender 
who assesses the target and not on the actual economic value of the target. 
Characteristics of the targets and of the offenders have interconnections. According to 
Morrison (2002: 314), operations of global financial markets ―are on a scale which 
dwarf many national governments: world foreign exchanges deal with an average 
$1,490 billion every day‖. This is why offenders have big incentives to attack 
financial markets (i.e. to manipulate them).  
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Since value is the most important factor about the targets, it deserves more attention. 
Among the categories of targets (legitimate, illegitimate and a-legitimate), we focus 
our attention on illegitimate targets and those which have more than one value: 
perceived, that is before the crime or with the perception error, and real, that is after 
the crime or without the perception error.  
(ii) Convertibility is also an important character of the targets, because even valuable 
targets may not be perceived to be valuable if not fully or partially convertible. 
Convertibility of any given financial target makes it more attractive and more 
valuable. For instance, more crime can be expected against dollar, euro and pounds 
compared with other currencies in international financial markets. 
 
(iii) Visibility ―identifies the person or property for attack‖ (Burke 2006: 46). 
Visibility is whether the offender knows the target is there (Miller, 2006: 82). In this 
sense, frequency of appearance of the financial targets can be considered as the 
visibility as well because the targets vary according to this characteristic too. For 
instance this character is necessary for distinguishing the systems in various time 
spans. For instance, ―[t]he growth in global financial flows has outpaced both trade 
and output‖ (Held et al., 1999: 320) in 1999 and the world‘s total publicly traded 
equity in 2000 was more than $20 trillion (New York Stock Exchange, 2000), but the 
frequency and thus the visibility has increased since then. 
(iv) Accessibility of the targets increases the risk of attack (Burke 2006: 46). 
According to Miller (2006: 82), the accessibility is whether the offender has access to 
the target and the feasibility of retreat or escape.  
Accessibility and inertia are very similar in our context, that is why we do not 
distinguish them, because according to Burke (2006: 46), inertia is ―[t]he physical 
aspects of the person or property that impede or disrupt its suitability as a target‖, and 
to Miller (2006: 82), the inertia can be exemplified by the feelings of the offender 
about his/her ability to get the target. We use another code, expected probability to 
represent this character but not in the context of targets. 
(v) Ownership is another quality of the targets.  For instance, if a specific target is 
owned by the public, criminals, being part of the public, may justify, although 
wrongly so, their criminal behaviour. Besides, corporations with complex ownership 
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structures such as the ones owned by the public via stock exchanges have many 
agency problems, many of which involve criminal behaviour, because then the 
managers have better access to the property they do not own.  
In addition, complex ownership structures such as ‗pyramidal ownership‘ make crime 
easier ―where companies are ultimately owned, through complicated chains, by other 
companies‖ (Solomon, 2010: xxiv) but simpler ownership structures comparatively 
decrease the likelihood of the target being victimized. If owners live in minutes or 
hours (as the equities of the day traders), they may have no time to protect their 
property from crime though. 
(vi) Stability of the targets has been an important factor in the era of high-frequency-
finance. In modern finance, almost none of the financial assets maintain their value 
for more than a few days, even seconds for some. They have longer staying-time in 
the financial markets, but the period is getting shorter. In this very dynamic, busy 
market entry and exit of the financial assets and short life-periods it is easier to 
commit financial crime before the regulators even realise that crime took place. 
 
(vii) Some targets or victims have the ability to react against the financial crimes. For 
instance companies whose equities are manipulated may react against the speculators 
and manipulators, but when they are monopolized (or when prices are fixed) they do 
not usually have the ability to react against the offender by themselves. This is why it 
is less risky to commit some of the financial crimes compared to others. 
Target vulnerability is the formal code in our grounded theory, and it explains the 
ease of the targets for the offender. It is the probability of actually committed crime. 
Target vulnerability is determined by the characteristics of targets. Among the 
characteristics are; value, accessibility, inertia, convertibility, visibility, ownership, 
stability, ability to react etc. Target vulnerability consists of weak (0) or strong (1) 
characteristics that are serially affected by each other. When they are completely 
weak, with no effect, their value is zero (0) and when they are completely strong and 
solely determine the vulnerability their value is one (1) but it is usually between 0 and 
1. 
All the ‗target hardening‘ literature in rational choice theories is relevant under this 
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category. These characteristics of the targets and victims along with the other 
concepts of environment and guardians, produce an opportunity space for crime. We 
modelled this concept and integrated it into our theory in the following part of the 
text. 
6.5.1. Opportunity Spaces 
There are many parameters of the ease and hardship of committing crime and our 
grounded theory compiles them under one encircling term, the code opportunity 
space. ‗Opportunity space‘ (Yavuz, 2003), ‗opportunity structure‘ (Wahlström and 
Peterson, 2006), ‗public sphere‘ (Habermas, 1992) and other similar concepts have 
been used for a certain period of time in the literature, but these concepts have not 
been formed under an umbrella term which allows both macro and micro parameters 
in it.  Opportunity space is a good candidate for such an effort, because it conveys the 
meaning better.  
According to Yavuz (2003: ix) opportunity space includes ―social and economic 
networks and vehicles ... and the dissemination of meaning, identity, and cultural 
codes‖. Consulting the ‗opportunity structure‘ definition of Wahlström and Peterson 
(2006), opportunity space can be redefined, for the purposes of this study, as the 
―circumstances that have an effect on the emergence, structure, scope and success‖ 
(McAdam et al., 1996) of political, economic, financial actions. ―What is distinctive 
about [this] theory is its emphasis on external structures‖ (Wahlström and Peterson, 
2006: 364) influencing the actions, behaviours etc. of the agents under scrutiny. 
Economic and financial systems organize their resources differently. They have 
different levels of efficiency, productivity, success, failure etc. although they all use 
almost the same kinds of resources (labour, land, capital, knowledge). These 
differences are likely to pose differences in opportunities in various contexts. For 
instance, the main fundamental organizations of the financial systems, financial 
institutions, are formed, operated and interact differently in different financial 
systems. Such differences may provide financial systems with different levels of 
crime opportunities too. This is very likely to be the case, but it is not easy to discuss 
whether they are dramatically different from each other. Opportunity space and its 
terminology solve this issue in the following Chapter 7. 
291 
In this study we mainly focus on employed
134
, white-collar financial criminals who 
act in or around
135
 a financial institution. Thus, institutional and/or individual 
opportunities are of paramount importance for our study, because they set a boundary 
around our main concept: ‗financial crimes‘.  
Politicians and businessmen usually see financial institutions in a 
national/international, competitive environment of different opportunities and 
constraints, which form many institutional/national/international opportunity spaces. 
In addition to institutional and economic opportunity spaces, social and political 
opportunity spaces are noteworthy in this context too, because ―[e]conomic systems 
are social institutions, and social institutions are ... domains of human behaviour that 
answer to some identifiable range of human needs‖ (Arnold, 1994: 4; original 
emphasis). Seeing human behaviour as a product of human needs is indeed a 
widespread idea in many disciplines of academia. We refer to this concept while 
explaining the mechanisms of the motivation, above in the preceding section. For 
now, let us continue with the concept of ‗opportunity spaces‘. 
As mentioned, the plural form of the phrase refers to various systems (in different 
time-spaces), in our context economic and financial systems: socialist, market and 
fully/partially Islamized systems. Figure 6.42 can be seen as an analogical 
generalization of these four opportunity spaces and show some factors of them. 
Figure 6.42 depicts an awareness of the distinct effects of various financial and 
economic environments. As is more explicitly depicted in Figure 6.45, every financial 
system has its own specific strengths and vulnerabilities against financial crimes 
unique to them. These characteristics can be mimicked but not exactly replicated. In 
Figure 6.42 the length of the opportunity spaces are equal because we focus on the 
same time-span, between 1980 and 2013. As is explained in the following parts of this 
Chapter, we use the plural ‗spaces‘ because there is more than one distinct kind of 
abstract space that offers opportunities  and difficulties for crime, such as political 
spaces that are vulnerable to financial white collar crime in for instance societies of 
no checks and balances. 
                                                 
134
By government, political party, corporation or self-employed. 
135
 For instance accountants of certain firms are ‗in‘ the institutions but politicians who provide illegal 
advantagess to these firms are ‗around‘ these financial institutions. In this specific example in market 
societies. 
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Figure 6.42: Main Components of Opportunity Spaces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Inspired by Valenzuela et al., (2010: 112) 
 
Similarly, in Chapter 6, while introducing the financial systems, we showed in three 
figures that the opportunity spaces of the financial systems must be considerably 
different. As shown in Figure 6.42, opportunity spaces are outer environments of the 
individuals and institutions in financial markets and they affect them in many ways. 
As the arrows pointing in different directions suggest, perceived expectations, 
occasions and circumstances of the outside world have both contracting and 
expanding forces of certain behaviours
136
, in our case the financial crime delinquency. 
We focus on the expanding forces in this part of the text.  Contracting forces were 
discussed as formal and informal proactive guardians or ‗passive capable guardians‘ 
above. ‗Active capable guardians‘ are not really relevant to motivation and are 
exercisable after the emergence of the crime motivation. Indeed, active capable 
guardians are valid only at the time of the crime in action or very chronologically and 
spatially close it. For the details of active guardians in the process of becoming white 
collar criminals please refer to Appendix A. 
                                                 
136
 The same interpretation could partially be derived from a generic SWAT (strengths, weaknesses, 
advantages and threats) analysis which is proposed to be used to reach the opportunity space of 
corporations by Valenzuela et al. (2010), because ‗motivation‘ and ‗success‘ of criminal acts are 
different concepts. 
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Whether or not mere existence of financial opportunities produces financial crimes is 
one of the fundamental questions about the opportunity spaces. RCT does accept that 
crime occurs in these circumstances; however, when we realise the proactive 
guardians, such as ‗intimate others‘, are indeed an unalienable part of crime 
motivation in a negative, discouraging way, they may, although it is unlikely, prevent 
crime even in the face of the opportunity. For materially dominated criminals it is not 
really likely though. 
Indeed, the problem may be the use of improper motivation theories of psychology by 
the RCT. According to Cüceloğlu, (1996: 230), there are mainly five psychological 
theories of motivation
137
. RCT‘s implicit assumption is that incentive theory is the 
correct representation of deviant behaviour. According to this theory again, ―some of 
our behaviours stem from the awareness of environmental stimuli and with no 
biological base‖ (Cüceloğlu, 1996: 230). 
However, the use of Maslow‘s (1971) theory of hierarchical needs would provide a 
better representation of the deviant behaviour, because Maslow assumes different 
human and animal behaviours (Cüceloğlu, 1996: 236). In this research, this translates 
into a theoretical power that is capable of explaining environmental stimulus in a 
dynamic, relativistic, non-discriminatory way. 
Now let us first look into the varieties of opportunity spaces that help us build 
financial opportunity spaces, which eventually affect financial crime decision making 
processes. 
Consequently, we may argue that there are discouraging (-) and encouraging or 
expanding (+) forces of opportunities and the ultimate level of opportunities are 
determined by the accumulated effects of those. We can denote these forces as 
expanding forces and constraining forces. Opportunity space is the sum
138
 of these 
forces and it is always positive, because it is not realistic that constraining forces have 
the ability of completely erasing all possible opportunities of committing financial 
crime.  
                                                 
137
 Drive theory, incentive theory, optimal level of satisfaction theory, instinct theory and Maslow‘s 
(1971) Theory of Hierarchical Levels of Need . 
138
 Please note that one of them is always negative. 
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The volume of the FWCC opportunity has social implications. As we climb up the 
socio-economic structure in a given society, the volume of the opportunity for 
committing FWCC increases. At the lowest level, the opportunity for committing 
financial crime is closer to zero and every upper level provides a better opportunity 
space for financial crimes, producing the widest space at the top level. This shape 
clearly shows that it is not impossible for non-white collar criminals to commit 
similar crimes as well. Since this suggests a smoother and incremental transition 
between different but attached social strata, this explanation is the reality expected by 
this research. Nevertheless criminology literature on white collar crime has more 
discriminatory explanations such as white-collar, or a specific social stratum. 
This shape of increasing, dynamic volume of opportunity can be represented in a 
reverse triangle as in Figure 6.43 below. 
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Figure 6.43: Social Structure of the Opportunity Space for Financial White-
Collar Crime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opportunity Spaces are two-fold: immediate and greater opportunity spaces and both 
of these have the ‗categories‘ of legitimate and illegitimate opportunity spaces. The 
first one is the primary concern of the crime motivation; however, the latter one also 
affects the crime motivation greatly but affects it indirectly. 
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comparison of the major financial systems based on these determinants, but financial 
crimes are not only affected by these factors. There are also secondary determinants 
of financial crime‘s macro financial environment, such as greater opportunity spaces. 
6.5.3 Greater Financial Opportunity Spaces 
Apparently there are many factors that are affecting the financial criminal activities 
but operationalizing all of these variables would lose the concept‘s ‗analytical bite‘ 
(McAdam, 1996). Nevertheless, we may mention some of the secondary contributing 
factors of financial opportunity spaces, such as economic, corporate, international, 
political, social and cultural and technological factors all of which can also be 
regarded as opportunity spaces per se. 
Wahlström and Peterson (2006) mention three varieties of opportunity structures, but 
in an era of vast globalization it is wise to include ‗corporate‘, ‗international‘ and 
‗technological‘ opportunity spaces as well, as shown in Figure 6.44. Morrison (2002: 
23, 343) also analyses similar opportunities by using ‗PEST analysis‘139 for various 
‗environments‘ and similarly, mentions the following dimensions, while analysing the 
global and national environment of international business: Economic, cultural, social, 
political, legal, trade and competitive, technological, financial.  
  
                                                 
139
 An acronym for ‗political-legal‘, ‗economic‘, ‗socio-cultural‘ and ‗technological‘ environments. 
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Figure 6.44: Varieties of Opportunity Structures That Form Financial 
Opportunity Spaces.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5.4 Dynamicity of Opportunity Spaces 
Opportunity spaces are not static: these are dynamic systems. Wahlström and 
Peterson (2006: 364) agree that the ―structures are specific to different locations and 
can vary from time to time‖. This is very intuitive because it is well known that the 
immediate opportunity spaces contract in times of crises. In times of war on the other 
hand, the same dynamic change happen on the greater opportunity spaces. Thus, 
opportunity spaces expand and contract in the course of time and space, as shown in 
Figure 6.45. 
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Figure 6.45: Dynamic Nature of „Financial Opportunity Space’ in Different 
Immediate and Greater Opportunity Spaces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cohen and Felson (1979), while discussing routine activities theory (RAT), argue that 
the time differences, as shown in Figure 6.45, are also a reason for different levels of 
crime propensity. For instance, they say, after the World War II, more people are 
placed in particular places at particular times
140
.  
Figure 6.45 depicts all of the opportunity spaces of financial crime as immediate and 
greater spaces in the various environments of market, transitional, Islamic financial 
systems. Financial systems change shapes and colour because of their performance 
and their characteristics respectively as the time passes just like the financial 
opportunity spaces affected by both the financial and political, technological and 
various other effects. 
After appreciating the mutual consent of the criminologists and opportunity space 
theoreticians, we may then argue that the opportunity space of financial criminals 
                                                 
140
 Indeed there is a whole theory of the Chicago school analyzing the consequences of this new form 
of life in modern cities regarding crime. These studies eventually led to geographical information 
systems (GIS) and an authentic field of study under criminology and criminal justice. 
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comprises the dimensions of time-span and environment which have afore=mentioned 
varieties (economic, social, corporate, political, technological, international) that have 
an external effect on behaviours of the financial agents and finance world.  
After defining and expanding the concept of opportunity spaces, we may now narrow 
our perspective down solely to the dynamicity and adaptation of the targets to the 
environment and try to lay down some important elements of the interaction between 
the environment and the individual‘s dynamic motivation process. 
6.5.5 Dynamicity
141
 and Adaptation of the Target Setting Behaviour and 
Environment 
The target is the primary motivation of the offender, because it provides an ‗expected 
utility‘ for him/her. The expected utility, that is the ‗value‘ of the target, helps to 
satisfy part or all of the need gap of the offender. Depending on the position of the 
offender on the needs hierarchy, social structure, and utility dimensions, offenders 
choose different targets to satisfy their need gaps. For instance, a white collar criminal 
may evade tax to enrich his/her ideal self while some other in a higher socio-
economic position may manipulate markets in order to enjoy the appreciation of the 
Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, his/her friends etc.  
Enjoyment of the utility gained by the crime decreases the need gap of the offender 
but in a short while, because of the recidivism, renewed ideal and real selves, 
increasing/decreasing volumes of SD in wealth distributions, confidence effects etc., 
consequent crimes may or may not occur until after the complete fulfilment of the 
need gaps or the realisation of the feared selves.  
Since the ideal self and the real self are constantly reproduced by the achievement of 
the legitimate, illegitimate and a-legitimate
142
 targets, further targets are set and 
renewed all the time. Thus, in a mid-term, after the enjoyment of a series of utilities 
and fulfilment of the need gap, offenders do not abandon their deviance. In fact, 
research shows that they commit crimes at higher frequencies, so long as they are not 
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 Philips and Votey (1987) agrees that the rational crime choice of offenders is dynamic. 
142
 A-legitimate targets are usual, periodic, expected earning in our everyday life. We get used to them 
and do not consider them as ‗targets‘ but they usually keep us in the position we are occupying, A-
legitimate targets may decrease our need gaps as well if we save some of it and reinvest (e.g. in 
education and training) and eventually increase our real actual selves. If we fail to actualize our a-
legitimate targets or lavishly spend it we may fall onto our feared self. 
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caught, because they increase their ideal self and/or actual self with their position in 
the hierarchy of needs and the social structure of the society. They find a safe way of 
deceiving the formal guardians and enjoy the fulfilment of the attained higher selves. 
These motives encourage individuals to continue committing crime at even higher 
frequencies. 
For a better comprehension of the theory targets other than illegal ones should be 
explained as well. As explained earlier, a-legitimate targets are usually our regular 
income such as salaries and rent. Legitimate targets, on the other hand, are usually 
bonuses, financial reinvestment, trade etc. A-legitimate targets are what keep us in the 
financial position we are in now. When we fail to actualise a-legitimate targets, 
because of illnesses or bankruptcy for instance, our first feared self is likely to be 
realised in a short time depending on the savings the individual makes or the safety 
nets in the society. 
Apparently, some of the offenders do not get the utilities in some instances and may 
lower their need gaps and accept lower positions in the hierarchy of needs when they 
repeat doing this or change their utility dimension slightly or completely. Many of 
these concepts can be justified by the arguments of psychology on various defence 
mechanisms, but further research is necessary for a reliable argument. Nevertheless, 
utility dimensions other than the material utility are not our concern here, unless they 
touch the criminality argument. Only the linkages are touched upon in this research. 
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Figure 6.46: Dynamicity and Adaptation of the Target-Setting Behaviour 
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As seen in Figure 6.46, people set targets according to their position in the society, to 
society‘s socio-economic structure and to their social, financial and moral 
environments. Depending on their legal earnings, their individual preferences and 
legal and a-legal targets emerge. However, whether they set illegal targets is not 
determined only by environmental factors, despite their considerable effects on 
deviance. 
Inner mechanisms of the offender determine the planned, pre-crime, illegal targets 
(see Appendix A). These mechanisms are explained earlier in this chapter. The 
immediate decisions about crime, on the other hand, emerge from the characteristics 
of targets and opportunity spaces in general. Environmental factors on the other hand 
increase the likelihood of the deviance and affect all the parameters of the dynamic 
process of being a criminal.  
Nevertheless, individuals with no deviance may also attack illegal targets if they 
perceive them to be considerably vulnerable and significantly valuable compared to 
their current material position in the society and to their dominant utility dimensions. 
Figure 6.47 shows this phenomenon. 
According to Figure 6.47, the individual resides at the peak of the wealth distribution 
of the society where usually the middle-class people reside. However, the individual 
would like to be in a higher socio-economic stratum in the society which is depicted 
as a point that is further right
143
 to the peak of the distribution where the individual 
currently resides. The individual has two options, he/she either chooses to fill the need 
gap to reach the higher stratum of the society by means of legal targets (in the figure 
depicted as a coin) or finds an illegal target which is far more valuable compared to 
the legal target and capable of filling the need gap faster, realising the first ideal self 
of the individual before the others. In the case of Figure 6.47 the distribution is 
normal. This means that the individual would have the same level of difficulty in the 
upper stratum of the society in order to realise his/her second ideal self which resides 
another (second) standard wealth deviation (depicted as lines perpendicular to the 
base of the figure)  away from the current position at peak. 
  
                                                 
143
 ‗up‘ for the portrait viewers. 
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Figure 6.47: Intimidating Effect of The Target Value in The Dynamic Process of 
Becoming a FWCC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Among other parameters of our grounded theory, Figure 6.47 shows the intimidating 
effect of the target value, ceteris paribus, in a society with normally distributed 
earnings and wealth.  
In the process of becoming a financial white-collar criminal this research theorises, 
every material gain decreases the need gap but, for instance, if the individual is 
promoted to a higher position in the society, which pushes the individual to set higher 
ideal selves, his/her motivation and potential deviance do not decrease. Rather, he/she 
sets new, higher selves and as a result, has bigger need gaps. 
In a similar vein, if individuals are constantly pulled into unrealistic ideal selves 
through media and advertisements or by unreasonable success examples, they never 
stop setting new and higher ideal selves and do not enjoy owned possessions which 
are safe from the point of view of crime but enter into a race to fill their swollen need 
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gap. 
Similarly, if some lose hope and fall into despair, for instance by failing to achieve 
their a-legitimate targets, they also hate themselves and, seeing their failure through 
the media and the society who do not appreciate them but call them losers, they find 
out new failures in their failure and do not stop and enjoy their belongings and 
actualise their feared selves in a repeating spiral.  
 
6.6. CONCLUSION 
In this first analytical Chapter, we answered the first research question of our study, 
that is, ‗why do people commit financial white-collar crime?‘. We developed a 
completely new, rational choice perspective which is inductive, positivist, dynamic, 
relativistic and original.  In many ways, this research developed the RCT into a more 
consistent, more comprehensive and more complex theory.  
As implicitly explained in this Chapter, along with the current version of the RCT, 
this research developed the motivation theory of Rollinson et al. (1998), the needs 
theory of Maslow (1954), the structural model of self of Freud (1961) and the theory 
of social stratification of Marx (1969)
144
. Further research on these specific theories 
would be useful to confirm both the improvement of those theories and this very 
theory, produced as a result of this research.  
In short, this research explained financial crime deviance in a longitudinal process but 
not all the details of the theory are explained in this Chapter. One of the main reasons 
was the requirement of parsimony in grounded theory research. Nevertheless, 
interested readers may find more details in Appendix A.  
As the attempt so far shows in this study, we integrated the effects or targets and their 
qualities into the same process with the socio-economic structures of certain societies. 
The theory explained both the inner mechanisms of the deviation process and the 
macro effects of the socio-economic environment on the process of becoming deviant. 
                                                 
144
 In the literature of social classes, Weberian Stratification is also a famous and important one; 
however this way of classification is designed at an upper level of conceptualization and our codes, 
developed as a result of the grounded theory, only give details of one of the three classifications of 
Weber, ‗class power‘(Waters, 2010). 
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New concepts and ideas such as immediate and greater opportunity spaces and 
normal and non-normal distributions are presented and applied. 
Our dynamic approach with macro explanations that are founded on a micro base 
produced a theory that is applicable to many extreme socio-economic conditions. This 
increased the validity of the theory via comparative cases.  
Indeed, only the analysis of social and economic stratification by the characteristics of 
the wealth distributions and showing the societal relativity between different systems 
is enough to present the authenticity of the theory explained in this Chapter.  
We presented the multi-dimensional utility function which is more convenient to 
reflect the offender calculations in all of the extreme cases we compare and indeed 
may encourage many researchers in various contexts of criminology other than white-
collar crime to conduct further research on this subject as well. Indeed, this multi-
dimensionality of the calculations may help us understand the so-called ‗irrational‘ 
behaviours in the society. 
Finally, the theory produced as a result of the grounded theory methodology satisfies 
all the requirements of a sound, reliable, scientific theory. Its positivist results, though 
complex, are measurable and this guarantees the testability and hence falsifiability of 
the resultant theory. 
Now we can turn our attention to the initial research question of this study in the 
following Chapter. As explained before, this research began with the following 
question: ‗which financial systems are the most/least vulnerable ones against 
financial white-collar crimes, if they are distinguishable in the first place?‘. Chapter 7 
provides the results of our comparative analysis based on the criteria and framework 
presented in this Chapter, mainly ‗opportunity spaces‘. A complete comparison was 
not possible because of page and time limitations. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the main components of a criminal behaviour, its environment, 
and then carries on to discuss certain components of the environment one by one. In 
this sense, our approach does not present a distant perspective compared to the 
current varieties of environmental criminology and specifically modern RCT, 
probably because we aim to improve it. 
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Chapter 7  
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND FINANCIAL CRIMES: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
THROUGH GROUNDED THEORY FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
According to Cohen and Felson (1979: 595) ―the risk of criminal victimisation varies 
dramatically among the circumstances and locations in which people place 
themselves and their property‖. This study, hence, aims to investigate whether all 
financial systems are equally vulnerable to financial crimes, by discussing the 
differences of positive and negative forces between the business environments of 
various financial systems, along with the greater environment of politics and 
economy, to learn ―which financial systems are the most/least vulnerable ones to 
financial white-collar crimes?‖ if there is a difference between them. As explained 
earlier, we postponed answering this question until this chapter, because the best 
available theory to be used in the literature, Rational Choice Theory (RCT), was not 
feasible for comparing the extreme cases this study deploys.  RCT does not provide 
proper or efficient explanations for motivation
145
 and the opportunity frame it renders 
is not enough to explain financial crime
146
. 
With the help of the rational choice based grounded criminology theory
147
 developed 
on financial white-collar criminality (FWCC) in Chapter 6 and the data accumulated 
therefrom, this chapter is ready to put the financial systems into the order of crime 
vulnerability according to the criteria recommended by the literature. Thus in this 
chapter a comparative analysis is presented not solely based on the observation of the 
cases and the relevant knowledge and information accumulated about and of the 
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 Please see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion. 
146
 Please see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion. 
147
 Please see Chapter 6 for the details of the grounded theory of financial crimes, produced by this 
study.  
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financial systems per se., rather, a comparison from a new theoretical perspective
148
.  
 
7.2. COMPARATIVE (FINANCIAL CRIME) OPPORTUNITY SPACES IN 
VARIOUS ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
A short introduction to the financial systems could be expected to precede the 
comparative analysis in this Chapter and this was the initial intention; however due to 
the space limitations we put this comparative introduction in Appendix C. 
Nevertheless, readers who wish to have a better flow of the concepts and the subject 
can first read Appendix C, a comparative introduction to the economic and financial 
systems, and return to this Chapter to continue following the rest of the analyses. 
The main aim of this chapter is to answer the second research question of the study: 
putting the financial systems into the order of FWCC vulnerability. This is not 
possible until we lay down certain criteria for the comparison. Gregory and Stuart 
(1985: 12) supply such criteria, namely, decision-making structures, coordination 
methods, property rights, incentive and motivation mechanisms. These factors are 
used as comparison criteria in Appendix C; however, they are not sufficient for our 
study, because this study is not simply about comparing financial systems but 
comparing them through a certain outlook, that of financial crimes.  Thus, it is better 
for us to additionally utilize criminological factors to tailor the comparison 
specifically for this outlook. Punch (1996) provides such structural factors for the 
studies of white-collar criminality under the following titles:  
(i) Markets, because ―there would appear to be some circumstances in which 
competitive pressures lead to misconduct‖;  
(ii) Size/Complexity, because ―oversize and control are difficult‖; 
(iii)Goals, because ―pressure to achieve particular objectives may increase the 
likelihood of deviance‖;  
(iv) Opportunity Structures149/Rewards because ―it is possible that the temptation 
increases as the rewards increase‖ (Newburn, 2007: 387). 
                                                 
148
 Nevertheless, we do not mean to test our grounded theory. We left testing the theory to other 
independent researchers mainly due to space limitations. This is why we do not use specific concepts 
and variables produced by the grounded theory, but we undoubtedly profited much from the complex 
nature of the theory which is evident from the 23 extended criteria developed as the output of this study 
to represent a single concept, ‗opportunity‘ in rational choice. 
149
 These underlined concepts and terms are confirming the outcomes of this study in both theoretical 
and comparative analyses. 
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In order to accommodate two different aims simultaneously, that is both giving an 
introduction to economic and financial systems and fulfilling the requirements of our 
viewpoint, we analysed markets and goals, in Appendix C, and kept size/complexity 
and ‗opportunity structure/rewards‘ analyses to be presented  in this Chapter, 
according to their volume of opportunity spaces or their ‗conceptual environment‘.  
Although opportunity space is a generic term, one may claim the possibility of 
different levels of opportunity spaces. Evidently, the financial opportunity space of 
the CEO of the Finance Department of Ford Motors is not equal to the opportunity 
space of an investment manager in a local bank. A personal hedge fund manager such 
as George Soros is not comparable to an employee investing his money in the stock 
market.  
Siegel (2009: 75) argues that ―motivated criminals must have the opportunity to find 
suitable undefended targets before they commit crime‖. For example, Miethe and 
Meier (1994) argue that life-style affects the opportunity for crime, as his/her life-
style determines his/her proximity and time of exposure to crime. As a victim as well 
the individual‘s attractiveness as a target and ability to be protected varies according 
to their life-style.  
In today‘s financial systems, the opportunity spaces are enormous, as both the trade 
and economic output of the world fall behind global financial flows (Held et al., 
1999:203). For instance, the overall size of the GDPs of all the countries in a certain 
year in recent decades are far behind the overall size of the derivatives market alone, 
which is only a sublevel market in greater financial markets. 
Financial systems‘ opportunity spaces vary because their business operations and 
natures, cultures, law, habits, educations, ideas, beliefs, routine activities etc. differ 
greatly. We may picture them in different settings as shown in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1: Greater Financial Opportunity Spaces
150
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let us now build our conceptual framework from the very bottom, up, by including 
one additional concept following another along with their visual aids, in order to 
decrease the effort of making conceptual connections. 
 
7.2.1. Greater Spaces 
7.2.1.1. Greater Opportunity Spaces for Financial Crime 
We may mention the greater financial opportunity, which is made up of secondarily 
important factors of finance along with the immediate financial opportunities with 
primary relevance to crime propensity. 
                                                 
150
 Despite the fact that the length of the opportunity spaces in Figure 7.1 (representing the time span 
between 1980 and 2013) were the same in Chapter 6, in this Chapter the sizes differ because of the 
differences in both the pace of the markets and of time perceptions. 
Direction Motivated 
Individual 
Environmental 
Factors 
Opportunity Space of 
Market Finance 
Opportunity Space of Socialist Finance 
Opportunity Space of 
Partially Islamized Finance 
Target 
Opportunity Space of 
Fully Islamized Finance 
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7.2.1.1.1. Politics as a greater financial opportunity space 
Politics affects almost all of the functions of a society in many ways, especially 
economics. Authors like Galbraith (1978), Frey (1983: 9) and many others argue that 
the phrase ‗political economy‘ makes better sense than ‗economy‘ alone. 
According to the World Economic Forum (2002: 5) there is a great mistrust of ―all 
institutions, including democratic institutions across the globe‖. But our concern here 
is more about the level of openness of the political economic systems. Morrison 
(2002: 23) agrees that this should be the concern for international business studies; 
one should be aware whether or not governments are ―stable‖, and the ―constraints‖ 
they impose on the market.  
Mc Adam (1996) suggests that the openness or the closedness of the political systems 
should be referred to while discussing opportunity spaces, especially ―people‘s actual 
access to the political system‖ (Wahlström and Peterson, 2006:365). And Dasgupta 
(2007: 140) agrees that the diversification from authoritarian to democratic states 
presents a range of opportunity spaces from restricted to expanded opportunities 
respectively. Additionally, in politically superior countries, financial agents enjoy 
bigger opportunity spaces because they are preferred as political (and thus financial) 
‗centres‘ and not peripheries. Opportunities are always better in the centres of cities, 
countries and societies and weak in the peripheries.  
Dasgupta (2007: 143) also argues that ―enjoyment of civil liberties, the ability to 
participate in the political sphere, and access to commodities (food, clothing, shelter, 
health care, education – more generally, wealth) are necessary if people are to 
flourish.‖ and this flourishing eventually expands opportunity spaces for every 
member of the society along with financial opportunities and financial ‗illegal‘ 
opportunities. 
Frey (1983: 11) defines the political economy as depicted in Figure 7.2, which shows 
the interaction between economy and polity resulting in endogenised institutions in 
creating a system, which is overlooked by some economists (i.e. Marshall, 1961). 
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Figure 7.2: Interactions between Economy and Polity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Frey (1983: 11) 
 
In this sense, the market system and its common political environment is the most 
open system and allows its participants to freely and diversely interact with each other 
in the market, and thus is the most vulnerable to financial crimes in this framework. 
―The shift towards more open markets and away from state ownership and control ... 
has brought greater opportunities for the expansion of business enterprises‖ 
(Morrison, 2002: 85) in market systems. In the countries with such a system, the 
political arena is more open to the public and these countries are usually 
parliamentary democracies.  
Consequently, we may argue that the East of the world map seems to be comprising 
of more social, authority-driven, formal, closely-knit populations while the West of it 
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has more individualistic, dispersed, informal, loosely-knit populations. Not 
surprisingly, with marginal exceptions, many of the socialist economies are in the 
East and their decision making is centralized and authoritative. Gray (1993: 36) 
agrees that, unlike Anglo-American and Anglo-Saxon-plus (Grey, 1993) capitalism, 
Continental Europe and Asia have more regulated systems.  
On the other hand, the political systems of socialist countries are usually closed 
systems. China and Cuba especially are among the most closed systems in the World. 
One may consider China in another sphere other than socialism but considering the 
replacement of China‘s political order with a democratic regime could not fit China‘s 
circumstances (Zhao, 2005: 425). In terms of property rights, for instance, it was the 
first time that the CCP made an amendment to the constitution allowing citizens to 
have private property (Xinhua Newsagency, 2004).  
Under Xiaoping‘s leadership, China has implemented market-oriented economic 
reforms and it is harder for the CCP to defend working class rights now, in the 
market-oriented economy.  Rosenthal (2002) argues that the CCP could find a 
solution for this tricky situation by announcing that the CCP is the defender not only 
of the working class but also of the private entrepreneurs. 
The socialist political environment is very much restricted and diversity of ideas is 
discouraged, even prosecuted. On the other hand, the Islamic political environment is 
not a very open political system either. In many of the Islamic countries states have an 
ideology and ideas and practices against these ideologies are not forgiven. Unlike 
Western democracies, these countries are not pragmatic, rational ‗democracies‘ but 
‗republics‘ with many assumptions and idees fixe. Some of them even support 
interesting mixtures such as ‗militant democracy151‘. Similarly, many of the socialist 
and Islamic political environments, especially in the last three decades, are either 
militarist systems which came to power via military coups or extremist 
fundamentalists, all of which are based on authority, control and restricted access to 
the political sphere. There are exceptions of course. 
Considering the full control of communist parties in China, Russia (before 1990) and 
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 Basically meaning that democracy as the ultimate, perfect, ideal system has to defend itself at all 
costs against all possible alternatives. 
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Cuba, we still have to put socialist political opportunity space down the bottom of the 
order. For example, Lewis (2009) argues that ―between 2004 and 2005 nearly 300,000 
party members were punished for corruption including party secretaries and nearly 
500 judges. Some were executed. Thousands have fled abroad with around 
30,000,000,000 pounds of the public‘s money‖ in China. 
It is easy to see these arguments in the following map of the Transparency 
International‘s ‗Corruption Perception Index‘ in Map 7.1 but Table 7.5 suggests a 
different result. Since all the parameters we study are dynamic in time dimension 
between the1980s and 2014 it is not easy to provide a quantitative analysis of the 
results. This is indeed a good opportunity to prove that it is essential to give a 
qualitative judgement about ‗white collar‘ strata of a given system in our analyses. 
 
Map 7.1: 2013 Corruption Perception Index 
Source: www.transparency.org 
 
As the Map 7.1 suggests there are no significant differences between the socialist and 
fully and partially Islamised economies in terms of their political corruption but Table 
7.1 suggests that there is a considerable difference between the socialist and partially 
Islamised systems.  
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Table 7.1: 1995 Corruption Perception Index 
    
Ireland 8.57 4 0.61 
United Kingdom 8.57 4 0.17 
USA 7.79 4 1.67 
Hong Kong 7.12 7 0.48 
Malaysia 5.28 7 0.36 
Italy 2.99 4 6.92 
China 2.16 4 0.08 
Source: www.transparency.org 
 
Apart from Iran, Islamic political systems can be considered quasi-open (or quasi-
closed) systems. This is why putting Saudi Arabia and Malaysia into the same picture 
is not fair because their political environment is different and more open. This is why 
we may put the financial systems into the order of political opportunities as shown in 
Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Comparison of Political Environments of Financial Systems as 
Greater Opportunity Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3 Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
 
7.2.1.1.2. Technology as a greater opportunity space 
In today‘s finance world, a few clicks are enough to EFT great sums of money from 
one country to another. Without uniform or at least very similar financial techniques 
and institutions this would not be possible. Technical regulations in our study thus can 
be considered to be standard despite the extremely distant world-views of the 
financial systems. 
Technology affects financial crimes a great deal. 97% of the currency is electronic 
only and never printed on paper. Technology supplies a ground for financial crimes 
that differs from place to place. Even as early as the 1920s, many bogus stocks were 
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sold, after the common
152
 use of telephones, in ‗boiler rooms‘153 (Shiller, 2010).  
Technological space is dynamic across different financial systems in the course of 
time. For example, 1980s expertise about stock markets and accounting practices left 
its place to a good amount of computing, networking, security technologies and 
software knowledge around 2010. Reaching a good quality of education and 
technology requires considerable initial wealth which can be used as a ladder to reach 
more of the fruits. 
Morrison (2002: 23) discusses the ―level of technological education and training‖, 
encouragement of technological innovation, funding and computer literacy while 
explaining the technological environment of PEST analysis.  
In 2000, The New York Stock Exchange was handling ―40 per cent of its volume 
through SuperDOT, its computerized trading system‖ (New York Stock Exchange, 
2000). Now this ratio is so high that Wall Street only holds some servers of the 
financial institutions and the trading floors are closing down. Especially in the last 
decade, even traditional trading floors have become extinct because the whole finance 
runs on digital gadgetry; electronic systems such as Swapswire
154
, SecFinex, Equilend 
and electronic marketplaces like NASDAQ, NYSE Arca and Globex are examples 
(Morrison, 2002: 325). 
Some of these practices make financial crimes easier for the ones who can reach 
cutting edge technology.  For instance, ―the stock market crash of October I987 raised 
anew the question whether certain trading practices, such as program trading
155
, 
manipulated the market by causing a severe decline in securities prices‖ (Goldmann, 
2010). A similar crash of May 6
th
 2010, the ‗Flash Crash‘, occurred in approximately 
15 hours when ―Dow Jones [took] the fastest and most dramatic nose dive in its 
history‖ (NPRO, 20 March 2013). 
Similarly, the financial markets are not the market as we know it either. What we call 
                                                 
152‗Common‘ meaning, a few hundred calls a year. 
153
 These operations were called boiler rooms because many phones in the cheapest places such as 
basements with boilers were being used for selling, often bogus stocks. 
154
 to deal interest-rate swaps. 
155 See Jonathan R. Macey, Mark Mitchell & Jeffry Netter, Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of 
the Uptick Rule and Its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 Cornell. Rev. 799 
(1989). 
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‗financial markets‘ are computers, networks and software now. ―There are no people 
at all any more, there are just black boxes‖ (NPRO, 2013) which are dealing with 
milliseconds. ―When you are dealing with milliseconds, there can be absolutely no 
delay … Speed of light between one point and another … becomes your outside 
ring… that you can go [the distance between a bank and its data centre] tends to be in 
that neighbourhood of 30 to 35 fiber miles‖ (NPRO, 2013). 
If modern banks build their data centres more than 35 fiber miles away from the 
markets (e.g. Manhattan) or use slower machines, CPUs, etc. they are doomed 
because then they would operate behind the actual markets where one second is 
enough to crash the whole market (NPRO, 2013). Everybody is required to use 1000 
cable which takes the speed of light one microsecond to go down the cable. If 
somebody had 5 ft. off their cable, they get 1/2/1000 0000
th
 of a second faster which 
can be enough to be ahead of the market and misuse this time advantage in high 
frequency trading (NPRO, 2013). 
The market system has technologically advanced over the last thirty years compared 
to socialism and Islamic systems (as seen in Table 7.3
156
, 7.4 and 7.5), and the 
representatives of socialism, especially around the 1980s, were also technologically 
advanced enough to be in front of the representatives of the Islamic financial system, 
because of Russia as superpower, Cuba as ‗Soviet pawn‘ according to her enemies 
(Latell, 2005: 194) and China, who has been taking over the role of the Soviets in the 
socialist world, since the last decade.  
  
                                                 
156
 Year 2000 is in the middle of our time frame but the recent picture is not significantly different apart 
from China. 
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Table 7.3: Global Competitiveness Index for 2014 
Country/Economy Rank (out of 148) Score (1-7) 
United States 5 5.48 
Hong Kong SAR 7 5.47 
United Kingdom 10 5.37 
Saudi Arabia 20 5.10 
Malaysia 24 5.03 
Ireland 28 4.92 
China 29 4.84 
Italy 49 4.41 
Russian Federation 64 4.25 
Source: World Economic Forum 
 
The World Economic Forum‘s World Competitiveness Index dates back to 2008 but 
Morrison (2002) gives Table 6.8 below for the year 2000. In this ranking of the first 
15 countries, there are no socialist or Islamic countries. 
 
Table 7.4: Top Competitiveness Rankings for 2000 
Global Competitiveness Index (WEF) World Competitiveness Scoreboard 
(IMD) 
1 Finland 1 US 
2 US 2 Singapore 
3 Germany 3 Finland 
4 The Netherlands 4 The Netherlands 
5 Switzerland 5 Switzerland 
6 Denmark 6 Luxembourg 
7 Sweden 7 Ireland 
8 UK 8 Germany 
9 Singapore 9 Sweden 
10 Australia 10  Iceland 
11 Canada 11  Canada 
12 Belgium 12 Denmark 
13 Austria 13 Australia 
14 Japan 14 Hong Kong 
15 France 15 UK 
Source: Morrison (2002) 
 
In a similar vein, as seen in Table 7.5, in 2000, only 1.34 % of the Chinese population 
were on the internet, unlike market systems. 
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Table 7.5: Distribution of the Population on the Internet in 20 Selected Countries 
(2000) 
Country Number of people (millions) Percentage of population 
Australia 7.77 40.54 
China 16.9 1.34 
India 4.5 0.45 
Japan 27.06 21.38 
South Korea 15.3 32.31 
Czech Republic 0.35 3.4 
Denmark 2.3 43.1 
Finland 2.27 43.93 
France 9 15.26 
Germany 18 21.74 
Iceland 0.14 52.11 
The Netherlands 6.8 42.79 
Norway 2.2 49.57 
Poland 2.8 7.25 
Russia 9.2 6.3 
Spain 4.6 11.5 
Sweden 4.5 50.72 
UK 19.47 32.72 
US 148.03 53.72 
Canada 13.28 42.8 
Source: Nua Internet Survey (2000) at http://www.nua.ie/surveys. 
 
In addition to the corruption, indeed, one can use e-readiness ranking to show the 
level of technology use in the country cases we study. Map 7.2 and Table 7.6 below 
show 2008 and 2000 global rankings, respectively. 
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Map 7.2: 2008 E-Readiness Rankings 
 
 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2009) 
 
Table 7.6: E-Readiness Rankings of Top Countries in 2009 
Rank in 
2009 
Country Overall Score Business Environment Readiness 
5 United States 8.60 7.65 
8 Hong Kong 8.33 8.20 
13 United Kingdom 8.14 7.03 
26 Italy 7.09 6.24 
38 Malaysia 5.87 6.81 
51 Saudi Arabia 4.88 6.16 
56 China 4.33 6.32 
59 Russia 3.98 5.67 
68 Iran 3.43 4.22 
 
Source: EIU (The Economist Intelligence Unit), 25.06.2009 
 
As can be seen, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and other partially-Islamized countries are 
technologically better than Sudan and Iran. Therefore, we put the financial systems 
into the order of technological opportunity as shown in Table 7.7. 
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Table 7.7: Comparison of Technological Environments of Financial Systems as 
Greater Opportunity Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
7.2.1.1.3. Society and culture as a greater opportunity space  
One may doubt that a detailed discussion of opportunity space in the context of 
financial crimes is necessary; however, financial systems run under different socio-
political cultures, which have different effects on crime rates.  
We can exemplify social interactions in the society for social opportunity space. The 
mutual relations between finance, economics and society are well established and 
conceptualised as Sozialökonomik by Weber ([1904] 1949, 64–65). 
In relation to this, routine activities theorists frequently refer to everyday habits of 
ordinary people and they argue that these innocent, normal activities are so frequent 
that they affect crime rates by either peacefully and unconsciously guarding against 
crime or generously allowing it. Their emphasis on the ordinary life styles of regular 
people forces us to analyse the social structure and everyday financial habits of 
regular people in various financial systems.  
Social and political opportunity spaces are very important and are long-term 
determinants of financial crime vulnerability. For instance, Levitt and Dubner 
(2006)
157
 make a convincing case by using the effects of a 1973 US Supreme Court 
decision on abortion (Roe vs. Wade) and claim that the drop of crime statistics in the 
1990s is because of this decision, some twenty years earlier.  
Another convincing case is suggested by Dasgupta (2007: 140-143) in comparing 
                                                 
157
 Roe (Norma McCorvery from Dallas, Texas) was a ―poor, uneducated, unskilled, alcoholic, drug-
using twenty-one-years-old woman who had already given up two children for adoption and … in 1970 
found herself pregnant again‖ (Levitt and Dubner, 2006: 3) and this case prevented many children 
being born into adverse family environments who would eventually end up being criminals in the1990s 
and thus helped reduce crime rates in all possible types of crime.  
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authoritarian governments with ‗firm governance‘ and democratic governments with 
―transparency, political pluralism, a free press, freedom of association‖ for political 
contexts as well. Dasgupta (2007) concludes that economic and financial performance 
and size is greatly affected by the type of government.  
Under cultural opportunity space, we may cite perceived expectations, abilities, 
qualities and beliefs of individuals in the society, language, traditions, education, life 
style and the like as the determinants of culture. Financial crimes require a great deal 
of intellectual capacity, as the greater the level of intellectual ability or the perception 
of intellectual ability, the more probable the criminals would be capable of seeing 
financial crimes as feasible.  
Morrison (2002: 23) recommends the comparison of the following concepts for the 
analysis of the sociocultural environments of businesses: cultural diversity, 
―educational levels of the population‖, women‘s involvement in the markets and 
family life (whether ―single parent families, or ... extended families are the norm‖).  
It should be noted that financial crimes require a well-educated human profile. 
According to the Human Development Index, in 2002, China‘s rank in this index was 
35 ranks lower than Malaysia‘s (China = 0. 745, Malaysia = 0.793); and Malaysia 
was 47 ranks lower than UK and 51 ranks lower than US (UK = 0.939, US = 0.936); 
Italy was close to US and UK with 0.920; and Hong Kong was 0.903, Cuba was 
0.809, Russian Federation was 0.795, Saudi Arabia was 0.768, Iran was 0.732, Sudan 
was 0.505 (Todaro and Smith, 2006: 62; Thirlwall, 2006). 
The same index‘s world map is depicted in Map 7.3 below, which suggests a similar 
picture after a decade. 
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Map 7.3: 2013 Human Development Index 
 
 
 
Financial crimes require a well-educated human profile and Table 7.8 and 7.9 
compare public education spending levels, literacy and participation in education in 
the cases we compare in 2009 and 2002 respectively. 
 
Table 7.8: Public Education Spending in Developing Countries as Percentages of 
Government Spending in 2009 
 
PUBLIC EDUCATION SPENDING 
Russian Federation 12.9 
Cuba 20.6 
China - 
Malaysia 25.2 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 19.5 
Sudan - 
 
Source: The World Bank (2013) 
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Table 7.9: Participation in Education in 2002 
 
Adult Literacy Rate (Percentages 15 and Older) 
 
Male Female 
Russian Federation 100 99 
Italy 99 98 
Cuba 97 97 
China 95 87 
Malaysia 92 85 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 84 70 
Saudi Arabia 84 69 
Sudan 71 49 
         Source: Thirlwall (2006: 81-84) 
 
Indeed all of these results are compatible with our comparative results of the Hofstede 
(1991) indices. Hofstede‘s (1991) research on cultures is indeed more appropriate for 
our study to apply because he has a study diverse enough to allow us to compare the 
cultural environments of the financial systems in a concrete manner and put these 
systems into a fairer order. Let us now use the four main parameters of the cultural 
comparison of Hofstede and apply those to our study. 
In this study, we mainly look for significant differences of internal and external 
pressures on financial businesses in various financial systems, and as for the external 
pressures, Schumpeter (1987: 12) says: ―The subject matter of economics is 
essentially unique process in historic time. Nobody can hope to understand the 
economic phenomena of any, including the present epoch, who has not adequate 
command of historical facts and an adequate amount of historical sense...‖. In 
addition, cultures are the strongest of the concepts that accumulate and reflect the 
collective characters of the societies that have been shaped over the centuries. 
Analysis of culture cannot be abandoned in any of the economic analysis for this 
reason. 
Some important measures of organizational culture that may help us compare the 
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financial systems are studied by Hofstede (1991) in a study with 116,000 participants 
(sales and service staff) from one firm operating in 40 different countries. In 
Hofstede‘s research (1991) all the participants were nationals of their countries and 
the findings of the study are supported by further research by Laurent (1983), Ronen 
and Shenkar (1985) and Grey and Thone (1990).  
Hofstede (1991) claims that there are mainly four measures of organizational culture:  
(i) Masculinity;  
(ii) Power-distance; 
(iii)Uncertainty-avoidance; 
(iv) Individualism.  
Among these measures, masculinity scores indicate whether or not the agents 
dominantly prefer a materialistic utility function over social and moral utilities. Power 
distance, on the other hand, is the best candidate to compare the need gaps of market, 
socialist and Islamic cultures. Similarly, uncertainty-avoidance basically measures the 
haste (that is the perception error between the perceived and real actual selves) in our 
theoretical framework; and individualism, having two poles of individual and social, 
in fact gives the rough picture of expectations (or expected probability); because 
people in individualistic societies do not habitually lean on others, they do not even, 
generally, lean on their families and close relatives but earn their livings by 
themselves. This fact eventually develops a self-confidence wide-spread in the society 
and translates into high expectations for their ideal selves, with much stress and 
pressure though. 
All the same, we are aware that these measures are derived from a study that is 
conducted in business settings and like all research has some shortcomings. This is 
why we do not rely only on the research of Hofstede (1991) but use many supporting 
and criticizing arguments from many other resources to feed our theoretical 
framework. 
Table 7.10 gives all of these indices: PDI: Power Distance, IDV: Individualism, 
MAS: Masculinity, UAI: Uncertainty-Avoidance, Long-Term Orientation 
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Table 7.10: Hofstede‟s Cultural Dimensions 
 
Countries PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO 
Greece 60 35 57 112  
Portugal 63 27 31 104  
Guatemala 95 6 37 101  
Uruguay 61 36 38 100  
Belgium 65 75 54 94  
El Salvador 66 19 40 94  
Poland 68 60 64 93  
Japan 54 46 95 92 80 
Peru 64 16 42 87  
Argentina 49 46 56 86  
Chile 63 23 28 86  
Costa Rica 35 15 21 86  
France 68 71 43 86  
Panama 95 11 44 86  
Spain 57 51 42 86  
South Korea 60 18 39 85 75 
Turkey 66 37 45 85  
Hungary 46 55 88 82  
Mexico 81 30 69 82  
Israel 13 54 47 81  
Colombia 67 13 64 80  
Brazil 69 38 49 76 65 
Venezuela 81 12 73 76  
Italy 50 76 70 75  
Czech Republic 57 58 57 74  
Austria 11 55 79 70  
Pakistan 55 14 50 70  
Taiwan 58 17 45 69 87 
Egypt 80 38 52 68  
Iraq 80 38 52 68  
Kuwait 80 38 52 68  
Lebanon 80 38 52 68  
Libya 80 38 52 68  
Saudi Arabia 80 38 52 68  
U. Arab Emirates 80 38 52 68  
Ecuador 78 8 63 67  
Germany 35 67 66 65 31 
Thailand 64 20 34 64 56 
Finland 33 63 26 59  
Iran 58 41 43 59  
Switzerland 34 68 70 58  
Ghana 77 20 46 54 16 
Nigeria 77 20 46 54 16 
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Sierra Leone 77 20 46 54 16 
Netherlands 38 80 14 53 44 
Ethiopia 64 27 41 52 25 
Kenya 64 27 41 52 25 
Tanzania 64 27 41 52 25 
Zambia 64 27 41 52 25 
Australia 36 90 61 51 31 
Norway 31 69 8 50 20 
New Zealand 22 79 58 49 30 
South Africa 49 65 63 49  
Indonesia 78 14 46 48  
United States 40 91 62 46 29 
Philippines 94 32 64 44 19 
China 80 20 66 40 118 
India 77 48 56 40 61 
Malaysia 104 26 50 36  
Ireland 28 70 68 35  
United Kingdom 35 89 66 35 25 
Hong Kong 68 25 57 29 96 
Sweden 31 71 5 29 33 
Denmark 18 74 16 23  
Jamaica 45 39 68 13  
Singapore 74 20 48 8 48 
Max 104 91 95 104 118 
Min 11 6 5 8 16 
Average 57,5 48,5 50 56 67 
Source: Hofstede (2012). 
Note: PDI: Power Distance, IDV: Individualism, MAS:, UAI: Uncertainty-Avoidance, Long-
Term Orientation 
 
7.2.1.1.3.1. Masculinity 
Masculinity scores indicate whether or not the agents dominantly prefer a materialistic 
utility function over social and moral utilities because: 
[i]n masculine cultures performance counts above all – money, material 
possessions and driving ambition epitomise what is seen to be good. 
Conversely, the so called feminine cultures are characterised by a far 
stronger concern for the quality of life. People rather than possessions are 
considered important and a high value is placed on service to others‖ 
(Rollinson et al., (1998: 369: emphasis added).  
Morrison (2002: 139) also sees masculinity as a sign of inclination ―towards 
aggressive and materialistic behaviour‖ like Hofstede does. Femininity, on the other 
hand, ―denotes sensitivity, caring, and emphasis of quality of life ... negotiation and 
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compromise‖ in contrast to masculinity‘s ―conflict and competition‖ Morrison (2002: 
139).  
Finally, masculinity is always seen as more materially oriented, savage and deviant 
than femininity or the lower degrees of it. This should then be another reason for the 
financial crime disposition. Indeed, this masculinity and femininity divide can be 
depicted as various utility dimensions because Hofstede‘s (1991) research confirms 
our theoretical arguments that are put forward in the previous Chapter. Let us now 
explain these utility dimensions, as materially dominated utility function suggests the 
same thing masculinity dimension suggests. Table 7.11 gives the masculinity index of 
the cases we compare:  
 
Table 7.11: Masculinity in Hofstede‟s Cultural Dimensions 
 
Country Masculinity 
 Italy 70 
 Saudi Arabia 52 
 Iran 43 
 United States 62 
 China 66 
 Malaysia 50 
 United 
Kingdom 
66 
 Hong Kong 57 
Max  70 
Min  43 
Average  56,5 
Source: Hofstede (2012). 
 
7.2.1.1.3.2. Power distance 
Power distance shows in what degree the ―members of the society accept a 
hierarchical or unequal power structure‖ (Morrison, 2002: 138). Rollinson et al. 
(1998: 369; emphasis added) argue that ―where power distance is low superiors and 
subordinates treat each other more as equals and there is a strong tendency to try to 
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minimise social inequalities‖. If social inequalities are minimized then people‘s 
discrepancy between their actual and ideal selves is smaller, which is tantamount to 
saying that low power distance cultures produce societies that comprise of individuals 
with fewer „needs‟ and thus proportionally less motivation. Similarly, higher degrees 
of power distance would increase the altitude of the would-be-financial-criminals; 
‗ideal selves‘ from their ‗perceived (actual) selves‘ and thus increase the ‗need‘ and 
motivation for them. Likewise, ―[i]n large power distance societies, people consider 
themselves to be inherently unequal and there is more dependence by subordinates on 
bosses‖ Hofstede (1991: 25). This is why we observe a more consultative style of 
management in low-power-distance cultures versus an autocratic or paternalistic style 
in high-power-distance cultures. Power distances of some selected countries are 
presented below as an index at Table 7.12.  
 
Table 7.12: Power Distance in Hofstede‟s Cultural Dimensions 
 
 Country Power Distance 
 
 Italy 50 
 Saudi Arabia 80 
 Iran 58 
 United States 40 
 China 80 
 Malaysia 104 
 United Kingdom 35 
 Hong Kong 68 
Max  104 
Min  11 
Average  57.5 
Source: Hofstede (2012). 
 
Morrison (2002, 139) argues that Asian, Latin American and African countries, where 
socialism exists more, ―tend to have large power distances‖, while Northern Europe 
and America, where we observe more market economies, have relatively small power 
distances,. This realization is important for this study. We would expect much less 
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power distance in socialist countries. At least, socialism, with all its aim of pressing 
down power differences should have had an effect on these societies, but it does not, 
according to Hofstede‘s (1991) research. It is possible to argue that those societies 
choose socialism because they require it, as they have a huge power-distance and 
realising this fact they choose to lessen it with the help of socialism. Even if this 
argument is correct, it is apparent that they failed to eradicate the social power-
distance in a short time compared to the evolution of the social norms over many 
decades. 
Nevertheless, we should be aware that Hofstede (1991) gave his questionnaire to sales 
and service staff, who do not really have much relation with CEOs, the white collar, 
upper-class individuals who are the focus of our study. Although Hofstede‘s findings 
are completely correct, they may not be adequate to lay down the whole power-
distance picture of the society. Yet it does give a rough picture, because white-collar 
individuals are also raised in the same society and they are not alien to it. Truths about 
a part of the whole can represent the truth about the whole, at least approximately. In 
order to get a better representation of the whole we elaborate and confirm Hofstede‘s 
(1991) findings from other resources about power-distances of various cultures. 
7.2.1.1.3.3. Uncertainty-avoidance 
―The uncertainty-avoidance dimension deals with the cultural acceptance of risk 
taking. In a culture characterised by strong values of uncertainty-avoidance, values 
are weak, the ambiguities of life are more rapidly accepted, rules are not sacrosanct 
and can be abandoned with ease‖ (Rollinson et al., 1998: 369). This is why people try 
to avoid risks as much as they can. When everything is ambiguous and everything is 
easily changeable there is much to be afraid of in the market. In high uncertainty-
avoidance cultures, however, rules are considered to be sacrosanct and cannot be 
abandoned. This is a latent guarantee and eventually lessens the fear and increases 
individuals‘ capacity to take risk.  
Morrison (2002: 139) confirms this understanding by arguing that ―high uncertainty 
avoidance countries ... tend to be more expressive and emotional‖. Low-uncertainty-
avoidance cultures, on the other hand, mean ―simply greater control of anxiety levels, 
not its non-existence‖. This refines our synthesis of equating uncertainty-avoidance to 
haste/impatience in our theoretical conceptualization. Obviously, then, low-
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uncertainty-avoidance cultures create more inclination towards financial crimes, 
because crime choice is always riskier than non-crime choice and there is less social 
opportunity to calm oneself down. 
Uncertainty-avoidance is, apparently, a good reason to avoid taking the risk of getting 
caught and investing in comparatively more secure places (despite the lesser probable 
returns) and avoiding a vulnerable financial situation in the first place, per se.   
7.2.1.1.3.4. Individualism 
According to Morrison (2002: 139), individualism shows ―the extent to which 
individuals perceive themselves as independent and autonomous beings‖. 
Collectivism is at the opposite side of it, and they ―see themselves as integrated into 
‗in-groups‖. We can attribute clear belonging of ‗collectivism‘ to the socialist 
countries and ‗individualism‘ to market societies because some authors refer to 
market economies as a ‗free enterprise system‘. Morrison (2002: 139) confirms this in 
stating that ―[h]igh individualism scores occurred mainly in the English-speaking 
countries, while low individualism was prevalent in Latin American and Asian 
countries‖.  
Morrison (2002: 119) also argues that ―societies which place greater value on the 
collectivity such as the family or the kinship group are likely to develop institutional 
structures which are more paternalistic... These societies are likely to value group 
loyalty more highly than individual freedoms‖. Italy is an exception, because 
―founders and family members ... retain large shareholdings‖. For instance Fiat‘s 
owners hold a controlling block of shares to ―act as a deterrent to takeover‖(Morrison, 
2002: 22). 
These measures apparently have diversifying effects on financial crime motivations. 
For instance the preponderance of financial crimes is committed individually or in 
very small groups. Table 7.13 shows the individualism index of Hofstede (1991: 26). 
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Table 7.13: Individualism Index Ranks of Some Countries and Regions 
 
 
Source: Hofstede (2012). 
 
Thus, using these criteria, the strongest culture against financial crime deviance 
would be a culture with:  
(i) Low power-distance, individualism and masculinity;  
(ii) High uncertainty avoidance.  
Let us now analyse the country groups we study and their corresponding cultures in 
terms of these measures provided by Hofstede and find out which culture or cultures 
are closer to this ideal, strongest form. 
As seen in Figure 7.3, Hofstede forms eight distinct groups of cultures after surveying 
100 countries (Robinson et al., 1998: 560-562): (i) More Developed Latin; (ii) Less 
Developed Latin; (iii) More Developed Asian; (iv) Less Developed Asian; (v) Near 
Eastern; (vi) Germanic; (vii) Anglo, and (viii) Nordic.  
  
 Country Individuality 
 Italy 76 
 Saudi Arabia 38 
 Iran 41 
 United States 91 
 China 20 
 Malaysia 26 
 United 
Kingdom 
89 
 Hong Kong 25 
Max  91 
Min  6 
Average  48.5 
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Figure 7.3: Global Cultures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rollinson et al. (1998: 369) 
 
For the purposes of our study, we may distinguish and group these cultures to include 
the cases we study as shown in Figure 7.4 to form a more general, inclusive class of 
corresponding cultures. 
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Figure 7.4: Global Cultures with Corresponding Economic and Financial 
Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Rollinson et al. (1998: 369) 
 
Among these, the culture groups ‗Anglo‘, primarily, and ‗Germanic‘, secondarily, can 
be considered as market societies, because the first group includes US, UK, Canada, 
New Zealand and Ireland while the second one includes Austria, Israel, Germany, 
Switzerland, South Africa and Italy. 
Socialist culture then is denoted as ‗less developed Asian‘ and ‗less developed Latin‘, 
because in the first group there are the countries Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, India, 
Pakistan, Philippines and Singapore, while in the second group are Mexico, 
Venezuela, Chile, Peru, Portugal and Yugoslavia. With few exceptions, ―the 
groupings fit well with the historical and linguistic development of the countries, 
Muslim 
Socialist 
Market 
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which gives a plausible feeling about the clusters‖ (Robinson et al., 1998: 560). 
Finally, Hofstede puts Iran and Turkey in the category named ‗Near Eastern‘ and with 
high power-distance, uncertainty-avoidance and low individuality Malaysia could 
easily be put in this group, and Arab countries
158
 with high power-distance but 
comparatively more individualism than the ‗Near Eastern‘ culture may be considered 
as closer to ‗Near Eastern‘ culture. Then countries with Islamic finance are in this 
group only. 
Consequently, Hofstede‘s results show that liberal market economies are generally 
operating in an ‗Anglo‘ culture, while less liberal market economies, such as the 
Anglo-Saxon-plus economy (Grey, 1993) operate in various cultures such as 
‗Germanic‘, ‗More Developed Latin‘ and ‗More Developed Asian‘. The 
characteristics of the ‗Anglo‘ culture are: (i) Low power-distance and uncertainty-
avoidance; and (ii) High individualism and masculinity. Other than uncertainty-
avoidance, we may bluntly argue that ‗Germanic‘ culture shares most of the 
characteristics of ‗Anglo‘ culture.  
It should be noted that Robinson et al. (1998: 561) see such a correlation between the 
cultures and their economic orientation, arguing that ―high individualism only seems 
to be prevalent in certain developed countries, while those that are still developing 
tend to have more collective orientations‖. 
Comparatively socialism is more neatly distributed to cultures. Mainly, socialist 
countries in our study are placed under ‗less developed Asian‘ and less so in ‗less 
developed Latin‘ cultures. ‗Less developed Asian‘ culture has the following 
characteristics: (i) unlike almost all of the market societies
159
 high power distance and 
medium masculinity; (ii) low individualism and uncertainty-avoidance. Especially 
low individualism is clearly non-existent in all market cultures (‗Anglo‘, ‗Germanic‘, 
‗more developed Latin‘ and ‗more developed Asian‘). This is bluntly160 correct for 
‗uncertainty-avoidance‘ too. Interestingly there is no culture with lower uncertainty 
avoidance than ‗less developed Asian‘ culture, which includes Hong Kong and 
                                                 
158
Uncertainty-avoidance ranking 67, masculinity 52, individualism 38, power distance 80. 
159cultures including, bluntly, ‗more developed Latin‘ (France, Belgium, Spain) and ‗more developed 
Asian‘ (Japan). 
160‗Bluntly‘, because only ‗Anglo‘ culture is not high in uncertainty-avoidance although higher than 
‗less developed Asian‘ culture. 
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Taiwan. The only difference between ‗less developed Asian‘ culture and ‗less 
developed Latin‘ culture is that the second has a higher degree of uncertainty-
avoidance.  
Interestingly, Islamic economies are almost uniformly distributed in the culture 
groups since they collectively reside under ‗Near Eastern‘ culture. The main 
characteristics of this culture are (i) high power-distance and uncertainty-avoidance; 
(ii) low individualism; and (iii) medium masculinity. ‗Less developed Latin‘ culture is 
very similar to this culture with slightly higher masculinity
161
. Second, the most 
similar culture group to the ‗Near Eastern‘ culture (mostly Islamic) is the ‗less 
developed Asian‘ (mostly socialist), which also has geographical neighbourhood to 
the Near Eastern culture.  
Interestingly, Morrison (2002: 140) categorizes these groups differently by omitting 
two of the measures (masculinity and uncertainty) and decreasing the groups. This 
threefold categorization can be seen in Table 7.14. 
 
Table 7.14: Cultural Differences between Selected Countries 
 Power 
distance 
rank 
Individualism     
rank 
Masculinity      
rank 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
rank 
Group1 ( high power distance plus low individualism) 
Indonesia 8-9 47-8 30-1 41-2 
Malaysia 1 36 25-6 46 
Group 2 ( low power distance plus high individualism) 
Germany 42-4 15 9-10 29 
Netherlands 40 4-5 51 35 
UK 42-4 3 9-10 47-8 
USA 38 1 15 43 
Group 3 ( varying patterns) 
France 15-16 10-11 35-6 10-15 
Greece 27-8 30 18-19 1 
Japan 33 22-3 1 7 
Note: 1. Rank: 1 =highest; 53=lowest 
Source:  Hofstede, G. (1994) Cultures and Organizations ( London : Harper Collins ); various 
tables in Morrison (2002: 140). 
 
                                                 
161
 Historical neighborhood between 8
th
 – 15thcentury could be a reason. 
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This categorization of Morrison (2002: 140) forms more inclusive groups and 
captures economic and financial systems even more uniformly which makes it better 
operable by our study.  
Morrison (2002: 140), as seen in Table 7.14, sees the second category as ―high power 
distance plus low individualism‖ cultures, the second category as ―low power distance 
plus high individualism‖ (the contradiction of the first group) cultures and the last 
category as ―varying pattern‖ cultures. From the perspective of Robinson et al. (1998: 
560-562), with eight identified cultures, the first category corresponds to the 
combined ‗Anglo-Germanic‘ culture which now includes US, UK, Ireland, Italy, 
Germany, Canada, Australia, Austria, Switzerland, South Africa and Israel. 
Furthermore, this categorization also suggests that both socialist and Islamic cultures 
are social and show respect to power figures. As Morrison (2002: 141) puts it, ―where 
people are less dependent on in-groups, shown in Group 2, they are also less 
dependent on powerful leaders‖. 
Then we should note that the safest culture for financial crime resistance is the 
Muslim culture as Table 7.15 and 7.16 depict. 
Table 7.15: Relative Positions of Various Cultures Compared to the Most 
Resistant Culture against Financial Crimes 
 Masculinit
y 
Power 
Distance 
Uncertaint
y-
Avoidance 
Individualis
m 
Total 
Error 
Most Resistant 
Form 
1 1 5 1 0 
      
Muslim Culture 2.5 5 5          (3)* 1 5,5       
(7.5)* 
Socialist 
Culture 
3.5 5 3 1 8.5 
Market Culture 5 1 3.5 4 8.5 
      
Partially 
Islamised 
(calculated as 
the mid-system 
of market and 
Islamic 
finances) 
5 + 2,5 = 
7,5  
7,5 / 2 = 
3,75 
5 + 1 = 6 
 
6 / 2 = 3 
5 + 3,5 = 
8,5 
 
8,5 / 2 = 
4,25 
1 + 4 = 5 
 
5 / 2 = 2,5 
5,5 + 8,5 
= 14 
 
14 / 2 = 7 
Note: (*) Scores when ‗Near Eastern‘ culture is combined with ‗Less Developed Asian‘ culture. This 
score may be necessary because Rollinson et al. (1998: 369) mention Pakistan and India in ‗Less 
Developed Asian‘ culture. 
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Table 7.16: Organized Indices of Hofstede According to Economic Systems 
Analysis 
   PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO  
Fully Islamized  Iran 58 41 43 59   
         
         
Partially Islamized 
 Saudi Arabia 80 38 52 68   
 Malaysia 104 26 50 36   
 Average  92 32 51 52   
         
Socialist 
 China 80 20 66 40 118  
 Hong Kong 68 25 57 29 96  
 Average  74 22.5 61.5 34.5 89  
         
Market 
 Italy 50 76 70 75   
 United Kingdom 35 89 66 35 25  
 United States 40 91 62 46 29  
 Average  41.66 85.33 66 52 27  
 
Masculinity 
As Table 7.17 shows, both Anglo and Germanic cultures are very high in 
individuality, making them vulnerable to financial crimes compared with socialist and 
Islamic cultures, that is less developed Asian and Near Eastern cultures, respectively. 
However the discrepancy between them is not high on this measure. 
 
Table 7.17: Masculinity Comparison of Various Societies as Hosts of Economic 
and Financial Systems 
  Market Socialist Fully 
Isl. 
Partially 
Isl. 
Ideal Total 
Error 
M
o
ti
v
at
ed
 
O
ff
en
d
er
s 
High 
Masculinity in 
the Society 
5 3.5 2.5 2.5 1 
 
 Error 4 2.5 1.5 1.5  9.5 
Note: 5 = Highest masculinity, 4 = high masculinity, 3 = moderate masculinity, 2 = low 
masculinity, 1 = very weak masculinity. 
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These analyses are general analyses and they need to be verified for specific offender 
types. We expect them to roughly repeat themselves. Let us see if they do. 
Power Distance 
As Table 7.17 shows, both ‗Anglo‘ and ‗Germanic‘ cultures, which represent market 
societies, are very low in power distance and ‗less developed Latin‘ and ‗less 
developed Asian‘ cultures which represent socialist countries are very high in power 
distance. Islamic countries are, like socialist countries, very high in power distance 
too. Keeping in mind the criticism we raised before about the macro level inabilities 
of the research on power distance, we then can put this order into Table 7.18 as 
follows. 
Table 7.18: Power Distance Comparison of Various Societies as Hosts of 
Economic and Financial Systems 
  Market Socialist 
Fully 
Isl. 
Partially 
Isl. 
Ideal 
Total 
Error 
M
o
ti
v
at
ed
 
O
ff
en
d
er
s 
Power 
Distance 
1 5 5 5 1  
 Error 0 4 4 4  12 
Note: 5 = Widest power-distance, 4 = wide power-distance, 3 = moderate power-distance, 2 = 
narrow power-distance, 1 = very narrow power-distance 
 
Uncertainty-Avoidance 
As Table 7.19 shows, ‗less developed Asian‘ culture is the lowest of all cultures in 
terms of uncertainty avoidance. Anglo culture is pretty low and a little higher than 
less developed Asian culture, but when we include the Germanic culture, which 
includes Italy, we may argue that the uncertainty-avoidance is moderate in market 
societies. And finally there is no doubt that Muslim countries are very high in 
uncertainty avoidance. 
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Table 7.19: Uncertainty Avoidance Comparison of Various Societies as Hosts of 
Economic and Financial Systems 
  Market Socialist 
Fully 
Isl. 
Partially 
Isl. 
Ideal 
Total 
Error 
M
o
ti
v
at
e
d
 
O
ff
en
d
er
s 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance in the 
Society 
3.5 3 5 3 5  
 Error 1.5 2 0 2  5.5 
Note: 5 = Highest uncertainty-avoidance, 4 = high uncertainty-avoidance, 3 = moderate 
uncertainty-avoidance, 2 = low uncertainty-avoidance, 1 = very weak uncertainty-avoidance. 
Individualism 
Table 7.20 shows that ‗Anglo‘ culture is very high in individualism however 
‗Germanic‘ culture is moderate. When we think of both in combination, we may 
argue that market societies are high in individuality and it is clear from Figure 7.4 that 
less developed Asian and Near Eastern cultures, which correspond to socialist and 
Islamic cultures respectively, are the lowest in this measure. 
 
Table 7.20: Uncertainty Avoidance Comparison of Various Societies as Hosts of 
Economic and Financial Systems 
  Market Socialist Fully 
Isl. 
Partially 
Isl. 
Ideal Total 
Error 
M
o
ti
v
at
ed
 
O
ff
e
n
d
er
s Individualism 
in the Society 
3.75 1 1 1 1 
 
 Error 2.75 0 0 0  2.75 
Note: 5 = Highest individualism, 4 = high individualism, 3 = moderate individualism, 2 = low 
individualism, 1 = very weak individualism. 
 
In Tables 7.21 through 7.26 comparison of the cultural environment of financial 
systems is made and the systems we analyse are put in an ordinal position in relation 
to their position and performance accordingly. 
Table 7.21: Comparison of the Cultural Masculinity of Financial Systems as 
Greater Opportunity Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
3 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
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Table 7.22: Comparison of the Cultural Power Distance of Financial Systems  
as Greater Opportunity Space  
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
 
Table 7.23: Comparison of the Cultural Uncertainty-Avoidance of Financial 
Systems as Greater Opportunity Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
2 Market/Capitalist Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
Table 7.24: Comparison of the Cultural Individualism of Financial Systems  
as Greater Opportunity Space  
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
Table 7.25: Comparison of the Cultural Opportunity Space of Financial Systems 
(as Total Impact of Masculinity, Power Distance, Uncertainty-Avoidance and 
Individualism) 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 7  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
3 + 1 + 1 +3 = 8 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
2 + 3 + 2 + 2 = 9 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 + 1 + 4 + 4 = 13  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
It is more feasible to convert these numbers to corresponding values those are closer 
than 4 in order not to inflate the effects of societal factors in our comparative analysis 
in the following parts of the text. 
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Table 7.26: Comparison of the Cultural Opportunity Space of Financial Systems 
(For Further Comparison) 
Their Order Financial Systems 
7 / 4  = 1.75      1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
8 / 4  =  2          2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
9 / 4  =  2.25     3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
13/ 4 =  3.25     4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
7.2.1.1.4. Economics as a greater opportunity space 
The effects of the economic environment on the financial world are obvious and self-
explanatory. While comparing international economic environments, Morrison (2002: 
23) focuses on the ‗growth‘ of the economy and is specifically concerned about 
whether there is a recession or unemployment, whether ‗wages and consumer 
spending are rising‘ and whether there are regional differences or differences between 
various sectors (in our case finance and service sectors) in growth/recession. For 
instance, Siegel (2009: 75) argues that criminal opportunities abound in urban 
environments where facilitators are also readily found. As the international 
urbanization index in Map 7.4 shows, market societies are more vulnerable to 
financial crimes.  
 
Map 7.4: 2013 Urban Populations as Percentage of Total Population 
Source: World Bank, 2013 
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In market economies the base of financial crime opportunity (see: Figure 7.5) is 
higher; the economically least advantaged people have more opportunity to commit 
financial crime. For instance, credit cards are available for everyone and big loans for 
financial investment are still possible for such people if they have a clear credit 
history (Peston, 2008).  Laws are loose (e.g. one-time bankruptcy with no 
punishment) and guardians are not well equipped with formal codes (e.g. auditors can 
be paid by the audited) 
 
Figure 7.5: The Base of Financial Opportunity in the Market Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a big difference between socialist financial opportunities and capitalist 
financial opportunities for financial criminals. There is no doubt that the market 
economy allows its members to deal with a great deal of financial information by 
providing them with necessary institutions, technologies, education, economic and 
financial infrastructure and even the life-style and other sociological and 
psychological means. 
Table 7.27: Size of the Economy in Selected Countries, 1998 
Economy 
GNP, 1998 
($billions) 
GNP per 
capita 
(dollars) 
(Wealth 
Distribution) 
GNP per 
capita, 
measured at 
PPP (dollars) 
National 
Debt as 
percentage 
of GDP in 
1998 
China 928,9 750 3,220 20.5 
Malaysia 79,8 3,600 6,990  
United 
Kingdom 
1,263.8 21,400 20,640  
United States 7,921.3 29,340 29,340  
Source: World Bank (2000); World Development Report 1999/2000  
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Undoubtedly the market economic system performs better than both Socialist and 
Islamic economic systems (see Table 7.27, Graph 7.1, 7.2 and Map 7.5, 7.6) and 
consequently produces more opportunity for both legal and illegal activity.  
 
Graph 7.1: Leading Exporters in World Merchandise Trade, 1998 ($US) 
               
Source: World Trade Organization statistics (2000), available at http:// www.wto.org.  
 
Map 7.5: Information and communication technology (ICT) service exports 
(BoP, current US$) in 2013 
Source: World Bank, 2013 
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As Map 7.2 and Map 7.3 show, there has not been a significant difference since the 
1998 figures shown by Graphs 7.3 and 7.4. 
 
Graph 7.2: Leading Importers in World Merchandise Trade, 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Trade Organization statistics (2000) available at http//www.wto.org.  
 
Map 7.6: Merchandise imports (current US$) in 2013 
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2013 
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Socialist and Islamic economic systems are also producing opportunities, but less than 
market economies and when compared to each other one can mention the nature of 
many Islamic economic systems as rentier economies, while Russia (when socialist) 
and China emerged as great economic and political powers of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries comparable to the best powers of the market economy. Thus, socialism has 
produced more economic opportunity than Islamic economies over the last three 
decades and is thus more vulnerable to financial crime from the point of view of the 
economy. Table 7.27 quantifies our conclusion for this specific parameter, ‗economic 
environment‘ as a greater opportunity space. The order reached in Table 7.28 is 
followed by the other means of comparison until the final analysis. 
 
Table 7.28: Comparison of Economic Environments of Financial Systems as 
Greater Opportunity Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
7.2.1.1.5. Corporate environment as a greater opportunity space 
Financial corporations have been such great powers for the last three decades that 
now they play the roles the agents and institutions of the real economy play but with 
heavy financialisation. Initial public offerings, corporate financial investments and 
bond issuance of companies are only a few examples of financialisation.  
Stemming from various corporate structures and practices financial opportunities are 
sometimes confined and sometimes expanded. For instance ‗empowerment‟ provides 
a better opportunity space, while ‗performance based payments‟ produce more 
vulnerability. Shiller (2008) gives some examples, such as stock options as payments 
to CEOs triggering frauds and speculation.  
We then can visualise different kinds of opportunity spaces that are affecting the 
financial opportunity space in a single framework. This framework may be useful to 
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depict financial crimes changing dynamically in a given time span, here from 1980 to 
2010.  
There are many examples of bad corporate culture in the financial environment. For 
instance, Curtis (1998) argues that; 
To the traditional bankers from Barings, the 1980s culture that was taken 
over was strange and alien but it was one that was making them a great 
amount of money. Far more than they had made as much for bankers but 
what made that money was the willingness to cut corners and cheat 
customers. It was a culture that Leeson knew well, where extra profits were 
often skimmed off clients‘ accounts.  
It is pretty clear from our analyses that the market system is more vulnerable in this 
parameter as well, because the corporate environment in market systems is more 
competitive, more demanding and more individualistic, whereas it is very calm in 
socialist systems as it is based on solidarity
162
. As Islam accepts the ideas of the 
business firm, private investment and private property it is more vulnerable to 
financial crime in corporate settings than Socialist kolhozs (collective farms).  
Table 7.29 quantifies our conclusion for ‗corporate environment‘ as a greater 
opportunity space of FWCC. The order reached in Table 7.29 is followed by other 
similar tables until the final analysis. 
 
Table 7.29: Comparison of Corporate Environments of Financial Systems as 
Greater Opportunity Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3 Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
 
 
In order to summarize our analyses up to here a statement of ‗total impact‘ is 
necessary. The following tables (Table 7.30 and Table 7.31) can be used for such an 
objective: 
                                                 
162
 Campanella‘s City of the Sun discusses this phenomenon decades before Marx and does not provide 
a convincing argument. 
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Table 7.30: Comparison of the Total Impact of Greater Financial Opportunity 
Spaces 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1+1+1+1+1 =   5  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2+3+3+3+2 = 13 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4+2+2+2+4 = 14 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3+4+4+4+3 = 18  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
 
 
Table 7.31: Comparison of the Total Impact of Greater Financial Opportunity 
Spaces 
Their Order Financial Systems 
5 / 5  = 1        1  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
13 / 5 = 2.6    2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
14 / 5 = 2.8    3 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
17 / 5 = 3.4    4  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
 
7.2.1.2. Greater defensive spaces of financial systems 
We may define the defensive space as the presence and availability of the laws, 
policies, institutions, services etc. to keep the individuals away from criminal 
activities. We need to analyse the defensive system separately, because it would be a 
mistake to equate the lack of opportunity and defence. 
Available opportunities are important for crimes against property. Shichor (1990) is 
one of the researchers who showed this effect. According to him, as the economic 
development increases in a given country, the number and value of crime targets 
increase.  
Nevertheless, this is only one of the reasons. Shichor (1990) also argues that along 
with the number of targets, the emphasis of the society on material gains changes as 
well
163
. Indeed our grounded theory shows that this chain of concepts affect each 
other and the effects may be traced back to the society and its socio-economic 
                                                 
163
This reminder of Shichor (1990) also reveals some hints about the changing utility-functions that are 
changing the dominant dimension of the utility functions depending on the circumstances and 
environment but not isolated from the choices of the society. 
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structure, which produce more/less motivated and probably more/less frustrated 
people and eventually an increase/decrease in the economic growth and frustration 
along with their volume of motivation and the level of deviation for the ones that are 
weak in psychological, biological, sociological and moral ways.  
In the same context, Reichel (1990) argues that the increase is multiplied by the facts 
that in modern, economically more developed countries law enforcement institutions 
are more capable, they have electronic surveillance, recording etc. and citizens are 
more educated and they report more crime to police, and thus, they catch more 
criminals and produce more statistics.  
Nevertheless, from the point of view of RCT, this reasoning per se does not really 
make sense, because a rational property offender‘s calculations have to take into 
consideration that crime awareness is high in his/her environment and that he/she 
should either give up committing crime, considering the imminent threat of 
apprehension and punishment because of full awareness about crime, or understand 
that he/she has smaller opportunity space for committing financial crime in his/her 
new environment which is now alert to crime. However both of these calculations 
would produce less crime.  
For instance, consider that a city police department deploys a new ‗forensic 
accounting unit‘ where many professional accountant police are employed to fight 
against financial wrongdoings by the public. A rational financial criminal living in 
that city, among other things, would also calculate that law enforcement institutions 
are more capable now, that they have all the means to capture criminals, and thus 
would stop committing crime or wait until the weakest moment comes. Thus, in this 
new state of the society, gains of the crime do not exceed the losses out of the crime 
because punishment is more certain and quick compared to the past. Indeed this is 
what the legal system aims at: balancing those rational options. Indeed, this is an 
intuitive reasoning, because the fact that there are more targets requires that there 
have to be either more capable guardians (depending on the strategies of the 
guardians) or more punishments attached to those targets. Since governments are also 
rational players it is not reasonable to argue that their efforts are useless and 
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irrational
164
.  
A more detailed explanation can be found in Appendix A of various codes of 
guardians, targets and punishment. Nevertheless, in short, it can be argued that 
success of the guardians per se does not increase crime. This is against the meaning 
and emergency aim of the guarding institutions such as police. As long as the society 
is aware that guarding is better in the society or the awareness of crime is higher, the 
rational criminal would immediately adjust
165
 to the current environmental settings of 
the crime
166
. 
This is why we cannot only rely on the idea that property offences are the result of an 
increase in the number and value of property or opportunity, because even very big 
opportunities can be balanced out via capable guardians, the legal system, punishment 
policies, policing techniques, education, social environment etc. and thus refraining 
from crime can be rationalized. 
Research shows that criminals not only try to avoid guardians, but also are aware of 
the capabilities of the guardians. For example, if the property offenders feel that there 
are police in the area or even nosey neighbours, they avoid targets (Tunnel, 1992). 
Sampson and Cohen‘s (1988) research, on the other hand, reveals that criminals know 
and avoid the areas of active, ‗crime-fighting‘ cops.  
Levitt and Dubner (2006:16) argue that ―economics is, at root, the study of 
incentives‖ and ―[t]he typical economist believes the world has not yet invented a 
problem that he[/she] cannot fix if given a free hand to design the proper incentive 
scheme‖. However, incentives are formed differently in different settings and this is a 
matter of financial crime disposition. Levitt and Dubner (2006:16) give an interesting 
example,
167
 where financial incentives designed for decreasing certain behaviours in 
                                                 
164
 It should be noted that the arguments are based on stable definitions of crime (see Chapter 2). If for 
instance a city police department decides to enforce a law which is not usually enforced this cannot be 
considered an increase in the crime rate because increase requires a continuum.   
165
 Admittedly, ‗delay‘ exists in the adjustment processes and it is inevitable. If some research, 
(especially the ones conducted immediately after a public policy on crime fighting) statistically proves 
the ‗increase‘ as argued by Reichel (1990), those studies have also to prove that the increase is outside 
the time span of delay. 
166
 In fact it is possible to rephrase all the environmental factors mentioned in the text as the crime 
scene of the financial white collar crime. This is indeed a preferred wording for the policing studies. 
167
 Despite an announced fine of $3 per child/day for late pickups, families increased the number of late 
pickups from 8 per week to 20 per week. 
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fact more than doubled those behaviours.   
The literature usually refers to these complex defensive spaces as informal guardians, 
because their role is secondary but very important and even sometimes determining. 
The informal guardians are usually proactive; they act before the crime. Their effects 
are precautionary and deterrence focused. Unlike these guardians, though, formal 
guardians are active, after crime forces are deterrence focused, they either anticipate, 
assuming the existing crime and waiting for it, or know that a crime has been 
committed and investigate it. This is why they are - in time- very close to crime unlike 
informal guardians. 
Many criminologists agree that perceived informal sanctions directed by family 
members and peers rather than formal ones from government and other formal 
institutions have the greatest effect of deterrence (Hollinger and Clark, 1983; 
Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Williams and Hawkins, 1989; Paternoster, 1989). Among 
them the most effective are the intimate handlers. 
7.2.1.2.1. Social relations 
Passive guardianship consists of the social ties between the individual and his/her 
family, spouse, partner, housemate, relatives, neighbours, townsmen, friends, 
colleagues, clubs, fellowships, societies, fraternities, associations etc. Both the quality 
and quantity of these social relationships affect the individual in many ways. For 
instance, people with rich social relationships may have a decreased need gap to 
satisfy compared to others who lack such relationships. For instance, white collar 
people are at the highest layers of Maslow‘s (1954) hierarchy of needs which are self-
esteem and self-actualization. Unlike other, low-level needs these needs at the highest 
layers are relative needs.  These needs cannot be fulfilled out of the society. Praise, 
appreciation, admiration, applause is necessary for an individual who would like to 
fulfil the need gaps as a white-collar person and if in certain societies people have 
many social relationships and opportunities to receive social appreciation while others 
lack it in other societies, this discrepancy between these societies is worth focusing 
on. Thus, crime vulnerability increases in 
absence of an intimate handler, a significant other, for example a parent or 
girlfriend – that can impose informal social control on the offender. A 
potential offender must escape the ‗intimate handler‘ then find a crime 
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target without being under the surveillance of this ‗capable guardian‘ 
(Burke, 2006: 46).  
Research shows that as the divorce rates increase the crime rates increase which could 
be because of the decreasing number of some of the very important passive guardians 
(NYU, 2011; p: 4). 
Parental supervision and monitoring is also an important active guardianship because 
parents are physically very close to the would-be offender. Chase-Lansdale et al. 
(1997), Klebanov et al. (1997), Sampson (1986) and many others argue for the 
importance of the family in many ways. 
Individualism, one of the cultural dimensions of Hofstede‘s (1994) study, can be used 
to distinguish the cases we compare. Table 7.32 below shows the individualism index 
of Hofstede (1991: 26) in which Italy is an exception because ―founders and family 
members ... retain large shareholdings‖ in Italy. For instance Fiat‘s owners hold a 
controlling block of shares to ―act as a deterrent to takeover‖ (Morrison, 2002: 22) in 
Italy. 
The individualism index of Hofstede (2012) can also represent a comparative level of 
social relations between certain societies depicted in Table 7.32. 
 
Table 7.32: Individualism Index Ranks of Some Countries and Regions 
 
 
 
Source: Hofstede (2012). 
 Country Individuality 
 Italy 76 
 Saudi Arabia 38 
 Iran 41 
 United States 91 
 China 20 
 Malaysia 26 
 United 
Kingdom 
89 
 Hong Kong 25 
Max  91 
Min  6 
Average  48.5 
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Suicide rates in various countries can also be taken as evidence of the strength of 
social relations. Suicide rates are shown in Map 7.7. 
 
Map 7.7: Suicide Rates in 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Health Organization, 2011 
 
Thus, we may put the financial systems under scrutiny in the order shown in Table 
7.33 which quantifies our conclusion for ‗social relations‘ as a greater opportunity 
space.  
Table 7.33: Comparison of the Social Relations of Greater Financial Defensive 
Spaces 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3 Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
4  (least vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
 
7.2.1.2.2. Ethics education 
Education is another informal guardian. According to the Schlaefli, Rest, and Thomas 
study (as cited in Cagle & Baucus, 2006, in Ryan, 2010) ethics education positively 
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affects ethical behaviours. Ghoshal (2005) blames business schools‘ exclusion of 
ethics and morality from their curriculum for the commonplace corporate 
misconducts. He also argues that the management theories describe totally 
opportunistic, self-interested, egoist individuals. ―Some research has shown business 
students (undergraduate and graduate) differ from nonbusiness students in their views 
towards ethical issues‖ (Ryan, 2010: 86). Likewise, Henderson (as cited in Brown, 
1994: 105) believes business graduates ―suffer from ethical naiveté—a generally low 
level appreciation for the complex moral questions that often underlie business 
decisions which are formulated and evaluated in purely profit terms‖.  
Students themselves think that the school does not prepare them for value conflicts 
(The Aspen Institute, 2003). Yet in a recent study of 1,700 MBA students in the 
United States, Canada, and the UK, students overwhelmingly (70%) blame the 
personalities of business leaders for the corruption witnessed in recent years (The 
Aspen Institute, as cited in Henle, 2006).   
―While there is general acceptance of business ethics in business education, there is 
no clear standard of what ethics courses should teach‖ (Stewart et al., 1996: 913). 
According to Ryan (2010), The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of 
Business (AACSB), the accreditation body for business schools, is responsible for the 
rise and fall of the ethics portion of the curriculum.  
According to Ghoshal (2005), business schools are part of the ethics problem. They 
are held accountable for producing ethical businessmen, however their attention to 
ethics varies widely (Evans et al., 2006). ―Perspectives suggesting how to teach ethics 
in business school, what to teach, and even if to teach it at all are prevalent in the 
literature covering a span of at least 15 years and arguably more than an entire 
century‖ (Ritter, 2006: 153). 
Solberg et al. (1995) found that out of 323 business school deans, only 16% reported 
that they required a stand-alone business ethics course and of those, 58% of the ethics 
courses are elective. Evans and Robertson (2003) found that 25% of MBA programs 
require a course on business ethics, but Evans et al. (2006) found that the top 100 
MBA programs required no ethics-related courses. Furthermore, Walker (2005) found 
that among the 1800 respondants a significant number reported that they had no ethics 
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training. In search of the reason, Evans and Robertson (2003) attribute the state of 
ethics education in business schools to the lack of faculty interest. 
Shaw (1996) reports that ethics courses are left to philosophy departments, which can 
provide no real ethical dilemmas in business life. Morris (2001) argues that this share 
is almost half and half between business departments and philosophy departments. 
Half of the business schools do not have a specific course for business ethics and at 
the ones that have such courses, insider trading and leveraged-buyouts, primary 
ethical concerns in Wall Street, are covered in 12% at the undergraduate studies level 
and in 6% at graduate level. (Rozensher and Fergenson, 1994). Furthermore, 
Velthouse and Kandogan (2007) found that ethics was the least important skill for 
MBA students. ―The typical MBA curriculum allocates little time, if any, on defining 
acceptable managerial behavior and the consequences of pursuing improper behavior‖ 
(Williams et al., 2000: 697). 
Eventually, Ghoshal (2005: 75) blames business schools for the ethical corporate 
scandals and argues that they ―do not need to do a great deal more to help prevent 
future Enrons, they need only to stop doing a lot they currently do. They do not need 
to create new courses, they need to simply stop teaching some old ones‖. However, 
Ryan (2010) could find no significant difference between ethical responses of 
business students with ethics courses and without ethics course. She also looked at the 
content of the ethics courses. Thus we may argue that it is probably not as easy an 
issue as Ghoshal (2005) argues to develop ethicality in businessmen, because it is a 
rather complex issue and it involves many variables from very diverse courses of 
social life. 
In evidencing all these, Abdullah and Valentine (2009: 93) state that ―[o]nly a handful 
of business giants have had any formal education on business ethics but there seems 
to be more compromises these days… Through the process of educating and exposure 
to good virtues, the development of ethical values in a child‘s life is evident‖ 
(Abdullah and Valentine, 2009: 93). 
Greater financial defensive spaces play a complex role in deviance. It is possible to 
find out linkages to crime from various walks of the social, biological, psychological 
life. But determining whether these linkages, these effects, are merely correlated to 
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this complex, wide phenomenon or if they are indeed the causes of it is not easy, 
because ―as the divorce rate changed over the twentieth century the crime rate 
increased a few years later. But this does not mean that divorce causes crime. Rather 
than divorce causing crime, divorce and crime rates might both be due to other social 
processes such as secularization, greater individualism or poverty‖ (Vaus, 2001: 3).  
For both of these criteria, the market system is the most vulnerable system, because it 
is based on individualism, liberty and freedom. There are considerably less social 
relations created by the city life and the technological advances that make electronic 
mechanisms of socialization possible in the modern world. The market system both 
leads and makes use of these technologies and life-style in the highest frequency. 
Besides, not only the economic system but ethical, political, international relations, 
legal etc. systems of the market societies are based on utility choices, which are at the 
heart of the Western education system as well. This is why the market system‘s 
greater defensive system is large compared to the other systems.  
Socialism, on the other hand, is the system that emphasizes the social bonds and 
relations in life, and educates the public according to those principles. Indeed some 
research about such education is presented in the section where utility dimensions are 
discussed in this text.  
As for the ethics education in socialist schools, we may mention the research by 
Hemesath (1994) who showed that American and Soviet students‘ rational choices in 
prisoner‘s dilemma games with real monetary gains were significantly different. ―In 
the 88 games played, a total of 176 decisions were made: 90 by Russians and 86 by 
Americans. The Russians cooperated 72.2% of the time, while the Americans did so 
only 51.4% of the time‖ Hemesath (1994: 85).  Hemesath (1994: 92) claims that ―the 
implied defection rate for the American students, 48.8, is consistent with other recent 
data on American students playing the prisoners‘ dilemma game‖. Indeed, this is a 
perfectly rational (in the classical sense of the utility function) result for repeated 
prisoners‘ dilemma game for Americans because this way of playing decreases the 
probability of predictability by the other player as low as possible (lowest being at 
50%). The strategic form of the game applied by Hemesath (1994) with exact payoffs 
can be seen below (Game 7.1): 
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Game 7.1: Prisoner‟s Dilemma Game with Monetary Payoffs in Roubles.  
  Other Player 
  Cooperate Defect 
You 
Cooperate 
300 for other 
300 for you 
500 for other 
0    for you 
Defect 
0     for other 
500 for you 
100 for other 
100 for you 
 
In Socialism, the whole system is based on the idea of solidarity. Therefore, Socialism 
deserves to be at the bottom of the comparison of vulnerability. This analysis 
automatically determines the position of both partially and fully-Islamized systems. 
These analyses are quantified in Table 7.34.  
 
Table 7.34: Comparison of Ethics Education as a Greater Financial Defensive 
Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3 Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
4  (least vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
 
 
7.2.1.2.3. Belief of afterlife 
This criterion is necessary because in some environments, financial systems such as 
Islamic finance have the ability to frighten its members with punishments in other 
worlds. This ability at least doubles the deterrence ability of financial systems with 
beliefs of afterlife. This belief is not only confined to established religions or 
Abrahamic religions only. Belief systems such as Confucianism or others believing in 
reincarnation have the same advantage compared to cultures with a belief system that 
does not have such characteristics.    
In this regard socialism tops the list because of Marxism‘s and Leninism‘s well-
known attitude against religion, nevertheless Confucian Chinese and Christian 
Russians do have such belief systems, but in the market economy people with beliefs 
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in afterlife are more numerous compared to socialism, and Islamic finance is in the 
most advantageous position in terms of this criterion. 
Table 7.35 from The European Values Survey gives some of the societies‘ responses 
to their belief of afterlife or reincarnation: 
It is rather surprising that the former Communist states of Eastern Europe 
show this relatively high degree of belief in survival after death, whatever 
the form. Even in Russia about one-third believes in reincarnation. The 
effect of anti-religious propaganda on the beliefs of the populations of 
Eastern Europe seems to have been rather slight‖ (Haraldsson, 2006: 175). 
 
Table 7.35: Persons Who Believe in Life After Death and Reincarnation 
 Reincarnation Life after Death R/L 
United Kingdom 29 58 - 
Italy 18 73 24 
Russia 32 37 75 
Source: Haraldsson, E. (2006). 
 
Table 7.36 quantifies the parameter ‗belief of afterlife‘ as a greater defensive space. 
The order reached in Table 7.36 concludes our comparison of greater spaces and 
Table 7.37 and Table 7.38 depict the summaries of ‗greater defensive spaces‘ and 
‗greater spaces‘ in general respectively. In the following section, the comparison 
continues with the ‗immediate opportunity spaces‘ before the combined summary. 
 
Table 7.36: Comparison of the Belief of Afterlife as a Greater Financial 
Defensive Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1  (most vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
2 Market/Capitalist Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
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Table 7.37: Comparison of the TOTAL IMPACT of Greater Financial Defensive 
Spaces 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1+1+ 2 = 4/3  = 1.3    1   (most 
vulnerable) 
Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2+2+3 = 7/3  = 2.3     2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4+3+1 = 8/3  =  2.6    3 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3+3+4 = 10/3 =  3.3   4   (least 
vulnerable) 
Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
Table 7.38: Comparison of the Combined Total Impact of Greater Financial 
Opportunity and Defensive Spaces 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 + 1 = 2  2 / 2 = 1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 + 2 = 4  4 / 2 = 2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3 + 3 = 6  6 / 2 = 3 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
4 + 4 = 8  8 / 2 = 4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
 
 
Along with informal guardians there are formal guardians such as banking standards, 
accountancy standards, computer networks, security standards, finance laws, 
regulations etc. We explain those forces after explaining the financial opportunities. 
7.2.2. Immediate Spaces in Facilitating Financial Crimes 
Unlike greater opportunity and defensive spaces, immediate spaces are the closest 
opportunities and adversities to the financial crime in both time dimension and the 
spatial dimension. These spaces have greater and faster effects on the deviance 
behaviours of the financial white collar criminals.  
7.2.2.1. Immediate financial opportunity spaces of financial crime 
Primarily, the financial opportunity spaces are formed by local, national and 
international private and governmental financial institutions like central banks, 
investment banks, commercial banks, insurance companies, stock markets, mutual 
funds, corporations and individuals who enter into/leave markets and every kind of 
transactions such as mergers, buyouts, bankruptcies, and financial services, like 
issuing currencies, announcing interest rates, opening up or closing down, all 
359 
financial techniques, methods, tools enforcing and regulating bodies and/or 
announcing/abolishing laws by governmental agencies form the financial opportunity 
space etc.  
We may mention many factors of financial opportunity spaces as immediate factors 
affecting financial crimes, such as pressure on accounting, efficiency of the markets, 
routine financial activities, expectation of the markets, concentration of agents, 
flexibility, level of control, complexity, efficiency, dependency (for instance 
manipulation and price-fixing is dependent on market power), performance and 
concentration or heterogeneity. Let us now compare the financial systems according 
to these factors. 
7.2.2.1.1. Entropy 
The main characteristic of the financial environment is its fastness, its dynamicity, 
increasing the level of entropy. Increasing entropy in the international financial 
institutions is ―raising broad questions of stability and control‖.  For instance, whether 
―[t]he advent of e-commerce, which facilitates almost instantaneous securities 
transactions around the globe, benefits the public is a major concern of stock market 
regulators‖ (Morrison, 2002: 314).  Long term business projects TQM, Kaizen and 
various other organizational change projects also have various effects on financial 
opportunity space because organizational change processes are usually described as 
chaotic environments with less order, less predictability and high risk. 
With financial diversification and accessibility, citizens are engaging more and more 
with the market (Wahlström and Peterson, 2006: 363; Micheletti, 2003) and ―lodging 
their challenges and concrete demands directly at businesses and corporations‖ 
(Micheletti, 2003) in recent decades and the leading markets are the Western markets. 
Shichor (1990) agrees that socio-economic change brings about anomie in the society 
and eventually causes criminality. This is why the countries in transition are affected 
from the consequence of the drastic change in their marketplaces. Russia and China 
are prominent examples, because Chinese and Russian societies have moved towards 
a market-oriented economy in a relatively very short time. But the level of entropy is 
higher in market societies compared to socialist and Islamic system, because the 
market system has been the leading system of new technologies, methods, techniques 
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and relevant education, research, development, innovation etc.  
The socialist financial system follows the market system in terms of increasing 
entropy, because unlike established religions they are not restricted or controlled by 
the steel rules of the moral system.  
For instance some of the markets, such as alcohol and pornography, restricted to the 
Islamic finance, are not restricted to them
168
. Almost all of the financial contracts of 
the market system such as futures contract, options contract, debt based assets, are 
also prohibited to Islamic finance in their original forms but they appear under new 
and altered structures such as musharaka certificates, ijara sukuk, mudaraba 
certificates, inter-bank investment (MII), government investment certificates (GIC) 
etc. Since the pace of new kinds of asset development in Islamic finance is fast, 
especially in recent years, and cannot be matched by socialist development, Islamic 
finance‘s immediate financial opportunity space is more active, more dynamic and 
more energetic. However, these developments are not comparable to the 
developments of the market system with its below milliseconds electronic markets 
(NPRO, 2013). Nevertheless every new development in the market system is 
benchmarkable by the socialist system, unlike Islamic finance. This is why it is not 
easy to decide the level of entropy discrepancy between the socialist and Islamic 
financial systems and the market system. 
As Table 7.39 shows, the financial systems can be put in the order of ‗entropy‘ as an 
immediate opportunity space for FWCC. The order reached in this table is followed 
by the other means of comparison until the final analysis. 
 
Table 7.39: Comparison of Entropy as an Immediate Financial Opportunity 
Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
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 Muller and Teaching Company (2008) argue that interest is also prohibited in socialist economies. 
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7.2.2.1.2. Ownership of financial assets 
In the modern era, as Newman (2005) agrees, the structure of firms has dramatically 
changed, from one person/family owned small firms to firms like GM, Nokia, and 
Intel where keeping individual ownership or family ownership was almost impossible. 
This hardship first led to the group ownership of firms, namely corporations, and 
then, in the context of capitalism, ‗collective‘ (Bradburn (2001: 117) prefers to use the 
word ‗public‘) ownership via the stock market of firms.  
These changes brought about a rather complex ownership structures of firms in the 
late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century, where we use terms like ‗stakeholders‘, 
‗shareholders‘, to denote modern ownership styles. These structures basically mean 
that, when one collects enough of the shares of a company, one can actually gain the 
legal ownership of firms
169
. So, then, we may talk about a running ownership of the 
firms especially in recent decades and especially in outsider-dominated, Western 
financial systems
170
. The consequences of this structure are that the firm is now only 
good in the market if it is perceived to be rising, regardless of its size, wealth and 
history, because the owner is not stable and thus has no principle, liking, preference, 
moral, perspective etc. that can be predicted. However, in more stable ownership 
structures, families are usually known to have an expertise, a specific industry of 
preference and an honour, dignity, name, etc. to protect in the long term. 
A pension fund director says: ―the responsibility of ownership rests with people who 
don‘t want it and are not seeking it‖ (Solomon, 2010: 11). Bradburn (2001: 117) 
agrees that the modern ownership structure is a contributing factor to financial fraud. 
Consequently, shareholders, who own but do not want to own companies, try to 
overcome the principal-agent problem by voting for takeover (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983) and force the manager to lose his/her job, which eventually causes greater 
concentration in the market though. 
It should be noted that firms and especially accountants, practicing in such financial 
environments, apparently have a much greater opportunity space for financial crimes, 
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 Adam Curtis, in his documentary, The Mayfair Set, broadcast by BBC2 in 1999, gives some 
examples of actual takeover of some firms by stock holders.  
170
 Excluding Germany 
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especially for fraud, competition crimes and tax evasion.  
In this regard, we may argue that the loose ownership structures would provide a 
bigger opportunity space for financial criminals and vice-versa. Then, we may put 
capitalist ownership at the top of our ordinal order for this specific measure because 
of having very loose ownership structures.  
In socialism, there is no private but rather public ownership. Similar to stock market 
ownership, socialist economies manage the total belongings of the whole country by a 
certain group of managers (usually communist party members) and they do not own 
those assets but act as an agent to the principal (the whole public in this case). Since 
we study financial white-collar criminals, socialism deserves the second place 
according to this measure per se, because the ownership structure is fairly unclear. 
For instance, as experienced in Russia, the owners of the ‗shares‘ of state 
conglomerates, ‗the commanding heights of the economy‘ (Cran et al., 2002), are all 
the members of the society. So are the banks, universal insurances, all the pensions 
and central banks. This widest possible sphere of financial asset ownership produces 
conflicting interests and/or confusion. Indeed the literature reports many examples of 
bad behaviour by socialist white-collar individuals in this context
171
.  
As far as Islamic ownership is concerned, it requires a very stable ownership and thus 
is the least vulnerable against financial crimes under ownership structures.  However, 
recently, Islamic sukuk are allowed by renowned scholars and complicate the 
comparison. Nevertheless, inside our constrained time-frame we may still argue that 
the Islamic ownership structures are the least vulnerable to financial crimes because 
they produce less opportunity. 
Table 7.40 quantifies our order for the ‗ownership of financial assets‘ as an immediate 
opportunity space. 
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  See:  Hollingsworth M., and Lansley S. Londongrad: From Russia with Cash; the Inside Story 
of the Oligarchs. London: Fourth Estate. 
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Table 7.40: Comparison of Ownership as an Immediate Financial Opportunity 
Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
Nevertheless if we make a distinction of frequency order and magnitude or severity 
order we may argue that socialism should top the list in terms of the severity of the 
financial crimes committed in socialist financial systems, in terms of ownership 
structures, because the whole market is controlled by very few people and their 
activities are not under the open scrutiny of the public, because as experienced in 
China now, court personnel are also communist party members. This is why the 
blurred Socialist ownership structure is indeed open to financial crimes in terms of 
this criterion only. 
7.2.2.1.3. Pressure in financial markets 
One can measure the stress levels in financial markets by looking at the performance 
indicators, the pressure on accountancy. Excessive pressure in financial markets is not 
something recent. In 1932, in the US, S&P 500 companies were paying out 180% of 
their earnings as dividends. This type of practice is indeed ―typical‖ for depression 
eras (Shiller, 2010).  It is clear that paying more than one earns is not something 
rational. The fact that this practice is typical in financial markets even in dire 
positions is important evidence that the markets are under great pressure. Shiller 
(2010) argues that this is something cultural.  If it is so, there should be variations 
between different systems that affect financial crime propensity and our analyses 
indicate that the market system is under more pressure than both of the compared 
systems. In this sense, Islamic financial markets have more pressure applied than 
socialist markets in domestic financial affairs but less so in international financial 
affairs. 
Until 2000 (entrance to the WTO in 2001), China was a closed, socialist country. It 
was only after its entrance to the WTO that ―foreign banks [were] able to offer 
services directly to Chinese companies, in competition with Chinese banks, for the 
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first time‖ (Morrison: 2002: 77). Considering that its national debt was far below the 
Maastricht Convergence Criteria (approximately 20% of GDP), we may argue that 
China had a more balanced financial environment. Moreover, until the last decade, 
China did not have a liquid bond market, centrally controlled its capital markets and 
wanted to replace the revenues that local authorities obtained from numerous fees 
with central taxation (Morrison: 2002: 77). All of which suggests that Chinese 
financial opportunity space until the last decade was rather confined compared to 
market economies in terms of the pressures applied to the markets. Nevertheless, 
further analysis is required for the comparison of socialist and Islamic finance. 
Morrison (2002: 331) argues that ―[m]ergers and acquisitions ... are key to 
companies‘ growth strategies. A major driving force has been the enhancement of 
shareholder value, bringing cost savings and efficiencies‖. If M&A activities are the 
key activities of growth, these routine activities imply that companies have many 
incentives to have a monopoly position in the market in their everyday activities. In 
this sense, the Chinese economy has more opportunity than both partially and fully-
Islamized economies but Islamic countries are in debt to international lenders. 
Partially-Islamized economies have more liberal stock markets as well. 
Table 7.41 shows the ordinal places of their vulnerability for FWCC in terms of the 
‗pressure in financial markets‘.  
 
Table 7.41: Comparison of the Pressure on Markets as an Immediate Financial 
Opportunity Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
7.2.2.1.4. Expectations of the market 
Especially in some financial systems, ‗expectations of the market‘ is the fundamental 
mechanism. Expectations may stem from the central planning office in socialist 
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countries and big stockbroking houses for instance in market economies. Predictably, 
expectations of the financial markets differ greatly from system to system. What is 
important here is the seriousness, the impacts, the consequences and the level of 
ambitiousness of those expectations. When they are high, we may argue that the 
likelihood of an institutional blind eye towards financial crimes increases, which in 
turn increases the opportunity for financial crimes, especially competition crimes and 
financial fraud.  
Price to earnings ratio in finance is a good example of the effects of expectations in 
financial markets. For instance in 2000, the price to earnings ratio was 46 to 1 (46/1) 
in NYSE (Shiller, 2010).  
In many market economies, expectations ―come from big stockbroking houses that 
forecast the profits from a particular company and then use this projection as 
recommendation to buy or sell shares‖ (Bradburn, 2001: 118). These projections are 
very stressful for the companies because they (Bradburn, 2001: 118, emphasis added): 
become a benchmark for the company. If the company fails to meet the 
projection then its rating inevitably becomes dented. Too many failures and the 
bottom may drop out of the market for the hares altogether. A company that has 
undervalued shares is very vulnerable to a takeover.  
Clearly, then, in market economies, many of the companies are under great stress to 
reach or exceed the expectations of the market, because ―[m]ost publicly quoted 
companies are stretched between telling the analyst what they want to hear and then 
actually delivering the results. If they do ail in reality then creative accountancy 
may well be the only solution‖ (Bradburn, 2001: 118, emphasis added).  
Fraud and competition crimes then, are the first and foremost vulnerable kinds of 
deviance for this measure of market societies. Market economies expect better 
performance from their agents than other financial markets in other systems do and 
the agents have the same perception. For instance, the ―[p]olicies of liberalization and 
deregulation in the 1990s led to inflows of capital, as investors [became] attached to 
high rates of interest and trusted that governments wouldn‘t allow their banks to fail‖ 
(Morrison, 2002: 327). 
And the ―[i]nvestors ... look for companies that produce very good results there and 
then. Essentially, if you are a company that does not make optimistic noises about the 
366 
future you may well end up with a low share price even if you are actually doing 
well‖ (Bradburn, 2001: 118). 
Especially in socialism there is no need to have great expectations in internal financial 
markets, because socialism bans competition in the first place. This is why one can 
only expect external, international competition in socialism, because competition with 
international companies and conglomerates and countries is encouraged. For instance 
relatively more pressure is expected to be felt by the state companies operating in 
defence, telecommunications, space etc. and central expectations from the national 
agents are high in these markets, because socialism calls for universal solidarity and 
claims rule over all the working-class.  
Socialism bans speculation as well. This is a reason for less expectation from the 
financial markets. For instance a socialist farmer cannot wait for the raising of wheat 
prices by the central planning office but has to sell at a planned time and planned 
price. Nevertheless the idea of universal solidarity is not very strong and Islam has a 
similar approach in terms of universal solidarity and bans speculation too.  
Indeed Islam does not officially and explicitly recognize competition either, but does 
accept it as a reality, implicitly, and encourages solidarity, philanthropy and charitable 
giving (sadaqa) in the sense of developing ‗competition but also cooperation‘ 
mentality. In partially-Islamized economies competition is more visible and in fully-
Islamized economies the expectations from financial agents can be more realistic 
because of the financier who ―should become a real investor, prepared to play a 
participatory role as investor along with the entrepreneur (i.e. in mudharabah and 
musharakah‖ (Asutay, 2010). 
Indeed, from a macro perspective, the socialist economy identifies itself through 
economic phenomena and through the criticism of capital (i.e. by Das Kapital). 
Therefore, one would expect its public and thus its management to expect more from 
all economic and financial activities of the state and its commercial branches. Unlike 
both socialism and capitalism, Islam does not identify itself through material 
argumentation. This is another reason why especially fully-Islamized finance is not 
significant in its vulnerability to financial crime in this specific factor of comparison. 
This is why we may conclude that socialism and fully-Islamized finance are the least 
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vulnerable systems to financial crime in the context of market expectations, because 
Islam does not ban competition and partial-owners of the shirkah may have 
expectations of higher gain both in national and international markets in addition to 
the rulers of the economy and finance.  
Table 7.42 shows the ordinal level of ‗expectations of the financial markets‘ as an 
immediate opportunity space. 
 
Table 7.42: Comparison of Expectations as an Immediate Financial Opportunity 
Space  
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
7.2.2.1.5. Efficiency in the markets 
It may be one of the most important theories of finance, but ‗efficient markets‘, 
although accepted very strictly by some (e.g. Brealey et al., 2006) are only a 
hypothesis (Shiller, 2010) and they have strong, semi-strong and weak forms 
(Roberts, 1967). Some prominent finance practitioners say that they ―don‘t believe‖ 
that financial markets are efficient (Redleaf, 2010). 
Fisher Black, who apparently has the semi-strong perspective, says ―markets are very 
efficient. By that I mean, that prices are usually within twice fundamental and half 
fundamental value‖ (Shiller, 2010). However some of the authors (i.e. Bradburn, 
2001; Robert, 1967) do not agree with even the weakest forms. Bradburn (2001: 117, 
emphasis added) presents one of those arguments in his book on business ethics and 
gives an example from accountancy:  
―[T]he majority of businesses are owned by large institutional investors ... 
such as pension funds and other fund managers ... [They] are looking for a 
regular growth over a period of time. You may think of a pension fund as an 
example. In this case, progressive steady growth is needed. In reality, few 
businesses can achieve this and wide fluctuations are inevitable. Over time 
the net result will be the same of course, but the variations may unnerve 
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investors. 
A simple solution would be to ‗smooth out‘ the performance of the 
company by holding back sales in certain periods and putting them through 
in others. This strategy is known as ‗keeping things in the bottom drawer‘ 
and is remarkably common.  
These ―remarkably common strategies‖, undoubtedly, slow down the market to the 
lowest performer sister firm under the control of, say, the pension fund and create an 
orchestrated market with less efficiency.  
Redleaf (2010) provides an analytical reasoning for the proof of inefficiency by 
referring to the shares of Shell, because identical shares of Shell in Holland vs. the 
UK fluctuated dramatically in 1998, by 20% compared to its identical counterpart. 
―The growth of international financial institutions, raising broad questions of stability 
and control in financial markets has drawn both praise and criticism‖ and the criticism 
was ―the risks of instability and vulnerability to financial shocks  (Morrison, 2002: 
314; (emphasis added). 
These strategies of course have devastating effects on the financial opportunity 
spaces, which in turn undoubtedly affect the magnitude of the financial crimes in 
various financial systems. For instance, while analysing competition crimes, we then 
have to know at least the major players in the financial markets and try to predict their 
rules of the game while comparing the rough probability of the concentration in the 
markets because we can no longer analyse the emergence and enforcement (i.e. by 
competition authorities) of the market failures in a doubted competitive environment. 
We should, then, note the comparative departures of all financial systems from 
perfectly efficient equilibrium in order to correctly evaluate competition crimes, 
speculation and fraud specifically. 
In socialist financial systems, for example, markets are the least efficient because 
everything from money supply to labour price is controlled by the central planning 
office and thus all the prices are artificial. Immediately after releasing the control on 
the markets one expects a huge departure from the current prices. Indeed this was 
what happened after the collapse of the USSR; prices increased greatly and all the 
commodities disappeared for many days but reappeared after a while with the correct 
prices (Cran et al. 2002). In this sense one may consider socialist financial markets as 
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systems running on artificial, fixed, controlled prices, which are a crime in the West 
and in Islamic finance. Since the whole system is planned accountancy has a goal to 
accomplish for both sellers and buyers and thus the accountancy is just an extension 
of the central planning office, which means that unreal accountancy records are the 
norm and correct timing, amount and price is an anomaly in such markets, because it 
is very hard to rule a very complex system with all possible detail from one office. 
There is no doubt that manipulation of the markets is also an everyday job in socialist 
countries because the managers of the economy are ordered officially to do so. 
Market finance, as the name suggests, is more efficient than centrally-planned 
financial systems, because an open market is a complex system and as a complex 
system it auto-adjusts better than all the controls and plans.  
Islamic finance, likewise, follows the market system in openness and freedom of 
interaction, because there is a recognition of the market in Islam, first of all, and it 
stems from the right to private ownership. Thus, members of an Islamic financial 
environment can seek various types of trading, which is restricted by some nass or 
norms. It is, however, hard to reach a synthesis between market finance and Islamic 
finance, because Islamic finance also suggests the open market. Islamic finance has 
some restrictions on open markets (e.g. ban on interest, ban on some industries such 
as alcohol etc.), but market economies have such restrictions as well (i.e. ban on 
marihuana, fixing prices at crises
172
 etc.). Nevertheless, market finance has fewer 
restrictions on the markets. 
Making a fair distinction of vulnerability by using this criterion, then, is only possible 
if one can make an efficiency distinction between the unlimited free market and semi-
controlled free market. Looking at the leftmost side of the dichotomy, we already 
showed that the total control produces less efficiency. Since the other extreme side of 
the dichotomy is a no-restriction-market, it is not hard to argue that no-control-
markets also produce inefficiency.  
Besides, what is really important is the level of efficiency after the set-principles and 
restrictions, because as long as the restrictions are not significantly different the large 
number of transactions in the markets (with significant differences of efficiency) 
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overrides the difference caused by the restricting principles. In this sense, we 
recognize that even in very severe conditions the Prophet Muhammad did not fix the 
prices despite some of his disciples going to him and asking him to do so. Thus, in the 
first best solution case, even the state has no right to fix prices in Islamic economics 
and finance, which is a very important criterion for our comparison. 
In providing a frame of operation rules, Asutay (2010) agrees that Islamic finance 
calls for a ―more stable and transparent system. In such a system there is an automatic 
adjustment of real assets and their financial counterparts. In the conventional banking 
system there is no such mechanism for adjustment‖. 
As mentioned before, both market finance and Islamic finance have some restrictions 
in the market, but in an Islamic financial system the market seems to be more efficient 
compared to the market finance which produced the central banking system, and has a 
separate finance department other than the treasury to monitor and control it, although 
the interference is scarce. Indeed, further discussion is necessary on this specific 
comparison, but we leave this discussion to further research and reason that market 
finance is less efficient compared to the Islamic finance and thus more vulnerable to 
financial crime. 
As Table 7.43 shows, the financial systems can be put in the order of ‗efficiency‘ as 
an immediate opportunity space. 
 
Table 7.43: Comparison of Efficiency as an Immediate Financial Opportunity 
Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
2 Market/Capitalist Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
7.2.2.1.6. Long/short term focus  
RCT supporters, such as Cohen and Felson (1979), found that changes in everyday 
activities were correlated with changes in crime rates. For instance, short term 
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markets have a considerably higher exchange frequency of financial assets. Then the 
frequency changes in financial systems can also be a criterion of comparison between 
financial systems because higher frequencies create bigger opportunities for financial 
criminals. 
Keynes (1923) argues that ―[t]he long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In 
the long run we are all dead‖. In the finance world short-termism is almost a rule. 
Short termism is defined as ―a tendency to foreshorten the time horizon applied to 
investment decisions, or raise the discount rate above that appropriate to the firm‘s 
opportunity cost of capital‖ (Demirag and Tylecote, 1992: 17). Countries and 
corporations with a short-term focus are usually running on ‗outsider-dominated‘ 
corporate governance structures (Frank and Mayer, 1994; Short, et al., 1998), and the 
greatest numbers of outsider dominated corporations are in the market system, 
because they are forced to immediate successes, directly by managers with their own 
perceived self-interest (Boatright, 1999) or/and indirectly, by institutional investors 
for instance. 
Indeed, long-termism in financial markets narrows down the opportunity space for the 
financial crimes, because ―creative accounting cannot make up for long-term poor 
performance‖ (Bradburn, 2001: 118). Comparatively short term operations and the 
short-sighted mechanism of the financial markets provide financial institutions and 
their employees with a greater opportunity space. For instance, in stock markets with 
more long term investors, public companies are in less stressful environments,
173
 
because they can have better performance in the future and when the future comes, 
their poor performance would be smoother in a longer term picture. 
Creative accounting ―can really be viewed as a short-term [fix] to paste over the 
cracks‖ (Bradburn, 2001: 118), which makes especially ‗fraud‘ the number one 
vulnerable deviant financial behaviour in short-term financial markets. 
There are many recent techniques like „high frequency trading‟, which basically 
means collecting and analysing the data very quickly, in milliseconds usually, and 
putting them on trade at incredibly high frequency and in short periods. Trading 
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 Indeed it is proven by researchers in US that the stock market is the most profitable financial market 
compared to all possible financial markets for almost two hundred years (Shiller, 2011). 
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according to the popular Google search terms is a good example. Indeed this has been 
a historical trend of financial markets; driven by market economies, financial 
trading‘s time span has constantly been shortened in the markets.  
Criticizing this short term focus of the market system, Alan Greenspan complains that 
―[w]e cannot live in the present only. Human-beings cannot survive unless they create 
provision for the future‖ (Creadon et al., 2009). 
Recently, financial professionals and quants are discussing the problems of unequal 
opportunities in the current financial markets, because of some firms having abilities 
of reaching the electronic financial markets 1/10 second faster than others (done by 
‗big firms‘). This is indeed considered very ‗disturbing‘ and ‗unfair‘ by some 
professionals in the field such as Emanuel Derman (2010), who is also known as the 
Einstein of Wall Street. For Derman (2010) and some other scholars financial markets 
are now  trading at the speed of light and unlike the October 1987 crash which 
happened within a day
174
, the next crash can happen within minutes. 
The Islamic economy is undoubtedly more long-term oriented compared to the market 
economies, because it discourages a debt-based economy. The ban on interest is one 
of the most important discouragements of debt because lenders have less incentive to 
lend, knowing that they cannot receive a secure gain, but rather invest their money in 
the real economy and thus for long term profit. This is why it is rational for the rich in 
an Islamic economy to develop ‗risk-sharing, stake-holding, participatory‘ behaviours 
in the economy (Asutay, 2010). The centrality of musharakah (profit-loss-sharing) 
and mudharabah (venture capital) contracts can be considered as examples of such 
characteristics of the Islamic economy.  
Since debt is one of the prime causes of haste in the economy, we can confidently put 
the market economy to the top of the order of vulnerability. The basis of this 
conclusion can be seen from Maps 7.8 and 7.9, which depict public debt in 2000 and 
2010. 
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Map 7.8: Amounts of Public Debt in 2010 
 
Source: The Economist 2012 (economist.com) 
 
Map 7.9: Amounts of Public Debt in 2000 
 
Source: The Economist, 2012 (economist.com) 
374 
 
Hofstede (1996) also studies the time orientation in different cultures, which was 
originally studied by Michael Harris Bond. Morrison (2002: 139) describes time-
orientation as ―people‘s time perspectives in their daily lives‖. According to Bond 
(2002: 139), there are ―different time orientations between Western and Eastern ways 
of thinking‖, that is, ―[s]hort-term orientation stresses satisfying needs ‗here and 
now‘, and is more characteristic of Western cultures, whereas long-term orientation 
stresses virtuous living through thrift and persistence, and is prevalent in Eastern 
cultures‖ (Hofstede, 2002: 140). 
Therefore, the Socialist financial system is at the bottom of the list and market finance 
heads it. Socialist finance‘s position is pretty clear, because what is important for the 
socialist management is the long term aims of the economy, such as enough 
production, delivery and investment to produce a nurtured, educated society with no 
illness and the promised solidarity. It is intuitive to know that these aims cannot be 
reached by focusing on short-term performance in the central planned economies. 
Nevertheless this is correct only because we study white-collar financial crime, 
because the public in this case would economically be very short-sighted since they 
do not need to think about their own and their families‘ futures. It is all planned by the 
government and thus they have all the incentive to finish what they have until the 
closest planned delivery.  
Thus, financial systems can be put in the order of ‗long/short term focus‘ as an 
immediate opportunity space as shown in Table 7.44. 
 
Table 7.44: Comparison of Short/Long Term Focus as an Immediate Financial 
Opportunity Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3 Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
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7.2.2.1.7. Concentration of agents and assets 
As can be seen from Table 7.45, market finance has the biggest players of the finance 
world. In the hedge funds market many of the firms are from market economies.  
 
Table 7.45: The Biggest Hedge Funds in 2007 in Billion Dollars 
 
Source: Hedge Fund Intelligence, Institutional Investor 
 
It is pretty clear that the world concentration levels are on the increase. For instance, 
―the number of TNCs has increased enormously between the end of the 1960s and the 
end of the 1990s, the number of TNCs in the 15 most important developed countries 
had increased from 7,000 to 40,000‖, which produces a proportionate growth in FDI 
(United Nations, 1999) and financial opportunity as well.  
Geographical concentration is very clear in some of the world financial markets and 
not in others. In the US, New York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq (since 1971), in London 
London Stock Exchange, in Europe Frankfurt NeuerMarkt (since 1997) and in China 
Beijing Stock Exchange are the major financial centres but the United States has the 
greatest financial power because institutional US investors‘ assets are six times their 
European counterparts and index fund managers from the US lead the international 
equities (Morrison, 2002: 317). For instance Calpers alone, in 2002, had $24.3 billion 
foreign equities (Morrison, 2002: 317). 
Moreover, criminologists Cohen and Felson (1979) argue that in megacities where 
many people live in a smaller area, dense centres increase crime rates because this 
kind of life-style increases the financial opportunity space per unit area. Since World 
War II, the finance world has had its own financial mechanism, distinct from the 
1. JPMorgan Asset Management 44.7 
2. Bridgewater Associates 36 
3. Farallon Capital Management 36 
4. Renaissance Technologies Corp. 33.3 
5. Och-Ziff Capital Management 33.2 
6. D.E.Shaw Group 32.2 
7. Goldman Sachs Asset Mgmt 29.2 
8. Paulson & Co 29 
9. Barclays Global Investors 26.2 
10. GLG Partners 23.9 
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earlier times, and one of the features of this new financial era is the parts of the cities 
that are named ‗financial districts‘ such as the City of London in London and Wall 
Street in Manhattan Island of New York City, Hong Kong in China. It is common in 
the modern world that specific districts of one city in every country have the financial 
concentration. Some academicians like to call it ‗glocalization‘.  
Banks, insurance companies, stock markets and other financial centres usually reside 
very close to each other and form a dense financial district which in turn may help 
increase the financial crime rates. Actually, industrial organizations theory suggests 
that they should have been residing dispersedly but they are not. Thus there must be 
professional reasons for that and those reasons may well include some financial 
opportunities. 
Cohen and Felson‘s (1979) theories seem to be valid on financial assets of world 
markets as well. The 1999 Financial Modernization Act is a good example. After this 
act in the USA, banks and insurance companies have been basically united because 
this Act allowed banks to offer insurance services, which was possible in Europe 
many years before. Increased concentration of financial transactions, assets and 
institutions, then, increases financial crimes and this should be properly addressed in 
our study.  
At the international level, off-shore centres are very active compared to other places 
and this specialization creates different levels of opportunity spaces.  
Agents of the market finance are far greater than their competitors, as presented in 
Tables 7.46, 7.47 and 7.48. Table 7.46 for instance shows that the biggest 
conglomerates of the world are from the market financial system. Similarly, Table 
7.43 lists the big cities of the market financial system in terms of the GDP, not of 
population, revealing the concentration of assets. Looking at the figures it is easy to 
grasp that in a market system the ordinal place of the population is always higher than 
the ordinal place of the GDPs, unlike socialism which is the opposite. 
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Table 7.46: The World‟s Top Five TNCs by Foreign Assets, 1997 
Rank by foreign 
assets 
Corporation Country Industry 
1 General Electric United States Electronics 
2 Ford Motor Company United States Automotive 
3 
Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group 
Netherland/ United 
Kingdom 
Petroleum 
4 General Motors United States Automotive 
5 Exxon Corporation United States Petroleum 
Source: United Nations, World Investment Report 1999 (Geneva: United Nations), p.78 (in 
Morrison, 2002: 37). 
 
Table 7.47: Global Cities Index, 2010 
Rank City Rank by 
Population 
Rank by GDP 
1  New York  6  2 
2  London  28  5 
5  Hong Kong  31  14 
6  Chicago  25  4 
7  Los Angeles  12  3 
8  Singapore  38 23 
13  Washington  42  10 
15  Beijing  13  33 
19  Boston  41 11 
20  Shanghai  7  21 
25  Moscow  19  13 
27  Dubai  56  49 
33  Miami  58  54 
38  Houston  40 17 
40  Atlanta  39  15 
41  Istanbul  21  30 
43  Cairo  17  36 
44  Dublin  62 55 
48  Kuala Lumpur 57 65 
62  Shenzhen  26  28 
65  Chongqing  23  57 
Source: Foreign Policy (2010) 
 
According to Morrison (2002: 51), globalization ―has favoured some cities and 
regions, but not others‖. Indeed it is a pervasive habit of the finance community to use 
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the phrase ‗financial centre‟175 although similar phrases like ‗economic centre‘, 
‗industrial centre‘, are either not popular or do not even exist. In addition to 
―traditional‖ (Morrison, 2002: 317) exchanges like the New York and London Stock 
Exchanges, newer, famous exchanges like Nasdaq
176
 (National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System), reside in traditional centres too. 
In addition to the real assets, many of the most widely used indices of stock prices, 
such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Nasdaq Composite in New York and 
the FTSE 100 in London are also located in these centres.  
Both the acquirer and the acquired conglomerates are also from market economies as 
seen in Table 7.48. This is a clear indication of concentration. 
 
Table 7.48: Global Acquisitions, 2000 
Target Acquirer Value($billion) Sector 
Mannesmann   
(Germany) 
Vodafone 
AirTouch (UK) 
198.9 Telecoms 
Time Warner ( US) AOL (US) 181.9 Internet/ media 
Sprint (US) MCI 
Worldcom(US) 
127.3 Telecoms 
Warner- Lambert 
(US) 
Pfizer (US) 87.9 Pharmaceuticals 
Mobil( US) Exxon ( US) 86.4 Oil 
SmithKline 
Beecham(UK) 
GlaxoWelicome 
(UK) 
78.4 Pharmaceuticals 
Citicorp (US) Travelers (US) 72.6 Banking/ financial 
services 
Source: Financial Times, 5/6 February and 30 June 2000, in Morrison 2002: 333. 
 
60 % of all the hedge funds in the USA is located in New York and the rest is located 
in only a few states, namely, Connecticut, Illinois and Florida (Terzi, 2009). London 
is the second biggest global centre of hedge funds and in the five years between 2002 
and 2007, the size of the hedge funds in London doubled. Graph 7.3 clearly shows 
that London is the centre of hedge funds in Europe. 
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 E.g. Morrison, 2002: 317.  
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 Focuses on technology and ‗new economy‘ stocks and is located in New York since its foundation 
in 1971. 
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Graph 7.3: London‟s Share in European Hedge Fund Market, between 2000-
2007 (Billion Dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
 Source: IFSL Forecasts, 2008 
 
Apart from this geographical concentration, institutions are concentrating as well. 
Funds of hedge funds can be regarded as an example of this concentration. As Graph 
7.4 shows, especially since 2002 funds of funds in the hedge fund market are 
increasing very fast. 
 
Graph 7.4: Number of Funds of Funds in Hedge Funds Market since 1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Hedge Fund Research Inc. 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
London
Other Europe
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
item
380 
To compare the socialist, Islamic and market opportunity spaces, we may also 
compare the commodity markets, as the commodity markets are the base markets of 
the financial world this comparison is necessary.  
In 1999, in Hong Kong only one commodity market, Hong Kong Commodity 
Exchange, was in operation on cotton and sugar and in 1999, in Malaysia, there were 
only two commodity markets, namely, Malaysian Rubber Exchange (rubber) and 
Straits Tin Market, Penang (tin) 
In the market system on the other hand, in 1999, there were many commodity 
markets. For instance in Italy, there were four commodity markets: BorsaMerci di 
Bologna (agricultural produce, flour, cereals), BorsaMerci di Firenze (cereals, 
fertilizers, flour, vegetable oil, wheat, wine), BorsaMerci di Padova (alcohol, live, 
cattle, chickens, eggs, fertilizers, fruit, grain, olive oil, timber), BorsaMerci di Parma 
(cereals, ham, eggs, flour, pork, potatoes, chickens, tomato, concentrate). In the same 
year, the USA hosted the biggest proportion of the commodity markets in the world 
such as the Board of Trade of Kansas City Commodity Exchange, New York, New 
York Cocoa Exchange etc.  
LTCM for instance controlled 100 billion dollars of global assets directly and more 
than a trillion dollars indirectly. Sen. Jon Corzine, Co-Chairman of Goldman Sachs 
states that between 1994-1999 (Cran et al., 2002, emphasis added): 
The nineties saw a huge build up in concentrations that we had never seen on a 
global scale. Maybe we had way back in history. Romans had financial 
institutions that were disproportionately large to the overall activity of the world 
they operated in but LTCM was a specific type of hedge fund. They were 
involved whether it was the Singapore exchange, Tokyo stock exchange, the 
London Stock exchange, New York... There was no market that they weren‘t in. 
Maybe the largest player across the largest players.  
Although naming the last three decades as ‗liberalization‘, ‗globalization‘, and 
‗financialization‘ eras respectively, this categorization does not mean that the 
characteristics of the earlier decades have vanished or the later stages do not have 
their roots in the earlier ones. On the contrary,  ―[w]hile M&A activity has a long 
history within national economies, in 1999, cross-border mergers had grown in 
number, to half of all reported mergers in the US, the EU and Asia‖ (Paul, 2002: 333). 
―What is even more striking, though, is the increase in the average deal value‖ of 
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M&A activities, which rose from $29 million in 1990 to $157 million in 1999 
(OECD, 2000). It is hard to believe that this five times increase stems from the value 
change in nine years. Financialization and wealth creation by financial products 
seems to be a more rational reason behind it. 
Consequently, we may confidently argue that the frequency of financial crimes is 
breaking the world record every new year. Karaşin (2009: 10), for instance, argues 
that speculation, ―corruption, fraud and manipulation in the financial markets has 
never been greater than in the tighter financial markets of 2009‖. 
It may be rather interesting to discuss the ‗place‘ of opportunity space; however, in 
the era of globalization and enmeshed international business, it is rather difficult to 
determine which system resides where. Involvement of foreign direct investment 
(FDIs) in the international business world is a good example of this dynamic place of 
opportunity spaces, generally shaped by transnational corporations (TNCs) who 
controlled in 2002 ―a third of world output and about two thirds of world trade‖ 
(Morrison, 2002: 35). 
FDI is a way of investing in foreign firms. This is mainly done in three ways: (i) 
short–term, investment only, share (equity) purchase of usually under 10%; (ii) long-
term, direct role in the management of the company by purchasing more than 30% of 
it or (iii) ―contractual, non-equity agreements‖ (Morrison, 2002: 33). 
Morrison (2002: 34) also argues that ―[t]he growth in FDI has had a pervasive impact 
on international business. No longer could it be said that a company, its factories and 
the products it manufactures are necessarily the products of its home nation‖ 
(Morrison, 2002: 34). This is even more correct for financial activities of TNCs 
because it is becoming harder to determine whether or not a financial crime 
committed in one specific country really belongs to that country. Reich (1991) agrees 
that the notion of national origin of many complex products, hence, does not have any 
real meaning.  
As Table 7.49 depicts, the biggest fund managers operate in the market financial 
system and it is forecast by IFSL that in 2007, 40% of all the hedge funds globally 
will be managed by New York (Terzi, 2009) as seen in Table 7.50. 
 
382 
Table 7.49: The Biggest Fund Managers in 2008 
 
  Billion Dollars 
Citco Fund Services 482 
Citi 228 
HSBC Securities Services 217 
Goldman Sachs Administration Services 212 
The Bank of New York Mellon 150 
CACEIS Investor Services 137 
SS&C Fund Services 115 
UBS Global Asset Management Fund Services 83 
GlobeOp Financial Services 78 
PFPC Alternative Investments Group 72 
 
Source: Hedge Fund Administrators Survey (2008). 
 
Table 7.50: Locations of Hedge Funds between 2002 and 2007 in Billion Dollars 
 
  USA Europe Asia Others 
2002 81,6 12,3 4,9 1,2 
2003 76,8 16,1 5,5 1,5 
2004 72,1 20,6 5,5 1,8 
2005 66,6 22,7 7,8 2,8 
2006 66,0 24,0 7,0 3,0 
2007 66 24 7 3 
 
Source: IFSL Estimations, 2008 
 
It is, therefore, not a surprise that the agents and assets are concentrated in the market 
financial system and this concentration is bigger in magnitude even in a theoretical 
sphere because socialist financial systems, at least until now, do not attempt to operate 
in international markets such as TNCs, MNCs, maybe because central planning is not 
possible for the whole world market or had not seemed possible before the digital age. 
This is indeed surprising because in the internal markets, the Socialist financial 
system concentrates all the agents and the assets of the whole system in the capital of 
the country and rules them from the centre; nevertheless there are almost two hundred 
additional, national, financial world markets for the capitalist/market agents to operate 
in and they top the list despite the heavy concentration policies of socialism in 
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internal markets. One may argue that Chinese financial agents are in the world 
markets with this strategy but this strategy is not theorized as part of the socialist 
literature yet and it cannot be generalized to the past decades of the socialist history 
because it is recent and not followed by other Socialist players in world markets.  
These arguments determine the predicted orders as depicted in Table 7.51: 
 
Table 7.51: Comparison of the Concentration of Agents as an Immediate 
Financial Opportunity Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
Nevertheless, these results are valid for the scope of the international financial 
environment. When we look at the national environments, we observe that Islamic 
financial markets are more concentrated than socialist and market financial systems. 
We may consider both Tables 7.52 and 7.53 to reach a conclusion about the 
comparative position of the Islamic financial system in terms of the ease of price-
fixing and manipulation. 
 
Table 7.52: Shariah Compliant Assets across the World in 2008 
Country $US million, 2008 Annual change, % 
Iran 235,335 27.5 
Saudi Arabia 92,018 26.1 
Malaysia 67,074 32.3 
Kuwait 63,138 44.3 
UAE 49,083 35.9 
Bahrain 37,405 42.8 
Qatar 21,022 77,5 
United Kingdom 18,094 60,7 
Turkey 15,783 65,5 
Pakistan 6,315 30,0 
Source: The Banker (October, 2008) 
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Table 7.53: Top Ten Islamic Banks Across the World in 2008 
Bank Assets, $ million Profits, $ million 
Bank Melli 48,470 542.1 
Al Rajhi Bank* 43,981 1,739.7 
Kuwait Finance House 38,224 633.1 
Bank Saderat 32,610 228.0 
Bank Mellat 32,534 162.2 
Bank Tejarat 26,340 0.2 
Bank Sepah 24,142 28.8 
Dubai Islamic  Bank 22,802 512.3 
Bank Keshavarzi 16,298 0.3 
HSBC Amanah 15,194 n/a 
Source: Wilson (2009) - (The Banker, London, October 2008 & Annual Reports, December 
2008)  
 
Looking at the numbers, we can calculate that the total amount of Shari‟ah compliant 
assets across the world is $605,267 million and the total amounts of assets of the ten 
biggest banks are $300,595 million in 2008. Thus, 605,267 / 300,595 = 2.01, which 
means, half of the world‘s total, global Islamic financial assets are held by only 10 big 
banks. It is not possible to reach such figures for either the market system nor the 
socialist system. Therefore, in practice, Islamic finance is more vulnerable to varieties 
of price-fixing and manipulation and more vulnerable to financial crimes on this 
criterion. 
Nevertheless, this fact does not change our initial results for this criterion, because 
many banks of the market finance system have Islamic windows and they have more 
power and thus concentration in all of the world‘s financial markets.  
7.2.2.1.8. Complexity 
In the last decade, the financial world has been an over-quantified, digitalized world, 
which is completely understandable only by the world‘s best mathematicians and 
computer experts. It is unnecessary to attempt to determine the high frequency of the 
developments in communications, transportation and technology and many of those 
developments have parallel developments in the finance world. SuperDOT, LTCM, 
Forex, tropical derivatives, high frequency finance are only a few of them. 
385 
 ―The global financial crisis ... was due ... to the new financial complexity offering up 
the opportunity for widespread, systemic fraud‖ (Hutton, 2010). In recent decades, 
finance has been so complicated that even accountants are having a hard time coming 
up with a number for the earnings of companies (Shiller, 2008).  
Tax policies are among the most complicated issues in finance. For instance, Shiller 
(2008) argues that even the Nobel Prize winning finance theories such as those of 
Franco Modigliani and Miller‘s irrelevance of dividend policies for the shareholders, 
do not hold for tax policies and this exception of the tax policies is valid in all the 
areas of finance because financial taxation is a very complicated issue. 
One of the complexities of today‘s finance is the ‗risk sharing‘ problem which means 
that managers and shareholders have different risk-taking attitudes (Shankman, 1999), 
and since shareholders are so many and include institutional investors as well, a 
specific literature has built up on the voting rights of the shareholders which 
complicate financial decision-making even more. ―As Michael Lewis describes in The 
Big Short, credit default swaps had been deliberately created as an asset class by the 
big investment banks to allow hedge funds to speculate against collateralised debt 
obligations. The banks were gaming the regulators and investors alike‖ (Hutton, 
2010). 
Shiller (2008) thinks that ―it is amazing how things can suddenly grow and nobody 
understands them. So, there is vulnerability‖. About credit default swaps, Shiller 
(2008) says:  
I‘ve just got the latest number of how much credit default swaps there are 
outstanding. According to the Bank for International Settlements, there are now 
52 trillion dollar worth of credit default swaps outstanding. Fifty two trillion 
dollars… but the GDP of the United States is only 14 trillion. So, how can there 
be 52 trillion dollars of CDS? And this thing has only came in last ten years or 
so. So, I called an economist at BIS and asked ‗Can you please explain it to me 
where is this 52 trillion coming from?‘. I have got a note from him: ‗Still trying 
to figure it out‘. But that is what happens. The system performs very well and 
then it becomes vulnerable. Nobody understands all of it. 
As mentioned by The Guardian (2010), ―London and New York had become the 
centre of an international financial system in which the purpose of banking became 
making money from money – and where the complexity of the ‗innovations‘ allowed 
extensive fraud and deception‖.  
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Nevertheless in market economies, white-collar criminals do not deal with more 
complex structures compared to the Socialist system because a white-collar person in 
socialism, who is usually a member of the communist party and occupies a ruling 
position related to finance, rules the whole financial system with all its details. For 
instance in a country with a population of more than one billion, the members of the 
Communist Party appointed to finance positions have to find a way to plan the 
production of the raw materials (e.g. corn) first and then plan its distribution to first 
level mid-processors (e.g. the mill) and then the second level mid-processor (e.g. to 
produce smooth paper using cornstarch) and distribute it to another mid-processor 
(e.g. to produce books) and distribute it to the last resort, the buyer. In order to do that 
the central planning office must be informed that the book publishers need cornstarch 
and that the CPU manufacturers need silicon etc. and when the needs change the 
office has to get information about the new production processes too. Even just the 
planning of the production is very cumbersome, but forcing the supply to meet the 
demand and covering all the processes with enough supply and transaction of 
financial assets, credits and standard allowances of private property is too complex to 
imagine. All of these processes are left to the market mechanisms in the market 
financial system and in the Islamic financial system. 
Among all four financial systems, Islamic finance is the simplest financial system 
because it does not have the principle of central planning and it bans interest, which is 
a fundamental ingredient in the modern market economy and calculated in almost all 
transactions. Besides, debit/credit is discouraged and some of the timing and place of 
the transaction of the goods and corresponding prices are banned in Islam, which are 
arguably the second and third most important ingredients in modern market financial 
system. Exclusion of these complexities from the Islamic financial system puts it to 
the bottom of the order. Consequently, the ranking is as provided in Table 7.54. 
Table 7.54: Comparison of Complexity as an Immediate Financial Opportunity 
Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
2 Market/Capitalist Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
387 
We need to note in bold that this order is correct from the point of view of a white-
collar criminal only and not from the viewpoint of the public, because in Socialist 
countries everything is very simple for the public: whatever is ordered by the 
government must be followed. In this case the market economy tops the list but we 
study white-collar crime in this research. 
It may be argued that the partially-Islamised financial systems bear more complexity 
compared to the market system and it is a reasonable argument but there is no 
transaction (to the best knowledge of the author) that is banned by the market system 
but allowed by Islamic finance. This is why the argument does not hold. 
7.2.2.1.9. Volume of financial assets 
Map 7.10 depicts the world distribution of household wealth in the year 2000 and 
shows the volumes of the financial assets distributed over all four financial systems 
we compare. 
 
Map 7.10: The World Distribution of Household Wealth in 2000 
 
Source: http://www.mindfully.org/WTO/2006/Household-Wealth-Gap5dec06.htm 
 
In a confirming manner, Wahlström and Peterson (2006: 363) argue that groups‘ and 
governments‘ financial opportunity spaces are expanding in Europe, because access to 
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greater world financial markets is increasing.  
Map 7.11 shows the stock market capitalization across the world as a percentage of 
the top (US in green with $ 16, 997, 982, 000, 000) market (yellow dots denote 10% 
and red dots denote 1%) which can be used as a measure of financialization of the 
financial markets in relevant countries and economic systems. 
 
Map 7.11: Stock Market Capitalization of World Markets in 2005 (shown as the 
percentages of the top market, US) 
 
Source: World Bank (2007) 
 
It should be noted that fully Islamized countries such as Sudan and Iran are not 
represented in this map while market societies, predictably, are over represented. 
Financialization of the economy is relatively high in market economies and less in 
socialist economies and moderate in Islamic economies. 
Socialism is second because of China‘s role in recent decades as seen from Map 7.11. 
Morrison (2002: 51) counts China as the first among ―[t]he five most popular host 
countries in the developing world for FDI investment‖ followed by Brazil, Mexico, 
Singapore and Indonesia. We may take this fact to clarify the ownership of the 
volume and ownership of opportunity and conclude that China is hosting financial 
assets of other big investors and although the geographical location of the transactions 
and probable offenses takes place in China most of them indeed are not owned by 
China and other East Asian countries. In addition, United Nations (1999) warns us 
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that these five countries had 55% of all FDI flows to developing countries in 1998. 
Table 7.55 shows the last order of financial systems‘ vulnerability against FWCC in 
terms of ‗volume of financial assets‘. This concludes the vulnerability comparison of 
immediate opportunity spaces for FWCC. The order reached in this table is combined 
with the earlier tables to reach Table 7.56. Table 7.57 repeats the same results for 
further comparison to reach the final ordinal places of the compared cases. 
 
Table 7.55: Comparison of Volume of Financial Assets of Financial Systems as 
Immediate Opportunity Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
In sum, the total impact of all the criteria that positively affect the opportunity space 
for committing white-collar financial crime produces a picture as seen in Tables 7.56 
and 7.57: 
 
Table 7.56: Comparison of the TOTAL EFFECT of Immediate Financial 
Opportunity Spaces 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1+1+1+1+2+1+1+2+1 = 11   (most 
vulnerable) 
Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2+2+3+3+1+4+2+1+2 = 20 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3+3+2+2+3+2+3+3+3 = 24 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4+4+4+3+4+3+4+4+4 = 34  (least 
vulnerable) 
Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
Table 7.57: Comparison of the TOTAL EFFECT of Immediate Financial 
Opportunity Spaces (for Further Analysis) 
Their Order Financial Systems 
11 /9 = 1.2   1  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
20 /9 = 2.2   2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
24 /9 = 2.6   3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
34 /9 = 3.7   4  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
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Consequently, from the point of view solely of immediate positive motivational 
effects, our analyses conclude that the market financial system is the most vulnerable 
financial system among the cases we compared and the fully Islamized financial 
system is the least vulnerable one to FWCC. 
However, these are all immediate opportunity spaces that positively affect financial 
crime propensity. In order to get a true picture of the effects of immediate financial 
opportunity space and other opportunity spaces, we need to take into account the 
‗negatively effecting‟ immediate opportunity spaces as well, that is, negative in the 
sense that they alleviate the effects of the environmental factors of probable financial 
crimes.  
Comparison of the sum of the negative and positive forces (both environmental and 
motivational) would be enough to categorise financial systems according to their 
vulnerability to financial white-collar crimes. 
Let us now analyse the opportunity spaces with immediate negative effects on 
opportunity spaces. 
 
7.2.2.2. Immediate financial defensive space of financial crime 
7.2.2.2.1. Legal and justice systems  
Legal and justice systems are one of the primary elements of immediate financial 
defensive systems. Rationality is a big concern for all finance people, and everything 
about punishment is calculated by them before attempting to commit crimes that are 
related to pecuniary benefits. Nevertheless, specifically for white-collar criminals, 
sometimes the benefits are so big that even decades long imprisonment does not deter 
them. 
―Historically, the legal environment has been determined by national legal systems 
stemming from state sovereignty‖ but ―[i]ntegration in capital markets has not been 
matched by integrated regulatory frameworks‖ (Morrison, 2002: 215, 317). New 
players in the market have a say in the enactment process and thus the form of the 
resultant legal system in which they operate. Complexity is an important factor in this 
trend. 
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According to Reichel (1999: 109), in terms of values, characteristics and attitudes, 
―legal traditions can be classified into the four categories of common, civil, socialist 
and Islamic‖, but realizing that there are many commonalities and convergences 
between the first two and their geographical and historical neighbourhood, we may 
refer to common and civil law as Western Law; such categorization also suits our 
comparative approach to financial systems. Unfortunately, there are not many 
extensive comparative analyses of legal traditions (see for instance, Ehrmann, 1976; 
Ingraham, 1987), but we utilize the existing literature. In general, one may argue that 
there are mainly three kinds of law: (i) legislations (statute law) as in civil and 
socialist law countries; (ii) case law (judge-made-law) as in common law countries, 
and (iii) divine law as in Islamic countries. The geographical distribution of these 
laws are depicted in Map 7.12. 
 
Map 7.12: Distribution of the World‟s Legal Traditions 
 
Source: http://www.odci.gov 
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As Reichel (1999) does, we prefer using ‗legal tradition‘ instead of ‗legal system‘ 
because none of the systems we compare are standalone and free from the effects of 
others, but the stronger effect of civil law over others can be observed in Graph 7.5.  
Legal systems are mixed with one another because ―the groundwork for modern legal 
systems in much of the world was the legacy of colonial regimes‖ and ―[l]egal 
traditions in many countries, which are based on customary law, predate Western 
systems and continue to form an important part of the overall legal environment‖ 
(Morrison, 2002: 222). In a way, socialist law is an inheritance of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, while civil law is an inheritance of the Roman Empire, common law of the 
traditions of England and Islamic law of the religion of Islam. 
 
Graph 7.5: Countries by Type of Legal Traditions 
 
Source: The World Fact Book (http://www.odci.gov) and Library of Congress Country 
Studies (http://1cweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html) 
 
Table 7.58 depicts the countries along with their corresponding legal traditions which 
can be used to show the corresponding legal traditions of the financial systems we 
compare. Since Table 7.58 makes no distinction for socialist or Islamic legal 
traditions, despite the fact that Morrison (2002) is aware of them and does emphasize 
their distinction in the same source, it may point out the continuing effects of 
Civil (48%)
Common (19%)
Common/Civil (11%)
Socialist (3%)
Islamic (3%)
Civil/Islamic (5%)
Common/Islamic (5%)
Other (6%)
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colonialism on these countries. Morrison (2002: 222; emphasis added) also says that 
―[i]n many countries, therefore, we now find a mixture of pre-modern customs, 
colonial forms and newer codes designed to keep up to date with business needs‖. 
 
Table 7.58: Some Countries and Their Legal Traditions 
Civil 
(Roman) Law 
Common 
Law 
China Australia 
France Canada 
Germany India 
Indonesia Malaysia 
Iran Singapore 
Italy England 
Sweden United 
States 
Source: Morrison (2002: 220) 
 
There are mainly two categories of law, private
177
 and public law. Private law 
regulates the relations between individuals (including companies) and public law 
regulates the relations between individuals and the state as the representative of the 
public.  Table 7.59 gives the main differences between the public and private law, 
which does not hold for Islamic law. 
 
Table 7.59: Differences between Public (Criminal) and Private (Civil) Law 
 Criminal Law Civil (Private) Law 
Concerns Offences against society Disputes between private 
individuals or companies 
Purpose of the 
action 
To preserve order in the 
community by punishing 
offenders and deterring others 
To remedy the wrong which 
has been suffered 
The parties A prosecutor prosecutes a 
defendant 
A plaintiff sues a defendant 
Where the action 
is heard 
The criminal court, that is 
magistrates‘ court or Crown 
Court 
The civil courts, that is, 
county court or High Court 
Standard of proof The prosecutor must prove his 
case beyond a reasonable doubt 
The plaintiff must establish 
his case on the balance of 
probabilities 
Decision A defendant may be convicted A defendant may be found 
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 Sometimes referred to as civil law too. 
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if he is found guilty, or 
acquitted if he is found not 
guilty 
liable or not liable 
Sanctions Imprisonment, fine, probation, 
community service 
Damages, injunction, specific 
performance 
Examples Murder, theft, drunken driving, 
health and safety violations 
Contract, tort, property law 
Source: Adapted from Keenan and Riches (1998: 5) in Morrison (2002).  
 
In recent decades the law is more vulnerable and weaker compared to earlier times in 
history because ―[t]he speed of some developments such as e-commerce has far 
outpaced the development of the law to cover them. While governments have slowly 
woken up to the legal implications of advances in technology, they have also realized 
their own limitations in regulating international transactions‖ (Morrison, 2002: 215). 
Apart from the technological innovations, the legal system has to deal with other 
kinds of innovations such as financial innovations. Merger regulations can be a 
representative example. ―Indeed, national rules have become more complex and the 
list of countries with merger regulations is growing. Merger notification regimes are 
in place in 57 jurisdictions and, of these, between 1994 and 2000, 35 have enacted 
new or substantially revised rules‖ (Morrison, 2002: 335). 
Reichel (1999) argues that Islamic law does not consider the ‗state‘ as a separate and 
legal personality; he explains that Islamic law is private law and every wrongdoer, 
even the state‘s rulers, are judged by the private law. Therefore, Islam applies the 
same law to the corporations as well but unlike other legal systems Islam does not 
recognize corporations as legal personalities and instead of punishing their legal 
personality punishes the individuals who are responsible from breaking the law. After 
all, it is not reasonable to conceive that the law would ban legal personality to the 
state but grant it to businesses. 
Nevertheless, even if we follow the currently discussed rights of the corporations as 
legal personalities we need to appreciate the difference between Islamic law and the 
legal systems of market societies who have granted this right for many centuries. 
Table 7.60 shows the main differences between the legal traditions for both 
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substantial and procedural law. 
 
Table 7.60: Differences between Legal Traditions  
 Civil Law 
Tradition 
Common 
Law 
Tradition 
Socialist 
Legal 
Tradition 
Islamic Legal 
Tradition 
General 
Role of Case 
law 
Guidance, but 
not binding 
System of 
binding 
precedent 
Guidance, but 
not binding 
Guidance, but 
not binding 
Legal Style Systematized 
application of 
principles 
Pragmatic and 
piecemeal 
Systematized 
application of 
principles 
Systematized 
application of 
divine rules 
Cultural Differences 
Do Legal 
Rights and 
Obligations 
Lie with the 
Individual 
(Private Law) 
or the State 
(Public Law)? 
Public law when 
concern is with 
the state‘s legal 
personality; 
private law 
when concern is 
with the 
individual‘s 
legal 
personality. 
Public law, 
with both the 
individual and 
the state 
having a legal 
personality. 
Public law, 
because the 
state has an 
interest in all 
transactions. 
Private law, 
because the 
concern 
always centers 
on the 
individual‘s 
legal 
personality. 
What is the 
position of the 
judiciary in 
relation to 
other 
government 
branches? 
Courts have 
equal but 
separate power. 
Courts share 
in balancing 
power. 
Courts are 
subordinate to 
the legislature 
Courts and 
other 
government 
branches are 
subordinate to 
the Shari‘a 
Substantive Component 
The primary 
source of law 
is 
Written code 
(provided by 
rulers of 
legislators) 
Custom Principles of 
the socialist 
revolution 
Divine 
revelation 
Procedural Component 
How is 
flexibility 
provided 
Judge-made law 
 
Particularization 
Variation in 
reasoning and 
definition 
Identification 
of issues as 
either 
questions of 
law or of fact 
Principle of 
analogy 
 
Directives 
from higher 
level courts 
Mazalim 
courts 
 
The process 
of ijtihad 
Source: Reichel (1999: 111); Morrison (2002: 222, 115, 118) 
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It is hard to say that there exists a significant difference between the vulnerability 
levels of the legal and financial systems in theory, but in practice the literature 
recognizes that the Western legal traditions behave unnecessarily leniently to the 
financial agents because of the recent policies of the governments since the Thatcher 
and Reagan era. For instance Rodger and McCulloch (2001) take this view of the 
competition crime regulation of the UK. Competition related operations‘ and 
institutions‘ control are weak in the US and Europe as well. A publication as an 
extension of our comparative analysis is presented as an appendix to this text and it 
can be referred to in order to appreciate the level of leniency in the Roman and 
Common legal traditions towards financial agents in recent decades. These policies 
produce vulnerability to financial crimes in terms of the criterion of the legal and 
justice systems‘ relative strengths. Burke (2006: 44) agrees that preventive strategies 
―would involve reform of the law and its administration in order to alter the equation 
and make crime appear less attractive‖. 
Newburn (2007: 375) defines occupational crime as ―crime committed within 
businesses‖. Indeed organizations are not capable of committing crimes, but people in 
it do.  Legally granted identity of corporations before judges produces a culprit with 
no body to suffer. This is basically the most vulnerable part of the defensive space of 
the market finance and is not possible to experience in socialist and Islamic financial 
systems. It is really hard for jurisprudence to find a ‗real‘, complete, distinct, 
standalone personality to convict in a corporate identity, as organizations do not have 
senses, nor consciousness or intellect, but the people in it have those qualities which 
are required to commit crime. 
As suggested by Geis and Meier (1977), a definition of white collar crimes is the first 
point to mention. To them, it is ―very difficult‖ because conventional methods of 
criminology are not adequate for WCCs. For instance, ―[p]sychopathy and/or inability 
to defer gratification do not provide much insight into antitrust violations‖ (Geis and 
Meier, 1977: 3). 
Difficulty of Enforcement 
Apart from the definitional and etiological difficulties, there is an agreement on the 
difficulty of dealing with white collar crimes as well because ―corporations often 
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plead nolo contendere
178
 to criminal charges which are brought, a luxury not 
generally made available to robbers and burglars ... Such pleas stifle opportunities to 
accumulate trial information, always a rich source of data‖ (Geis and Meier, 1977: 3). 
Furthermore, most white-collar crimes are not defined in the conventional codes but 
are ―hidden in civil and administrative laws and involve rather complex matters of 
legal protocol‖ (Geis and Meier, 1977: 3). 
Mayer (1990: 298) indicates the first of them; the internal and external leniency of 
the professionals, government officials and members of the public against 
financial criminals:  
What makes the S&L outrage so important a piece of American history is not the 
hundreds of billions of dollars, but the demonstration of how low our standards for 
professional performance have fallen in law, accounting, appraising, banking and 
politics—all of them. 
Severity, here, then, requires that criminal justice policies and criminal laws should 
outweigh the possible benefits of crime. Research verifies this assumption. According 
to Rengert (1989), there is enough scientific evidence showing that lower 
incarcerating jurisdictions have the highest crime rates but, considering the young age 
of modern finance and our analysis in the following chapters, we can confidently state 
that for financial criminals, severe penalty has not existed at all. 
The most important and the most effective one of these three measures is the 
certainty. Paternoster (1989) shows that certainty is more important than the severity 
of the punishment. Certainty requires that promises made by the law and public 
policies be kept and not postponed, lessened or pardoned, or excused. If would-be-
criminals see the consequences of their future offenses by seeing their peers punished, 
they may decide not to commit crime.  
Studies of both objective and perceptual deterrence often do find negative 
correlations between certainties of criminal penalties and the rate or frequency 
of criminal behaviour, but the correlations tend to be low. Severity of 
punishment has an even weaker effect on crime. Neither the existence of capital 
punishment nor the certainty of the death penalty has ever had a significant 
effect on the rate of homicide... The empirical validity of deterrence theory is 
limited. (Akers 1994: 54; emphasis added) 
Many criminologists agree that perceived informal sanctions directed by family 
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 From Latin: ‗I do not wish to contest‘. This defense saves legal costs and prevents defendants from 
receiving the legal title of ‗criminal‘ from the court.  
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members and peers rather than formal ones from government and other formal 
institutions have the greatest effect (Hollinger and Clark, 1983; Grasmick and Bursik, 
1990; Williams and Hawkins, 1989; Paternoster, 1989). This fact should encourage us 
to take into consideration the social measures of deterrence along with legal ones. 
Objective and experimental research shows that the correlation mentioned is observed 
significantly between crime rates and the certainty, severity and celerity of 
punishment by Gibbs (1968), Kobrin et al. (1972), Title and Rowe (1974;), Ross 
(1986), Green (1986); and not significantly by Bursik et al. (1990), Chiricos and 
Waldo (1970), Ross and McCleary (1990), Kelling et al. (1974). Wu and Liska (1993) 
found the same effects but now to different degrees between different races (white 
and black). Walker (1980) on the other hand expands the usefulness, the effectiveness 
of deterrence to international rational criminals.  
Bottomley and Coleman (2002: 62) disagree with these studies and criticise 
deterrence, because ―the chances of being caught in the commission of an offence by 
a passing police patrol are extremely low in the UK‖. Bottomley and Coleman (2002) 
may be correct in their criticism for street crimes, but in fact the chances are not that 
low for auditors who visit a company provided that they are serious in conducting an 
audit, otherwise even millions of deterrence measures would be obsolete. 
Surprisingly, this was the case for Barings. When asked about internal audit, which 
was launched when his managers in England learnt that clients were not paying their 
bills, Leeson suggested that the losses were for the clients. But he told the truth to 
Adam Curtis (1998): 
You have to expect that everything is to be found. This is the nature of the audit. 
They supposed to test everything and test documents. If he had picked up any 
document it had five eights account is on in some way or form, any document 
with the five eights account, so of course I‘m worried. They come in and they 
don‘t test any record. So I can‘t be happier, they didn‘t test any record, one 
record... I mean.. It‘s not an audit. 
"The high recidivism rate further challenges the efficacy of contemporary deterrence 
theories‖ (Nacro, 1997: 42). Indeed, financial criminals repeat their offenses, but this 
is not a breach of rationality, on the contrary, this is purely rational in a situation of 
almost no deterrence and enforcement, or in the terminology of RCT, in situations of 
punishment with no certainty, severity or celerity.   
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Deterrence theory also hypothesizes that these three measures, certainty, severity and 
celerity, function together and are affected by each other. For instance, even very 
severe punishments may not reduce crime rates, if punishments are not certain or 
postponed for a long-time, or conversely, small amounts of punishment would suffice 
if it is certain and quick. Therefore, while interpreting the results of the research 
testing deterrence theory, one should be cautious of suggesting public policies for law 
enforcement and other related public institutions (Patemoster, 1989). Patemoster 
(1989) also warns that it is, for instance, very easy to confuse the effects of deterrence 
(fear of punishment) and incapacitation (cleaning streets of offenders), which is 
supported by Siegel (1995: 120). 
By means of celerity and certainty, criminals should feel the burden of punishment on 
and around them. Otherwise, as the homo-economicus view suggests, they would 
prefer the closer benefit to a greater future loss (or the reward of ‗the release of future 
burden‘).  
This notion is another example of how interconnected two rational choice theories in 
the different contexts of economics and criminology are and why it makes sense to 
deploy RCT for financial crimes. Indeed, Burke (2005: 43) argues that earlier forms 
of RCT in the late 1960s and early 1970s, ―tended to compare the decision-making 
process adopted by offenders with straightforward economic choice‖.  
Similarly, Gary Becker (1968) in the early RCT literature suggests a trade-off 
between  ‗legitimate opportunities of income and reward‘ vs. ‗illegitimate income and 
rewards‘ and claims that people choose between legal and illegal means on the basis 
of the best return. Burke (2005: 43-44) comments on this equation and says that 
changing the criminal law or the crime policy is the best way of influencing the 
equation of the criminal decision making process. 
For example, the death penalty is the ultimate punishment; however, neither classical 
nor post-classical schools support the death penalty; maybe because they reasoned 
that people live, as if they are going to live eternally. Some are religious and believes 
that they ‗will‘ live eternally and some others like re-incarnationists believe that they 
‗will‘ live eternally in different forms of life. For a Muslim criminal, severe worldly 
punishments have relatively more negative consequences compared to  other 
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criminals. For instance, the suffering about a death sentence in this world multiplies 
because of the belief that a second and eternal death in Hell is waiting. Financial 
white collar criminals living in both socialist and market societies are either not bound 
by these punishments or loosely bound
179
. The resultant Table 7.61 sums up these 
analyses 
 
Table 7.61: Comparison of Legal and Justice Systems as an Immediate Financial 
Defensive Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3 Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
 
7.2.2.2.2. Accounting system 
Classical accounting or double-entry book-keeping dates back to the 12
th
 century and 
―[m]odern book-keeping systems are still based on principles established in the 
fifteenth century
180‖ Venice (Dyson, 1997: 4). 
Modern finance though is significantly different from classical finance, which lasted 
until the third quarter of the 20
th
 century. However, accountants still use 
comparatively very similar ways of keeping records of firms, despite the fact that 
―[t]he days when a company‘s accounts were simply a record of its trading 
performance‖ are over (Bradburn, 2001: 117). Better tools could not be produced that 
are distant from accounting and this forces accounting to do nothing but ‗cook books‘ 
to reflect a presentable look of the firm in an era of very high leverages, fluctuating 
stock prices, derivative prices, exchange rates, debts, loans, interest rates and inflation 
calculated every new instant by electronic and automatic accountancy because ―the 
pressure to produce strong results is greater than before‖ (Bradburn, 2001: 117).  
 ―It is worth noting that most creative accountancy is not illegal‖ and that 
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 For in some common belief systems in market societies, people‘s place in Paradise or Hell is not a 
consequence of the crimes they commit in this world. Their place is irrelevant to what they do in this 
world (Kimball and Teaching Company, 2008).   
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The first known book is written by Italian mathematician Pacioli in 1494 (Dyson, 1997: 4). 
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―accountancy rules in many countries are just too grey. This means the rules are very 
much open to interpretation‖ (Bradburn, 2001: 117). Especially in market economies, 
accounting has been so complex that ―senior managers themselves may be largely 
dependent upon their junior colleagues telling them what is happening‖ (Dyson, 1997: 
5). Besides, in the UK, for instance, ―there is nothing to stop anyone calling himself 
an accountant, and setting up in business offering accountancy service‖ (Dyson, 
1997). 
Problems with accounting are not limited to the problems presented above. It would 
be better if auditors were ―appointed by and report[ed] directly to the board rather 
than management‖ and if they did not ―audit their own work‖ (Sternberg, 2004: 73). 
For instance, Enron‘s accountant and external auditor was the same corporation, 
Arthur Andersen, and this moral hazard problem was probably one of the most 
important factors in one of the biggest frauds in finance history. Sternberg (2004) 
believes that the role expected from auditors indeed belongs to directors. 
In socialism, where the state controls all prices and the supply of money to and from 
the economy, the use of prices is not really meaningful, because even if the state has 
less of any goods, the price will be the same but delivery will be less. On the other 
hand government can also double the wages, but if it does not increase the supply, 
better wages would be meaningless as well. The same effect occurs when the prices 
are halved but the supply is the same or both the supply and the prices are doubled. 
Therefore, it would be difficult to apply classical accountancy ―to assess the wealth of 
a farmer in a non-monetary system‖ (Dyson, 1997: 5) and compare this wealth with 
others. The only thing that really matters is the amount of supply and it is not 
comparable in Socialism, as Dyson (1997) shows in the following Table 7.62.  
For instance if the government drops the price of a cow down to one-third of the 
previous year‘s price the socialist farmer may indeed rationally act as if he/she had 
lost ten cows during the last year despite the fact that he/she raised 5 more because 
ceteris paribus, he/she must give away three cows in order to buy whatever he/she 
used to buy in exchange for one cow. Therefore, accountancy is valid only for the 
state in socialism and since we study white-collar criminals this is what counts for our 
analysis. Indeed this is also why socialist accounting uses labour hours for recording, 
reporting and comparing instead of the prices. This example is shown in Table 7.62. 
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Table 7.62: Accounting for a Farmer‟s Wealth by using Assets Only in a Non-
Monetary System 
His 
Possessions 
A Year Ago Now Change 
Cows ●●●●●●●●●● ●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
● 
+5 
Hens (●=10) ●●●●●●●●●● ●●●●●●● -30 
Pigs ●●●●●● ●●●● -2 
Sheep (●=10) ●●●●● ●●●●●●● +20 
Land (●=10 
acre) 
●●●● ●●●● no 
change 
Cottage ● ● no 
change 
Carts ●●● ● -2 
Ploughs ● ●● +1 
Source: Dyson (1997: 5). 
 
Islamic accounting, on the other hand, is described as ―the process of identifying, 
measuring and communicating economic and other relevant information, inspired by 
Islamic worldview and ethics, and complies with Islamic law (Shari‘ah) – in order to 
permit informed judgements and decisions by potential and expected users of 
information‖ (Abdul Rahman, 2010: 19), and derives most of its principles from the 
Qur‘an (2: 282181):  
O you who believe! When you contract a debt for a fixed period, write it down. 
Let a scribe write it down in justice between you. Let not the scribe refuse to 
write as Allah has taught him, so let him write. Let him (the debtor) who incurs 
the liability dictate, and he must fear Allah, his Lord, and diminish not anything 
of what he owes. But if the debtor is of poor understanding, or weak, or is 
unable himself to dictate, then let his guardian dictate in justice. And get two 
witnesses out of your own men. And if there are not two men (available), then a 
man and two women, such as you agree for witnesses, so that if one of them 
(two women) errs, the other can remind her. And the witnesses should not 
refuse when they are called on (for evidence). You should not become weary to 
write it (your contract), whether it be small or big, for its fixed term, that is 
more just with Allah; more solid as evidence, and more convenient to prevent 
doubts among yourselves, save when it is a present trade which you carry out 
on the spot among yourselves, then there is no sin on you if you do not write it 
down. But take witnesses whenever you make a commercial contract. Let 
neither scribe nor witness suffer any harm, but if you do (such harm), it would 
be wickedness in you. So be afraid of Allah; and Allah teaches you. And Allah 
is the All-Knower of each and everything. 
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 Khan‘s translation from quran.com, 2011 
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According to AAOIFI, the objectives of Islamic accounting are to ―determine‖ and 
―safeguard‖ ―rights and obligations of interested parties‖ by ensuring ―proper 
accounting recognition (recording) and valuation of assets to all contractual 
parties‖ who would be equity holders, holders of investment accounts, other 
depositors, current and saving account holders, others who transact business with 
the Islamic financial institutions, who are not equity or account holders, zakat 
agencies and regulatory agencies (Abdul Rahman, 2010: 15 -16). 
Nevertheless, as Abdul Rahman (2010) states, modern Islamic finance followed the 
first of the two options for the development of financial principles, that is analysing 
the Western accounting principles and testing their compliance with the Islamic 
principles. In a way, Islamic principles have been used as a filter mechanism to test 
the compliance of non-Islamic standards. Sternberg (2010: 72) does not agree that 
this process helps to guarantee the health of the sieved principles, as passing an 
MOT test does not guarantee that one‘s car is safe or valuable, because the process 
is not designed to suspect and pinpoint the faults in the car, just like auditors with 
the corporations they audit. 
For practical purposes, we do not observe any substantial difference between classical 
accounting, assurance and auditing standards and Islamic ones, other than the 
inclusion of zakah as an information requirement and exclusion of interest 
information, which does not specifically concern accounting and related knowledge.  
Sudan and many other agents of Islamic finance have adapted ―the Shari‘ah standards 
issued by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) and use them as their guidelines‖ (Mohammad et al., 2010: 4), but it is 
hard to pinpoint a characteristic of these standards that causes a significant difference 
between the market finance and Islamic finance.  
Since in socialism the accountancy is, in effect, controlled by the white-collar 
managers of finance, and since the number of these people is very much restricted 
compared to both Islamic and market finance, Socialism can be put at the top of the 
list, as depicted in Table 7.63. 
Table 7.63 puts the arguments mentioned in the order of financial systems‘ 
vulnerabilities to FWCC in terms of ‗accounting systems‘. 
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Table 7.63: Comparison of Accounting Systems as an Immediate Financial 
Defensive Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
2 Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
2 (least vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
 
7.2.2.2.3. Audit 
The most important vulnerability of the modern audit is the fact that auditor and 
accountancy firms are the same corporations and that they are paid by those to whom 
they are supposed to be providing warning for their mistakes and wrongdoings. 
Arthur Anderson is a good example, because it did internal and external auditing and 
consulting at the same time for Enron and was paid by it. 
This is a clear example of the conflict of interest and what is more interesting is the 
fact that governmental agencies have no objection to these practices. For instance, the 
US government asked for an assessment of the independence of Arthur Anderson in 
the Enron case and the assessment was made by Arthur Anderson itself. Moreover, 
the government accepted the assessment, which basically said that according to 
Arthur Anderson, Arthur Anderson was independent (Monsk et al., 2004). These 
observations about the market finance are good reasons to describe it as a very loose, 
even naïve system in terms of audit standards. 
Indeed, the system does not appoint accountants to find out mischief in the corporate 
records. Far from it, there is no party appointed for those kinds of jobs in modern 
finance. This is why, ―[i]t is inappropriate to expect financial auditors to detect most 
sorts of fraud and operational problems, because that is not their job. As Lord Justice 
Lopes famously remarked: ―An auditor is not bound to be a detective, or as it was 
said, to approach his work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there is 
something wrong. He is a watchdog, but not a bloodhound‖ (Sternberg, 2004: 71). 
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Nick Leeson‘s case confirms the possibility of such practices but Baring managers 
accuse accountants. Ron Baker, Leeson‘s manager at the time, the Head of Financial 
Products Group, Barings Investment Bank, 1993-1995, thinks that (Curtis, 1998, 
emphasis added):  
It is the auditors in the end. Nick would probably have been clever, probably 
distracted people but at the end of the day there is a job that needs to be done. It 
seems to me that they began to associate the commercial success of the 
organization somehow or another with the lack of controls. You run a London 
Investment Bank with pristine controls which you polish regularly but a global 
stock broker… It‘s a very different business. Maybe that was a business in which 
you let a rock and roll a little bit more then you did with a Merchant Bank 
because that was the way that business had been successfully run. The people 
that were sent in to seats of controls were seduced by the commercial success of 
the organization and lost their way”. 
On the other hand, accountancy, as a job, has some moral hazard problems as well. As 
Dyson (1997: 11) states,  
Even external auditors have limited independence. This is because the directors 
of a company usually recommend the appointment of a particular firm of 
auditors to the shareholders. It is rare for shareholders to object to the directors‘ 
recommendations so if the directors are in dispute with the auditors, they can 
always hint that they are thinking of appointing another firm. The auditors can 
always appeal directly to the shareholders, but they are not usually successful.  
And indeed there is not really much possibility of success, because in market societies 
owners are many and dispersed across the globe, while the managers are few and 
densely located. 
Sternberg‘s (2004: 71) explanations are plausible in this discussion so as to have some 
analysis why the practices are as they are:  
Believing that auditors should have been able to detect signs of the impending 
disasters, commentators called for better corporate governance as a remedy. But 
although there is undoubtedly cause for concern when major corporations and 
vast sums of money disappear, auditors play at most a peripheral role in 
corporate governance. 
―As interpreted by regulators‘ and auditors‘ professional associations, the auditor‘s 
responsibility is largely formal, and is satisfied by pronouncing on the technical ways 
in which financial accounts are drawn up‖ (Sternberg, 2004: 73). Because of such 
inabilities and the ―extremely limited role‖ of auditors, Sternberg (2004: 73) supports 
―government audit‖. However, in laissez faire capitalism, governments prefer to stay 
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away from the economy. This is a reason we can put market system at the top of the 
list of vulnerability on this criterion of comparison. 
As mentioned before, Sternberg (2004 :72) uses the analogy of MOT and auditor.  For 
him, they are very similar because ―[t]he MOT does not guarantee that the vehicle is 
safe‖ and ―in like fashion, an auditor merely confirms that financial statements have 
been drawn up in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles‖. 
Finance in socialist societies does not have a proper auditing mechanism either, 
because the accountancy makes sense at the top level only and the only people that 
can audit the record keepers are the same members of the communist party if not the 
members of the same party located in courts. Actually in a BBC documentary about 
China, a lady judge accepts that her party membership is not deniable in the court 
(Lewis et al., 2006). This puts socialism in the second position because the socialist 
system at least is willing to prevent bad practices through control. In Islam though 
there is neither the principle of central control with very few checks and balances nor 
wilful ignorance as a principle for the sake of better liberty in the marketplace. On the 
contrary, Islam orders the establishment of an enforcement force to oversee the 
markets. 
Table 7.64 puts these arguments in order of financial systems. Thus market finance 
tops the list followed by socialism because of socialism‘s lack of internal control and 
lack of separation of powers under the command of communist parties. 
 
Table 7.64: Comparison of Audit Systems as an Immediate Financial Defensive 
Space  
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
7.2.2.2.4. Control and management of finance 
According to Sternberg (2004: 71) many faults that were attributed to auditors were in 
fact the faults of managers because they were ―misreporting corporate performance‖ 
(Bebchuk and Bar-Gill, 2002: 1). 
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Keiser (BBC World News, 2011; emphasis added), a financial analyst, draws a 
grimmer picture of the managers by claiming that when he worked in Wall Street he 
observed that:  
Everyone kicks upstairs the bribes. The brokers bribe to the office manager, the 
office manager bribes to the regional sales manager, the regional manager bribes 
to the national sales manager. This is a common understanding. At Christmas, 
who gets the bonus in an average brokerage house? It‘s the compliance officer. 
The compliance officer sits there all day long; he supposed to be making sure 
you do not violate any of the margin rules. That you are complying the law. Of 
course... to the extent that you can bribe the compliance officer, you are 
complying the law... Fraud is not a product of the system. Fraud is the system.   
In a similar vein, Nick Leeson of Barings Bank asks: 
Why didn‘t those people who run Barings come to you and say what are you 
doing? Because they are stupid. They don‘t understand the business they should 
have never been in the position of owning. Especially people like Tony Horse 
he was supposed to be the global treasury function. He supposed to understand 
derivatives. He didn‘t and he would pay the money every single day. Would 
accept pretty ridiculous explanations from me. It wouldn‘t happen in Morgan 
and Stanley. In Barings they had a lot of idiots. Basically in every one of the 
controlling functions. They are asking questions but they wouldn‘t going to pin 
off. They didn‘t understand the basics of the business. (Curtis, 1998) 
In the case of finance in the market system, the management and control is either very 
weak or virtual, and this is because of the belief that the more liberal and free of 
control the markets are the better their performance will be.   
Since the ―institutional ownership is an increasingly dominant feature of developed 
financial markets‖ (Stracca, 2005: 5) investment is usually a decision of a group of 
people in certain corporate rules and regulations and principles. For instance ―pension 
funds are predominantly managed by corporate treasurers, who often delegate the 
asset management to a third party, thus creating an additional layer of agency‖ 
(Stracca, 2005: 5). Limitations and control on the decision making in these many 
layers of agencies are seen as limitations on financial opportunities
182
. Thus, ―active 
management
183
 appears to subtract, rather than to add value‖ (Stracca, 2005: 5), the 
efficient markets hypothesis in macro level markets has effects in organizational 
culture as well. Western organizations act on liberal control mechanisms. They claim 
that when the financial organization is left with minimum control the results are better 
                                                 
182
 E.g. control may cause missed opportunities if a financial action is possible only after a control 
mechanism.  
183
 Apparently includes constant control. 
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because of the free competition between the individuals for bonuses and other 
benefits.  
Control, according to the market paradigm, kills entrepreneurship and creativity. 
However, liberty has a price and the price is usually the vulnerability to financial 
crimes. This is why we put the market financial system at the top of the list. 
Corruption levels in socialist and Islamic systems especially in recent decades are 
measured and draw a grim picture for both of these systems, worse in fact than the 
market economy, nevertheless these are the results of inabilities because these 
systems are not against control, unlike laissez faire capitalism and market financial 
system.  
As can be seen in Table 7.65, socialism should be at the bottom of the list because it 
is widely accepted in various literatures in social sciences that socialism applies far 
more control over the society compared to other systems. 
Table 7.65 shows the order of financial systems‘ vulnerability against FWCC in terms 
of ‗management and control systems‘.  
 
Table 7.65: Comparison of Control and Management Systems as an Immediate 
Financial Defensive Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3 Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
 
7.2.2.2.5. Business ethics 
Obviously, the first thing to criticize in a comparative study of financial crimes about 
both capitalism and socialism would be the lack of ‗moral filter‖. Islamic/moral 
economics and finance require such a filter to produce an Islamically accepted 
outcome in the economic and financial activity. Chapra (2003: 24-5) explains ‗the 
loss of moral filter‘ as follows:  
Since the socio-economic importance of religion essentially lies in the 
collective sanction it provides to moral values, …, the loss of the religious 
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sanction for values was a great tragedy. Society became deprived of the 
socially-agreed filter mechanism. … Consciousness of the human self may 
still be there to serve as a filter mechanism at the individual level, it is not 
sufficient to perform the function of a socially-agreed filter mechanism 
which is needed to create a harmony between individual self-interest and 
social interest. 
―Islamic rules of economics make it binding for human beings not only to abide by 
the Shari´ah tenets relating to dos and don‘ts but also to keep in mind the impact of 
their activities on others and society as a whole‖ (Ayub, 2007: 42). This implies that 
Islamic moral economy ―adopts a balanced approach between an individual‘s freedom 
and the well-being of society‖ (Ayub, 2007: 42). 
Why would not consciousness of human self serve as a filter mechanism? Chapra 
92003: 25) cites famous Western philosophers and scholars, Will Durant, Arnold 
Toynbee, Jeremy Bentham and others: 
Toynbee and Duran have rightly concluded, after their extensive study of history, 
that moral uplift and social solidarity are not possible without the moral sanction 
that religion provides. Toynbee assets that: religions ―tend to quicken rather than 
destroy the sense of moral obligation in their votaries‖ and that ―the brotherhood 
of Man presupposes the fatherhood of God – a truth which involves the converse 
preposition that, if the divine father of the human family is left out of reckoning, 
there is no possibility of forging any alternative bond of purely human texture 
which will avail by itself to hold mankind together‖. Will and Ariel Durant have 
also observed forcefully that ―there is no significant example in the history, 
before our time, of a society successfully maintaining moral life without the aid 
of religion‖. 
Consequently, market ethics is utilitarian ethics and does not have the moral filter 
of either solidarity or morality, but some people operating in those markets do have 
moral filters stemming from Christian/Jewish traditions, despite the fact that this 
morality is constantly weakening.  
This is the main reason why the Islamic financial system should be at the bottom of 
the vulnerability list in terms of this specific criterion. It has this filter constantly 
publicized, assured, and renewed.  
As can be seen in Table 7.66, since socialism rejects the morality of organized 
religions, its ethical strength can be considered to be the most vulnerable one, in 
relation to financial crimes. However, solidarity is constantly enforced in socialism 
and it is not a neutral characteristic in the process of becoming a white-collar 
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criminal. Despite the existence of solidarity, though, socialism comes second in the 
list, because social solidarity is valid only in socialist markets. In international 
markets, solidarity can even be considered as a catalyst in the process of becoming 
a white-collar criminal, because it does not recommend ethical behaviours for the 
‗others‘ explicitly or at least not as strongly as Islamic/moral economics and 
finance do.  
 
Table 7.66: Comparison of Business Ethics as an Immediate Financial Defensive 
Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
7.2.2.2.6. Corporate governance 
Corporate governance has political economy implications, and it is expected that 
different political economies will have different corporate governance structures. A 
survey indicates that there are mainly two categories of corporate governance systems 
in the world: insider-dominated and outsider-dominated models (Franks and Mayer, 
1994; Short et al., 1998). The insider dominated system is mostly known as the 
German and Japanese model and the outsider dominated model as Anglo-Saxon style 
(Roe, 1993).  
The literature refers to these systems, respectively, as ‗relationship-based[4]‘ (Melis, 
2000) and ‗market-based‘ (Zysman, 1983) systems as well. From a discursive point of 
view, relationship-based (or insider-dominated, stakeholder-emphasized) corporate 
government systems are popular in socialist and neo-socialist political systems such 
as China and market-based (or outsider-dominated systems) are popular in 
market/capitalist political economies. We may argue that Islamic corporate 
governance is in between insider and outsider-dominated corporate governance 
structures, but suggests a larger stake holding than the German or Japanese models. 
In terms of ownership Islam does not impose a specific form of corporate governance. 
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For instance separation of ownership and management and thus the principal-agent 
problem existed in the personal life of Prophet Muhammad. He was the manager of a 
business which was owned by his would-be wife Khadija. So, it is hard to argue that 
Islam is directly against the shareholder view of corporate governance, but it is also 
hard to argue that stakeholding has little importance in its most comprehensive form 
in Islamic forms of corporate governance. First of all, Islamic corporate governance is 
different from the mainstream corporate governance theories. It is based on tawhid 
and it suggests a large and sustained
184
 stakeholding. The Islamic literature sees 
shareholders as individuals and not necessarily legal and separate bodies of different 
identity outside the identities of the owners. However, the individuals have the full 
responsibility of their social and physical environment in Islam. Nevertheless, some 
of these responsibilities may not appear in the legal codes and are left to the hereafter. 
Corporate governance policies were initiated in the UK, specifically by the Cadbury 
Report (1992), and diffused therefrom. One can argue that ―countries are attempting 
to reduce their differences and there is a possibility that corporate governance will 
converge at a global level‖ and the flow of convergence is towards the Anglo-Saxon 
style (Solomon, 2010: 194, 195).  
According to Solomon (2010: 205): ―A problem for many policy-makers and 
politicians is the potential for countries to be forced into the Anglo-American-style 
capitalism and corporate governance, when this is not the best route for them to 
take, given the characteristics of the economy‖. 
Because of the principal-agent problem of the outsider dominated corporate 
governance system, such systems are more vulnerable to financial crimes compared 
to insider-dominated systems. In socialism though, there is no private property and 
thus no corporate ownership issues emerge. Ownerships are held by the public as a 
whole and the principal-agent problem is not a commercial but a political problem. 
The greater public as not stakeholders, but the real owners of, for instance, 
kolkhozes do not usually have access to their agents in the capital of the market. In 
this sense, the socialist style of corporate governance is indeed equal to the state‘s 
governing of a corporation and not a ‗governance‘.  
                                                 
184
 Because of the ban on speculation. 
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Table 7.67 shows the last order of financial systems‘ vulnerability against FWCC in 
terms of ‗corporate governance systems‘ as an immediate defensive space. This Table 
concludes our comparison. The order reached in this table is combined with the 
earlier tables to reach Table 7.68. Table 7.68 repeats the same results for further 
comparison to reach the final ordinal places of immediate spaces shown in Table 7.69,  
 
Table 7.67: Comparison of Corporate Governance Systems as an Immediate 
Financial Defensive Space 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 (most vulnerable) Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
2 Market/Capitalist Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
In sum, the resultant picture of the comparative defensive spaces of the financial 
systems against white-collar financial crime is as follows (Table 7.68 and Table 7.69): 
 
Table 7.68: Comparison of the Total Effect of Immediate Financial Defensive 
Spaces 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1+2+1+1+1+2 = 8  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
3+1+2+4+2+1 = 13 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
2+2+3+2+3+3 = 15 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3+2+4+3+4+4 = 20  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
 
Table 7.69: Comparison of the Total Effect of Immediate Financial Defensive 
Spaces (for Further Analysis) 
Their Order Financial Systems 
8 / 6 = 1.3      1 (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
13 / 6 = 2.16  2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
15 / 6 = 2.5    3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
20 / 6 = 3.3    4  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
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Consequently, the combined effect becomes as shown in Table 7.70. Considering all 
the opportunity spaces and defensive spaces both as greater, secondary effects and 
immediate, primary effects, market society tops the vulnerability list and fully 
Islamized financial systems are at the bottom.  
 
Table 7.70: Comparison of the Combined Total Effect of both Immediate 
Opportunity Spaces and Immediate Defensive Financial Spaces (In the Same 
Order) 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1 + 1 = 2  2 / 2 = 1  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 + 2 = 4  4 / 2 = 2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3 + 3 = 6  6 / 2 = 3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4 + 4 = 8  8 / 2 = 4  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
7.2.3. Targets in the Financial Opportunity Spaces 
Offenders of financial crime aim at the targets inside the opportunity spaces. The 
magnitude and characteristics of the targets increase/decrease the value, density and 
vulnerability of the opportunity spaces. Because of this effect, the vulnerability of the 
system differs as the qualities of the targets differ in different systems. In this sense, 
all financial systems can be put in different cardinal orders depending on the financial 
targets aimed at by the culprits.  
However, opportunity spaces cannot be envisioned as simple characteristics of the 
environment specific to various crime types (such as dense markets high opportunity 
for unfari competition, manipulation. quick market higher opportunity for speculation, 
weak control markets high opportunity for tax evasion, complex markets higher 
opportunity for fraud etc.) because this approach disregards the effects of individual 
motivation, social effects of other individuals in the society along with political and 
bureaucratic structure of the state. It is possible to not have competition crime even in 
very dense markets and speculation in very quick markets as it is well established in 
the literature 
Now let us analyse these targets along with their differing characteristics to sort them 
out according to their vulnerability in relation to financial crimes. 
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7.2.3.1. Price Fixing 
In socialist societies, ―the authorities are able and willing to impose a price by decree 
... in such cases, what is needed is not a buffer stock but either a docile populace 
willing to accept queuing as a way of life or a secret police capable of preventing the 
market from reasserting itself – preferably both‖ (Copeland, 2008: 41). This is why 
the socialist system is the primary suspect for price fixing but the prices are not fixed 
by some free operators in the market but the governments. Nevertheless, we define 
crime in a socio-legal way. In this sense, not all of the price-fixing is defined as crime 
in Socialist states but it is easiest to conduct in socialist systems. 
Under socialism, most of the time, price fixing is done by the governments, but 
socialist governments are not the only governments who fix prices. For instance, in 
the US, at the time of World War I, prices of some commodities such as wheat and oil  
were fixed by using mainly two methods (i) average cost of earlier prices (supply and 
demand), (ii) ―marginal cost of production‖ (Simpson, 1919). Nevertheless, in a 
market system prices are usually fixed by private corporations with a large proportion 
of a given market. Standard Oil in the US is a good example from the 20
th
 century. 
Not only price fixing but other financial crimes such as speculation and manipulation 
are also committed by ―a ‗large trader‘ ... whose trades change prices‖ and change 
them ―only because of size‖ (Jarrow, 1992: 312).  
Therefore, governmental authorities enact laws ―to purge the securities exchanges of 
those practices which have prevented them from fulfilling their primary function of 
furnishing open markets for securities where supply and demand may freely meet at 
prices uninfluenced by manipulation or control‖185. 
Price fixing and being a monopoly or monopsony (ihtikar) in the market is prohibited 
in Islamic Law as well (Nawawi, 2009: 31- 38; Ilgen, 1998: 179-188). As for 
opportunity space for price fixing, the main determinant of price-fixing is the market 
density. It is not possible for financial institutions and individuals to fix prices before 
gaining ruling positions and market density is one of the most important prerequisites 
                                                 
185
 Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, Stock Exchange Practices, S. Rep. No. I455, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. 30 (1934) (The "Fletcher Report"), Reprinted in 5 Legislative History of the Securities Act of 
I933 and Securities Exchange Act of I934, at Item No. 21 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Maher Eds., 
1973). 
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of such positions. Usually in socialism one state company is the sole representation of 
the whole market or the whole industry while in capitalism and Islamic finance, the 
big firms with enormous market power can commit competition crimes. 
7.2.3.2. Speculation 
One of the main reasons for regulating financial markets is to prevent speculation. 
Fischel and Ross (1991: 503) for instance, argue that the Securities Act of I933,
186
 the 
Securities Exchange Act of I934
187
 and Futures Trading Act of 1982
188
 in the US 
were enacted to prevent the ‗excessive speculation‘ that took place in the stock market 
crash of 1929 and Great Depression of 1930.   
Speculation is a crime not only because many laws state so, but also because it is 
socio-legally defined as crime.  Speculation is defined as a crime because it brings 
about much harm to financial markets, some of which are mentioned in the Securities 
Exchange Act as follows:  
Speculation which ―produce widespread unemployment and the dislocation of 
trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and 
adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged 
by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices 
and by excessive speculation on such exchanges and markets. (emphasis 
added).189 
Some other examples of harm from price destabilizing speculation are given by 
Jarrow (1992: 312), who argues that ―when trading strategically, the large trader 
(called a speculator) generates profits at no risk, i.e., creates arbitrage opportunities‖.  
Indeed, even the scholars who prefer not to make ―moral distinctions between 
speculators and non-speculators‖ (i.e. Copeland, 2008: 40) cannot help themselves but 
make references to ―‗goodies‘ and ‗baddies‘‖, ―‗genuine‘ traders190‖ and ―gnomes of 
Zurich
191‖ whenever they discuss currency speculation. 
Speculation is not acceptable, and like interest it is prohibited, under Islamic law as 
well (Ilgen, 1998: 184; Tabakoglu, 2008: 64), because, as Jarrow (1992: 312) puts it, 
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 Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at I5 U.S.C. ? 77a-77aa (i988). 
187
 Pub. L. No. 73-29I, 48 Stat. 88i (codified as amended at I5 U.S.C. ? 78a-7811 (i988). 
188
 Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (i983) (codified as amended at 7 U.s.c. ??I-26 (I988). 
189
 U.S.C. 78b(4) (I988). 
190
 Importers, exporters, long-term investors. 
191
 Short and very short term (i.e. minute long) investors who are ―cynical‖ (Copeland, 2008). 
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speculation ―generates profits at no risk‖. It is an ‗unearned profit‘ (Morrison, 2002: 
222) according to Islamic law.  
As for the opportunity space of the speculation, the main determinants of the 
opportunity space for speculation are the investment and investor turnover rates in 
financial markets and the frequency of contracts that reach dead end.  
For instance for both Americans and Europeans put options writers earn by expecting 
an unfulfilled contract and the buyer may not deliver it at all. Thus, the option 
contracts with no fulfilment at or before (for American options) the exercise date 
reach a dead end and the frequency of such contracts provide an opportunity to 
measure the level of speculation in the financial markets. In a similar vein, frequency 
of the turnovers, (such as the time-span between buying and selling of the same 
percentage of share by the same buyer/seller) provides an opportunity to measure how 
big the opportunity space for speculation in any given market is. 
In this sense, speculation in the market system occurs many times more than in 
socialist or Islamic systems, because in socialism the financial markets operate either 
on command or on a central plan which is not really open to speculation. Whatever 
the state dictates or indicates about the markets must be accepted, because the state 
has the information monopoly. Therefore, there is very little space to create arbitrage 
opportunities in such markets because everybody has similar information about the 
limited number of (state) agents in the market.  
As for the difference between Islamic and market systems, we may argue that the 
market system defines speculation as a crime only in the socio-legal sense, but not in 
a definitive way, whereas Islam defines it in a clear-cut legal manner. In this sense, 
we may conclude that the opportunity space for speculation is bigger in market 
societies compared to the Islamic financial system because the system does not 
guarantee a legal punishment for such financial acts in market societies. Indeed in a 
market system, agents even see speculation as a mundane, legal event and everyday 
mechanism of the financial markets, which is not so in Islamic finance. 
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7.2.3.3. Manipulation 
Manipulation like other financial crimes is also committed by ―a ‗large trader‘ ... 
whose trades change prices‖ and change them only ―because the ‗other side‘ of the 
market believes (with some probability) that the large trader is informed, regardless of 
the possible information they may really have‖ (Jarrow, 1992: 312). 
―Even without proprietary information, these traders can sometimes manipulate prices 
to their advantage and generate profits at no risk.‖ (Cherian et al., January 01, 1993: 
201). 
Manipulation is usually an artificial transaction with a big impact on financial markets 
(Yıldırım, 1990) and is an attempt to control price and to encourage people (and 
machines) to make transactions by deceptive, misleading acts, transactions and 
information (Tweles et al., 1992: 317). Manipulation can also be considered as an act 
of manipulating rationality by purposefully changing the circumstances or 
infromation make-up of a given market.  
Nevertheless, it is not easy to deceive the rationality of people when they have enough 
time to contemplate their investment. This could also be an important parameter of 
the market manipulation, that is, the speed of the processes of buying and reselling in 
the market. The following can be considered to be an example: 
About his manipulation of the Nikkei Index, Leeson of Barings states (Curtis, 1998); 
The market movement allowing and increasing at the same time. Everything is 
increasing, my capability to accept the loss, the capability to accept the larger 
market movement, the capability to accept the larger position. Everything 
increases during the period, everything is building. 
In sum, manipulation is crime under all financial systems compared in this study, 
market and Islamic (Ilgen, 1998: 179) and socialist.  
As for opportunity space in relation to manipulation, the main determinant of 
opportunity space for manipulation is the market density. Just like price-fixing, 
manipulators also need to gain a ruling position in the market and the density in those 
markets is the most important indicator, most important prerequisite of such positions. 
Therefore, one can measure the opportunity space for committing the crime of 
financial manipulation in the market density of any given market. 
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However, the availability of the stock market is a prerequisite for the market density. 
In socialism the market does exist, because even in the wildest forms of socialism all 
attempts to abolish money and to destroy the markets failed (Hamburg and Teaching 
Company, 1977). Market socialism is thus inevitable in socialism, but the magnitude 
and the functionality of it differs greatly in different forms.  
Conversely, in Islam, the stock market existed from the very beginning of Islamic 
economics but an organized stock market in the conventional understanding is rather 
new in Islam. Muslims used to buy shares of each other‘s companies (shirkah) but 
they did not use an organized stock market in order to quicken the process of buying 
and selling the commodities or shirkahs probably because they considered it as a 
speculation. Even in the 21
st
 century, stock markets in Muslim economies either do 
not exist at all or are in their initial stages of development. 
In this sense, one can argue that one would experience less manipulation in Islamic 
markets and even less in socialist economies compared to capitalist, market 
economies. In addition, there is little doubt that a market economy has the fastest 
means of market transactions and information centralization which is a catalyst for 
market manipulation. 
7.2.3.4 Fraud 
In order to get a deep understanding of the availability of financial crime targets in 
socialism, we need to look at the „opportunity spaces‟ in socialism, and thus to the 
interactions of the financial agents individually, institutionally and with the 
environment. When we look at the financial agents as living organisms in financial 
systems, who are interacting with the financial environment and trying to catch more 
of the available sum all the time, socialists, with a rewriting of social change rules by 
eradicating private property, apparently, encourage those agents not to compete on 
those profits and settle them down, and of course decrease the activity level of the 
system dramatically by decreasing the opportunity spaces. 
As regards to the opportunity space for fraud in relation to the system understanding, 
the main determinant of financial fraud is the level of innovation and availability of 
various numbers of financial tools for the investors in the markets. For instance, in 
Islamic financial markets, the volume of opportunity space is lower than the market 
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financial system because in Islamic finance fewer tools are available for the investors. 
For instance, all the tools that include riba (interest) and gharar (uncertainty) are 
forbidden in Islamic finance. Islamic finance firms can also not invest in certain 
markets such as the ones producing or selling alcohol, drugs, pornography, even 
cigarettes in some countries.  
In addition, Islamic finance has fewer financial tools. It has those such as: sukuk 
(Asset-Backed Leasing Bonds), musharakah (profit and loss sharing), mudarabah 
(venture capital), tawarruq (short term liquidity provision), murabahah (mark-up 
priced sale), eina (trade financing), salam (prepaid forward sale), istisna‟(commission 
to manufacture), „urbun (down-payment sale) etc. but some of these tools‘ legality, 
(such as tawarruq) is still under discussion. Thus, in this limited volume of financial 
markets, there is less opportunity to cook accounting books in Islamic finance and 
even less in socialist finance. In socialist countries such as China, financial crimes are 
considered to be one of the cruellest kinds of crimes and punished by death sentences 
(The Register, 2009; New York Times, 2012; Aljazeera, 2009), which decreases the 
financial opportunity space for fraud dramatically. 
Moreover, the possibility of increasing the number of financial tools is really low in 
Islamic finance. For instance, Islamic financial institutions cannot use some of the 
tools of the trade such as options. American call and put options are not allowable in 
Islamic finance because their delivery date is uncertain. Thus, the market financial 
system has this whole market of American options market as an additional 
opportunity space to create financial frauds, which is lacking in Islamic finance. 
Savings accounts are another example of asymmetric volume of opportunity space 
between Islamic finance and market finance, because in Islam, one needs to draw 
whatever he/she deposits earlier to the Islamic Bank. 
Inversely, it is very hard to spot certain tools or additional markets that do not exist in 
market finance but in Islamic finance. Thus in general, it is really difficult to find a 
better opportunity space for fraud in Islamic finance compared to market finance. 
Nevertheless, there may be a loophole, which may be responsible for a great number 
of financial crimes and outpace all other means of financial crime in one or more of 
these financial systems, but the volume of this study is already too large to discuss 
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such circumstances. 
Convertibility of the value of targets is also important for a comparative analysis. For 
instance, US dollar, GB sterling and the Euro are more convertible. Thus, compared 
to Chinese, Cuban, Malaysian, Saudi, Iranian and Sudanese currencies, currencies of 
market societies are more vulnerable to financial crime, because they are more 
attractive and convertible.  
In recent times, many electronic targets began to be more convertible than currencies. 
For instance, derivatives are one of these tools. The fact that ―[t]rade in derivatives 
grew enormously in the 1990s‖ (Morrison, 2002: 324) is the proof that people, at 
times, prefer these tools rather than currencies and currency market derivatives. This 
makes such tools more vulnerable to financial crimes which are widespread in market 
finance. 
7.2.3.5 Tax evasion 
Discussion of tax evasion and tax compliance goes back to the history of the state, the 
philosophical debates of ‗social contract‘. According to Vinhanto (2000: 5) for 
instance, there is ―[a] social contract as a basis of tax evasion particularly in transition 
economies that have inherited a deep mistrust of government from their socialist 
past‖, but the history of Western democracies is also full of such hot discussions (e.g. 
those of Rousseau, Locke). 
Crowe (1944), one of the few contemporary thinkers on taxes, examines the 
perspectives on tax compliance in three ways, as a responsibility of the individual: (i) 
to the state, (ii) to the community
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, (iii) to God.  
McGee (January 01, 2006) prefers another three fold categorization of views: (i) tax 
evasion is never ethical, (ii) always ethical, and (iii) sometimes ethical. McGee 
(January 01, 2006) argues that  
Some recent empirical studies that solicited the views of segments of the 
populations in Romania (McGee, 2005a), China (McGee and Guo, 2006; 
McGee and Yuhua, 2006), Hong Kong (McGee and Ho, 2006), Argentina 
(McGee and Rossi, 2006), Guatemala (McGee and Lingle, 2005), Poland 
(McGee and Bernai, 2006), Armenia (McGee and Maranjyan, 2006), Germany 
                                                 
192
Mironov (2008: 1) argues that naming ‗stealing‘ as tax evasion is a politically correct way of 
naming it. 
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(McGee et al., 2005) and Ukraine (Nasadyuk and McGee, 2006) found this 
view to be widespread.   
McGee (1999) also found in Armenia that the two main reasons for evasion were ―the 
lack of a mechanism in place to collect taxes‖ and ―the widespread opinion that the 
government does not deserve‖ tax. In a follow-up study McGee and Maranjyan 
(2006) found a widespread belief in the society ―that there is no duty to pay taxes to a 
corrupt government‖ (McGee, January 01, 2006: 16). 
Thus, we may argue that ―[i]n a common assumption of the economics of tax evasion, 
...  the choice of a taxpayer to evade taxes depends upon the perceived fairness of the 
tax system‖ (Vihanto, 2000: 5), because "[a]ccording to the main hypothesis [of 
Hayek's theory], taxpayers are more compliant with tax laws to which they can in 
principle give their full consent‖ (Vinhanto, 2000: 5). 
From a rational choice perspective, when laws are considered to be unfair, there is a 
more motivated offender and suitable targets increase as the people get richer and the 
tax money at stake for them gets higher and capable guardians get weaker as it is 
easier to transfer money to overseas accounts. 
―Tax compliance is assumed to increase, for instance, when taxpayers feel guilt or 
shame for breaking the tax code (Erard and Feinstein, 1994), when they regard the 
fiscal system as basically fair (Cowell, 1992) or when they observe other taxpayers 
comply (Myles and Naylor, 1996)‖ (Vihanto, 2000: 7). 
―There are no reliable statistics on those who evade taxes, or even the amounts 
evaded, because the obvious intent of such evasive activity is to prevent authorities 
from ever learning the details‖ (Cowell 1990: 26, as cited in Vihanto, 2000: 6). 
Mironov (2008: vii) who constructed ―a direct measure of evasion/stealing for 179 
public companies‖ finds out ―that big corporations evade 50%-70% less than small 
ones‖ in Russia in 2008 and that ―large corporations that have assets greater than 
$100M evade about two-three times less than small ones‖. 
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Mironov (2008: 1) mentions three ways – other than his own193- of measuring 
―private benefits of control‖: Dyck and Zingales‘s (2004), Nenova‘s (2000), and 
Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan‘s (2002): 
However, in many cases big Russian corporations do not send funds directly to 
―spacemen‖194. In order to hide profits they use affiliated entities which deal 
with ―spacemen‖. For example, Gazprom, the largest natural gas producer in 
Russia, used its affiliates "Gaztaged", ―Laingaz‖, ―Provaidgaz‖ and other 
entities for these purposes. In 2003-2004 ―Gaztaged‖ sent $992M to the 
spaceman ―TrubmyTorgoviy Dom‖ and ―Laingaz" transferred $267M to 
another spaceman ―Energosintez-M‖. (Mironov, 2008: 2). 
―Off-shore centres are very important places and are very frequently used for evading 
tax. For instance in 2001 Sibneft decreased its income tax by 10 billion roubles 
($330M) by selling oil through several traders registered in the low-tax zones in 
Chukotka and Kalmykia‖ (Vedomosti (2002, as cited by Mironov, 2008: 5). 
There are mainly three types of tax evasion: (i) legal, (ii) illegal and (iii) semi-legal. 
The first category, legal schemes, ―typically involve using external or internal off-
shore companies with low tax regimes for profit accumulation‖ and the second way of 
legal tax optimization is a so-called ―insurance scheme‖195... Finally, one of the most 
popular ways of tax evasion [is] ―... decreas[ing] taxable income by inflating expenses 
through fake contracts.‖ (Mironov, 2008: 5).  
In Islamic economics, tax evasion is a crime (e.g. Murtuza and Ghazanfar, 1998), and 
similarly to the Islamic economics literature, the Bible ―discusses tax evasion and the 
duty of the citizenry to support the government in several places
196‖ (McGee, 2006: 
16). 
As for the opportunity space for tax evasion, the main determinant of the opportunity 
space for tax evasion is the strength of accounting standards in any given financial 
system, but as is shown in the chapter on ‗guardians‘ all accounting standards are 
converging at an accelerating speed and there remains no significant difference 
                                                 
193 Identification of ‗spaceman‘ (Mironov, 2006).  
194
 ‖[S]hort-life firms specially created for tax evasion and/or stealing purposes that are typically 
registered in the names of persons who lost their IDs or homeless people‖ and live ―1.5 years and 
receive monthly revenues of about $470K, that is 3.5 times higher than the average cash receipt of 
regular firm[s]‖ in Russia (Mironov, 2008: 1), also called "dump", "flash-light", "bruise", "hedgehog" 
(Vedomosti, 2005). 
195
According to Expert (2004), the share of the "insurance schemes" was 44% of the entire insurance 
market (Mironov, 2008: 5) 
196
e.g. Jesus, in the Bible, says: ―Give to Caesar the things that are Caesar's‖. 
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between them.  
In market finance though, there is much more to declare compared to Islamic finance 
and Socialist finance. First of all, in socialism there is no or very limited private 
property, and in simple terms almost everything belongs to the state. Therefore, it is 
pretty difficult to deserve the right of privately possessing property let alone hiding it 
from the state. Even if this was possible in a socialist state which controls every single 
bit of economic life it is almost impossible to evade tax. Indeed one could argue that 
the whole life of the socialist public is deemed to be ideally devoted to the tax or 
public good. In such a society of constant enforcement of solidarity, it is difficult to 
come up with people who eagerly look for ways of evading tax. Therefore, socialist 
finance is the least possible candidate for evading tax. 
Tax revenue literature in some countries (such as in Turkey) categorizes income tax 
as tax from purely financial activity and tax of revenue as stemming from the real 
economic activity (Kahraman, 2008: 8).  This is one of the reasons why Islamic 
finance comes after the market finance, because in Islamic finance, all financial 
activity must be backed by the real economic activity. This is indeed not simply less 
volume of financial activity and hence less tax, obligations recorded on accounting 
books estimates are more than hundred time less volume according to Chapra (2009). 
On the other hand, especially in earlier times the Islamic tax evaders (if we accept 
zakah as a tax from rich to the poor), were taken as outlaws and war was waged 
against them by the first Khalifa Abu Bakr. However many Islamic jurisdictions are 
not very strict in application in recent centuries, but still Muslims believe that because 
tax evading takes place against the whole public, it deserves the devastating amount 
of suffering in the afterlife compared to crimes against certain people. Nevertheless, 
there is a considerable amount of opportunity in Islam compared to socialism. These 
are some of the important reasons why Islamic finance should come second in the list. 
7.2.3.6. Value of Financial Targets 
We may categorise the financial crimes according to their values for offenders and the 
damage they do to financial systems through the following criteria, hence: 
(i) Price-Fixing; 
(ii) Manipulation; 
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(iii) Speculation; 
(iv) Fraud; 
(v) Tax Evasion. 
Price-fixing usually returns a sustainable future return for a long period of time while 
tax evasion takes place only for a certain period and only for a certain part of the 
reported gains. Since the tax is a smaller part of the overall gain the offender receives 
its value is less than price-fixing.  
Market manipulation is a less valuable crime for offenders as it is done for specific 
periods of time and for specific circumstances, whereas price-fixing is a constant 
phenomenon in the marketplace and attempts to change the most fundamental factor 
of the market, ‗price‘. In a way, price-fixing is constant market manipulation. 
Speculation is a less valuable crime for the offender, because its effect is less than 
both price-fixing and manipulation. If the offender has enough power, it would 
choose to manipulate the market and would not be contented with only speculating in 
it. Speculators are usually individual offenders unlike institutional offenders because 
speculation is easier to do and yields less return. 
Still, for individual speculators, evaded tax is only a fraction of the gain from 
speculated assets. As for the relative weights of the financial targets in market 
economies, Table 7.71 can be used. 
Table 7.71: Relative Market Shares of Different Kinds of Financial Targets 
 
  
Hedge 
Funds* 
Pension 
Funds* 
Investment 
Funds* 
Insurance 
Firms* 
Global Assets Of 
The 1000 Biggest 
Banks 
Hedge 
Funds 
% 
1998 0.22 13.57 9.40 10.40 35.50 0.30 
1999 0.32 17.26 11.40 11.50 36.70 0.40 
2000 0.41 16.07 11.90 10.10 37.90 0.50 
2001 0.56 15.24 11.70 11.50 39.60 0.70 
2002 0.59 13.79 11.30 10.40 43.90 0.70 
2003 0.80 18.30 14.00 13.90 52.40 0.80 
2004 0.93 18.80 16.20 15.00 60.50 0.90 
2005 1.13 20.55 17.77 16.20 63.80 0.90 
Source: International Financial Services, 2007. 
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7.2.3.7. Visibility of financial targets 
We may categorise the financial crimes according to their visibility for offenders as 
follows: 
(i) Tax Evasion; 
(ii) Speculation; 
(iii) Manipulation; 
(iv) Fraud; 
(v) Price-Fixing. 
Tax evasion is the first candidate for the visibility, because it is obvious for any 
offender to negotiate and save any possible discount from earnings. Speculation is the 
second best candidate because it is obvious for the speculators whether the market 
goes down or up. Since they use these short or very short time waves of rise and fall 
to profit from it is easy to know because following the financial markets in today‘s 
technology is still very easy. However, it is not as visible as tax evasion, because tax 
evasion is a product of a mandatory process of tax, and it does not require an extra 
effort to be aware of the opportunities but speculation does. 
Manipulation is the third most visible financial crime, because it is rather apparent 
that if one‘s assets are losing value, a gain would be possible (initially gain from loss 
and then the real gain) if the offender could manipulate the market or if the 
competitor‘s assets gain value, but there are more ways of doing manipulation 
compared to speculation and it is less visible because it is not driven by the market. It 
is on the contrary initiated by the offender and thus requires better visibility and 
alertness than speculation. 
Fraud is the fourth most visible financial crime, because it requires an extra effort to 
observe the opportunities of profiting from the malfunctioning of the market. The lack 
of supervision, regulation and monitoring in the market needs to be seen before 
manipulation which requires a better visibility compared to tax evasion, speculation 
and manipulation.  
Price-fixing is the least visible financial crime, because it is not market-driven and it 
is not intuitive like tax evasion and speculation too. Price-fixing is the least visible 
financial crime because there are many different possible ways of reaching the price-
fixing status and more importantly staying at that status. Both reaching and sustaining 
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price-fixing requires the strongest vision and constant watching of the market.  
7.2.3.8. Accessibility of Financial Targets 
We can categorise financial crimes according to their accessibility as follows: 
(i) Tax Evasion; 
(ii) Speculation; 
(iii) Fraud; 
(iv) Manipulation; 
(v) Price-Fixing. 
Tax evasion is the most accessible financial crime, because offenders have to report 
tax at certain intervals and at every new interval the possibility of not reporting 
certain gains and losses is very easy. Besides it is not ‗doing‟ something, but ‗not 
doing‟ something and thus easier to explain (i.e. by mistake, misunderstanding, 
misinterpretation) and convert (e.g. showing a personal earning as a corporate earning 
or vice-versa.). In addition, one does not need to convince or affect others (unlike 
speculation) while avoiding tax and can easily rationalize it (e.g. by saying that tax 
laws are so unjust, government is rich, poor are paid less etc.). 
Speculation comes next in the ranking, because it still needs interaction in the market 
with others. One cannot speculate alone but one can evade tax alone and this is why 
tax evasion is at the bottom of the list and it is above others because it is very easy to 
use the necessary transactions of speculation via legitimate and fast ways.  
Fraud is obviously less accessible than speculation and tax evasion, because it 
requires a special set up and a better understanding and control of the market and its 
agents, structures, processes etc. Its accessibility is less than manipulation and price-
fixing because the offender does not have to move, force, the whole market and must 
convince only a fraction of it 
Lastly, manipulation and price-fixing are the least accessible financial crimes because 
they require large scale influence of markets and prices. Manipulation requires such a 
power for specific times in the market while price-fixing requires this power 
constantly and this is why price-fixing is at the end of the accessibility order of the 
financial crimes, because offenders need the biggest market share either solely or in a 
group for a long time to fix prices. 
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7.3. CONCLUSION  
In this part of the research, what is looked for is not causality, nor correlation. These 
were the aims of the previous analytical Chapter. In this Chapter, we merely try to 
explain the latent differences between certain financial systems.  
Nevertheless, our results predict that there are more opportunities to commit crime in 
the market financial system and less defensive space to prevent it. Since ―[g]ood 
prediction does not depend on causal relationships. Nor does the ability to predict 
accurately demonstrate anything about causality‖ (Vaus, 2001: 4), our predictions can 
be used to predict financial white-collar crime in the context we presented here. As 
explained in the discussion of methodology in Chapter 5, it is almost impossible to 
reach statistics about white collar crime let alone white-collar financial crime. 
Usually, either the crimes are not in fact white-collar or financial or the statistics are 
only periodically collected if collected at all. 
Hence, our results in this Chapter could be taken as the best we can get for prediction 
because, as is well known in the science community, it is very hard to lay down 
predictions based on causality, but even then causality needs commentary because 
―[r]ecognizing that causation is more than correlation highlights a problem. While we 
can observe correlation we cannot observe cause. We have to infer cause‖ (Vaus, 
2001: 4). 
The combined results can be put after such a necessary explanation. Table 7.69 
summarizes and combines all the results of our comparative analysis in this Chapter. 
In order to reach these results we first compared the secondary effect of environment 
by using the greater opportunity spaces and the greater defensive spaces of financial 
systems we compare. After these analyses, the immediate, primary effects were 
analysed under the same two titles: opportunity and defensive spaces. This was 
followed by combining the results to represent the combined effects of the greater 
financial spaces and using the same procedure to reach a unified result for the 
immediate financial spaces. Thus, Table 7.72 is the result of the combination of these 
two spaces and thus the table represents all possible effects of the opportunity spaces 
both positive and negative, both secondary and primary effects. This makes Table 
7.72 the most important and concluding table in this Chapter; however 
complementary results follow in Table 7.75. 
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Table 7.72: Comparison of the Combined Total Effect of both Greater and 
Immediate Opportunity and Defensive Financial Spaces (with the Same Order) 
Their Order Financial Systems 
4 + 3  = 7  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
6 + 7 = 13 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
8 + 9 = 17 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
11+ 14 = 25  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
In our comparison, we used both positive forces increasing the financial crime 
propensity and the negative forces decreasing it. However, when crime is the concern 
the comparison is usually based solely on the positive effect. Comparison of negative 
effects is important and necessary though. To give an example, we may refer to 
Burke‘s (2006) argument on rationality and rational choice. 
Burke (2006: 44) agrees that preventive strategies ―would involve reform of the law 
and its administration in order to alter the equation and make crime appear less 
attractive‖. Although this is correct, this is also an oversimplified look at the rational 
choice because, in our study, we cited some scholars who convincingly argue that, in 
the UK, preventive strategies mostly relied on reducing or eliminating the targets (e.g. 
payment cards instead of chequebooks). Moreover, education and social development 
can also change the level of crime disposition.  
Indeed, the results are not surprising because the defensive space of the market 
system has been decreased since the Reagan Administration in the United States and 
the Thatcher Administration in the UK. The change was so pervasive that the era is 
even called that of ‗Reaganomics‘ or ‗supply-side-economics‘, which simply means, 
reducing both tax and spending, introducing financial deregulation and controlling the 
money supply to reduce inflation. 
It is also reasonable to see a financial system based on religion and morality as the 
least vulnerable system, because the results are of some behaviour about which the 
religion promises an eternal punishment. 
Arguably the most interesting result is the position of socialism, because it may be 
expected that socialism with few opportunity and constantly emphasised defensive 
mechanisms (such as solidarity) should have been at the bottom of the list or closer to 
429 
it. Nevertheless, these arguments are correct only for the vast majority of the people 
living in Socialism. But the rulers of them are white collar individuals and live in a 
considerably different environment with many consequences for FWCC . When 
compared to the white-collar criminals in other systems, even capitalism, white-collar 
people in socialism have enormous power and opportunity to commit crime. We 
provide examples in the text such as owners of the state conglomerates after the 
collapse of Soviet Russia.  
From our analyses we can also produce a comparative picture of the opportunity 
spaces and defensive spaces as shown in Table 7.73 and Table 7.74. As seen in Table 
7.73 the order does not change compared to Table 7.75 but the results on defensive 
space‘s final effects suggest a change in the order between socialist (2nd ) and partially 
Islamised economy (3
rd
) This is probably because the defensive effects in socialism 
are better.  
 
Table 7.73: Comparison of the Combined Total Effect of both Greater and 
Immediate Opportunity Spaces (with the Same Order) 
Their Order Financial Systems 
6 + 11   = 17  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
14 + 20 = 34 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
12 +24  = 36 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
17+ 34  = 51  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
 
Table 7.74: Comparison of the Combined Total Effect of both Greater and 
Immediate Defensive Spaces (with the Same Order) 
Their Order Financial Systems 
2 + 8  = 10  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
4 + 15 = 19 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
8 + 13 = 21 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
6 + 20 = 26  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
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Table 7.74 is scaled down so that the financial systems are seen as ordinal places in 
Table 7.75. All the analyses given in this Chapter achieved the result aimed at, 
confirming many times that the ordinal places of the financial systems in terms of 
their vulnerability to financial white collar crime are as in Table 7.76. However, this 
last rescaling, along with the other four rescalings, remind us that there have been 
many widening gaps between the cases we analysed and that the rescaling hid those 
gaps and, in a way, scaled all the varied gaps to a standard gap of ‗1‘. 
 
Table 7.75: Rescaled Comparison of the Combined Total Effect of both Greater 
and Immediate Opportunity Spaces (with the Same Order) 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
3 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
4  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
 
Table 7.76: Rescaled Comparison of the Combined Total Effect of both Greater 
and Immediate Defensive Spaces (with the Same Order) 
Their Order Financial Systems 
1  (most vulnerable) Market/Capitalist Financial System 
2 Partially Islamized/Moral Financial 
Systems 
3 Socialist/Transitional Financial System 
4  (least vulnerable) Fully Islamized/Moral Financial Systems 
 
Let us first see all criteria and the financial systems‘ relative positions in the order of 
vulnerability level according to those criteria first in Table 7.77 and the moving sums 
and greater sum to compare the effects of criteria from various categories in Table 
7.78. 
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Table 7.77: Financial Systems‟ Relative Positions in Terms of the Criteria Used 
 
Criteria Market Socialism 
Partially 
Islamised 
Fully 
Islamised 
Direction 
of Effect 
Proximity 
of Effect 
Politics 1 4 2 3 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 S
p
ac
e 
G
re
at
er
 S
p
ac
es
 Technology 1 2 3 4 
Society-Culture 1 2 3 4 
Economics 1 2 3 4 
Corporate Environment 1 4 2 3 
Social Relations 1 4 2 3 
D
ef
en
si
v
e 
S
p
ac
e 
Ethics Eduation 1 4 2 3 
Belief of Afterlife 2 1 3 4 
Entropy 1 2 3 4 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 S
p
ac
e 
Im
m
ed
ia
te
 S
p
ac
es
 
Ownership Structures 1 2 3 4 
Pressure to Markets 1 3 2 4 
Expectation of Markets 1 3 2 4 
Efficieny of Markets 2 1 3 4 
Long/Short Term Focus 1 4 2 3 
Concentration 1 2 3 4 
Complexity 2 1 3 4 
Volume of Assets 1 2 3 4 
Legal and Justice Systems 1 4 2 3 
D
ef
en
si
v
e 
S
p
ac
e 
Accounting Systems 4 1 2 3 
Audit 1 2 3 4 
Control and Management 1 4 2 3 
Business Ethics 1 2 3 4 
Corporate Governance 2 1 3 4 
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Table 7.78: Financial Systems‟ Relative Positions in Terms of the Criteria Used 
(With Moving Sums and The Greater Sum) 
Criteria Market Socialism 
Partially 
Islamised 
Fully 
Islamised 
Direction 
of Effect 
Proximity 
of Effect 
Politics 1 4 2 3 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 
S
p
ac
e 
G
re
at
er
 S
p
ac
es
 
Technology 1 2 3 4 
Society-Culture 1 2 3 4 
Economics 1 2 3 4 
Corporate Environment 1 4 2 3 
Greater Opportunity 
Space Sum 
5 14 13 18   
Social Relations 1 4 2 3 
D
ef
en
si
v
e 
S
p
ac
e 
Ethics Education 1 4 2 3 
Belief of Afterlife 2 1 3 4 
Greater Defensive Space 
Sum 
9 23 20 28     
Entropy 1 2 3 4 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 S
p
ac
e 
Im
m
ed
ia
te
 S
p
ac
es
 
Ownership Structures 1 2 3 4 
Pressure to Markets 1 3 2 4 
Expectation of Markets 1 3 2 4 
Efficiency of Markets 2 1 3 4 
Long/Short Term Focus 1 4 2 3 
Concentration 1 2 3 4 
Complexity 2 1 3 4 
Volume of Assets 1 2 3 4 
Immediate Opportunity 
Space Sum 
11 20 24 35   
Legal and Justice Systems 1 4 2 3 
D
ef
en
si
v
e 
S
p
ac
e Accounting Systems 4 1 2 3 
Audit 1 2 3 4 
Control and Management 1 4 2 3 
Business Ethics 1 2 3 4 
Corporate Governance 2 1 3 4 
Immediate Defensive 
Space Sum 
21 34 39 56 
Opportunity Space Sum 16 34 37 53  
   
Defensive Space Sum 14 23 22 31  
   
Great Sum 30 57 59 84 
    
 
Nevertheless, the literature is seriously concerned about the convergence/divergence 
discussions of the financial systems. In fact, through some more quantitative analysis 
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this study does provide a final measurement of the level of divergence between the 
financial systems under scrutiny in terms of financial crime vulnerability. 
Let us now turn our attention to this argument. The study needs to make a convincing 
argument that the distances between the financial systems, in terms of their 
vulnerability to financial crime, are meaningful. This is a problem because for 
instance, if one of these systems‘ scaled, measured position is 1000 and the others are 
1001, 1004 and 1011 respectively, all the systems can be accordingly ordered as 1-
1000, 2- 1001, 3- 1004 and 4- 1011. However, compared to the volume of the cases 
the distance between them would then be meaningless. They all can be considered as 
the same the entities with the magnitude because of the relative unimportance of the 
residuals, 1, 4 and 11 compared to the minimum volume, 1000.   
The literature on financial systems agrees that the opportunity spaces are converging 
(Asutay, 2010). To give an example from the context of comparative corporate 
governance systems, Solomon (2010: 205) argues that ―traditional insider-dominated 
systems have been encouraging greater dispersion of equity ownership. This has 
helped to cultivate a broader shareholder base and to encourage greater shareholder 
democracy‖. 
This analysis in Table 7.72 only concludes the comparative ordering of the financial 
systems in terms of their vulnerability levels against FWCC. We do not yet know that 
the distances between those systems are meaningful or not. Hierarchical Cluster 
Analysis
197
 (HCA) can be used to see the financial system‘s vulnerability levels as 
visual distances between them. Figure 7.6 and Table 7.79 depict such a dendogram 
and a proximity matrix which can be used to test the meaningfulness of the ordinal 
places of the financial systems in Table 7.72.  
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 As mentioned in Chapter 5 on research methodology, the main research method is the grounded 
theory and the results of this method are presented in Chapter 6. We also explain in the beginning of 
this Chapter that the comparison between the vulnerability levels of the financial systems are done in 
this Chapter by means of the theoretical codes produced by the theory presented in Chapter 6 and thus, 
this Chapter does not intend to use hierarchical cluster analysis as neither the fundamental nor as the 
primary method but uses it as a confirmation mechanism to see the significance of the distance between 
the ordinal results. This is why we put aside all the methodological discussions about the variables, 
power calculations, choice of hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) versus K-Means, Two Step Cluster, 
measurement of the variables and other related discussions. However, for a quick reference, we should 
inform the reader that IBM SPSS Statistics Version 19 is used for calculations and dendrogram 
generation and the ‗nearest neighbor‘ method is chosen as a cluster method and as an interval measure 
we used ‗squared Euclidean distance‘.  
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As the dendrogram shows, distinctions between the financial systems in terms of their 
vulnerability levels are meaningful in more than one scale and magnitude. From the 
most macro level, we observe two distinct vulnerability levels as significantly 
different clusters: socialism and market finance (rightmost red line) but fully and 
partially Islamised financial systems do not appear from this level of outlook as a 
distinct cluster. However when the observation is scaled down to see more than two 
financial systems as distinct clusters (leftmost red line) we then come up with Islamic 
finance (both fully and partially Islamised) as an additional cluster to the upper level 
clusters and forming three clusters: socialist finance, market finance and Islamic 
finance. Thus, we can conclude that our analyses suggest that the vulnerability levels 
between fully Islamized finance and partially Islamized finance are not distinct and 
meaningful.  
Looking at the dendrogram in Figure 7.6, it is also obvious that the distinction 
between the vulnerability levels to FWCC is most meaningful between Islamic 
finance (both fully and partially Islamised as a group) and socialism. 
 
Figure 7.6: Dendrogram of Financial Systems‟ Vulnerability Levels against 
FWCC 
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In a similar vein, Table 7.79 shows that both partially and fully Islamized financial 
systems are closer to the market finance in terms of their vulnerability levels against 
FWCC compared to socialism‘s vulnerability levels. Vulnerability distance between 
socialism and market finance is greater than the distance between Islamic finance and 
market finance.  
 
Table 7.79: Proximity Matrix to Show Distances of Financial Systems‟ 
Vulnerability Levels to FWCC 
Proximity Matrix 
Case 
Matrix File Input 
Market Socialist 
PartiallyIslamis
ed 
FullyIslamis
ed 
Market ,000 69,324 43,756 47,302 
Socialist 69,324 ,000 78,675 76,405 
PartiallyIslamised 43,756 78,675 ,000 7,363 
FullyIslamised 47,302 76,405 7,363 ,000 
 
By these figures and tables we conclude our analyses on comparative vulnerability 
levels as measured by the opportunity and defensive spaces of financial systems and 
the level of convergence between these systems. Table 7.80 and Figure 7.7 and Table 
7.81 are supplied to show that the comparative results of this study are not responsive 
to minor changes such as overemphasis on some of the criteria and thus magnifying 
or downgrading the statuses of some of the cases we analyse.  As shown in Table 7.80 
four additional criteria are used to magnify the effects of social environment on 
FWCC vulnerability of the financial systems under scrutiny. The results of 
hierarchical cluster analysis (HCI) are in Figure 7.7, which show that the 
magnification by the four additional criteria does not affect the results. Thus the 
results, that are the relative places of the financial system‘s vulnerability levels, are 
stable.  
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Table 7.80: Criteria Used for Comparison with Additional 4 for Measuring the 
Stability of the Results 
 
Figure 7.7: Cluster Analysis Results with Additional 4 Social Criteria for the 
Test of Stability
 
 
Criterion 1: Politics Criterion 16: Complexity 
Criterion 2: Technology Criterion 17: Volume of Assets 
Criterion 3: Society-Culture Criterion 18: Legal and Justice Systems 
Criterion 4: Economics Criterion 19: Accounting Systems 
Criterion 5:Corporate Environment Criterion 20: Audit 
Criterion 6: Social Relations Criterion 21: Control and Management 
Criterion 7: Ethics Education Criterion 22: Business Ethics 
Criterion 8: Belief of Afterlife Criterion 23: Corporate Governance 
Criterion 9: Entropy Additional Criterion 24:  Masculinity 
Criterion 10: Ownership Structures Additional Criterion 25:  Power Distance 
Criterion 11: Pressure to Markets Additional Criterion 26:  Uncertainty Avoidance 
Criterion 12: Expectation of Markets Additional Criterion 27:  Individualism 
Criterion 13: Efficiency of Markets  
Criterion 14: Long/Short Term Focus  
Criterion 15: Concentration  
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Table 7.81: Proximity Matrix for Hierarchical Cluster Analysis with Additional 
Criteria 
Proximity Matrix 
Case 
Matrix File Input 
Market Socialist 
PartiallyIslami
sed 
FullyIslamise
d 
Market ,000 82,829 48,719 56,046 
Socialist 82,829 ,000 93,110 88,215 
PartiallyIslamised 48,719 93,110 ,000 14,275 
FullyIslamised 56,046 88,215 14,275 ,000 
 
As a result, this part of the study proved that the comparative analysis of the financial 
systems would be flawed if financial systems are compared by using the arguments of 
the RCT which would equate the volume of the financial assets in a given financial 
system to financial opportunity in that financial system. For instance, such a 
comparison would consider two financial systems with the same volume of assets but 
a different level of density in the market. Such a comparison would also conclude that 
two financial systems have equal propensity towards financial white collar crime if 
they had the same volume of assets, ignoring the fact that they may have different 
levels of greater and immediate defensive spaces. In fact, two supposedly equal 
systems may be shown to be unequal under all 23 criteria presented in Table 7.77, 
especially when the comparison is pinpointed to certain financial crimes (e.g. 
competition crimes, tax evasion, fraud, manipulation, speculation etc.) instead of the 
‗financial crimes‘. 
Thus, this study enriched and developed a rather blunt concept of opportunity in RCT 
to a level of almost a ‗theory of opportunity‘ with many criteria, 8 of which are about 
the common effects of the environment of crime and can be used to compare other 
kinds of crimes while another 15 are specific to financial white collar criminality and 
may be adapted to the crime types under scrutiny in order to complete the 
‗opportunity space of crime198 under rational choice. 
As for the economic and financial systems compared in this study, one may conclude 
                                                 
198
 Please note that this is in fact a code group that belongs to our grounded theory which is developed 
as a result of this study, presented in Chapter 6. This Chapter tries to mature this code group in order to 
feed modern RCT to force a more complex analysis of opportunity. This approach, in effect, makes this 
study a development for RCT even if all the results of Chapter 6 were excluded.  
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that the main departing point between the financial crime propensity of the systems is 
the existence of a free market, because as Figure 7.7 shows the biggest distance exists 
between partially and fully Islamised economies and socialism. The distance 
decreases between the market system and socialism as the analysis is cut from a more 
macro level but still exists in a significant way. However this does not mean that we 
should abolish the free market in order to eliminate financial crime. In fact, Table 
7.82 provides some insights about the solutions to financial crime as a public policy 
problem. 
 
Table 7.82: Comparative Result of Financial Crime Propensity as Opportunity 
and Defence 
Criteria Market Socialism Partially 
Islamised 
Fully 
Islamised 
Opportunity Space Sum 16 34 37 53 
Defensive Space Sum 14 23 22 31 
Opportunity Space Distance  
Relative to the Best Theoretical System 
14 x 1 – 16 = 
2 
14 x 1 - 34 = 
20  
14 x 1 - 37 = 
23 
14 x 1 - 53 = 
39  
Defensive Space Distance  
Relative to the Best Theoretical System 
9 x 4 – 14 = 
22 
9 x 4 - 23 = 
13 
9 x 4 - 22 = 
14 
 9 x 4 - 31 = 
5 
 
Looking at Table 7.82 it can be concluded that market and fully Islamized systems‘ 
positions are at the poles of the opportunity spaces for financial crime because the 
market economy is holding the worst opportunity position and the worst defensive 
position at the same time. Likewise, the fully Islamized system resides at both best 
opportunity and best defensive position against financial crimes.  
The financial crime propensity of the market system can be improved by 
compromising some of the freedom, speed, complexity and volume of the financial 
markets and increasing its defensive spaces by, for instance, focusing on community 
improvement policies, social ties in the society, law, ethics, morality etc. Likewise, 
socialism‘s position can be improved by focusing on its immediate defensive space. 
Details of immediate defensive space are represented in Table 7.78 which is mainly 
about control. The Islamic system‘s position is strong but this does not mean that this 
position is worthy when we remind ourselves that the performance of the financial 
markets is negatively affected from this position. Moreover, merging our analysis 
439 
with the analysis in Appendix C, we may argue that the Islamic system‘s theory and  
application is not matching as well as capitalism and socialism‘s theories and 
application match because its theory dictates a distinct system (see Figure C.16 and 
relevant discussions in Appendix C) while its application converges (Figure 7.7) with 
modern systems.    
In other words, Islamic economics and finance theorise a ‗distinct‘ system compared 
to the dichotomy of full-control and no-control systems and the systems in between 
the poles of this dichotomy. This is indeed what is expected for a system that arose 
from a different ontology but the current application of Islamic economics and 
finance does not reflect this distinctive nature as is evident from the results of our 
cluster analysis. This is probably because the modern Islamic knowledge-base is a by-
product of the mechanism of ‗moral filter‘ in the knowledge development process that 
is used by contemporary Muslim scholars. The problem which has been uncovered by 
this study with the ‗moral filter‘ is that it cannot accumulate below whatever is not put 
in from above. Theories of modern economics and finance when ‗filtered‘ cannot 
produce anything dissimilar to modern economics and finance.  
Thus, in many ways, this study proves that the use of ‗filters‘, moral or otherwise, 
does not produce consistent results in the knowledge production process. 
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Chapter 8  
CONCLUSION 
 
 
―I am a mathematician.  
What mathematicians do is that  
they take 300 pages and condense it into one equation.‖   
Paul Wilmott, Quant 
 
 
 
8.1. SUMMARY 
In this concluding chapter the main findings of the research presented in this study are 
explained with the consequences and implications for the social sciences literature. 
First of all, this research fulfils the aims and objectives
199
 that are set out in the 
introductory chapter by developing a theory of financial white-collar crime, which 
was motivated by the observed gap in the literature as identified by Coleman (1987), 
Hagan (1989), Aas (2012) and many others.  
In order to fill this gap, the terminological confusion over ‗crime‘, ‗financial crime‘, 
‗white-collar crime‘, ‗bounded rationality‘, ‘‗multiple rationality‘ etc. is sorted out 
first and put into a coherent group of local intentions and needs of the study. This 
effort has turned out to be a very productive one, because one of the most important 
processes of grounded theory is to create a purposeful terminology through 
continuous coding and recoding. We may argue that we unintentionally extended this 
critical process to the very earliest stages of our study and produced a terminology 
from which confusing concepts were weeded out in the first place even before the 
grounded theory process began.  
After these clarifications, we compared the alternative perspectives on crime and 
deviance in criminology, and described the foundations of socialist and Islamic 
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 The aims and objectives of the study are presented in Chapter 1. 
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criminology, some of which do not even exist as a separate study area
200
 in either 
Western or Socialist and Islamic literature.  
Then we categorized all the crime theories according to their usefulness in explaining 
financial white-collar crimes, picked rational choice theory (RCT) as the base theory 
in order to shorten the theory building process, and identified the shortcomings of this 
theory for a comparative analysis of extreme cases: i.e. its latent assumption that the 
motivation is ‗automatic‘ (in the realization of an opportunity) and homogeneous 
across different individuals and different social-cultural environments. (Aas, 2012). 
After finishing the literature review, we followed the method of ‗theory building by 
comparative case studies‘ (Eisenhardt, 1989), hoping to solve some of the 
fundamental problems with RCT in general and in criminology in particular. 
Following the literature on grounded theory method, we used the most extreme 
comparative cases to expand the applicability of our theory to the widest possible 
intellectual area and generated very productive results. We produced a complex
201
 
mid-range theory of crime which fills important gaps in rational choice theories.  
Lastly, we compared the financial systems according to their principles regarding 
economics and finance using some criteria suggested by Gregory and Stuart (1985: 
12) and continued these analyses by comparing the financial systems depending on 
their white-collar financial crime propensity, using some criteria suggested by Punch 
(1996). In this latter comparison, we used some of the concepts we produced in earlier 
stages of our study: i.e. greater and immediate opportunity spaces as both positive 
and negative forces against and towards crime, as a complement to Punch‘s (1996) 
criteria. This second analytical Chapter of our study generated the cardinal positioning 
of financial systems (relative to each other) according to their vulnerabilities towards 
financial white-collar crime propensity.  
During the research process, which aims at generating a theory of crime, almost all of 
the branches of social sciences literature are scrutinized and theoretical comparisons 
are made. Incredible amounts of quantitative and qualitative data are processed. Five 
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 Such as ‗socialist criminology‘ and ‗Islamic criminology‘, ‗alternative perspectives of crime‘. 
201
 According to Georgen (2010: 4) complex theories study social systems holistically and they ―do not 
focus exclusively on one aspect such as the legal framework or compliance but look at the multiple 
interacting dimensions that together create the social ecosystem‖. 
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years‘ long hard work on social sciences inevitably brought about many unplanned 
improvements in other theories in social sciences that touch onrational choice. These 
improvements are presented in Chapter 6 which includes improvements in (i) 
definition of ‗financial crime‘, (ii) utility theory, (iii) theory of social stratification, 
(iv) theory of motivation, (v) rational choice theory, (vi) theory of environmental 
criminology, and (vii) theory of needs.   
 
8.2. MAIN FINDINGS AND REFLECTIONS 
The following section aims to position the findings of this research in the context of 
the relevant literature, which is done twice for each of the empirical results. 
8.2.1 Reflecting on the Theoretical Implications 
This study followed Eisenhardt‘s (1989) theory building methodology202 by using 
comparative cases, and at the end of our study we reached one of the most productive 
results of the four possible
203
 alternatives of grounded theory research (Eisenhardt, 
1989: 545): ‗mid-range theory‘. One of the most important characteristics of our 
theory is its dynamic nature of representing crime as a process taking place in the 
continuum of time
204
 and space within the sociological, administrative and legal outer 
environment and the inner environment of self-perception.  
This feature of the resultant grounded theory is important in the context of current 
―insufficient‖ (Hagan, 1989) criminology theories because almost all criminology 
theories try to distinguish the criminal from the innocent. They are discriminatory but 
there is not much evidence that crime as a scientific concept has this feature, which is 
not assumed in this study because this study does not take criminality as a 
characteristic or absence of a characteristic in an individual, but takes criminality as a 
continuum, as a process at the end of which crime is a possibility for each and every 
one of the individuals in a given society.  
As mentioned earlier, the most relevant theory to our grounded theory is RCT, which 
is criticized because of not articulating the function of motivation. When the 
                                                 
202
 Eisenhardt (1989) borrows much from the grounded theory methodology and thus the methodology 
used in this research can be considered under the umbrella of grounded theory literature. 
203
 The other three are concepts, conceptual frameworks, prepositions. 
204
 Coordinated to the hierarchical needs of Maslow (2010). 
443 
theoreticians did articulate it, they did so relatively later in the development of the 
theory but still with the assumption of automatic and homogenous motivation across 
extremely different individuals.  
According to Gottfredson and Hirshi (1990: 87): ―individual differences in the 
tendency to commit criminal acts ... remain reasonably stable with the change in the 
social location of individuals and change in their knowledge of the operation of the 
sanction system‖. However, Aas (2012) proves that this approach does not enable a 
criminological theory to extend its validity across the borders of socialist or Islamic 
countries let alone all other variations. This approach is pervasive in the literature 
(e.g. Mehmet, 1999). Although some of the game theoreticians make minor references 
to variety in human rationality (e.g. the immaterial world), they often do so in a 
downgrading way. For instance Polak (2007) calls people with the emphasis on the 
utility dimension other than materially-dominant utility ―stupid‖, while informed 
about the studies which predict that these people comprise roughly 30% of the 
Western society. 
These and many other hardships of using RCT for financial crime comparisons 
(especially for extreme cases) force us to find ways of overcoming or circumventing 
the principles, claims, assumptions, postulates of RCT by building a new theory of 
crime with a more capable, multi-dimensional base. We theorise that all dimensions 
effect all criminals in various ways but dominant-dimensions are more powerful in 
their effects. Norms, laws and regulations that are parallel to those dominant-
dimensions are easier for the would-be-offenders to comply with but all the rationality 
assumptions of individuals are considered to be different in certain degrees and forms 
in other dominant dimensions. For instance, self-interested behaviour in a moral 
culture is severely criticized while it is ordinary in materially dominated cultures. 
As a result of this research, a theorization is made as a threshold between `motivation` 
and `deviance`. The threshold is passed by hasty individuals; however, this rational 
choice (passing the threshold) is expected under the materially-dominant dimension 
only. That is, for another identical person who is in the identical situation but under 
the domination of another dimension, passing the threshold may not be rational and 
thus would not be expected until more severe inner and outer conditions emerge. 
Inversely, people committing financial crime under the effects of the socially-
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dominant dimension for instance may pass these thresholds (despite their lower need 
gaps and haste) faster in environments that are under the effects of other dimensions, 
for instance, the materially-dominant dimension.  
Many one-dimensional applications of RCT draw ―heavily‖ (Tittle et al., 2010) from 
Gary Becker‘s (1968) ―economic approach‖. Nevertheless, Becker (1968; emphasis 
added) argues that ―a useful theory of criminal behaviour can ... simply extend the 
economist‘s usual analysis of choice‖. But do not all the economists‘ ideas running on 
a standard understanding of the economy? In Chapter 3, we showed that they are not. 
For instance, according to Zimbalist (1989: 10): ―the approach of homoeconomicus 
will be analytically more limited in explaining the performance of planned economies 
than it is in reference to market economies‖. Then, Becker‘s (1968) understanding is 
relevant only in the market economy sphere of society because the other two major 
forms of economic knowledge have totally different understandings of extending the 
―usual‖ (Becker, 1968) analysis of choice. But what are those different understandings 
of rationality (or utility function to be more specific) in other economic systems, 
namely Socialism and an Islamic economy in this research? 
Still, we confirm some of the parameters of RCT suggested by Becker (1968) and 
Cornish and Clarke (1986). Going beyond their conceptualization we give a detailed 
analysis of these concepts, determine their interrelations in a dynamic environment 
and identify their entry and exit points in the process of becoming a financial criminal 
along with their interplay with the macro socio-economic system. 
Indeed, Cornish and Clarke‘s (1986) approach is not completely different from this 
study. For instance the ‗readiness‘ occurs after the evaluation of perceived solutions 
and these solutions are either legal or illegal and this part is placed under the ‗general 
needs‗ step of the same process. Cornish and Clarke (1986) are obviously aware that 
despite needs being ‗general‘ they are differently perceived and targeted by many, 
because all the individuals have different positions in relation to the fulfilment of 
those needs. There is no obvious disagreement between the model of RCT and the 
grounded theory produced as a result of this study. The involvement of the ‗needs 
hierarchy‘ in our analyses is no exception, because under the ‘Background Factors‗ 
frame, Cornish and Clarke (1986) enlist ‘sex‗ and ‘class‗ as social factors and they 
also mention the ‗general needs‘ and use the phrase ‘middle class‘. Thus, obviously, 
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Cornish and Clarke (1986) have a class based, materially unbalanced view of the 
society where there are society-wide, common, ‗general‘ needs. We put these 
dispersed ideas in a better form and suggest a complex, relative, nonlinear, dynamic 
relationship between them.  
In fact, many recent criminology theories and theoreticians use the common concepts 
and understanding of the society and crime motivation in very similar ways but use 
slightly different perspectives. Arguably we could begin our study by articulating the 
‗Strain Theory of Merton‘ (1938) and use the same concepts, arguments and 
mechanism to begin our study but would see no contradiction there either, because 
Merton (1938) uses very similar concepts such as ‗means‘ and ‗goals‘. The crime, in 
Merton‘s (1938) view, is either shortcutting to goals or shortcutting for the goals, but 
failing or, while approaching the goals, using unapproved ways and failing. In this 
sense, the grounded theory that emerged as a result of this study does not contradict 
any of the crime theories but rather confirms and merges their arguments in a complex 
and relative way. 
Indeed, the grounded theory constructed by this study recommends the replacement of 
the implicit fundamental psychological base of RCT. As mentioned in Chapter 6, 
RCT assumes that the ‗incentive theory‘ is the correct base theory of rational choice; 
however, we deconstruct this view and reconstruct a new perspective, which takes the 
‗need theory‘ of Rollinson et al. (1998: 149) as the fundamental base of rationality, 
which makes better sense in showing the connections between the individuals‘ inner 
selves and outer environment. 
Implicit assumptions which cause inconsistencies in RCT are identified in detail in 
Chapter 6 and there is no need to repeat them here but should be briefly mentioned as 
follows: we had better mention some of them as follows: 
(i) Definition of ‗financial crime‘ is not based on stable definitions. 
(ii) Theory of crime is constructed on a static theoretical foundation despite 
the fact that criminality and/or deviant behaviour is a dynamic 
phenomenon. 
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(iii) Theory of crime is constructed linearly and assumes a statistically perfect 
society in which one theoretical explanation fits all societies
205
. 
(iv) Theory of crime is constructed on one dimension which fits its linear 
perspective despite the fact that one kind of individual cannot be assumed 
in the postmodern, multicultural world. 
(v) Theory of crime is constructed on external stimuli and anomalies with no 
connection to the inner-selves of the agents nor their various needs and 
preferences depending on their circumstances. 
Along with these side results
206
 about RCT, we produced many codes relating to 
crime in general and financial white collar criminality in particular. These codes and 
the relationships between them are depicted in Figure 8.1 and Formula 8.1 
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 For a criticism of this paradigm see Aas (2012). 
206
 In fact these side results hold such a powerful explanatory power that their implications are more far 
reaching than the targeted results of the grounded theory we produced. 
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Formula 8.1: The Final Model of the Grounded Theory  
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Figure 8.1: Codes of the Grounded Theory on Final Dynamic Model 
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As Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008: 156) suggest, grounded theory studies are considered 
to be empirical studies: 
Strictly interpreted, as the result of any grounded theory study, a generation of new 
theory should emerge as a process, irrespective of the field where the method is 
applied. That this new theory should consist of a set of plausible relationships 
proposed among concepts and sets of concepts is the outcome of the methods 
application. Therefore, it is possible to say that theory is an outcome of empirical 
analysis. 
Confirming Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008), our inductive, positivist methodology handed 
us even more positivist results, with the possibility of putting all our codings, organized as 
concepts, categories, sub-categories, dimensions, into a formulation shown in Figure 8.1 and 
Formula 8.1 to show the interrelations and co-functioning. 
However, presentation is made in both positivist (in Appendix A) and interpretivist (in 
Chapter 6) ways simultaneously in order to be more clear and explicit about a complex theory 
which is sensitive to initial conditions such as haste
207
 in the coding system of the study.  
 
8.2.2 Reflecting on the Findings of the Comparative Analysis 
In our second empirical analysis, based on our comparison of the economic or financial 
system according to the established categories of the new grounded theory, we produced the 
following matrix in Table 8.1, which depicts the financial white collar crime sensitivities of 
various financial systems according to 23 different criteria in four groups.  These criteria are 
specific to financial white collar crime opportunity spaces but additional comparison on 
comparative criteria of general economic features of the compared systems are presented in 
Appendix C. 
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 ‗Haste‘ can also be considered as the strange attractor of the complex system the individual operates. Such 
fundamental concepts are named the ‗core category‘ in grounded theory methodology. 
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Table 8.1: Results of Comparative Analysis 
Criteria Market Socialism 
Partially 
Islamised 
Fully 
Islamised 
Direction 
of Effect 
Proximity 
of Effect 
Politics 1 4 2 3 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 
S
p
ac
e 
G
re
at
er
 S
p
ac
es
 
Technology 1 2 3 4 
Society-Culture 1 2 3 4 
Economics 1 2 3 4 
Corporate Environment 1 4 2 3 
Greater Opportunity 
Space Sum 
5 14 13 18   
Social Relations 1 4 2 3 
D
ef
en
si
v
e 
S
p
ac
e 
Ethics Education 1 4 2 3 
Belief of Afterlife 2 1 3 4 
Greater Defensive Space 
Sum 
9 23 20 28     
Entropy 1 2 3 4 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 S
p
ac
e 
Im
m
ed
ia
te
 S
p
ac
es
 
Ownership Structures 1 2 3 4 
Pressure to Markets 1 3 2 4 
Expectation of Markets 1 3 2 4 
Efficiency of Markets 2 1 3 4 
Long/Short Term Focus 1 4 2 3 
Concentration 1 2 3 4 
Complexity 2 1 3 4 
Volume of Assets 1 2 3 4 
Immediate Opportunity 
Space Sum 
11 20 24 35   
Legal and Justice Systems 1 4 2 3 
D
ef
en
si
v
e 
S
p
ac
e Accounting Systems 4 1 2 3 
Audit 1 2 3 4 
Control and Management 1 4 2 3 
Business Ethics 1 2 3 4 
Corporate Governance 2 1 3 4 
Immediate Defensive 
Space Sum 
21 34 39 56 
Opportunity Space Sum 16 34 37 53  
   
Defensive Space Sum 14 23 22 31  
   
Great Sum 30 57 59 84 
    
 
Our analysis suggests that the market economy is the weakest financial system against 
financial crimes, and Socialist, partially-Islamized, and fully-Islamized financial systems 
respectively follow the market system in that order in their propensity towards financial 
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crime. Socialism‘s position may look unexpected because when greater opportunity spaces 
are compared it appears as a less vulnerable system. This is indeed a reasonable expectation 
when we consider socialism emphasizing social bonds, and constantly educating the public 
according to those principles; however, its position deteriorates when the immediate 
opportunity spaces are compared. This is because this study is based on white-collar financial 
crime and in Socialism, white-collar people have greater opportunity spaces and less control 
of them is possible compared to other financial systems. 
Table 8.1 shows that more criminals would be expected to attack financial systems in higher 
ordinal position. As shown, capitalism is at the top of the matrix, followed by socialism, but it 
should be noted that the score of the greater opportunity space of socialism in the matrix in 
Table 8.1, which is considerably low for the general public (14) and shares bottom place in 
the list with the Islamic system (13, 18) due to insignificant differences. However, this result 
changes when the environment approaches white- collar people (immediate opportunity 
space) in Socialism. In a similar vein, Table 8.1 also shows that the offenders attacking 
certain financial systems would experience a better defence from Islamic and socialist 
systems and worse defence from the market system as the defensive space approaches the 
individual (immediate opportunity space). Islamic systems provide a better defensive system 
compared to other financial systems. 
A deeper look at the results of the comparative analysis also shows that the study pinpoints 
the critical areas of improvement. A given system may improve its position against financial 
crime‘s vulnerability by improving the weak performance areas. In this regard we may argue 
that without compromise in being an open system (greater opportunity space) and lessening 
the opportunities (immediate opportunity space), a market economy may improve its position 
by emphasizing the informal guardians such as the bonds of family, relatives, neighbours, 
colleagues, friends and ethics in the society. 
Likewise, looking at the results, one may argue that socialism may improve its performance 
against financial white-collar crime vulnerability by being more tolerant of moral systems in 
the society and by forming strong control mechanisms on the ruling party, usually the 
Communist party. 
The Islamic system‘s position on the other hand can be improved by improving their political 
and corporate environment, social relations and ethics education, shifting the balance of 
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long/short term focus towards the longer term and improving legal and justice systems, 
accounting systems and control and management systems of finance. 
Our analysis also gives a heuristic picture about certain concepts in finance and provides 
some hints about the consequences of their applications. For instance, we may see that as the 
system‘s entropy rises the level of vulnerability against financial white-collar crime rises. 
Similarly, the corporate environment in a market system is more competitive and more 
demanding, whereas it is moderate in a Socialist system as it is based on solidarity
208
. Islam is 
more vulnerable to financial crime in corporate settings than Socialist kolhozs (collective 
farms) because it allows the idea of business firm private property and corporations.  
Nevertheless, Table 8.1 does not tell us about the meaningfulness of the distances between 
the compared financial systems. For instance if a is 1, b is 2, c is 3 and d is 7834 then the 
ordinal place of these four cases 1-a, 2-b, 3-c, 4-d does not represent reality unless we 
demonstrate the meaningfulness of the distances statistically. Figure 8.2 depicts such an 
analysis which is a product of hierarchical cluster analysis. 
  
                                                 
208
 Campanella‘s ‗City of the Sun‘ discusses this phenomenon decades before Marx and does not provide a 
convincing argument. 
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Figure 8.2: Dendrogram of Financial Systems‟ Vulnerability Levels against FWCC 
 
 
As Figure 8.2 depicts, hierarchical cluster analysis, which successfully distinguishes 
socialism and the market system as distinct clusters at the most macro level but Islamic 
systems do not appear in this macro view. When we cut the dendrogram below 15 (left-most 
red line) we realise that partially and fully Islamized systems are not considered as distinct 
clusters. This level of clustering can be translated to mean that the distinction between 
partially and fully Islamised systems‘ vulnerabilities against financial white collar crime are 
not very meaningful. Thus, despite the fact that we reached an ordinal result we need to 
merge the results of partially and fully Islamised economies and re-present our results as 
follows: 
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Table 8.2: Refined Results of Comparative Analysis 
Criteria Market Socialism 
Islamic Economy and 
Finance 
 
Direction 
of Effect 
Proximity 
of Effect 
Politics 1 4 2,5 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 
S
p
ac
e 
G
re
at
er
 S
p
ac
es
 
Technology 1 2 3,5 
Society-Culture 1 2 3,5 
Economics 1 2 3,5 
Corporate Environment 1 4 2,5 
Greater Opportunity 
Space Sum 
5 14 15,5   
Social Relations 1 4 2,5 
D
ef
en
si
v
e 
S
p
ac
e 
Ethics Education 1 4 2,5 
Belief of Afterlife 2 1 3,5 
Greater Defensive Space 
Sum 
9 23 24     
Entropy 1 2 3,5 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 S
p
ac
e 
Im
m
ed
ia
te
 S
p
ac
es
 
Ownership Structures 1 2 3,5 
Pressure to Markets 1 3 2,5 
Expectation of Markets 1 3 3 
Efficiency of Markets 2 1 3,5 
Long/Short Term Focus 1 4 2,5 
Concentration 1 2 3,5 
Complexity 2 1 3,5 
Volume of Assets 1 2 3,5 
Immediate Opportunity 
Space Sum 
11 20 29   
Legal and Justice Systems 1 4 2,5 
D
ef
en
si
v
e 
S
p
ac
e Accounting Systems 4 1 2,5 
Audit 1 2 3,5 
Control and Management 1 4 2,5 
Business Ethics 1 2 3,5 
Corporate Governance 2 1 3,5 
Immediate Defensive 
Space Sum 
21 34 47 
Opportunity Space Sum 16 34 44,5  
   
Defensive Space Sum 14 23 26,5  
   
Great Sum 30 57 71 
    
 
Results of the comparative analysis as combined ordinal places (Table 8.1 and Table 8.2) 
show that the market system is the most distant financial system from Islamic finance and in 
terms of financial crime vulnerability they are poles of our analysis. Nevertheless, 
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hierarchical cluster analysis results depict Islamic systems as almost a sub-category of the 
market economy. Since market and Islamic systems were at the poles of the comparative 
analysis, there is only one explanation to these results: the distinction between Islamic 
economics and finance and market finance is being reduced but Islamic finance has valuable 
characteristics to elevate the market system into one of the strongest systems against financial 
white collar crime despite allowance of unlimited private property and the level of 
complexity of the market economy as a system. 
Results of the comparative analysis of financial crime propensities of the financial systems 
clearly show that some of the most important assumptions of RCT are too simple for a 
complex phenomenon. For instance, there is no doubt that socialism offers the least financial 
opportunity (in the sense of RCT) compared to all other financial systems but the results of 
our comparative analysis depict that socialism is not at the end of the order because, just like 
motivation (as proven in Chapter 6), opportunity is not a homogenous concept, although it is 
assumed to be so in RCT. In other words, white-collar opportunity is not equal to the 
opportunity of a regular person in the society for financial crime. 
 
8.3. SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY IN GENERATING A 
GROUNDED THEORY 
8.3.1 Contributions of the Grounded Theory 
This study generated a relativist, complex theory of crime which works for financial crimes.  
While discussing the ‗good theory‘, Hale et al. (2005: 92) give some measures, which 
―include complexity, erudition, elegance, profundity, reflexivity, originality, resonance, and 
ethical stance‖. It is the reader‘s responsibility to evaluate but we think that our results are 
competent enough because our theory is logically consistent, inductive, parsimonious, and 
generalizable.  
The significant contributions of this study can be listed as follows: 
(i) Putting financial crime in its primary and secondary environment of opportunities and 
restrictions. 
(ii) Demonstrating that opportunity is a very complex phenomenon and deserves a deeper 
analysis. 
(iii) Proving that crime motivation cannot be assumed automatically because motivation is 
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a product of a dynamic motivation process. 
(iv) Proving that macro evidence on crime and financial crime does not follow the primary 
assumption of the rational choice theory that crime trends follow opportunity trends. 
(v) Improving rational choice theory by solving the inconsistencies of the theory. 
(vi) Merging micro realities about the individual and the macro world of the crime in the 
same theory. 
(vii) Abandoning the discretionary look at the individual in the theory building process 
which is followed by the literature on crime despite being a debated issue in the 
humanities. 
(viii) Developing a complex theory which deals with many diverse issues from a variety of 
fields of science, such as psychology, sociology, criminology, law, economy, finance, 
business, ethics, religion, morality, politics, international relations, public 
administration, culture studies, philosophy, anthropology. 
(ix) Generating a dynamic theory which is capable of making predictions about ordinary 
people‘s future crime propensities and their aversion to crime prospectively.  
(x) Improving ‗utility theory‘, ‗theory of social stratification‘, ‗motivation‘, 
‗environmental criminology‘ and ‗needs‘ in addition to ‗rational choice theory‘. 
(xi) Providing both qualitative and quantitative demonstrations of the grounded theory 
developed as a result of this study and making the theory reachable by a 
preponderance of the research community. 
8.3.2 Contributions of the Comparative Analysis 
Additionally, the principles below regarding comparative analysis section of this study can, 
bluntly, be announced as the main findings of this study apart from the grounded theoretical 
analyses and results. The significant contributions of the comparative analysis of this study 
can be listed as follows: 
(i) Proving that crimes‘ importance and seriousness are not uniformly distributed. 
For instance, theoretically, from their own perspectives, crime is very important 
and unexpected in socialism while it is mundane in Islam and expected in 
increasing amounts in capitalism. 
(ii) Evidencing that existence and survival of the definitions of crimes are relative 
between cultures; 
Cultures‘ perception of crime differs and this is a serious problem for a 
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comparative study, but it is not a problem for this study because all of the 
economic systems we conduct our study on mutually codify the kinds of deviant 
behaviours we study as ‗crimes‘.  
(iii) Demonstrating that both crimes and deviance are continuous variables and they 
change over time; 
Even religious definitions of crime can be included in this group in special 
circumstances like stealing in a big famine.  
(iv) Showing that the socio-legal definition of crime is operable and valid with slight 
differences in all of the interested financial systems; 
(v) Evidencing that the notion of the ‗rational criminal‘ is valid, operable and is 
suitable for the comparison of financial systems from the point of view of 
criminality; 
(vi) Showing that the theory that utilizes the notion of the ‗rational criminal‘ has some 
inconsistencies and shortcomings; 
(vii) Demonstrating that the utility function has more than one-dimension because a 
universal scientific criminology theory must satisfy different motivational 
paradigms of various financial systems; 
(viii) Proving that the model of crime causality must be very complex because use of 
opportunity is not enough to explain financial crime; 
(ix) Demonstrating that the model of crime causality must be dynamic because the 
definition of crime is not only legally but also socially based; 
(x) Evidencing that financial crime researchers have to use qualitative data because 
quantitative data is either very scarce or unavailable to the researchers. 
 
8.4. LIMITATIONS 
Since criminology is an interdisciplinary field of study, it is unfortunately not possible to 
bring in all the expertise in all relevant scholarly disciplines such as psychology, biology, 
anthropology, economics, finance, politics, law, forensics, computing, mathematics, statistics, 
literature, history, religion, criminal justice, sociology etc. Therefore, the grounded theory 
developed in this study is far from being a complete theory, just like many similar social 
studies. However, it is an attempt showing the depth and breadth of theoretical formulation 
on the subject matter. 
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8.4.1. Limitations of the Grounded Theory 
The theory developed in this does not explain crimes that are committed by people with 
socially or materially dominated utility dimensions nor does it explain crimes against 
property that are taking place in lower strata of the society. Our theory does not explain 
crimes that occur in relation to more than one utility dimension either. 
On the other hand, the theory developed in this study is only applicable to offenders with full 
and bounded rationality. Nevertheless we recognise that there is a certain group of people in 
the society with ‗idees fixe‘ who do not act rationally despite the fact that they are not insane 
or mentally ill. We believe other utility dimensions may serve as a better ground to analyse 
their nature. Thus, we believe that further research will decrease the number of these 
irrational behaviours by putting them into rationalities of morally and socially dominated 
individuals. 
According to the grounded theory approach, theory building ends when theoretical saturation 
is reached (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1990) and we are confident about its saturation 
on financial white collar crime. However, if the time constraint were released, it is highly 
possible that we would reach saturation at even higher stages of our analysis by including 
more codes and more relations between the codes. Nevertheless, since every added 
complexity decreases the level of parsimony, saturation is always a compromise and the 
researcher has to stop somewhere. 
We assume in our study that all the financial offenders are materially-dominated, that is they 
value material, monetary gain over social, moral and other unforeseen gains. These offenders 
are obviously more vulnerable to financial crimes, economic crimes, white-collar crimes and 
the like. 
If people are not under the effects of one single dimension, or to put it more quantitatively, if 
the set-ups of the inclinations in all dimensions are closest to the means of all dimensions and 
if their haste/patience factor is close to zero, then, would-be offenders are not vulnerable to a 
specific type of crime and if they commit a crime it is probably by chance and depending on 
mere environmental circumstances. 
However, if they are under the effects of one specific dimension and not others, this makes 
them vulnerable to the type of crimes that are specific to the dimension the would-be-
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offender is under the effects of. Thus, people with materially dominant utility dimensions are 
more vulnerable to crimes that yield material gains. 
Positivist results of this study
209
 do not suggest that equating certain numbers to the codes in 
the formula and reaching positivist conclusions about some individuals are possible. On the 
contrary, the purpose of the formula is to succinctly represent the relationship between the 
codes and to increase comprehension of the model produced in Chapter 6 and Appendix A. 
 
8.4.2. Limitations of the Comparative Analysis 
This study conducts a comparative analysis between the financial systems and presents a 
great deal of detail. Nevertheless, our comparison criterion, opportunity space, is a 
dynamicity phenomenon. Presenting more details was necessary but we had to invest our 
time and effort in relatively more important parts of the comparison; because of the limited 
space, it was not possible to give more details about all chronological parts of the cases. 
Lastly, one of the most important limitations of the comparative results is the number of cases 
we use to depict Socialist and Islamic systems, but we tried to overcome this shortcoming by 
referring to the theoretical foundations of these financial systems. 
 
8.5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Based on the research experience and the contribution of the study, the following future 
research related recommendations can be put forward: 
8.5.1 Recommendations for Theoretical Development of Rational Choice Theories 
The resultant grounded theory presented in this text has enough explanatory power to be 
expanded to explain other kinds of crimes in general and crimes against property in 
particular. 
Further research can develop this ‗grounded‘ theory into a ‗general‘ theory of crime.  By 
using other dimensions (i.e. social and moral), needs (i.e. moral and social needs) in other 
strata (i.e. lower and middle) of the society the codes of our theory can be increased in order 
to accommodate other types of crimes. To reach that level, first of all, the theory must be 
                                                 
209
 Taking place in Appendix A. 
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extended to low and mid-range (non-white-collar) crimes against property and then by 
including these crimes in other dimensions a higher level theory of crime such as ‗general 
theory of crime‘ can be reached.  
Gottfredson and Hirshi‘s ‗General Theory of Crime‘ (1990) is one of the famous attempts to 
form a general crime theory, offering the self-control theory as a generalized theory that 
explains all individual differences and all acts of crime and deviance in all ages and 
circumstances (Akers and Sellers, 2004: 122). Indeed self-control theory was pretty bold in 
its claims but it received much praise and is empirically tested by Pratt and Cullen (2000), 
Grasmick et al. (1993), Vazsayi et al. (2001), Perrone et al. (2004). Still, a general theory of 
crime is another one of the discretionary theories and it is not a complex, dynamic theory
210
. 
On the other hand, this social phenomenon is so complex that it waits to falsify whoever 
claims to be certain in social sciences. We trust that our theory bears an explanatory power 
that may be the core of a general dynamic, relativist theory of crime in the future. In this 
study, we used financial crimes to show part of the bigger picture the theory can explain. 
Integration of other crime types may form the general theory and allow criminologists to have 
a common discussion ground. Otherwise they have to offer safe, discretionary, retrospective 
theoretical solutions to crimes looking only through the eyes of victims and culprits. 
Future researchers may use a multi-dimensional system which does not consider materially 
dominant utility to be the sole utility dimension even in wild capitalist societies, because even 
the most popular economics text books have realized that ―after the careful calculation and 
comparison of the payoffs in terms of the decision maker‘s goals ... they have found much 
evidence of behaviour that is inconsistent with economists‘ typical rationally assumption‖. 
(Baumol and Blinder, 2009: 92, emphasis added). Moreover, financial criminals are 
anomalies in some of these societies and are almost always materially-dominated. 
A general theory is reachable by switching the utility function from the materially-dominated 
dimension to other dimensions such as morally and socially dominated dimensions. By doing 
so, criminologists may analyse other types of crimes within the same theoretical construct
211
. 
For instance, assassinations, hate crimes, terrorism, war crimes etc. can be theorised in the 
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 See Chapter 4 for more explanation. 
211
 This is possible even by disregarding the fact that the utilities of the would-be offenders are multidimensional 
because the structure of the theory allows all the Eurocentric knowledge generated over the years to take part in 
this multidimensional structure of the grounded theory, because it does not force one utility functions to take 
into account other means of rationality (e.g. ethical decisions in the context of the decision-making of homo-
economicus). 
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same framework of this study by using the morally-dominated dimension, while rape, 
murders, racist crimes, political crimes etc. can be analysed by using the socially dominated 
dimension. This does not necessarily require a clear categorization of the crimes depending 
on their dominant dimensions nor positions in the hierarchy of needs and the relevant 
distribution to compare with the society‘s dynamic distribution, because there is interplay, 
interaction between all of these dimensions and concepts. Thus, further research is necessary 
to discover these time, dimension and distribution mappings of crimes, because these 
analyses come with the assumption that bluntly, all the crimes are indeed members of a group 
of crimes corresponding to a certain place in the needs hierarchy, dominant dimension and 
relevant distribution. 
For instance, the lowest level in the hierarchical needs of Maslow is the need of basic living 
and shelter; and putting such a need-fulfilment aim as the ideal-self for a given individual we 
may start analysing street crimes against property, then climbing the ladder of the hierarchical 
needs we may analyse the crimes of labour, crimes of employment, corporate crimes and 
eventually the white-collar crimes. So, crimes against property can be added to the code 
family of this research by focusing on the same material dimension but this time on lower 
strata of the society and relevant needs there
212
.  
Likewise, focusing on social and moral dimensions and switching the focus from lower to 
upper strata of the society, other types of crimes can be coded and merged with an 
extended
213
 coding system of the grounded theory generated by this study. In the final 
analysis, a multi-attributed utility function can be used to code the crime types that exist at 
the interplay of material, moral and social dimensions before additional dimensions are 
discovered to complete the coding family of crime. The final picture would be very complex 
but very neat and agreed-upon theory that is ready for quantitative analyses such as game 
theory with multi-attributed utility function. 
It was not possible to accomplish this during our research process ;―[b]ecause of the nature of 
the research, that is time-consuming and set within a particular context, it is usually not 
possible to generalize from a grounded theory study. Instead of referring to a theory, 
researchers will refer to a development of a substantive model… This is regarded as theory 
                                                 
212
 Appendix A gives some hints about how to merge future researchers‘ coding with the code family of this 
research in order to form a general theory of crime. 
213
 See Appendix A, Section A.1.2. 
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that is bounded by and particular to the arena in which the study took place‖ (Colls and 
Hussy, 2009: 157-158). This is why many further studies are needed to criticize, empirically 
test and improve the theory generated by this study. 
8.5.2 Recommendations for Research on Comparative Crime Propensities 
As for the comparative analysis, another study may be conducted to compare not only the 
financial systems but also political, geographical, anthropological, national, cultural systems 
according to the various vulnerabilities, using the codes of our grounded theory in full detail. 
Since such further studies are supposed to produce a one-shot picture with very restricted 
dynamicity in time, an index could be produced by institutional researchers, and through 
statistical comparison such as time-series analysis, the public may compare some of the 
agents according to certain codes we suggest in our grounded theory. 
For instance, in the context of financial crimes, GDPs of respective countries can be used as 
the quantitative representation of the code ‗real actual self‘ of system A or country ‗a‘ while 
their first one positive standard variance away GDP level can be quantitatively equated to 
‗ideal real self‘ of  system A or country ‗a‘. In a similar vein, the current debt of system A or 
country ‗a‘ can be taken as the haste of the case under scrutiny. Quantifying other codes by 
various data available to researchers it is possible to approximate to the real, refined 
relationships between the variables, codes produced by this study.  
 
8.6. EPILOGUE 
This study aimed at discovering which financial systems were the strongest and weakest 
against financial white collar crime, but during the research process we realised that it was 
not possible to conclude the research before having a sound theory of crime which has 
comparatively rational answers to the following question, as to ‗why do people commit 
financial white collar crime?‘. This is why our extended research included developing a 
grounded theory in financial white collar criminality based on rational choice with the 
objective of determining the propensity of the identified economic systems for financial 
crimes and the also determining the process of criminality through a number of criteria in 
each economic and financial system.  
As the foundational chapters in the literature review chapters show (Chapter 2, Chapter 3, 
Chapter 4) this study formed a broad and solid comparative base for developing a theoretical 
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framework.. For instance the correct definition of ‗crime‘ allowed us to continue our research 
in all financial systems and the proof that the most important arguments of rational choice 
theory were not reliable in financial white collar criminality provided the research with a 
confident, non-hesitant approach to the theory building process. As the research methods 
chapter (Chapter 5) shows, this research benefited from a reliable and tested scientific method 
of collecting and processing data. Finally, as the theory development presented in Chapter 6 
demonstrates, this study reached a dynamic and relative theory of financial crime which has 
an explanatory power to embrace even the most extreme financial environments. The 
applications of its environmental arguments were used in a comparative analysis of financial 
systems and as Chapter 7 shows this study identified the strongest and the weakest financial 
systems against financial white collar crimes. Chapter 8, finally, reviews and summarizes the 
results of both comparative analysis and the grounded theory before locating the findings of 
the study in the context of the relevant literature. Chapter 8 also describes the limitations of 
the findings and makes some recommendations for future researchers who would like to 
extend the results of this study.  
Thus, this study fulfilled its aims and objectives in a responsible way, which was not initially 
expected to be with such difficulty, volume, and time-span.  
Finally, this study lasted five long, hard years with a massive amount of qualitative and 
quantitative data which was processed at a speed causing the researcher to wear glasses and 
wrist aid because of continuous typing and reading. The results could have been much 
clearer, shorter and better, because readers deserve it, but still the researcher is happy to be 
writing these final sentences, because he thought many times during the research process that 
he would never have enough endurance to see them. However, in the final analysis, this study 
has produced a crime theory which can survive in the postmodern, multi-modern, multi-
cultural, global, diverse world. Since it is capable of making prospective decisions about 
regular, non-criminal people and can produce changing, dynamic decisions based on many 
parameters about the individual and his/her environment it is unique in many ways. It does 
not solve all the problems with the rational choice theory but it identifies them and provides 
many channels to be developed into a mature, firm theory of rational choice. 
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Appendix I  
CODING PROCESS of the GROUNDED THEORY 
 
 
 
 
I. 1 INTRODUCTION 
It should be mentioned at the beginning that the material, process and coding provided 
in this chapter goes beyond this research, and is therefore located as an appendix. In 
addition, due to the word limit, it was not possible to present this as part of the main 
text.  
In this Appendix, we present the coding process of the grounded theory in complete 
detail. The results of the theory given in Chapter 6 in a discursive manner are 
represented by positivist formulations and denotations, as is habitual while presenting 
the quantitative analysis results. The parsimony of the resultant theory is evident in 
this kind of representation, as the interactions between various codes are also clearer 
this way. Nevertheless, even with the formulations it may not be easy to follow all the 
concepts in the formulae before getting acquainted with the concepts in the first place. 
Therefore, we present them more explicitly with the implications in the main text in 
Chapter 6.  
Probably a better presentation would be possible by merging the discursive and 
quantitative explanations of Chapter 6 and Appendix I (this Chapter), however, the 
page limitations of the main text forced this separation. This makes Appendix I a 
crucial read in order to fully understand the resultant theory of this study. Conceptual 
flow of the ‗codes‘ is preferred in Chapter 6 because the close relationships of some 
of the codes only appeared at a late stage of the production process. Those distant 
‗codes‘ appear in their original ‗order of emergence‘ in this Appendix and this may 
increase comprehension by reinforcing the meaning of the codes in different 
conceptual places and with different functions. 
  
465 
I.2 POSITIVIST REPRESENTATION OF THE GROUNDED THEORY 
Before giving all the details of the formal coding process step by step, we had better 
give the end results of the coding process so that the reader may have a complete 
quantitative picture of the theory.  
Thus, beginning with the final formula, we first briefly explain some of the main parts 
of the emergent theory before revealing the details of the building process by means 
of the ‗codes‘, following the grounded theory processes. The codes are explained, 
beginning with the simplest concept, in the following parts. This macro explanation 
and summary at the beginning of this Appendix may encourage a deductive 
expectation process at the time of the beginning of the reading as well. 
I.2.1 Final Results and the Fundamental Relationship between the Concepts and 
Categories 
Chapter 6 presented many of the ‗important‘ codes of our grounded theory in a 
qualitative way, in a verbal fashion. Nevertheless, the methodology produces a 
positivist code system.  In this Appendix we present those codes following the order 
of the knowledge generation process. Therefore, details and definitions of all the 
‗concepts‘, ‗categories‘, ‗sub-categories‘, ‗dimensions‘ etc. of these ‗important‘ codes 
mentioned in Chapter 6 and some additional ones are explained in full detail in this 
Appendix I.  
Readers can also follow the production process of the grounded theory in order to 
check, confirm, review, control, improve even the smallest steps of the knowledge 
generation process. In many ways, this Appendix shows the intellectual, cognitive 
style, the inductive reasoning of the researcher as well, and allows the research 
community to make consistency checks. 
A taste of the positivist results is included, below, in this initial part of the Appendix 
where only some of the later stages of the quasi-positivist representation of our 
analyses are presented so that general depiction can be downsized. The results are 
presented only until the code ‗deviance‟ because this is the main aim of the second 
question, but the theoretical findings that go beyond this point are also presented in 
the latter parts of Appendix I, so that the reader can get a full picture of the complete 
process of financial white-collar crime including ‗confidence‟, ‗total return‟ and ‗total 
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loss‟ of crime.  
Let us now begin with ‗deviance‟. Our theoretical analyses suggest that ‗deviance‟ is 
a ‗motivation‘ in ‗haste‘. However, motivation is a positive word and a positive 
concept. One may have high motivation and it is something to appreciate. Even if 
one‘s expectation of reaching an ‗ideal self‘ is very low this does not make him/her a 
criminal but maybe a loser or a winner in a longer time in the material world.  
However, if someone is in ‗haste‘ that is a problem that a new parameter may change 
in the equation towards ‗deviance‘. As the level of haste increases the likelihood of 
committing crime increases, however if there is no (zero) haste there is no crime only 
when the patience of the offender is high, because then he/she has enough time to 
reach his/her ideal self in the distant future. However, the intimacy of the ‗vulnerable 
target‘s value‘ is exempt from this rule and effective especially when the value is 
enough to bring the individual to a higher and distinct status
214
 in the society.  
Nevertheless the effects of other dimensions are excluded here for the sake of 
parsimony. Their dynamic effects may change the circumstances. For instance people 
may prefer to change their ‗dominant utility function‘ in the course of the deviance 
process proposed by this research. 
In the following part the positivist results of the grounded theory developed by this 
study are presented in a reversed order. Firstly, the highest order conceptual syntheses 
such as deviance and motivation are presented. They emerged in an inductive manner, 
as small parts of an unknown whole, but they were synthesized to form the wholes in 
various orders. Nevertheless, the correct, inductive order is presented after the 
presentation of the bigger picture, the macro results, as well. The first macro level 
code is ‗deviance‘ with two distinct categories: ‗passive‘ and ‗active‘ deviance. 
I.2.2 Passive and Active Deviances 
We may consider deviance in two different forms as well: Passive and active 
deviance. Passive deviance is only the crime disposition. If all possible passive 
guardians are removed (e.g. offender moves to another country with very few passive 
guardians), passive deviance shows only the inclination of the would-be offender. 
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 Usually one (linear or nonlinear) standard variance (depending on the circumstances of the 
societies) away from the current position. 
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Active deviance on the other hand is the deviance after the effects of passive 
guardians such as the morals, pressures of family, friends, laws, regulations etc. and 
suggests a criminal act. We expect crimes in short time periods from the people with 
high ‗active deviance‘.  
While passive deviance shows only psychological disturbance and inclination to 
crime, active deviance shows the readiness, preparedness for opportunities. As a result 
of our grounded theory methodology, the code passive deviance can be represented as 
a relationship between the codes motivation and haste as seen in Formula I.1 
implicitly and explicitly. 
 
Deviancepassive = Motivationerror × Haste
±1
 
or 
Deviancepassive = (Motivationperceived – Motivationreal ) × Haste
±1 
 
Formula I.1: Passive Deviance
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Dpass = (Mp -  Mr )× H
±1
 
or 
Dpass = [(Ip – Ap) × 1/tp ) x Epp
±1
] - [(Ir – Ar) × 1/tr ) x |Epr|
±1
] × |H|±1 
 
where H is ‗haste‟ and represents offenders‘ calculation error between his/her 
‗perceived‟ and ‗real actual selves‟, when positive we call it ‗impatience‟ and when 
negative ‗patience‟. 
Following the results of the grounded theory methodology, the code ‗motivation‟ can 
be presented as a relationship between the ‗need gap‟, „time‟ and ‗expectations‟ of 
reaching the ‗ideal self‘. Since the code ‗need gap‟ is represented as another sublevel 
relationship between the ‗ideal self‟ and the ‗perceived actual self‟ which are denoted 
by ‗I‘ and ‗Ap‘ respectively we use these sublevel codes to represent ‗need gap‟. ‗M‘ 
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 Please note that this is only the positive side of the ‗motivation‘ and does not give a realistic picture 
without ‗refrainment‘.  
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denotes ‗motivation‟, „t‟ denotes „time‟ and ‗Ep‘ expectation or ‗expected 
probability‘; the relationship between them is shown below. In this relationship, Ep = 
1 when the individual‘s experience, education, training and other abilities and 
capabilities are on a par with the average person in his/her position in the same society 
and it is positive when above average and negative when it is below average. Thus, as 
the experience, training, education level or other similar abilities and qualities of the 
individual increase, his/her speed and likelihood of reaching his/her ideal self in a 
reasonable time increase. 
In the formulation of perceived motivation below,  
(Mp = ((Ip – Ap) × 1/tp) x |Epp|
±1
) 
perceived ‗ideal self‟216 is the financial position, financial status, the individual would 
like to be at; ‗actual self‟ is the current financial position of the individual217, 
perceived ‗time‘ (usually relatively less than reasonable time) is the average time-span 
between the current and future financial positions and perceived ‗expected 
probability‟ is the individual‘s own likelihood of reaching his/her ‗ideal self‘ by using 
his/her capabilities, abilities etc. such as education, training, experience related to 
his/her current financial position. Perception of expected probability is also relatively 
higher compared to an average person in the same socio-economic position. 
Similarly, real motivation draws a more realistic situation of the individual by using 
parameters that are free from perception errors which are measurable by consulting 
the relevant social environment of the individual. In the formulation of real motivation 
below:  
(Mr = ((Ir – Ar) × 1/tr) x |Epr|
±1
)   
Real ‗ideal self‟ is the financial position the individual would realistically like to be 
in, real ‗actual self‟ is the current realistic financial position of the individual, real or 
reasonable ‗time‘ is the average time-span between the current and future financial 
positions and real ‗expected probability‟ is the individual‘s likelihood of reaching 
his/her ‗ideal self‘ by using his/her capabilities, abilities etc. such as education, 
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 This is usually relatively higher than the average person‘s position in the same situation because it 
includes perception errors. 
217
 This is also considered to be better than the average person‘s position in the same situation because 
it includes perception errors. 
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training, experience related to his/her current financial position. Real expected 
probability can be measured relative to the people with the same or similar positions. 
„Refrainment‟ is the reverse of ‗motivation‟. Since the positively motivating factors 
are different than the negatively motivating factors of crime (i.e. fear avoidance), 
separate concepts are necessary but these concepts are indeed two sides of the same 
phenomenon. Refrainment as a formal code in our grounded theory represents a 
synthesis between the codes actual self, feared self and the expected probability. Let 
us denote refrainment with „R‟, feared self with ‗F‘ and expected probability with 
„Ep‟. The relationship is depicted below: 
R = ((F – Ap) × 1/t) x |Ep|
±1
 
where feared self (under normal circumstances e.g. normal distribution of wealth) is 
the financial position, the subordinates (e.g. in a society with normal distribution of 
wealth one standard variance below the individual‘s financial position) of a certain 
individual hold, and where the individual is likely to drop onto, when he/she 
repeatedly fails to fulfil the requirements of his current financial position
218
. Expected 
probability is the probability of the realization of the ideal or feared self. It is positive 
when it denotes the expectations of the ideal self and when negative it denotes the 
negative expectations of dropping onto the feared self.  
The difference between the motivations with perception errors and without perception 
errors gives us the risky, exaggerated amount of the regular motivation. This part is 
important in deviance because it puts individuals in a vulnerable situation. Especially 
in times of ‗haste‘, need, urgency, the amount of crime vulnerability increases 
substantially. Indeed there are criminological schools focusing only on this parameter. 
As for deviance, ‗active deviance‟ is what we usually mean by deviance, that is, 
somebody with all the inclinations and intentions, despite the passive guardians, 
towards the forbidden targets and behaviours.  
Offenders are under negative and positive forces in relation to financial crimes. As 
motivational forces overcome the forces of capable guardians, mere existence of 
vulnerable financial assets would produce more delinquency. However, if 
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 Usually failing to achieve the legitimate targets such as salary e.g. by means of bankruptcy.  
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motivational negative forces and guarding positive forces are balanced, then mere 
existence of financial opportunity would not produce financial crimes.  
Individuals do not have automatic crime motivation. People are under the influence of 
both need fulfilment and fear avoidance
219
 emotions, and motivations as regular 
motivations and deviance motives cannot be automatically assumed for every 
individual in the presence of financial opportunity. Indeed, this outlook assumes a bad 
human nature, when science‘s initial position must be that it is a balanced nature, 
which can either be bad or good depending on the circumstances. 
The inductive procedures of the grounded theory suggest that the codes ‗motivation‟, 
„refrainment‟, ‗haste‟ and ‗passive guardians‘ (with all their sublevel codes and 
relationships) can be synthesised as an upper level code, as ‗active deviance‟. 
Nevertheless, there is another prior synthesis we need to mention. That is the code 
‗MotivationRefrainment‟ (MR) which stands for the relationship between ‗motivation‟ 
and ‗refrainment‟. Let us denote ‗active deviance as‘ ‗Dact‟ before we link all of these 
relationships in Formula I.2. 
Dactive = MotivationRefrainment × Haste - Gp 
 
Formula I.2: Active Deviance 
 
Dact = [(MRp - MRr )× |H|
±1 
] -  Gp 
or 
Dact = [((Mp + Rp) - (Mr + Rr)) × |H|
±1 
] - Gp 
or 
Dact = [[(Ip – Ap) + (Fp –Ap) × 1/tp ) x |Epp|
±1
]  - [(Ir – Ar) + (Fr –Ar) × 1/tr ) x   
           |Epr|
±1
] × |H|±1 ] -  Gp 
 
It should be noted that in formula I.2 ‗no-motivation‘ and thus 'no deviation‘ is 
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 e.g. such as losing the current socio-economic status and the accumulated wealth by bankruptcy, 
excessive risk taking etc.  
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possible (e.g. ideal self = actual self); ‗no-refrainment‘ (e.g. feared self = actual self); 
and ‗no-MotivationRefrainment‘220 are also possible (e.g. ideal self = actual self = 
feared self) in this theory, which is capable of theoretically spanning diverse human 
behaviour. Again, negative values are also possible for both ‗need gap221‘ (i.e. when 
ideal self < actual self) and ‗fear gap‘ (e.g. feared self < actual self) which can 
explain avoidance as well as inclinations to crime. 
This theory also uses codes attached to the individuals‘ inner selves (e.g. ‗H‘) and 
their relative positions in the society (e.g. ‗Ep‘) simultaneously in the same theoretical 
setting and it is distinctive in this sense.  
The theory also allows comparisons between very different social settings but since 
the focus of this study is FWCC, we assume that all individuals we deal with have 
their ‗actual selves‘ > ‗ideal selves‟ and their ‗actual selves‘ < ‗feared selves‟, and 
therefore: 
 
Formula I.3: MotivationRefrainment 
MR = M + R 
or 
MR = ((I – A) + (F – A)) × 1/t) x |Ep|±1 
 
I.2.3 Crime Motivation and Act of Crime 
Finally, we can introduce two of the upmost inductive syntheses of this study: ‗crime 
motivation‟ and „act of crime‟. These codes unite more than ten different sublevel 
codes and represent their relationships with each other. ‗Crime motivation‟ is different 
than ordinary ‗motivation‟ and it is directed towards the ‗illegal targets‟. As a result 
of our grounded theory process, the code ‗crime motivation‟ can be presented as a 
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 From a philosophical standpoint the implications of the relationship no motivationrefrainment offer 
a behavioral position which corresponds to a reasonable person in some societies who truly appreciates 
whatever he/she presently has and does not fear the possible risks of the future. For instance, 
theoretically, in a hypothetical communist society with a parallel, linear line of wealth distribution there 
would be no motivationrefrainmnet (MR). 
221
 Although such behaviors are not well known in societies with materially dominated utility functions, 
in societies with dominations in other dimensions of the multidimensional utility functions they exist. 
Buddhist monks according to whom the meaning of life itself is suffering could be an example. 
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relationship between the codes ‗active deviance‟ and ‗opportunity spaces‟ as seen in 
Formula I.4.  
Crime Motivation = Devianceactive × Opportunity for Crime 
or 
Formula I.4: Crime Motivation 
 CM = Da× O 
 
The synthesis of ‗crime motivation‟ and ‗target vulnerability‟ as the upper level code, 
‗act of crime‟, is given in Formula I.5. Act of crime is the final, accumulated 
prediction about the criminal act, after all the information about the offender, victim, 
target, socio-cultural environment and immediate and greater opportunity spaces are 
analysed and synthesized.  All other codes indeed are prior forms of information 
gathering and ‗act of crime‟, processing all of this information gives a prediction 
about specific individuals‘ and/or circumstances‘ deviance or the deviance of 
hypothetical situations. Details of target value are presented in the following parts of 
this Appendix as well. 
Formula I.5: Act of Crime 
CA = CM × TV 
 
where 
CA = Act of Crime and TV = Target Vulnerability 
 
Although very simply explained, with very few codes for now, the complexity of their 
structure can be observed throughout this Appendix,and the ‗opportunity space‟, 
which includes arguments we presented in Chapter 6 about the non-normal and 
normal socio-economic distributions‘ effects on crime deviance is explained in detail 
in the later parts of this Appendix as well.  
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I.3 STRUCTURING THE CODING  
As Glaser (1978: 70) and Strauss (1990: 33) argue, in grounded theory research, the 
labels of the codes can be derived from a variety of sources like interviews, literature, 
informants, NVIVO codes etc. In our research, we use the numbering of the section of 
this Appendix and assign certain ‗names‘ to all the codes uniquely as the formal 
labelling procedure of our coding process. Thus, all the concepts as a product of this 
study have both the numeric code of their time place in the continuous process of 
grounded theory and the verbal code to show their place in the overall meaning of 
what the quantitative formulations stand for. We use those labels after explaining 
(Colls and Hussy, 2009: 179) them, but some of the explanations are put in the main 
text (especially in Chapter 6) in order to eliminate repetition.  
There are certain principles to follow while coding in grounded theory research, in 
order to avoid confusion: For instance ―labels with technical content or unfamiliar 
jargon can cause problems of interpretation to readers outside the field‖ and ―when 
common terms are used as codes; sometimes readers can be biased by a prior 
knowledge or understanding of a term which conflicts with or does not reflect what is 
intended by the researcher‖ (Colls and Hussy, 2009: 179). We tried to eliminate such 
confusion at the expense of more space. Thus, the definitions of ‗crime‘, ‗white collar 
crime‘ and ‗financial white collar crime‘ could be some of the examples about which 
substantial explanation is made in Chapter 2. 
I.3.1. Phenomena  
The first procedure in building a grounded theory is determining the primary 
phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 75). In our study, we scrutinize primary 
phenomena of ‗crime‟ and ‗finance‘, better to say, ‗financial crime‟.  
‗Crime‟ is an umbrella term for financial crime in this study and because it limits the 
boundaries of this research let us attach the first numerical code of ‗I.3.0‘ to the verbal 
code ‗crime‘. Then, ‗financial crime‘ in this universe of ‗crime‘ could be taken as the 
first code from the type of phenomenon of this study with the numerical code ‗I.3.1‘. 
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I.3.2. Concepts 
There are mainly four concepts in our study, the first three of which come from the 
rational choice theories: ‗motivation‟, ‗targets‟ and ‗guardians‟. We include the 
‗environment‟ in this group of the main concepts222 after reaching the comparative 
analyses in our study because the different environments of the different financial 
systems affect the crime rates.  
Thus, the numerical codes of ‗motivation‟, ‗guardians‟, ‗targets‟, 
‗motivation/refrainment‟, „crime motivation‟, „act of crime‟, „environment223‟, are 
‗I.3.4.1‘, ‗I.3.4.2‘, ‗I.3.4.3‘, ‗I.3.4.4‘, ‗I.3.4.5‘ and ‗I.3.4.6‘ respectively. In order to 
save space, in the rest of the Chapter the numerical codes are not explicitly matched 
but can be assumed as the first code attached as the first additional numbering to 
the title number where I.3.0 stands for the universe of the study, I.3.1 stands for the 
phenomenon, I.3.2 for concepts, I.3.3 for dimensions, I.3.4.X
224.1, I.3.4.X.2, …, 
I.3.4.X.n for categories (e.g. ‗positive motivation) and I.3.4.X.Y225.1, I.3.4.X.Y.2, …, 
I.3.4.X.Y.n for properties (e.g. ideal self) I.3.4.X.Y.Z
226.1, I.3.4.X.Y.Z.2, …, 
I.3.4.X.Y.Z.n for subcategories
227
 (e.g. perceived actual self). 
All the codes after the code I.3.3 (dimensions) are considered to be under the 
‗material dimension‟ and not mentioned after the coding procedures after the 
dimension level but assumed to be under that dimension. However, for the future 
research, all of the codes after this level can be taken as I.3.4.U
228
.X.1, I.3.4.U.X.2, 
…, I.3.4.U.X.n for categories (e.g. ‗positive motivation‘) and I.3.4.U.X.Y.1, 
I.3.4.U.X.Y.2, …, I.3.4.U.X.Y.n for properties (e.g. ideal self) I.3.4.U.X.Y.Z.1, 
I.3.4.U.X.Y.Z.2, …, I.3.4.U.X.Y.Z.n for subcategories229 (e.g. perceived actual self) 
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 We also use the offenders and victims as concepts but in order not to compromise parsimony we 
only mention the main characteristics of these concepts. 
223
 Because of space limitations, the codes related to ‗environment‘ could not be presented in this study 
in full detail but the researcher will present these codes in a dynamic formula in further research. 
224
 The ‗X‘ stands for the concepts 
225
 The ‗Y‘ stands for the categories  
226
 The ‗Z‘ stands for properties. 
227
 This type of code does not appear in the foundational literature of grounded theory but it was 
necessary for this study to develop an additional type of code as ‗subcategory‘ in this study in order to 
both fulfill the detail level of the theoretical construct and to allow expansion of the study to further 
detail levels by the inclusion of the additional type of coding such as ‗properties of subcategories‘.  
228
 U stands for utility ‗dimensions‘ such as ‗material‘, ‗social‘ and ‗moral‘. 
229
 This type of code does not appear in the foundational literature of grounded theory but it was 
necessary for this study to developan additional type of code as ‗subcategory‘ in this study in order to 
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where U stands for specific dimensions. For instance U=1 for material, U=2 for 
social, U=3 for normative (moral) U=4 for an unidentified dimension. 
 
I.3.3. Dimensions 
Although the appearance of dimension is at the later stages of the grounded theory 
building in formal procedures its earlier appearance at the presentation of the theory is 
considered to be useful in order to provoke a better and smoother comprehension of it. 
Besides, the use of the term ‗dimension‘ in the sense of ‗utility dimension‘ of both 
Benthamian and non-Benthamian
230
 senses is valid in this study as well. Earlier use of 
dimension as a more macro type of coding makes sense for this research. In fact, 
dimensions are always one of the most macro level categorisations, after which all 
other factors specific to a certain dimension may dramatically change. 
This study assumes that individuals use a multi-dimensional utility function for many 
different kinds of targets. This can be considered to be a function of other functions 
such as material (m), social (s) and normative (moral) (n). 
U = {m, s, n} 
I.3.3.1. Materially-Dominated Utility 
This study also assumes that financial white-collar criminals already have a 
materialistically dominant utility function and (when motivated) they approach 
material targets. Since the focus of this study is FWCC, all the codes following from 
this point are assumed to be under the material dimension. We occasionally refer to 
other dimensions when necessary though. 
We may denote the material-dominated utility function of certain individuals by ‗Mt‘: 
M = Materially-dominant Utility 
I.3.3.2. Socially-Dominated Utility 
People with socially dominated utility function value the needs, ideas, well-being, 
health, morale etc. of other people or the public in general and incorporate these 
                                                                                                                                            
both fulfill the detail level of the theoretical construct and to allow expansion of the study to further 
detail levels by the inclusion of the additional type of coding such as ‗properties of subcategories‘.  
230
 Please refer to Chapter 6 for more explanation on multi-dimensional utility functions. 
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values in their decision-making dynamics. We may denote socially dominated utility 
function by ‗S‘. 
S = Socially-dominant Utility 
Since some of the political economic systems claim that their society functions on a 
socially-dominated utility function, consequences of the divergent economic 
behaviour of those people are important in both economic and criminological, legal 
studies, but in this study, the consequences of such utility are considered to be 
recessive for the white collar criminals when compared to material dimension. Still, 
this dimension is included in the study as an environmental factor of the individuals 
who act on material dimensions, but live in a society with socially-dominated utility 
function. 
I.3.3.3. Morally (Normatively
231
) Dominated Utility 
People with normatively dominated utility function prefer moral, normative targets 
compared to other alternatives such as material or social targets. For instance, devoted 
Muslims would not receive interest (material target) even if the yield of accumulated 
interest would go to a charity for the poor (social target) because of their dominant 
moral utility which bans earning interest. We may denote such utility by ‗N‘: 
N = Normatively-dominant Utility 
 
I.3.4. Categories & Properties 
In grounded theory research, ―the properties of each category of concepts must be 
defined along a continuum‖ (Colls and Hussy, 2009: 179) and we preserved this 
continuum, by meshing every newly added property of a certain category into the 
theoretical formulation. 
I.3.4.1. Under the Concept ‘Motivation’ 
There are two categories of the concept ‗motivation‘: (i) positive motivation, (ii) 
negative motivation. Negative motivation also increases the motivation towards 
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 Use of normativity can be preferred for the societies with transcendental beliefs other than 
established religions.  
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material (financial) targets. Positive and negative motivations can be considered to be 
the analogies of carrot and stick for motivation. 
I.3.4.1.1. Positive Motivation 
Positive motivation is the motivation that moves the individual towards the targets 
because of the positive consequences of acquiring the target, enjoying its value and 
decreasing the need gap. 
I.3.4.1.1.1. Actual-Self 
Actual self is – materialistically, socially and morally - where we are now. For 
instance, a given individual may work in a corporation as a CEO who receives a 
certain amount of salary, bonuses, rent from his/her estates and who has his/her shares 
of certain stock, cars, yacht, house, belongings, jewellery etc. This is the material 
actual self of a given financial white collar criminal both in a point in time and in 
short-term continuum. 
As we mentioned before, there must be two kinds of actual self: (i) perceived and (ii) 
real because, similar to all other perception theories
232
, information-processing theory 
argues that sensations and perceptions are different because ―sensations were pure and 
were not influenced by previous learning and experience‖ (Matlin, 1983: 7), but 
perceptions were. Thus, we need to distinguish the sensed and perceived concepts, 
categories, properties throughout our analysis and this usually refers to the vocabulary 
we use before the criminal act (perception) and after it (sensation). 
Thus, Properties of the category ‗Actual Self‘ are twofold: (i) perceived actual self, 
(ii) real actual self. 
I.3.4.1.1.1.1. Perceived Actual-Self 
According to rational choice theorists, 
offenders ... use free will and weight the perceived costs against the potential 
benefits. This weighing is called choice structuring. Offenders choose to 
engage in criminal acts if their rough calculation suggests the action might 
result in net gain. (Lanier and Henry, 1998: 77, emphasis added) 
Our perceived actual self is what we think we are now. For instance, the CEO 
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 Mainly, empiricist, Gestalt , Gibsanian, behaviourism. 
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exemplified above may be paying a credit of $10 million after he/she bought a yacht 
but even before the credit is paid he/she could be a member of the yachting club and 
perceive himself/herself at the financial status of the people in the club.  
There are two possibilities. Our perception, if erroneous, may either be more than 
what we really are or it may be less than it. In the first case, the perceived actual self 
is how we advertise ourselves. It is usually more just, richer, more 
beautiful/handsome, more knowledgeable, more ethical, etc. than what we are in 
reality. On the other hand, when ‗perceived actual self‘ is lower than our ‗real actual 
self‘ we try to be reserved, humble, unassuming, we are less demanding because we 
think,
233
 we first need to reach our actual self, the self the society usually sees us at. 
As mentioned earlier, all of our selves (e.g. ideal self, real self etc.) are socially 
constructed; we learn valuable information about ourselves from outsiders
234
, from 
others. In a way, such people are competing with themselves and not with others 
because the choice about the direction of their perception error belongs to them. If 
they decide their perceived actual selves are above their real actual selves they take a 
group of people above them and compete; however if they decide their perceived 
actual selves are below their real actual selves they actually compete with themselves. 
In finance as well, according to the behavioural finance theory, ―[s]ome cognitive 
errors result from self-deception, which occurs because people tend to think they are 
better than they really are‖ (Nofsinger, 2011: 7). 
We may now code these relative positions of perceived and real actual selves and 
denote perceived actual self as ‗Ap>r‘ when it is more than real actual self and as 
‗Ap<r‘ when it is less than real actual self. 
I.3.4.1.1.1.2. Real Actual-Self 
Our real actual self is what we are in reality. For a successful person who is a good 
observer and analyser of his/her socio-economic environment and who apprises 
his/her position in it correctly, equality of the real and perceived selves can be 
assumed but literature and experience tell us that such people are not common. We 
usually make perception errors about our position in the material, society and moral 
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 Indeed we ‗aim‗. 
234Nietzsche (2005) in ―Also sprach Zarathustra‖ gives a nice, philosophical explanation of this 
phenomenon.   
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dimensions.  
Let us denote actual self with capital ‗A‟, perceived actual self with ‗Ap‘ and real 
actual self with ‗Ar‘.  
A= Actual-self, 
Ap= Perceived actual-self, 
Ar = Real actual-self, 
We can show perceived (Ap) and real (Ar) actual selves as the multi-attributed utility 
functions. 
Ap = {m-1, s-1, n-1} 
Ar = {m0, s0, n0} 
 
Actual-Self Error
235
 
One may code these imbalanced positions of perceived and real actual selves as 
actual-self error. Actual-self error, thus, is the discrepancy (perception error) between 
the perceived actual-self and the real actual-self offenders make. So, this is just the 
gap between the individuals‘ perceived and real material selves. Instead of calling this 
difference a ‗gap‟ let us use a more analytic representation, which is very common in 
finance literature. For financial white collar criminals, it is easy to observe common 
positive actual-self-error. For example, Nick Leeson of Barings who tried to change 
the whole market and thus the Nikkei singlehandedly as a broker with limited 
resources is a stereotype example. 
Aerr= Ap- Ar 
 
I.3.4.1.1.2. Ideal-Self 
Ideal-self is where we envision ourselves to be in the future or as an ideal. Although 
usually thought to be only individually constructed, societies‘ labels, stigmas, 
appreciations and acknowledgements help individuals or all other offenders build both 
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 Please note that actual-self-error is not coded at this level in order not to cause confusion with its 
more important equivalent description: ‗haste‘ or impatience and patience as negative and positive 
haste.  
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their ideal and actual selves. Media, culture and all social interactions can be regarded 
as such factors.  Since the focus of this study is FWCC, the ideal self is the material 
or socio-economic ideal self in this study. 
We may observe these effects in the modified dynamic motivation model of Rollinson 
et al. (1998). This model
236
 in its static form also shows the relationship between ideal 
self, actual self, need gaps and expectations. 
For further use, we may denote ideal self with capital ‗I‘. Ideal self is a multi-
attributed function of material (m), social (s) and normative (n) utilities but in this 
study we focus on the material dimension of the ideal self which is similar in volume 
across all the cultures as Hofstede (1991) shows in his masculinity index
237
.  
I = Ideal-Self 
I = {mn, sn, nn} 
Usually m1 (ideal self‘s material utility), is larger than both m0 (real actual self‘s 
material utility) and m-1 (perceived
238
 actual self‘s material utility), s1 (ideal self‘s 
social utility) is larger than both s0 (real
239
 actual self‘s social utility) and s-1 
(perceived
240
 actual self‘s social utility) and n1 (ideal self‘s normative utility) is larger 
than both n0 (real
241
 actual self‘s normative utility) and n-1 (perceived
242
 actual self‘s 
normative utility). 
Strauss and Corbin (1994: 277) complain that ―researchers often seem to concentrate 
on coding as this methodology‘s chief and almost exclusive feature, but do not do 
theoretical coding… some researchers deliberately do not aim at developing theories‖ 
(Colls and Hussey, 2009: 181). To overcome this complaint, we used the ‗theoretical 
coding‘ beginning from the coding below. Thus, there are two kinds of codes in this 
Appendix: the ones with and without numerical codes. Theoretical coding for 
conceptualization is given in the text without the numerical codes but in title they 
have their formal codes. The traditional coding, as mentioned before, takes place as 
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 See Chapter 6. 
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 See Chapter 7. 
238
 More precisely ‗perceived actual self‘. 
239
 More precisely ‗real actual self‘. 
240
 More precisely ‗perceived actual self‘. 
241
 More precisely ‗real actual self‘. 
242
 More precisely ‗perceived actual self‘. 
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numberings of the titles when not explicitly isolated and theoretical coding takes place 
in the text without numerical codes (e.g. actual-self error, ideal-self error).  
Properties of the category ‗ideal self‘ are twofold: (i) Perceived ideal self; (ii) Real 
ideal self. 
 
I.3.4.1.1.2.1. Perceived Ideal-Self 
Perceived ideal self is the real-ideal self, increased by ‗ideal-self perception-error‘ 
either positively or negatively. Individuals have targets about their future professional 
and financial life. When for instance their own material targets are considerably 
higher than the material targets society sees as acceptable, reasonable, for the same 
individual, perceived ideal self is different than the real ideal self. Ideal self is also a 
multi-attributed function of material (m), social (s) and normative (n) utility. We may 
denote perceived ideal self with (Ip) which can be depicted as multi-attributed 
function. 
Ip = Ideal-Selfperceived 
Ip = {mn, sn, nn} 
 
I.3.4.1.1.2.2. Real Ideal-Self 
Real ideal self is the ideal-self appropriate to our abilities (real expected probability) 
and needs (real need gap). Usually (excluding exceptional individuals) society 
appreciates better the real ideal selves of the individuals under normal circumstances 
in a given society with normal risks because people‘s perception errors about 
themselves are greater than the perception error of the society about them. Probably 
because society has various viewpoints compared to the individual. Let us denote real 
ideal self with (Ir). 
Ir = Ideal-Selfreal 
Ir = {mn, sn, nn} 
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Ideal-Self Error
243
 
Ideal-self error is the error between the perceived ideal-self and the real ideal-self.  
This is common to all individuals, but in this study we take it as a perception error 
offenders make. Ideal self error can be denoted by (Ierr). 
Ierr= Ip- Ir 
 
I.3.4.1.1.3. Need Gap 
Need gap is basically the difference between our ideal and actual selves. As our need 
gaps increase, we need to do more to reach our ideal self (in our case of FWCC 
acquiring more financial gains) and thus, to study, earn, buy, spend more. If we do not 
have the means to do those things, some of us may choose shorter, easier ways of 
reaching them and commit crime. Consequences of the varied forms the need gaps 
take in various societies
244
 are important to discuss under financial crimes. Still, the 
discussion has not reached the point where we discuss the deviant motivation for 
illegitimate targets. Need fulfilment and the motivation for that is inside the legal 
framework until we include the time constraints as a pressure on the individual. 
If we denote ‗need gap‘ which is also a multi attributed utility (N = {m, s, n}) as ‗N‟, 
‗ideal self‘ as ‗I‘ and ‗actual self‘ as ‗A‘, we could formulize the ‗need gap‘ as 
follows: 
Need Gap = Ideal Self – Actual Self 
Formula I.1: Need Gap 
N = I – A 
 
Properties of the category ‗Need Gap‘ are also twofold: (i) Perceived need gap; (ii) 
Real need gap, which are explained as follows. 
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 Please note that the ideal self error is not coded at this level in order not to confuse it with relatively 
more important group of codes: ambition and greed. 
244
 See Chapter 6 about the societies with normal and non-normal (right/left skewed, high/low kurtosis) 
wealth, income and other socio-economic distributions as the determinants of the need gaps. 
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I.3.4.1.1.3.1. Perceived Need Gap 
Perceived need gap is the discrepancy between individuals‘ perceived actual selves 
and the perceived ideal selves. In a way, perceived need gap is all about the individual 
with all the perception errors. 
Need Gapperceived = Ideal Selfperceived – Actual Selfperceived 
Np = Ip – Ap 
 
I.3.4.1.1.3.2. Real Need Gap 
Real need gap, unlike perceived need gap, is the need gap free from the perception 
errors of the individual about his/her financial position now and the financial position 
in the future in a reasonable time. Reasonable time is socially constructed but varies 
depending on the level of expected probability of the individual.  
Need Gapreal = Ideal Selfreal – Actual Selfreal 
Nr = Ir – Ar 
 
Need-Gap Error 
Need-gap error is the error between the perceived need-gap and the real need gap that 
offenders make. Need gaps may have consequences for crime deviance. For instance, 
the individual may feel burnout after reaching the financial position that is after Ip - 
Nerr from his current position for obvious reasons or commit crime depending on the 
time perception of the individual and the opportunity space. 
Nerr= Np - Nra 
 
I.3.4.1.1.4. Expected Probability 
In the model of Rollinson et al. (1998:149), the expectation is simply the capability, 
the ability of the individual to reach the goals by legitimate means. We may show this 
concept in a visual model in Figure I.1: 
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Figure I.1: Examples of Relative Positions of Categories
245
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated, expectation or expected probability could be considered as the 
probability of reaching the goals and can be denoted ‗Ep‘ as expected probability. In 
Figure I.1, some of the codes are illustrated in a visual form. In the right-most figure, 
the motivation is higher compared to the middle figure because a higher ideal self is 
aimed by the motivated offender to be reached in the same amount of time. This 
difficult position requires more motivation when expected probabilities are the same. 
Then; 
Ep = Expected Probability 
Ep = {mn, sn, nn} 
 
Ep = 1  when individual has the same capabilities, education, experience as  
the average person in the same socio-economic situation in the society. 
If Ep > 0 then; Ep = |Ep|
1   
when individual has lower capabilities, compared to an  
average person in the same socio-economic situation in the society. 
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 Greyed-out figures are not actual and/or current depictions. 
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and  
If Ep < 0 then; Ep = |Ep|
-1  
when individual has higher capabilities, education, 
experience as the average person in the same socio-economic situation in the society. 
 
If Ep = 1, it means that it is not very likely that the would-be-offender can reach 
his/her goals
246
 and if the Ep increases in positive values we may assume that the 
would-be-offender has an increasing capacity to reach his/her goals. Negative increase 
in Ep means that the individual is approaching his/her feared self. This may or may 
not increase crime vulnerability, depending on the other parameters of the situation. 
Expected probability can be measured as a distance to the average. If for instance a 
certain quality (e.g. higher education) increases the pace of the individual twice in a 
socio-economic setting then the expected probability with this additional quality can 
be measured as 2, but other parameters such as experience, training, accumulated 
wealth should be taken into consideration as well while measuring in a 
materialistically dominated utility function. 
In many ways, this model is a probabilistic one, because, as Vaus (2001: 2) states, 
―one of the fundamental purposes of research design in explanatory research is to 
avoid invalid inferences‖, because ―while we can observe correlation we cannot 
observe cause. We have to infer cause.‖ (Vaus, 2001: 4) 
Cause is either deterministically or probabilistically formulated. Given the enormous 
complexity of the social systems, inferring deterministic cause-and-effect 
relationships in social sciences is not easy or even ―sounds odd. It is hard to conceive 
of a characteristic or event that will invariably result in a given outcome even if a 
fairly tight set of conditions is specified‖ (Vaus, 2001: 4). Therefore, in social 
sciences most causal thinking is probabilistic (Suppes, 1970). ―We can improve 
probabilistic explanations by specifying conditions under which X is less likely and 
more likely to affect Y. But we will never achieve complete or deterministic 
explanations.‖ (Vaus, 2001: 5)  
Thus, properties of the category ‗expected probability‘ are twofold: (i) Perceived 
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 Because there is a good reason why this position exists in that specific society. People around the 
average position are most likely to continue to be in the same position. The ones that can be promoted 
to the  fewer positions at the upper levels need to be above and far above the average. 
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expected probability; (ii) Real expected probability. 
I.3.4.1.1.4.1. Perceived Expected Probability 
People, especially in finance, over-estimate the probability of gains and their abilities. 
For instance when asked about their ability at driving, 65% of the individuals 
questioned by Nofsinger (2011) claimed to be better than the average driver, which is 
not possible. We may denote perceived expected probability by Epp. 
Epp = Expected Probabilityperceived 
I.3.4.1.1.4.2. Real Expected Probability 
Usually in finance the real probability of gains is less than the perception of it, but 
being fully aware of both the strengths and the weakness of oneself is a valuable asset. 
As the real expectations get higher, the crime disposition gets lower because more 
expectation means more alternatives to crime. As Siegel (1995: 114) argues ―criminal 
motivation may be reduced if potential offenders perceive alternatives‖. We may 
denote real expected probability by Epr. As the expected probability error gets larger 
when perceived expected probability is higher then the real expected probability is 
that it is highly likely that people commit more crime. 
Epr = Expected Probabilityreal 
 
Expected Probability Error 
Expected probability error is the perception error between the perceived expected 
probability and the real expected probability that offenders make. Sternberg (2004: 
72) calls this property in a different context ‗expectation gap‘, while comparing the 
abilities and roles of auditors and their perceived equivalents by the society.  
Eperr = Epp - Epr 
 
I.3.4.1.1.5. Time 
Time is used to code the individual‘s moves from one financial position to another. 
Time is also a multivariate code and is relative because every society provides various 
financial infrastructures of financial interactions, investments, developments etc. We 
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may denote time by ‗t‘.  
t = Time 
t = {mn, sn, nn} 
Properties of the category ‗time‘ are twofold: (i) Perceived time; (ii) Real time or 
‗reasonable‘ time. 
I.3.4.1.1.5.1. Perceived Time 
Perceived time is the time-span in which the individuals think they can reach their 
ideal selves, usually measured in years or months. Usually individuals make 
perception errors about their pace towards their future attainment of their ideal selves. 
tp = Perceived Time 
tp = {mn, sn, nn} 
I.3.4.1.1.5.2. Reasonable Time 
Reasonable time is the average time individuals spend in moving from their current 
financial position to their ideal position in a given society. It is socially constructed 
and it depends on the circumstances of the society in which the individual lives.  
A visual explanation of the term is possible by socio-economic distributions. Chapter 
6 depicts smooth nonlinear distributions of socio-economic statuses in various 
societies; however, those distributions appear in non-smooth, non-linear distributions 
especially when more details are allowed in the distributions. Looking at the micro 
locale of the individual in those distributions, it is possible to measure the reasonable 
ideal place and reasonable time
247
 for every specific individual, because so long as 
these distributions depict the real socio-economic positions of the individuals, a 
reliable measure of reasonable ideal place and reasonable time is measureable with an 
accuracy that is free from both self-perception errors and the perception errors of 
others.  
For instance, both government officials‘ and private company personnel‘s career plans 
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 For a quantitative measurement of ‗reasonable time‘, frequencies of socio-economic status can be 
converted into time periods by using Fourier Transformation. 
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show possible routes of promotion. Thus, it is known by individuals and by the public 
how many years it takes to get promoted to a higher socio-economic position. This 
time-span can be taken as the ‗reasonable time‘ for that specific group of people. 
However, better workers get promoted earlier than others and thus, there is a 
relationship between the reasonable time and expected probability. 
Reasonable time can also be represented as a multi-attributed utility function. 
tr = Reasonable Time 
tr = {mn, sn, nn} 
 
Time Error 
Time error is the error between the perceived time and the reasonable time.  This is a 
perception error offenders make. time error can be denoted by (terr). 
terr= tp- tr 
 
I.3.4.1.1.6. Motivation 
Formulating the relationship between ideal/actual self, need gap and expectation 
suggested by the motivation model of Rollinson et al. (1998: 149)
248
, we may form an 
equation to show the relationships between these variables in a simpler way. We may 
denote motivation with capital ‗M‘ for further use and give the general equation for it. 
Motivation can also be represented as a multi-attributed utility function. 
M = Motivation 
M = {mn, sn, nn} 
Motivation = ((Ideal Self – Actual Self) x 1/time) x |Expected Probability|±1 
or 
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Motivation = (Need Gap x 1/time) x |Expected Probability|
±1 
 
Formula I.6: Motivation 
M = (I – A) × 
 
 
× |Ep|±1 
or 
M = N × 
 
 
× |Ep|±1 
 
It should be noted that ‗greed‘ as a similar term is also an excessive motivation with a 
level higher than the threshold.
249
 This is obvious from the definition of Boatright 
(1999), a behaviour that leads someone to maximize their own perceived self-interest 
because this is indeed the definition of rational choice as well.   
Especially in a legal and cultural environment where everybody takes risk all the time 
habitually, people expand their risk-taking limit and in such environments one of the 
options would be committing crime. In contrast, in low-risk-taking-societies,
250
 
ceteris paribus, the same individual would not see crime as an option. So, haste and 
impatience are consequences of not only the environment but also the inner being, 
self-definition. Since haste can be learned socially all the discussions of the social 
control theories are psychological theories that are valid under this study.  
Properties of the category ‗Motivation‘ are twofold: (i) Perceived motivation, (ii) 
Real motivation. 
 
I.3.4.1.1.6.1. Perceived Motivation 
Perceived motivation is the motivation with mistakes individuals make about their 
motivation without knowing their real and ideal-self mistakes, their miscalculations of 
their abilities etc. Perceived motivation can be denoted by Mp and formulated as 
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 Threshold being the real ideal self for a given individual depending on his/her current financial 
situation and the socio-economic circumstances of the society such as wealth and income distribution. 
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 See Chapter 7 for more details on Hofstede‘s studies along with other arguments on risk-taking 
behavior in various cultural environments. 
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follows. 
 
Motivationperceived = (Ideal Selfperceived – Actual Selfperceived) 1/ timeperceived ) x |Expected 
Probabilityperceived|
±1
 
or 
Motivationperceived = Need Gapperceived x 1/ timeperceived ) x |Expected 
Probabilityperceived|
±1
 
 
Mp = ((Ip – Ap) ×1/ tp) x |Epp|
±1
 
or 
Mp = Np× 1/ tp) x |Epp|
±1
 
 
I.3.4.1.1.6.2. Real Motivation 
Real motivation is the motivation of the offender, which is calculated by taking into 
account all the perception errors and which must be recalculated and readjusted after 
the realization of the objectives and targets, after seeing and experiencing the real 
capabilities, real values of the targets and punishers‘ punishments. Both legitimate 
and illegitimate punishments are taken into consideration at the time of the 
readjustment. As outsiders we cannot know the perceived motivation of the 
individuals unless we analyse the situation and inner-self of the offender in detail but 
may know the real, reasonable motivation by comparing his/her situation with the 
situations of similar individuals. Real motivation can be denoted by Mr and 
formulated as follows. 
Motivationreal = (Ideal Selfreal – Actual Selfreal) x 1/ timereal ) x |Expected Probabilityreal|
±1
 
or 
Motivationreal = Need Gapreal x 1/ timereal ) x |Expected Probabilityreal|
±1
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Mr = (Ir – Ar) × 1/ tr) x |Epr|
±1
 
or 
Mr = Nr× 1/ tr) x |Epr|
±1
 
 
So, the perceived motivation is what is expected from a person with many perception 
errors and what eventually is realised is the real motivation which usually falls short 
of perceived motivation and is realised in a realistic position of the individual in a 
given society with certain biological, psychological, intellectual, financial etc. 
capabilities.  
Motivation Error 
Thus, apparently there is a difference between the motivation that is produced with 
perception errors and the one that is free from such errors. People may be seen as less 
or more motivated given their circumstances usually by the immediate and greater 
society surrounding the offender. Thus, the motivation error is the error between the 
motivation calculated by true parameters (usually from outsiders) and the calculations 
with perception errors (usually by the offender himself/herself). Motivation error is 
the error between the perceived motivation and the real motivation.  
Motivation may seem a continuum of need gap but there are good reasons that these 
codes are different. For instance motivation can be more or less than the need gap of 
an individual. If an individuals‘ perceived actual self is more than his/her real actual 
self, then, neither motivation error, nor need gap can give the true picture of the 
individual‘s distance and pace to his/her ideal self.  
Merr = Mp - Mr 
or 
[(Ip – Ap) × 1/tp ) x |Epp|
±1
] - [(Ir – Ar) × 1/tr ) x |Epr|
±1
] 
 
I.3.4.1.1.7. Haste or Impatience (The Core Category) 
Haste is the desire to access something with limited, insufficient resources. The model 
we presented up to this point is a generic model of motivation and does not 
necessarily produce deviant behaviour. Until this point, haste or impatience does not 
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appear in our model and in its current form it represents the motivation model of 
Rollinson et al. (1998: 149). As is presented in Chapter 6, we reproduce this model 
and put the individual into his/her relevant environment in a dynamic process. 
Characteristics of various possible environments such as linear, non-linear, normal 
and non-normal socio-economic distributions are also presented in Chapter 6. The 
meaning, value, characteristics of haste must be judged and determined inside this 
framework. Two individuals living in the same society with close socio-economic 
proximity may have completely different haste and motivation levels, because of the 
nonlinear consequences of motivational environment. For instance, as shown in 
Figure I.2, moving from $20,000 income to $40,000 means completely different 
things. In the income distribution of Argentina, for instance, this dynamic socio-
economic move puts the individual into a new class, while in Australia the individual 
is still in the same class despite the fact that he/she has doubled his/her income. This 
is an indication of the relative meaning of pecuniary change. Undoubtedly, an 
individual moving from Argentina to Australia with $40,000 unchanged income needs 
an adjustment time because he/she moves to a middle-class position, where he/she 
may claim a white-collar privilege he/she got used to in Argentina. This is one of the 
causes of ‗haste‘ in FWCC. The same example can be extended to dynamic moves 
inside or outside corporations, institutions, hiring, firing etc.  
In a situation similar to the one presented in Figure I.2 individuals may be in haste to 
reach a higher status in the society. This is tantamount to saying that they are ususally 
under time constraints. Since all the aims, financial positions, are achievable when 
enough time is provided, crime, especially financial crime, occurs with the scarcity of 
time. This is an intuitive way of presenting haste. This is an environmental, macro 
look at haste, but we may also define haste as a discrepancy (or error) between the 
real actual self and the perceived actual self 
251
 because the interaction between our 
inner self and outer environment is a two-way interaction.  
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 There is some empirical research to support this claim. For instance Perrone et al., (2004: 307) 
showed that ―the over-sampled middle and upper-middle-class Blacks in the sample exhibited 
relatively high levels of self-control‖. This effect in our model can be interpreted as the relative 
inability of the stigmatized Black people to set ideal selves that are higher than their status (―middle- 
and upper-middle-―) in the society they live in and thus as their having less discrepancy between their 
perceived actual and real actual selves.  
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Figure I.2: Complex Consequences of Nonlinear Socio-Economic Distributions  
Argentina‘s Income Distribution
 
Australia‘s Income Distribution
 
Source: The Treasury of the Australian Government (see: www.treasury.gov.au). 
As its linguistic meaning suggests, haste is an error. Actually, earlier in this Appendix 
we presented haste as actual self-error the individual makes about his/her position but 
did not code it then. This error has consequences during his/her financial interactions 
with the outer world.  
We may denote haste with capital ‗H‘. Volume and signs of the haste (H) is derived 
from the gap between the real actual self (Ar) and perceived actual self (Ap). Haste has 
the following constraints and properties: 
H = Haste, 
H = {mn, sn, nn} 
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H = | Actual Selfperceived - Actual Selfreal | 
 
Formula I.7: Haste 
H = | Ap - Ar | 
 
Properties of the category ‗Haste‘ are threefold: (i) Impatience; (ii) Patience, and (iii) 
No Haste. 
when; 
Ap ˃ Ar, H = |H| 
+1 
(H
+1
= Impatience) 
Ap ˂ Ar  H = |H| 
-1  
(H
-1
= Patience) 
 
Ar = Ap  H = |H| 
0  
(H
0
= No haste) 
Different cultures have different evaluations of time (Levine, 1997), and these 
differences affect crime propensity. If, for instance, some are more patient compared 
to others, it means that their time elasticity is greater, and thus they are less vulnerable 
to financial crimes. In some cultures, time itself has pecuniary consequences and this 
fact also affects crime propensity generally in a negative way because this translates 
into a less elastic time value and greater stress and pressure on financial agents. 
Hofstede (1991) provides an index of long-term and short-term orientation of various 
cultures and his studies may give some insights about the comparative positions of 
cultures in relation to time perception. In some cultures for instance people want 
things immediately in a ‗right here, right now‘ manner. Credit is a good option for 
such people who cannot wait. Then, one of the best ways of measuring haste in 
financial crime motivation is analysing the debt habits of the agents.  
 
I.3.4.1.1.7.1. Impatience 
It can be assumed that financial white collar criminals and criminals in general are 
impatient, either because of environmental strain, injustice or as a consequence of 
learned impatience gained while living in a certain macro or micro environment. 
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Biological, moral, political and other means of impatience as a consequence of time 
inelasticity are also possible. 
When,     Ap ˃ Ar,      H  =  |H| 
+1 
(H
+1 
= Impatience) 
 
 
I.3.4.1.1.7.2. Patience 
Patience, on the other hand, is possible for all individuals even in the strictest 
economic, social, environmental etc. conditions. In some cultures, such as some 
Indian cultures, the selves are educated enough to be patient under severe conditions. 
Therefore, it is possible to decrease crime rates even in the toughest environments. 
Nevertheless, if biological, social, educational, economic, political etc. conditions are 
corrected for the individuals to make it easier for the individuals to be more patient 
then crime rates may decrease even in the financial environments with big 
opportunities so long as the crime still has a negative net outcome for individuals. 
when, Ap ˂ Ar     H = |H| 
-1  
(H
-1 
= Patience)  
 
Proactive guardians like families, friends, colleagues, peers, neighbours, normative 
institutions etc. help build a contracting force against deviance, according to their own 
nature, own principles, before the existence of the deviant behaviour. These guardians 
produce ‗patience‘. Passive guardians do not cover all the deviance but this amount 
encompasses many enacted crimes and the financial crimes we study are only a few of 
them.  
I.3.4.1.1.8. Ambition & Greed 
Depending on the volume of positive perception error between real and perceived 
ideal selves, we may name this gap with a series of words such as ‗ambition‘, 
‗eagerness‘, ‗avidity‘, ‗greed‘, ‗avariciousness‘ etc. 
As we symbolized before; Ierr =| Ip - Ir |, we can now code this phrase into the code 
I.3.4.1.1.8, as A&G.  
A&G = Ambition and Greed 
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A&G = {mn, sn, nn} 
A&G = | Ideal Selfperceived - Ideal Selfreal | 
when; 
Ip > Ir  (or positive Ierr) and Ip < Posi + SDi+1 then  A&G = |Ag| (Ambition) 
Ierr = Ambition
252
 (depending on their distance from real actual self) and when 
Expected Probability (Ep) is equal to or more than .5 
 
and  
Ip > Ir (positive Ierr) and Ip > Posi + SDi+1 then; A&G = |aG| (Greed) 
Ierr = Greed
253
 (depending on their distance away from one SD after Posi) and when 
Expected Probability (Ep) is equal to or less than .5 
 
I.3.4.1.2. Negative Motivation 
Negative motivation also moves the individual towards the targets
254
 here, the 
negative emotions (e.g. sorrow, fear) instead of the happiness as a result of  the 
positive motivation moves individuals. Financial criminals do not like the 
consequences of losing what they have and to keep having it, they are motivated 
towards material targets.  
I.3.4.1.2.1. Feared-Self 
This is not a frequently used concept in motivation models. For instance, the model of 
Rollinson et al. (1998: 149) does not mention such a self either explicitly or 
implicitly. Nevertheless, in a discursive way, Göksu (2011) and many others (e.g. 
Mowrer, 1939; Farber, 1948; Miller and Dollard, 1941; Mowrer and Lamoreaux, 
1946; Brown and Jacobs, 1949) conduct studies on ‗fear‘ as a motivational factor 
along with the usual factors such as desires, ideals and needs. Göksu (2011) argues 
that when people‘s ‗fears‘ (along with other needs and desires) are not satisfied, they 
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 or Eagerness 
253
 or Avidity, avariciousness 
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 We do not yet make a distinction between the criminal and legitimate targets. For the position where 
perceived ideal self is less than real ideal self, please refer to the code ‗equanimity‟ and „apathy‟. 
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are first distressed and then depressed, if they stay under such stress for a long time, 
and this affects their motivation.  
According to Brown and Jacobs (1949: 747, emphasis added), fear is ―(usually) 
learned‖ because ―elicited by (conditioned) stimuli‖, which in the past was ―followed 
by noxious (unconditioned) stimuli‖. As Lamoreaux (1946) points out, fear is 
associated with „avoidance‟ behaviour. Brown and Jacobs (1949: 148) agree with 
Lamoreaux (1946) about the associated avoidance behaviour. Indeed they conduct 
some tests about the motivational consequences of fear and observe that ―the fearful 
animals were much slower than the controls, the mean log latencies for the two groups 
being 2.71 and 1.88 sec.‖ and that ―these animals were more prone to ‗freeze‘ or 
crouch than were the non-fearful ones‖ (Brown and Jacobs, 1949: 148).  
Brown and Jacobs (1949: 155, emphasis added) conclude that 
Since in both experiments the fearful animals learned the new response, whereas 
their comparable controls did not, the conclusion is drawn that fear-reduction 
functions much like other drive-reductions to reinforce new responses. The data 
do not indicate, however, that fear, in spite of its apparent drive properties, is 
necessarily accompanied by an increase in overt activity. 
Healy and Proctor (2003: 41) link the fear and environment by saying that ―fear is a 
motivational system that is provoked by danger signals in the environment‖ (emphasis 
added). This is why it is experimentally sound to code a new concept in this study, 
namely ‗feared self‘ which is the financial position of a given individual in the short-
term future when his fears about his/ financial circumstances come true. 
We may denote feared-self by ‗F‘. 
F = {m-n, sn, nn} 
Properties of the category ‗feared self‘ are twofold: (i) Perceived feared self; (ii)  real 
feared self. 
I.3.4.1.2.1.1. Perceived Feared-Self 
If a person gets very close to his/her feared self, he/she would not be deterred by even 
the severe and certain punishments if his/her haste is not negative and bigger in 
magnitude because there is the possibility that the positive returns from the crime may 
put a considerable distance between the feared and real selves; however punishment is 
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not really relevant in that case since the offender is already very close to his/her feared 
self.  
As for the perception of fear, people, especially in finance, overestimate the 
probability of risks and losses (Nofsinger, 2011) too. Usually in finance the real 
probability of losses, the risk, is less than the perception of it (Nofsinger, 2011). 
Perceived feared self can be denoted by ‗Fp‘. 
Fp = Feared Selfperceived 
I.3.4.1.2.1.2. Real Feared-Self 
On many occasions, the worst financial situations as a consequence of a variety of bad 
scenarios are known in the society. For instance, the consequence of being fired from 
one corporation is usually working in a relatively smaller, lower paying job in the 
same or a similar industry. If for instance some individuals have fears of being jobless 
for a very long time in their current position, then their perceived fear self may be 
higher than their real feared self. This is another self-assessment error we call feared 
self error. 
Fr = Feared Selfreal 
Feared Self Error
255
 
Feared-self error is the error between the perceived feared-self and the real feared-
self. 
Ferr = Fp - Fr 
 
I.3.4.1.2.2. Guarding-Gap 
Guarding-gap is the gap between the current and immediate lower dynamic level of 
the dominant utility preference hierarchy of the potential offender depicted in Chapter 
6 as an extension of Rollinson et al.‘s (1998: 149), although we give a psychological 
formulation for this concept. 
G = Guarding-Gap  
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 Further coding is possible to encode the crimes of despair, stress, fear etc. (such as ambition and 
greed) but our context is financial crime in this study and we stop further coding towards the feared 
self. 
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G = {m-n, sn, nn} 
Guarding-Gap = Actual selfperceived – Feared self 
Or 
 
Formula I.8: Guarding Gap 
G = A – F 
 
Properties of the category ‗guarding-gap‘ are twofold: (i) Perceived guarding-gap; 
(ii) Real guarding-gap. 
I.3.4.1.2.2.1. Perceived Guarding-Gap 
Gp = Guarding-Gapperceived 
Guarding-Gapperceived = Actual selfperceived – Feared selfperceived 
or 
Gp = Ap– Fp 
 
I.3.4.1.2.2.2. Real Guarding-Gap 
Gr = Guarding Gapreal 
Guarding Gapreal = Actual selfreal – Feared selfreal 
or 
Gr = Ar – Fr 
 
Guarding-Gap Error 
Guarding-gap error is the error between the perceived guarding-gap and the real 
guarding-gap. 
Guarding Gaperr = Guarding Gapperceived - Guarding Gapreal 
Gerr = Gp - Gr 
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I.3.4.1.2.3. Refrainment 
Refrainment is the behaviour of keeping away from the crime. In a way it is a 
negative motivation to crime before the existence of the opportunity. Much of the 
refrainment concerns guardians such as courts, police, prisons, regulatory agencies 
and the policies and punishments of these institutions. These are known as active 
guardians in the literature and active guardians include perceptions of the laws and 
regulations
256
, police, intelligence etc. We may include the international agencies, 
especially for political and corporate offenders, such as INTERPOL, WTO, WHO, 
UN, NATO, International Court of Justice, quasi-governmental agencies such as the 
competition authority, FSA etc. and the hisba system in Islam and criminal justice 
systems in general. 
However, depending on the utility preferences, social and moral institutions, such as 
stigmatization by the society, belief in eternal punishment of the religion, become 
important concerns if they have after-crime effects, as well
257
.  
R = Refrainment 
R = {m-n, sn, nn} 
Refrainment = Guarding Gap × 1/time) x |Expected probability|±1 
Hence,  
 
Formula I.9: Refrainment 
R = G × 1/t) x |Ep|±1 
or 
R = ((F – Ap) × 1/t) x |Ep|
±1 
 
Thus, properties of the category ‗Refrainment‘ are twofold: (i) Perceived refrainment, 
(ii) Real refrainment. 
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 This is valid for the first crime motivation only and after the crime is committed the experience 
especially of judiciary and correction systems replaces the perception of the CJS in general before the 
recidivism, unless the offender changes places in time (e.g. enactment of new law, establishment of 
new institutions etc.) or space (e.g. moving to another country). 
257
For instance education does not have such an effect. It has a proactive effect only. 
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I.3.4.1.2.3.1. Perceived Refrainment 
Perceived refrainment is the mistakes we make about our reasonable refrainment 
level without knowing our real-self and feared-self errors, miscalculations of the 
readiness of feared self, our abilities etc. Outsiders may usually appraise individuals‘ 
real refrainment levels better then themselves. 
Refrainmentperceived = Guarding Gapperceived × 1/timeperceived ) x |Expected 
Probabilityperceived|
±1
  
Rp = Gp × 1/tp) x |Epp|
±1
 
or 
Rp = (Ap – Fp) × 1/tp) x |Epp|
±1
 
 
I.3.4.1.2.3.2. Real Refrainment 
Real refrainment is the avoidance of the offender. This includes all the perception 
errors and is the correct representation of the refrainment for a given individual in 
his/her current financial situation, reasonable feared position and his/her correctly 
considered abilities and qualities.  
Refrainmentreal = Guarding Gapreal × 1/timereal ) x |Expected Probabilityreal|
±1 
or 
Rr = Gr × 1/tp) x |Epp|
±1
 
or 
Rr = (Fr – Ar) ×  1/tp) x |Epp|
±1
 
 
Refrainment Error 
Apparently, then, there is a difference between the refrainment that is produced with 
and without perception errors. People may be seen as less or more refraining, given 
their circumstances, usually by the immediate society surrounding the offender. So, 
the refrainment error is the error between the refrainment calculated by true 
parameters (usually by outsiders) and the calculations with perception errors (usually 
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by the offender himself/herself). Refrainment error is the error between the perceived 
and the real refrainment.  
Rerr = Rp - Rr 
 
I.3.4.1.2.4. Equanimity and Apathy 
Depending on the volume of negative perception error between real and perceived 
ideal selves, we may name this gap by a series of words such as equanimity, ithidal 
(in Arabic) or thamkin (in Arabic) etc. 
As we symbolized before; 
Ierr = Ip- Ir 
when; 
Ip < Ir  and Ip > Posi - SDi+1 then; 
Ierr = Equanimity or ithidal (in Arabic) and thamkin (in Arabic) (depending on their 
distance from real ideal self) 
and  
Ip < Ir  and Ip < Posi - SDi+1 then; 
Ierr = Apathy
258
 (depending on their distance away from SDi+1-Posi) 
 
I.3.4.1.2.5 Position 
In the upcoming sections, we need further analysis of the individuals‘ financial 
positions. This is why a new code for the current financial position of the individuals 
is necessary. We may denote the financial position of the individual ‗i‘ as Posi. 
Position = Posi 
Current financial position may for instance be the sum of all the wealth and earnings 
of the individuals less their debt.  
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 For the other possibility where perceived ideal self is greater than the real ideal self, please refer to 
the codes ‗ambition‟ and ‗greed‟. 
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I.3.4.2. Under the Concept ‘Guardians’ 
Guardians are useless without punishment. If guardians do not punish but just guard 
the targets offenders have all the incentive to try to reach illegitimate targets time and 
again until finding a way of getting them. Nevertheless, guardians without punishment 
affect the size of the opportunity spaces because of adjustment time effects or 
perception errors for instance. 
I.3.4.2.1. Guardians 
Properties of the category ‗Guardians‘ are twofold: (i) Active guardians; (ii) Passive 
guardians, and they can deliver legitimate and  illegitimate punishments. 
I.3.4.2.1.1. Active Guardians 
We may denote ‗Active Guardians‘ by ‗Ga‘. Active guardians have the legal authority 
of exercising punishment. Police, SEC, INTERPOL, competition authorities, prisons 
etc. are among the active guardians. Active guardians can but usually do not act 
before the crime in time. Chronologically, they act either earlier than but close to the 
crime in the time dimension or act after the crime again close in time. They usually 
have little or no effect on the process of becoming a criminal before the deviant 
motivation phase. 
I.3.4.2.1.2. Passive Guardians 
Passive guardians do not have legal authority of exercising legal punishment. All 
social punishers are under this title, such as spouse, parents, family members, 
relatives, neighbours, friends, colleagues etc. Passive guardians‘ effects on crime are 
usually before the crime, in terms of this study, before the deviant motivation phase of 
the process of becoming a financial white collar criminal.  
We may denote ‗Passive Guardians‘ by ‗Gp‘. 
I.3.4.2.2. Illegitimate-Target Guarding Capability 
Guarding services for illegitimate-targets reduce the size of the illegitimate 
opportunity space by the amount of capable guarding of the whole illegitimate 
opportunity space. Illegitimate-target guarding is supplied by active guardians only. 
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All the environmental, systemic etc. precautions to prevent crime are relevant under 
this discussion, such as corporate governance structures to prevent crime. This 
category does not encompass the discussions about ‗target hardening‘ because those 
precautions are not about the environment but the target itself. 
We may denote ‗Illegitimate-Target Guarding Capability‘ by ‗GC‘. 
GC = Illegitimate-Target Guarding Capability‟ 
I.3.4.2.3. Punishment 
All realized punishments, legal (real) or illegal (real), are extracted from perceived 
actual (material) self and thus decrease the guarding gap between perceived actual 
(material) self and perceived feared (material) self. We may denote punishments by 
capital ‗P‘. 
P = Punishment (-) 
P = {m-n, sn, nn} 
Besides, our financial position is decreased by the amount of material punishment as 
well: Pos = Posi – P. 
Properties of the category ‗punishment‟ are threefold: (i) Punishments by active 
guardians (legitimate punishment that is legally attached to the crime target); (ii) 
Punishments by passive guardians (illegal, illegitimate punishment such as 
stigmatization that is attached to the crime target); (iii) A-Legal Punishment (regular 
losses in everyday life to sustain the current position in the environment). All of these 
categories have the properties of ‗perceived‘ and ‗real‘ punishment values but we only 
discuss the ones under the active guardians, that is legitimate punishments. 
Punishments = Punishmentslegitimate + PunishmentsIlegitimate + PunishmentsA-Iegitimate 
P = PL + PlL+ PAL 
I.3.4.2.3.1. Legitimate Punishments 
Every legitimate guardian keeps a valuable target and thus all punishments come with 
a possible gain. 
PL= Punishmentslegitimate 
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I.3.4.2.3.2. Illegitimate Punishments 
Illegitimate guardians punish without the existence of any possible illegitimate gain. 
PIL= PunishmentslIegitimate 
I.3.4.2.3.3. A-legitimate Punishment259 
A-legitimate punishments are negatively correlated to everyday activities such as 
everyday spending for household and utility expenses, regular education payments, 
insurance payments, credit card payments, mortgage payments for long term 
purchases and other similar regular expenses in the material dimension. 
PAL= PunishmentsA-Iegitimate 
I.3.4.2.4. Legitimate-Punishment Value 
Properties of the category ‗Legal-Punishment Value‘ are twofold: (i) Perceived legal-
punishment value, (ii) Real legal-punishments value. Let us denote legitimate 
punishment value by PvL. 
PvL.= Legitimate Punishment‘s Value 
 
I.3.4.2.4.1. Perceived Legitimate-Punishment Value 
Perceived legitimate-punishment value is the value of the punishment before the 
crime, that is, before the full realization of the punishment, with the perception error. 
I.3.4.2.4.2. Real Legitimate-Punishment Value 
Real legitimate-punishment value is the value of the punishment after the crime, that 
is, after the full realization of the punishment, without the perception error. 
I.3.4.2.4.3. Legitimate-Punishment Value Error 
Legitimate-punishment value error (LPVE) is the error of the offender between the 
perceived punishment value and the real punishment value which is realized after the 
crime.  
LPV Error = Perceived Legitimate-Punishment V. – Real Legitimate-Punishment V. 
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 The linguistic meaning does not perfectly fit into the code but it is still meaningful from a strictly 
criminological and materialistic sense. 
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I.3.4.2.5. Relative Value of the Punishment 
From the point of view of the generic concept, punishment, the value of the 
punishment is not the same for all individuals, since the legitimate-punishment value 
error (LPVE) is different from offender to offender because there is no agreed upon 
perceived value of any punishment before the realization of the punishment, 
especially if the financial punishments are not defined as proportional to the financial 
damage.   
I.3.4.2.6. Net-Value of the Punishment 
Since the real value of punishment depends on the physical, social, psychological 
qualities  and characteristics of the offenders, there is no agreed upon value of the net-
value of the punishment. The net-value of the punishment is offender specific. 
I.3.4.2.7. Impact of Legitimate-Punishment  
Properties of the punishment‟s Impact are severity (perceived and real severity), 
awareness (perceived and real awareness), certainty (perceived and real certainties), 
celerity (perceived and real certainties), stability and more. For the detailed 
discussions about the qualities of punishment please refer to Chapter 3, Chapter 6 and 
Appendix III. 
I.3.4.2.8. Opportunity Space 
Opportunity spaces are twofold: (i) Immediate opportunity space, (ii) Greater 
opportunity spaces. The first one is the primary concern of the crime motivation 
however the latter one also indirectly affects crime motivation. We may denote 
opportunity space as ‗OS‘. 
OS = Opportunity Space 
Properties of the category ‗opportunity space‘ are twofold: (i) Legitimate, (ii) 
Illegitimate. Thus;  
Opportunity Space = Opportunity SpaceLegitimate + Opportunity SpaceILegitimate 
OS = OSL + OSIL 
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I.3.4.2.8.1. Legitimate Opportunity Space 
For a detailed discussion of the legitimate opportunity spaces of various financial 
systems please refer to Appendix III and Chapter 7. 
OSL = Opportunity SpaceLegitimate 
 
I.3.4.2.8.2. Illegitimate Opportunity Space 
For a detailed discussion of the legitimate opportunity spaces of various financial 
systems please refer to Chapter 7 and Appendix III. Illegitimate opportunity spaces 
are relative to the financial environment (please see Chapter 7). 
OSIL = Opportunity SpaceILegitimate 
To give an example, according to Curtis (1998, emphasis added), ―Nick [Nick Leeson 
of Baring] had a dual role. He was the trader and the bookkeeper at the same time. 
Even the auditors were uneasy about that but they praised him and reported no 
problem to the head office‖. 
As is obvious from this example, volume of illegal opportunity space is twofold: (i) 
The opportunities to reach the target, in this example, ‗the dual role‘ of Leeson, and 
(ii) The weakness, incapability, or absence of official guardians, ‗auditors‘ in this 
example. Let us code these variables as environmental opportunity and guarding 
opportunity. 
I.3.4.2.9. Opportunity Space for Crime 
While regular financial opportunity space is about the exchange volumes, size of the 
markets, available tools and techniques, assets and credits in the financial markets in a 
given macro or micro environment, opportunity space for crime is a very restricted, 
small part of this big space, where only illegitimate opportunities for a given 
individual or group are held. For instance, the whole of the assets processed in a 
certain time span in a city municipality is the opportunity space of that municipality as 
a public organization. These public institutions operate in this financial space of assets 
and credits as well, kept in ledgers in a municipality however the opportunity space 
for crime is only a small portion of all assets because preponderance of the amount is 
adequately guarded or the target is hardened against financial crime through many 
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security techniques. Thus, situational crime prevention techniques, such as ‗target 
hardening‘ can decrease/increase the opportunity space for crime and situational 
crime prevention theory literature is valid under this category. 
We may denote ‗opportunity space for crime‘ by capital ‗OSC‘.  
OSC = Opportunity Space for Crime  
OSC = Opportunity SpaceILegitimate – Illegitimate-Target Guarding Capability 
 
Formula I.10: Opportunity Space for Crime 
OSC = OSIL – GC 
 
I.3.4.3. Under the Concept ‘Target’ 
I.3.4.3.1. Target 
All the achieved targets, both legitimate (real) and illegitimate (real) are added to the 
real actual (material) self and thus decrease the need gap between perceived actual 
(material) self and perceived ideal (material) self. We may denote target by ‗T‘. 
Properties of the category ‗target‘ are threefold: (i) Legitimate target; (ii) Illegitimate 
target, (iii) A-Legitimate target. There are the properties of ‗perceived‘ and ‗real‘ 
legitimate and a-legitimate targets as well but we discuss only the properties of 
illegitimate targets in this study. Thus;  
T = Target (+) 
T ={mn, sn, nn} 
Target = TargetsLegitimate + TargetsIlegitimate+ TargetsA-legitimate 
T = TL + TIL + TAL 
 
I.3.4.3.1.1. Legitimate Targets 
Legitimate targets such as a bigger market share in a given market are free from 
probable legitimate punishments but they are not free from illegitimate punishments 
such as punishments applied by a monopoly, cartel etc. in a given financial market.  
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TL = TargetsLegitimate 
 
I.3.4.3.1.2. Illegitimate Targets 
Illegitimate targets are all illegitimate financial gains from various sources such as 
financial gains by manipulation, speculation, tax evasion, gaining a monopoly 
position by competition crimes or monetary yield of financial fraud. Every 
illegitimate target comes with its probable legitimate and illegitimate punishment. 
However the punishments written in legal codes must be considered with their applied 
nature. The code illegitimate target vulnerability enumerates many such qualities. 
TIL = TargetsIlegitimate 
I.3.4.3.1.3. A-legitimate Targets 
A-legitimate targets are positively correlated to everyday activities such as salaries, 
regular earnings from shares, rents etc. These are usually the targets which keep us in 
the financial and socio-economic position we occupy. Only the additional gains from 
legitimate and illegitimate targets decrease our need gap. A-legitimate targets 
(usually periodic earnings for regular living expenses) usually pay a-legitimate 
punishment, that is periodic expenses such as insurance, utilities, mortgage, credit 
payments etc. 
TAL = TargetsA-legitimate 
 
I.3.4.3.2. Illegitimate-Target Value 
Properties of the category ‗illegitimate-target value‘ are twofold: (i) Perceived 
illegitimate-target value; (ii) Real illegitimate-target value. Let us denote illegitimate 
target value by TvIL. 
TvIL = Illegitimate target‘s value 
I.3.4.3.2.1. Perceived Illegitimate-Target Value 
Perceived illegitimate-target value is the value of the target before the crime, that is, 
before the full realization of the target, with the perception error. We do not symbolise 
these codes because we do not use them in this study but they can be symbolised for 
further research. 
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I.3.4.3.2.2. Real Illegitimate-Target Value 
Real illegitimate-target value is the value of the target after the crime, that is, after the 
full realization of the target, without the perception error.  
It should be noted that all the conceptual codes produced as a result of the grounded 
theory research are not put into the final model in this study in order to increase 
comprehension, decrease the complexity level of the text by allowing fewer codes and 
for the sake of parsimony. In fact, the research produced more than twenty more 
codes as an extension of the model presented in Formula I.13 but those codes are not 
presented in this study because they were not sufficiently grounded on data and they 
require more research to fit into the code family of this research, which is well based 
on research and data from various areas of social sciences.  
Illegitimate-Target Value Error 
Illegitimate-target value error is the error of the offender between the perceived 
illegitimate-target value and the real illegitimate-target value and is realized after the 
crime.  
Illegitimate-Target Error = Perceived Illegitimate-Target – Real Illegitimate Target 
  
I.3.4.3.3. Relative Value of the Target 
From the point of view of the generic concept, financial targets, the value of the target 
is not certain. Since the illegitimate-target value error is different from offender to 
offender, there is no agreed upon perceived value of any target. Miller (2006: 82) 
agrees that according to the RCT, value depends on the offender who assesses the 
target and not on the actual economic value of the target. 
I.3.4.3.4. Net Value of the Target 
From the point of view of the generic concept, financial targets, the effects of those 
targets are not certain and do not have one value valid for all the offenders. Since the 
real value of target depends on the physical, social, psychological qualities, 
characteristics of the offenders, there is no agreed upon value of the net value of 
financial targets. Net value of the target is offender specific. 
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I.3.4.3.3. Illegitimate-Target Vulnerability 
The target is the primary motivation of the offender, because it provides an ‗expected 
utility‘ for him/her. The expected utility, that is the ‗value‘ of the target, helps satisfy 
part or all of the need gap of the offender. Depending on the position of the offender 
on the needs hierarchy, social structure, and utility dimensions, offenders choose 
different targets to satisfy their need gaps. 
For instance a worker in a factory may steal a wallet of money to buy a second hand 
car, while a white collar criminal manipulates markets and eliminates his/her best 
competitor and enjoys the appreciation of the Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, 
his/her friends etc.  
Enjoyment of the utility gained by the crime decreases the need gap of the offender, 
but in a short while, because of the recidivism and confidence effects, consequent 
crimes may occur until the complete fulfilment of the need gap.  
In the mid-term though, after the enjoyment of a series of utilities and fulfilment of 
the need gap, the offender does not lose his/her deviance, because he/she increases 
his/her ideal self and/or actual self probably with his/her position in the hierarchy of 
needs and the social structure of the society. Apparently, some of the offenders do not 
get the utilities in some instances and may lower their need gaps and accept a lower 
position in the hierarchy of needs and in the society, change their utility dimension 
slightly or completely.  
Target vulnerability is determined by the characteristics of targets. Among some of 
the characteristics are: value, accessibility, visibility, inertia, convertibility, 
ownership, ability to react etc. All the ‗target hardening‘ literature in rational choice 
theories is relevant under this category.  
I.3.4.4. Under Mutual Concepts ‘MotivationRefrainment’ 
I.3.4.4.1. MotivationRefrainment 
This study reaches a level of understanding that it is not possible to analyse or 
scrutinize motivation without taking into account the decreasing levels of it. 
Moreover, in order to include the possibility of refraining from the illegitimate targets, 
for instance in some societies where abundance of financial opportunities exist but 
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relatively less financial crime occurs, we need to put the symmetric equivalents of the 
‗motivation‘, coded as ‗refrainment‘ here260. We may denote ‗motivation/refrainment‘ 
as MR. 
Motivation/Refrainment = Motivation + Refrainment 
 
Formula I.11: Motivations/Refrainment 
MR = M + R 
or 
MR = [(I – A) + (F – A) × 1/t ) x |Ep|±1] 
 
If for instance MR is positive for a given financial white collar person one may 
assume that the individual is motivated towards material targets. It should be noted 
that this ‗motivation‘ includes not only the positive motivation caused by the need gap 
(M) but also the negative motivation (R) when the perceived actual self (Ap) is higher 
than the feared self (F). 
In a similar vein, when MR is negative for a given individual in a certain financial 
situation, the individual is reserved and he/she is governed by his/her fears rather than 
his/her aims and targets. This alternative is outside the scope of our study
261
 . This 
side of the motivation can explain crimes with uncommon behaviours, psychologies, 
rationalities. 
As the actual, ideal and feared selves approach ‗0‘ the potential offender is stable, 
indifferent. As the volume of MR gets higher by means of higher ideal and feared 
selves, the potential offender is ‗motivated‘ higher and as the volume of MR gets 
lower, the potential offender is ‗reserved‘ higher.  
I.3.4.4.2. DevianceCompliance 
Until this code in the process of the grounding theory building, the discussion was not 
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 In fact, refrainment is a byproduct of the behavioral model we used as the base model, the dynamic 
model we produced as an extension of it and the codes feared self, guarding gap. This process can be 
understood better by consulting Chapter 6. 
261
 Because this study assumes that all financial white collar criminals act on materialistically-dominant 
utility functions. 
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about motivation towards crime but about the regular motivation towards legitimate 
monetary targets. However, the base coding and the relations shown by some of the 
formulae in the previous parts of this Appendix have dramatic and complex
262
 effects 
on the crime motivation of the individuals.  
Motivation is a positive word and concept. One may have a very high motivation and 
it is something to appreciate. Even if one‘s expectation of reaching an ideal self is 
very low this does not make him/her a criminal but may put him/her into a vulnerable 
position if he/she makes perception errors by expecting consistently better from 
his/her performance in the material world. People usually are not aware of these errors 
because they are in a continuously changing process of recalculations of ideal self, 
feared self, actual self, expected probability etc. 
If someone is in haste, this is now a harder material problem for the individual to 
solve with the current means, abilities etc. Haste makes some irrational options 
rational because the individual‘s circumstances, his/her inner-self, targets, micro and 
macro position, forces him/her to crime. If there is no (zero) haste crime is not very 
likely to occur unless the value of the target is big relative to the need gap of the 
would-be-offender and the risks are lower than his/her guarding gap.  
When the patience of the offender is high, then he/she has enough time to reach 
his/her ideal self in a reasonable time in the distant future. However, the intimacy of 
the vulnerable target‘s value is exempt from this rule and effective especially when 
the value is enough to bring the individual to a higher and distinct status in the 
society. Nevertheless, the effects of other dimensions are excluded here for the sake of 
parsimony and their effects may change the circumstances.  
We may consider deviance in two different forms as well: passive and active 
deviance.  
D = Deviance 
D = {m-n, s-n, n-n} 
Properties of the Category ‗Deviance‘ 
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 Complex in the sense of sensible dependence on initial conditions. 
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There are two properties of deviance: passive and active deviance. 
 
I.3.4.4.2.1. Passive Deviance 
Passive deviance (Dp) is the disposition only. If all possible passive guardians are 
removed (e.g.. the offender moves to another country with very few passive 
guardians) passive deviance shows the inclination of the would-be offender only. 
Active deviance on the other hand (Da) is the deviance after the effects of passive 
guardians (Gp).  
Dp = Deviancepassive 
Deviancepassive = Motivation × Haste 
 
Formula I.12: Passive Deviance 
Dpass = M × H
±1
 
or 
Dpass = [(I – Ap) × 1/t) x |Ep|
±1
] × H 
 
I.3.4.4.2.2. Active Deviance 
While passive deviance (Dp) shows only psychological disturbance and inclination to 
crime, active deviance shows the readiness, preparedness for opportunities of crime.  
Active deviance is what is usually meant by deviance, that is, somebody with all the 
inclinations and intentions to commit crime despite the passive guardians towards the 
illegitimate targets.  
Offenders are under the negative forces of the crime motivation and the positive 
effects of the capable guardians in relation to financial crimes. As motivational forces 
overcome the forces of passive guardians then the mere existence of vulnerable 
financial assets would produce more delinquency, excluding the effects of active 
guardians. However, if motivational negative forces and guarding positive forces are 
balanced, then mere existence of financial opportunity would not produce financial 
crimes. We may denote active deviance by Da. 
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Dact = Devianceactive 
Devianceactive = MotivationRefrainment × Haste – Passive Guardians  
 
Formula I.13: Active Deviance 
Dact = MR× H
±1
 - Gp 
or 
Dact = (M + R) × H
±1
 - Gp 
or 
Dact = [((I – Ap) + ((F –Ap) × 1/t) x |Ep
±1
 |
±1
] × H±1 - Gp 
 
I.3.4.4.3.Overall-Value of Crime 
Overall-value of a financial crime for a given offender is the actual value gained out 
of the crime which is calculated by taking into account both gains and losses before 
and after it. Before crime occurs the offender has certain evaluations and assessments 
of crime. This is coded as perceived overall value in this thesis and usually after the 
crime all related punishments, depending for instance on full or partial apprehension 
and target value, with all or part of it for instance depending on the restrictions in the 
environment,  occur. After the crime is complete the offender has a better or complete 
understanding of his/her situation, the environment of the financial assets, guardians, 
the value and other characteristics of financial targets. This new value is coded in this 
study as real overall value of the crime. Overall value after the crime affects the 
individual in three possible ways: it either increases or decreases the overall need gap 
of the offender or has no effect. 
We may think of overall-value as net gain (or losses) rather than gross gains (or 
losses) out of crime by taking into account both the target values and punishments in 
all possible dimensions. While discussing the individual motivation, our assumption 
that all financial criminals run on materially-dominant utility functions holds, ceteris 
paribus. However, after the punishment we have to take into consideration at least the 
social dimension because people are social beings and cannot be indifferent to, for 
example, bad labels attached to them in their community and society such as 
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fraudster, thief, loser etc. If overall-value of crime is positive, it means all the positive 
gains from a specific criminal act overweigh all the negative losses.  
There are, thus, two properties of the category ‗overall-value of crime‘: (i) Perceived 
overall-value of crime; (ii) Real overall-value of crime. We do not symbolize these 
properties because we do not want to discuss them further in this study. 
V = Overall-Value of crime 
Overall Value of Crime = Target - Punishment 
Formula I.10: Overall Value of Crime (Theoretical) 
V = T – P  
 
I.3.4.4.3.1. Perceived (Expected) Overall-Value of Crime 
Perceived overall-value of crime is the overall-value of the crime that is calculated by 
all the perceived values of targets and punishments. 
Vp = Overall-Value of crimeperceive 
Vp = Tp – Pp 
 
Overall, we may classify the vulnerability of crime situations according to the 
variations of overall-value of crime 
(i) In crime situations where the perceived relative
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 overall-value is positive, targets 
are vulnerable to all offenders and targets whose perceived relative overall-value is 
negative are not vulnerable to any offender unless they are under dire conditions; 
(ii) In crime situations where the perceived relative overall-value is not only positive 
but also considerably big compared to the need gaps of offenders, targets are very 
vulnerable; 
(iii) In crime situations where the perceived relative overall-value is positive, big 
(compared to the need gaps) and where hasty offenders exist, targets are more 
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Relative in the sense of considering the specificities (i.e. perception errors about targets and 
punishments) of the offenders. 
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vulnerable than the previous situation; 
(iv) In crime situations where the perceived relative overall-value is positive, big 
(compared to the need gaps) and where hasty and able offenders exist, targets are 
more vulnerable than the previous situation.  
Following the implications of the grounded theory presented in this study, we may 
argue that it is hard to deal with crime by manipulating only the overall value of crime 
(e.g. by increasing the punishments attached to its illegal gain), because of the 
relativity of the values of targets and punishments. There is no agreed upon net 
overall-value of crime. One type of target may be important, valuable for one 
individual today and not valuable after a short while next week when circumstances 
change. This is why guardians cannot perfectly prioritise financial crime targets.  
 
I.3.4.4.3.2. Real (Success or Failure) Overall-Value of Crime 
Real overall-value of crime is the overall-value of the crime that is calculated by all 
the real values of targets and punishments and usually by the offender and after the 
criminal act. 
Vr = Overall-Value of crimereal 
 
Overall-Value Error 
Overall-value error is the difference between the perceived and real overall-values: 
Overall-Valueerror = Overall-Value of crimeperceived- Overall-Value of crimereal 
Verr = Vp - Vr 
Vr = Tr    when crime is successfully committed and Vr = Pr  when the crime 
fails or if the offender is caught. Then, after the crime some adjustments are made. 
For instance, if the crime is a repeated crime, e.g. tenth year tax evasion, the gain from 
the crime is indeed the total gain including the financial gains from earlier crimes 
because this is crime in continuum. Some of the important adjustments are explained 
below in detail. 
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I.3.4.4.4. Total Overall-Value of Crime 
Total overall-value of crime is the overall-value of crime, which is accumulated over 
a period of time. For instance effects of market entry deterrence may bring about 
financial gains to the culprit corporation even many years after all the legal 
punishments end.    
TV = Total overall-value of crime 
t = time of crime i 
n = number of crimes committed by the offender 
 
Total Overall-Value of Crime = overallValuet1 + overallValuet2 + … overallValuetn  
 
TV = Vt1 + Vt2 + … Vtn 
or 
TV = (T – P)t1 + (T – P)t2 +  … (T – P)tn 
 
I.3.4.4.5. Relative Overall-Value of Crime 
From the point of view of the generic term overall-value of crime, there is no agreed 
upon value of the overall value of the crime. Since the overall-value error differs 
from offender to offender, overall value of crime is offender specific and does not 
represent a single value that is valid for all the offenders. 
I.3.4.4.6. Net Overall-Value of Crime 
From the point of view of the generic term overall-value of crime, the crime does not 
yield a net-value, which is tasted and valued the same by all the offenders. Thus, the 
overall-value of a crime is certain (net) only for the real offenders and real time; if 
there is no offender; there is no net value of crime. Thus, all targets and punishments 
exist only at a specific time and space. Theoretically, without the individual and 
his/her environment, targets and their values are meaningless because there is no real 
person or situation to put them in a context.  
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I.3.4.5. Crime Motivation 
Unlike RCT, this study does not presuppose crime motivation, and when it discusses 
crime motivation, it does not presuppose it as equal for all possible offenders. We 
show in this Appendix and in Chapter 6 why and how the motivation is differentiated 
from situation to situation and from offender to offender. 
We may denote crime motivation with capital ‗CM‘. This is a full motivation to 
commit crime because it represents an individual
264
 who is motivated for financial 
targets and under pressure of time constraints. Besides the individual in this stage of 
the dynamic process is not bounded by the alleviating effects of the passive guardians 
such as ethics, religion, social labels attached to deviant behaviour etc. In this 
situation the individual is already considerably weak against the attraction of the 
financial crime targets‘ value and finally he/she comes up with financial targets in 
their financial crime opportunity space and realises that these targets are not inside the 
guarding capabilities of the active guardians. Thus, a financial crime may occur, but 
still, the individual may not yet have calculated the net financial gain out of crime. If 
the yield is not much relative to his need gap, then the crime may still not take place 
despite the vulnerable situation of the individual in this current environment and time. 
CM = Crime Motivation 
CM = Devianceactive × (Opp. Sp. for Crime – Illegit. Target Guarding Capability) 
or 
Crime Motivation = Devianceactive × Opportunity Space for Crime 
 
Formula I.14: Crime Motivation 
CM = Da × (OSIL - GC) 
or 
CM = Da× OSC 
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 Assuming that the individual‘s ideal self is greater than his/her actual self, he/she has self-
confidence and a relatively smaller guarding gap and he/she is in haste, is impatient and all the positive 
effects of passive guardians (e.g. his ethical position) do not restrain his/her motivation towards 
illegitimate financial white collar targets.  
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I.3.4.6. Act of Crime 
Now, with the inclusion of target along with its various qualities, actual figures of 
crime may be modelled in our grounded theory. Unless the attributes of the target are 
taken into consideration, the dynamic representation up to this point does not produce 
crime, but it does not mean that those earlier stages are unimportant; conversely, 
crime is a complex phenomenon and strictly dependent on the initial conditions just 
like all other complex social phenomena.  
It should be noted that the model quantitatively presented in this study is correct only 
under the assumption of the dominance of the material-utility dimension. There are 
inevitably situations where individuals with socially or morally dominated utility 
functions may not commit financial crime even under strict environmental 
circumstances. This is one of the areas for further study on this subject. 
The act of crime occurs after the involvement of the targets and their attributes in the 
crime motivation. That is, the natures of the targets may be very tough and prevent the 
target from being acquired or very easy and enable the success of the crime attempt. 
We may denote the act of crime as ‗CA‘  
CA = Act of Crime 
Act of Crime = Crime Motivation × Total Overall-Value of Crime 
 
 
Formula I.15: Act of Crime 
CA = CM × TV 
or  
CA = {Da× (OSIL - GC)} × (Vt1 + Vt2 + … Vtn) 
 
Formula I.13 can be depicted in an explicit form as in Formula I.14: 
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Formula I.16: The Final Model of the Grounded Theory  
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However, according to the model, still, the criminal act is not committed, completed 
or finished yet. Therefore, it is not known yet whether the crime is successfully 
completed or not, nor is it known whether the crime would or would not deliver the 
perceived target values of the illegitimate targets. In order to take the results of the 
criminal act into consideration for the repeated crimes or crimes in continuum we 
need to calculate return of crime to the individual. 
Please note that we differentiate ‗criminality‘, that is propensity (Da) and ‗crime‘ (CA) 
in our model. ‗Crime‘ is an actual event in which a criminal act is committed. The 
model presented in Formula I.16 and its explicit form gives two results: Success and 
Failure. The model developed in this study, hence, might have included recidivism 
and repeated crime‘s environment and motivation too. However, because of the lack 
of space, time and funding we leave discussion of those issues to further studies.   
The codes produced in this study are shown on the model in Figure I.3 where a 
complex formula with many parameters are put into a mathematical relationship 
which explains inner selves, differences between them, perception errors and 
consequences of those errors to form the motivation model of individual behaviour 
first and then (beginning from the left) shows how this regular motivation move 
beyond the boundaries of reasonable behaviour and including haste and passive 
guardians the formula shows how regular behaviour turns into a deviant one. 
Eventually, the formula explains the consequences of deviant behaviour when it meets 
certain amount of opportunity spaces for crime, the guardians, certain value of assets 
and their punishment.  
This final formula is shown in a stable environment because of the parsimony, space 
constraints and because the conceptual explanations about its dynamic nature are 
made in Chapter 6 where it is possible for the individual to fall/jump one standard 
variance below/above the socio-economic setting the formula runs and continuously 
readjust itself in runtime. 
In fact, a more complex, dynamic formula was developed by this study but that part is 
not presented in this text because some of the relatively latter codes were not 
grounded on reliable data. 
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Figure I.3: Codes of the Grounded Theory on Final Model 
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I.4. OVERALL CODINGS 
This Appendix has provided the foundational aspect of the grounded theory developed in this 
research in terms of the propensity of economic systems towards crime as well as the 
propensity and motivation of individuals towards crime. 
The above theoretical exploration and the resultant coding are brought together here to 
provide an overall and combined look at the particularities of the model. 
CA = {{{[( (Ip – Ap) + (Fp –Ap) × 1/tp ) × |Epp|
±1
]  - [(Ir – Ar) + (Fr –Ar) × 1/tr ) x |Epr|
±1
] × 
|H|
±1 
] ×  (OSIL - GC)} × {(T – P)t1 + (T – P)t2 + … (T – P)tn} 
Below, certain parts of the formula are explained in a structural manner, beginning from the 
left building blocks. In this way, it is easier to comprehend the theoretical form of by 
improving the conceptual cornerstones one by one. 
 
(Ip – Ap)  : Individuals try to reach an ideal material, financial status, ideal self  
  which is away from their current financial position, actual self. 
(Fp –Ap)  : Individuals also are afraid of being in a financial position  
  distinctively away from their current position (usually one standard     
  variance away). 
(Ip – Ap) + (Fp –Ap) : People are motivated by carrot (ideal self) and stick (feared self) and  
 distances between them makes up the total motivational base for them. 
(Ip – Ap) × 1/tp ) : The material gap between the current and ideal positions can be  
  shown as a requirement of material gain for every time interval 
(Ip – Ap) + (Fp –Ap) × 1/tp )  : The same requirement of material gain is valid for the 
gap between the current and feared financial positions as well. If the 
individual fulfils the total requirement of material gain for every time 
interval in a reasonable time he/she makes sure that he/she may not be 
afraid of the earlier feared position by attaining a better status in the 
society 
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(Ip – Ap) + (Fp –Ap) × 1/tp ) × |Epp|
±1: People‘s qualities that are above the average of the  
same local socio-economic position such as education, experience, 
ability, capital let them move faster towards their material goals and 
when below average they slow them down. 
[( (Ip – Ap) + (Fp –Ap) × 1/tp ) × |Epp|
±1
]  - [(Ir – Ar) + (Fr –Ar) × 1/tr ) x |Epr|
±1
] : All of the  
building blocks of the formula up to here can be calculated by 
including and excluding perception errors of the individuals. The 
difference between them gives the amount of risk the individual would 
find himself/herself in an unplanned situation with usually bad 
consequences. 
MRerr× |H|
±1   
: The long previous formula can be named MotivationRefrainment  
  error and this risk of crime is multiplied if the individual is in haste.
 
{MRerr× |H|
±1 
-  Gp } : This urgent risk is affected by the passive guardians such as ethics,  
morality, solidarity, friendship, family etc. in the society before the 
deviant behaviour emerges. If passive guardians are not successful to 
decrease the level of risk or urgency motivation becomes deviant. 
{{MRerr× |H|
±1 
-  Gp }×  (OSIL - GC)} : Deviant behaviour searches for vulnerable  
opportunities of crime and when it comes up with vulnerabilities in its 
opportunity space the deviance is activated from its passive form.   
{{{MRerr× |H|
±1 
-  Gp }×  (OSIL - GC)} × {(T – P)t1 + (T – P)t2 + … (T – P)tn}  : Active deviant  
individual makes calculations to know whether or not the value of the 
crime target exceeds the benefits and if it does, he/she commits crime. 
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Appendix II  
 
CORRESPONDENCE WITH INTERPOL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your email.  INTERPOL's International Crime Statistics are no 
longer being made available to the public.   
The decision to remove the statistics was taken as some users and some members of the 
media were making comparisons between countries based on these statistics, when 
different collection methods make such comparisons problematic
265
.  
In response to your request, we would advise you to contact the UNODC who may be 
able to assist you with your query, or the national authorities of the countries of 
interest.  
 Regards,  
 Press Office 
INTERPOL 
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 Apparently, grounded theory literature is in conflict with this perspective. 
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Appendix III  
A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 
TO ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: 
FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III.1. INTRODUCTION 
This appendix is an introduction to the economic and financial systems from the point 
of view of financial white collar crime (FWCC) and rational choice. As comparison 
criteria, we use Gregory and Stuart‘s (1985: 12) parameters as  follows: 
(i) Decision-making structures (i.e. centralized (authoritative, information 
loaded), decentralized (informative, information dispersed), mixed); 
(ii) Coordination methods (i.e. market, plan, mixed); 
(iii) Property rights (public, cooperative, private); 
(iv) Incentive and motivation mechanisms (i.e. material, social, moral, religious). 
These factors of comparison are not only needed to bring important facets of 
economic systems under consideration and compare them in an efficient way, but they 
also lay down the mechanisms of economic systems which reveal the factors of the 
vulnerabilities regarding financial crimes, because different decision making 
structures, coordination methods, property rights and incentive mechanisms bring 
about different levels of opportunities for committing financial crimes. Thus, in 
addition to being an introduction to the economic and financial systems, these 
parameters are also a foundational base for the main vulnerability comparison of 
various financial systems in Chapter 7. The main body of the comparison follows this 
Appendix in Chapter 7 by using the criteria suggested by Punch (1996) and some 
additional extensions specific to FWCC. 
  
528 
 
III.2. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
In order to form a solid, well established discussion, let us define the terms we use in 
this part of the text such as ‗economy‘, ‗organization‘, ‗system‘, ‗economic system‘, 
‗political economic system‘ and ‗financial system‘. 
According to Mankiw (2003: 4, 3), ‗economy‟ is ―the study of how society manages 
its scarce resources‖. The word comes from Greek, meaning ―one who manages a 
household.‖ If we think of public material needs as the operational ground of an 
economy, political and economic institutions are the main players in it. Among them 
are financial institutions such as corporations, investment banks, insurance 
companies, stock markets, and governmental agencies. Karaşin (2009) puts these 
financial institutions into neat groups of seven as follows: (i) Regulatory authorities, 
(ii) Financial corporations (i.e. merchant banks, investment banks, financial 
intermediaries, asset managers, insurance companies etc.); (iii) All the corporations 
with excess or deprivation of funds; (iv) Institutional investors (i.e. mutual funds, 
investment funds, investment clubs, hedge funds); (v) Individual investors (high net-
worth individuals); (vi) Speculators; (vii) Market centres (i.e. stock exchanges, 
derivative exchanges, central bank fund transfers, interbank money markets, SWIFT 
and other means of electronic fund transfers; (viii) Auxiliary services (i.e. 
clearance/settlement, IT, accountancy, audit and education). These institutions are 
organized forms of human interactions with economic and financial processes and 
outcomes.  
If we have a better look at the ‗organization‟ we see ―a set of participants who 
regularly interact‖ (Borstein, 1971: 4) according to some messages named rules 
(stipulating or constraining messages for an independent period) and orders (dated 
messages calling for a specific response from the participants), ―to accomplish a set of 
activities constituting the purpose of the organization‖. There are mainly two kinds of 
organizations: ‗for profit‘ and ‗non-profit‘. In economic organizations, the purpose of 
the organization is ‗profit‟. 
Organizations, while interacting with each other, form systems. A system is ―a 
collection of objects, ideas, or activities united by some regular form of interaction or 
interdependence‖ Borstein (1971: 4). In other words, systems are ―combinations of 
certain integrated parts, running together to form organized transformation processes 
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that accept inputs and produce outputs for a common purpose‖ (Üstün, 2011). Inputs, 
processes, outputs are common to all systems along with feedbacks and control 
(Üstün, 2011). The historical trajectory of organisational and institutional 
development shows that different cultures build different organizations and those 
organizations eventually build distinct systems, as each culture brings different forms 
and substance. 
The word „system‟ is from Latin ‗systēma‘ and has many meanings. According to 
Bunge (1979: 16) one of the three definitions of ‗system‘ is that ―a system is a set of 
interrelated elements‖. Bunge (1979: 16) argues that this definition is ―fine for 
conceptual systems‖ like economic, social, political and financial systems. Other 
definitions, namely ‗a black box receiving inputs, producing outputs‘ and ‗system as a 
binary relation‘ are not suitable for our study because ―the internal structure of the 
system is .... relevant‖ for this study and we study complex systems that are not easy 
to analyse in terms of  binary relations. 
Parallel to this definition of systems, Conklin (1991: 1) defines economic systems as 
―the organizational arrangements and processes through which a society makes its 
production and consumption decisions‖. In other words, ―Whether theoretically 
articulated and recorded or traditionally practised over years, ‗economic sysem‘ is a 
static registration of how society organises itself to address the basic economic 
problems of what is to be produced, how many, how and for whom‖ (Nomia and 
Tahnema, 1994: 41). Indeed different designs of these means of production create 
different kinds of economic and financial systems and the variations of designs stem 
from the common social ideologies and belief systems or ontological and 
epistemological foundations. An economic system, thus, reflects ―the interaction and 
participation of individuals, organizations and institutions‖ (Nomani and Rahnema, 
1994: 41, emphasis added) in it.  
Until now, the focus has been on the distinctions of economic systems, but economic 
systems do have many common features too. Performance, efficiency, income 
distribution, stability and viability are only some of them and they all have many 
consequences for financial crimes. Figure III.1 dynamically shows these 
commonalities between economic systems:  
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(i) Economic growth (i.e. intensive and extensive); 
(ii) Efficiency (i.e. static and dynamic); 
(iii) Income distribution; 
(iv) Stability (i.e. cyclical stability, inflation, unemployment); 
(v) Viability (e.g. legitimacy, extent of the use of markets, corruption, social services, 
etc.) 
Figure III.1: Common Aims of Economic Systems 
 
Note 1: ‗Y‘ at the y axis is the current, initial base of the position for every column; 
Note 2: Circles represent the economic position of one individual and empty circles represent 
the alternative positions to be avoided.  
 
All economic systems aim to achieve economic growth (moving upward from Y to 
Y+1, Y+2 etc. as a whole in Figure III.1) and use their potential efficiently (leaving no 
surplus energy for certain periods nor over-consuming it) and do it in a stable way, 
which means approximating a linear, continuous, positive, optimal growth line and 
avoiding deep ups and downs. There is almost no dispute about these common aims in 
economics literature. 
Many economists also agree that the economic growth and development should be 
viable which basically means that the system operates within the legal, ethical 
framework of the society (i.e. nobody should be allowed to manipulate the traded 
goods and services for their benefit and society‘s harm).  
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It should also be noted that justice is considered to be part of economics too; as the 
justice between the members of the society in terms of their incomes and wealth 
accumulation. All the major economic systems agree that the just distribution of 
wealth is necessary but they disagree about the definition of justice in income or 
wealth. For instance market economies favour a free, unrestricted formation of 
natural justice in a free market, while socialist economies try to weed out the 
unnaturally
266
 structured system and form a justice under equality in income.  
Our findings - especially about the ‗motivation‘ part - of the grounded theory we 
produced in the previous Chapter, and our realisation about the implicit and common 
justice and naturality
267
 arguments of the economic systems force us to contemplate 
an alternative depiction of this commonality in income distribution and it is the 
prominent ‗normal distribution‘ which is the mother of almost all quantitative268 
analyses in statistics and all science. In fact, this common aim is so obvious that it is 
hard to negate it. If all the physical, psychological, social and cognitive abilities, 
talents, skills and competences are naturally distributed why would we expect a non-
normal distribution of income in the first place while income is clearly an outcome of 
some or all of these factors
269
. 
In this sense, the fact that we are answering our initial research question after trying to 
solve a theoretical issue proved to be very profitable, because these commonality 
discussions – especially the one about the natural and normal distribution of income - 
seems to be capable of producing a completely new economic theory with a strong 
criterion of success. We leave this discussion to further research and continue 
discussing the common features of the economic systems.  
Consequently, all economic systems envisage that the income is naturally, justly, 
normally distributed among their members and that the growth is felt by those 
                                                 
266
 Karl Marx sees communism as the next and more developed system after capitalism (a historical 
reality for him) but he also agrees that capitalism had many unnatural dynamics that should be weeded 
out such as income disparity. 
267
 It is possible to refer to some of the verses to put Islam into the same framework as well. 
268
 Indeed the results of the qualitative analyses are also by-products of natural, normal distributions, if 
we realise that the outlier answers to the open questions are just deviations from the mean ideas and are 
rare compared to the middle. 
269
 Beware that this argument does not single out socialism because – although not frequently 
advertised - all socialist countries applied a varied amount of income to their workers (see for instance 
Sertel, 1993)  in many clusters but compared to capitalism, workers in socialist states receive earnings 
with small variations. 
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members, usually by the development of the society. 
Let us now discuss the distinguishing features of the economic systems we compare, 
namely, market (capitalist) economy, transitional (socialist) economy and fully and 
partially Islamized economies. However, before doing that, we need to lay down the 
criteria of the comparison. Gregory and Stuart (1985: 12) supply a good list of such 
comparison factors as follows:  
(i) Decision-making Structures (i.e. centralized
270
, decentralized
271
, mixed);  
(ii) Coordination Methods (i.e. market, plan, mixed); 
(iii) Property Rights (public, cooperative, private); 
(iv) Incentive and Motivation Mechanisms (i.e. material, social, moral, religious). 
These factors of comparison are not only needed to bring important facets of 
economic systems under consideration and compare them in an efficient way, but they 
also lay down the mechanisms of economic systems which reveal the factors of the 
vulnerabilities regarding financial crimes, because different decision making 
structures, coordination methods, property rights and incentive mechanisms bring 
about different levels of opportunities and motivations for committing financial 
crimes.  
While comparing financial systems by using these factors, we should address certain 
concepts for macro systems and attempt to answer some questions for micro systems. 
Among these concepts, we enumerate (i) framework paradigms (with ontological and 
epistemological sources) in terms of point of reference; (ii) value systems; (iii) 
foundational axioms; (iv) operational principles/mechanisms; (v) specific 
methodology and (vi) functional institutions for macro systems (Asutay, 2010, 
emphasis added).  
For the elaboration of micro foundations, Asutay (2010) argues that the following 
questions should be answered while comparing financial systems by using the factors 
suggested by Gregory and Stuart (1985): (i) What motivates human beings? or the 
incentive systems; (ii) What is the fundamental principle of rationality?; (iii) What is 
                                                 
270
 Authoritative, information loaded. 
271
 Informative, information dispersed. 
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the role and importance of self-interest?, and (iv) What are the perceived 
consequences of utility maximization? (emphasis added). 
Many economics schools scrutinize societies and they try to lay down the rules of the 
economic behaviour of the homo-economicus. Among them are: the Austrian School 
of Economics, Classical Economics, Environmental Economics, Evolutionary 
Economics, Feminist Economics, Historical School of Economics, Institutional 
Economics, Keynesian Economics, Labour Economics, Marxian Economics, 
Mercantilism, Monetarism, Neoclassical Economics, Reaganomics, Supply-Side 
Economics, Welfare Economics, Islamic economics, and many others. It is not 
possible to explore any of these schools in its fullness in this research, but this 
research inevitably compares some of them, since the foundational frames of some of 
these schools are already adopted by various economic and financial systems. 
It is important to identify that politics is also an essential part of the economy, as 
economies always run under political systems and the goals are set by either/both 
national or/and international political order. Subtracting politics from economic 
systems is almost impossible, because such debates are ―incomplete or misleading 
because economic systems are inextricably intertwined with other social systems and 
institutions, in particular political systems‖ (Arnold, 1994: 4). 
Marshall (1890), who introduced economics formally into the literature by renaming 
political economy as ‗economics‘, is not in favour of an integrated and comprehensive 
nature of economy and society framework.. According to him, economics ―examines 
that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the 
attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing‖ (Marshall, 1890: 
1). Walras (1873[1954]) similarly argues that economics is pure and positive science. 
This view was popular but, later on, with the contributions of Keynes and Schumpeter 
in the1930s, political economy returned as a powerful concept again. Especially in 
socialist literature, the involvement of politics is undeniable. Islamic literature‘s view 
is more comprehensive and closer to Arnold‘s (1994) perspective, basically claiming 
that all social systems are closely ―intertwined with other social systems‖. 
Political economy is a well-established term in the literature and it is defined as ―the 
study of the mechanisms used or usable by society to operate social economy‖ which 
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comprises of ―the tools, institutions and human energies that produce goods and 
services‖ (Tabb, 1999: 15) and evaluates ―non-economic factors such as political and 
social institutions, morality, and ideology in determining economic events‖ (Riddell 
et al., 1991: 37). Figure III.2 shows various economic systems in their political and 
social context.  
Figure III.2: Comparing Political Economies through their Actualisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Arif (1985: 81)  
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Before continuing let us remember that the ideal theoretical forms of financial 
systems and the way they function in practice differ a great deal. Some (such as Noam 
Chomsky) even argue that there has never been a true socialist country in the 
world
272
. Thus, we make distinctions between the theory and the practice of economic 
systems. In this and the following subsections, namely, introduction to political 
economic systems, we continue to introduce the theoretical postulates and premises 
of economics systems and leave the differences of practice to the analytical parts of 
the text. However, practices that are in conflict with the corresponding theory are 
referred to when deemed necessary. 
III.2.1. Capitalism, Market Economy and Finance in Theory  
Capitalism
273
, as the name suggests, is an economic system with an emphasis on the 
‗capital‘ and the ‗capitalist‘ who owns the capital and invests it. Although Arnold 
(1994: 5) suggests that the name ‗capitalism‘ is misleading because ―it is arguable that 
someone of some group is going to have to play the role of capitalist in any economic 
system‖, he would not deny the fact that capitalism praises, defends, encourages and 
emphasizes capital much more than other economic systems. 
The word ‗capitalism‘ was coined by socialists (Brewer, 2009: 14); however, the form 
of it goes back to mercantilism in the 1500s (Fulcher, 2004), but the power of the 
saved value, most of the time in billions, was not alien to people at any time in the 
history of humanity.  
In chronological order, Fulcher (2004) categorizes capitalism into three groups: (i) 
Merchant Capitalism; (ii) Industrial Capitalism; and (iii) Financial Capitalism. 
Modern capitalism is not an entity in itself though; rather, it is an end result of greater 
movements such as individualism (Ebenstein et al., 1994: 39) and liberalism 
(Heywood, 1998), which brought about the Reformation, in religion; physical 
sciences in learning; social sciences in human relations; democratic governments in 
politics; and the capitalist system in economy (Ebenstein et al.,1994; 39).  
                                                 
272
 Chomsky argues that the means of production have never belonged to workers in Russia and 
workers have just been the subjects of the Communist party instead of being subjects of factory owners 
in capitalist countries. 
273
 We use the terms ‗market economy‘ and ‗capitalism‘ interchangeably although we are aware that 
the emphasis is different in their nature. 
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While analysing capitalism we should be aware that there are capitalisms in everyday 
life shaped by the different political economies of each country, rather than a single 
capitalism. However, the word ‗capitalism‘ refers to the common features of many 
forms of capitalism, which ranges from the most liberal forms, such as the ‗laissez-
faire liberalism‘ of Adam Smith (Almond, 2006, 139), to the softest form of it, ‗state 
capitalism‘, which refers to a system where the state owns the main sectors like ―oil, 
steel, heavy machinery, telecommunications, aviation, and shipping‖ (Bremmer, 
2009: 42). Figure III.3 is an attempt to sort these forms of capitalism according to 
their markets‘ relative, independent formations. 
In this ranking of political economies of capitalisms free market capitalism is below 
laissez-faire capitalism because the first one ―assumes that economic transactions take 
place in a market that may be restricted in various degrees (Bradley and Donway, 
2010: 72).  
To appreciate the relative positions of the Anglo-American and Anglo-American-Plus 
distinction, we may refer, for example, to the Financial Times on June 6, 2000 where 
Italy and many other European countries were shown to open up their electricity 
market to the public and the UK 100 % of it. Still in 2014 (Financial Times, January 
23) ―Italy … is going ahead with a 40 per cent sale of state-owned postal services 
operator Poste Italiane‖ which ―decided last year to acquire 19.5 per cent of Alitalia in 
a recapitalisation that saved the privately owned airline from bankruptcy‖.  
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Figure III.3: Ordinal Scale of Market Liberty of Capitalism 
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III.2.1.1. Principles of capitalism 
It is not feasible to cite all the details of a market economy here, remembering that all 
the generalizations are indeed compromises. However, as essential features, we may 
refer to individualism, liberalism, materialism, utilitarianism, positivism, competition, 
free enterprise as the main principles of capitalism or the market economy. 
Let us now give the details of the market economy by using the comparison factors or 
the framework provided by Gregory and Stuart (1985: 12). 
III.2.1.1.1. Decision-making structures  
In market economies, decision making structures are decentralized implying that 
information is dispersed and mixed. The market economy favours free market 
mechanisms over centrally planned allocation. By means of price mechanisms, 
markets are considered to be in their most efficient form unless an external influence 
causes market failure. Markets are assumed to operate by the ‗invisible hand‘, self-
interest and self-regulation because ―it is believed that market forces will themselves 
create ‗order‘ and ‗harmony‘, and lead to ‗efficiency‘ and ‗equity‘. The government 
should hence abstain from intervening‖ (Ayub, 2007: 38). 
In its ―purest‖ (Morrison, 2002: 86) form, laissez-faire capitalism274 means the ―lack 
of restriction on activity‖ (Bradley and Donway, 2010: 71), of which the UK and the 
USA are good examples. 
Pryor (2005: 172) puts Canada, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, and 
Japan into the list and names it the ―Anglo-Saxon-plus‖ advanced market economy. 
However, some economists argue that ―capitalism in its classical laissez-faire sense 
does not exist anywhere‖ (Chapra, 2003: 17).  
Nevertheless, all capitalists think that ―[i]ndividual entrepreneurs  are much less likely 
to flourish in an environment hemmed in by hundreds of bureaucratic regulations 
governing location and planning permissions, building requirements and employment 
regulations – all of which are referred to as ‗red tape‘‖ (Morrison, 2002: 87). Graph 
III.1 and III.2 depict the cost of forming a private limited liability company and the 
number of weeks needed to do that in some of the capitalist countries respectively. 
                                                 
274
 Originally ―laissez-nous faire‖ [Skousen 2001, 46], meaning ―let us do‖ or ―leave us be‖. 
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These figures can be considered as a few measures of the amount of ‗red tape‘ in the 
economy or the measures of the level of laissez-faire capitalism. It is obvious from the 
figures that it is very cheap and fast to have a private company in market economies, 
especially in UK, US and Australia. 
 
Graph III.1: Cost of Forming a Private Limited Liability Company in 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Union of Industrial and Employers‘ Confederation of Europe (UNICE), in Financial 
Times, 23 March 2000. 
 
Graph III.2: Number of Weeks to Form a Private Limited Liability Company in 
1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Union of Industrial and Employers‘ Confederation of Europe (UNICE), in Financial 
Times, 23 March 2000. 
 
This simplicity and quickness and other liberal policies of market economies do not 
suggest that governments have no role in the markets, but that they have a lesser role 
compared to other economic systems. ―Government may tax, spend, and regulate a 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
Cost 
0
5
10
15
20
Number of Weeks 
540 
 
great deal; nonetheless, most commercial activity has a strong private component‖ 
(Ebenstein et al., Fogel, 1994: 39) in capitalism. Indeed, governments‘ involvement 
can sometimes be more than the theory formulates. Alt (1983: 60; emphasis added) 
argues for instance that in market economies, ―the Keynesian revolution was that 
policy makers should manipulate government expenditures to achieve a desirable 
level of aggregate demand‖. Nevertheless, the theories of Keynes were abandoned 
after the 1980s in favor of Hayek and his theories with much less government 
involvement.  
Consequently, this free of government intervention, short and easy access to market, 
individual and dispersed, uncontrolled, unplanned decision making provides financial 
agents, in theory, with a greater economic opportunity space for crime than socialism 
and Islamic economics, because information is shared by the whole entrepreneur 
society and the government behaves contrary to socialism, where very few people in 
the government decide and very many lack this privilege of information ownership 
which is crucial in financial crimes. In this, Islam is considered to be in the middle 
between market economy and socialism, but probably closer to capitalism, because 
the Islamic economy runs on markets and decision making is based on the individual, 
but further analysis is needed and this analysis is given under the discussion of 
Islamic economy. 
However, the condensed mechanism of decision making in place and time, in 
socialism, creates a great deal of opportunity for the few political and bureaucratic 
elite in it, which is comparable to the few white-collar criminals in capitalism; but, we 
may assume that the combination of the positions of rich and political elite in market 
societies may create a greater opportunity in market societies compared to socialism, 
and since the same group exists in Islamic societies, Islam then would be in the 
middle but closer to capitalism. 
We discussed the decision making processes of market economy but all of these 
decisions about ‗what to produce‘, ‗how much/many to produce‘, ‗when to produce‘ 
are made by using the incentive mechanisms in the supply and demand mechanism in 
free market societies. Let us now explain what those incentives are and how they 
operate. 
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III.2.1.1.2. Incentives and motivation mechanisms 
Incentives can be depicted as a consequence of wealth distribution in the society as 
shown in Figure III.4. For instance, in Figure III.4 the same white collar individuals at 
the same position in the wealth distributions of societies depicted by black and red 
nonlinear graphs usually have relatively different levels of motivation, because the 
nonlinear variance in red wealth distribution society has a relatively higher standard 
variance of wealth compared to the society with black wealth distribution. In fact, in 
nonlinear distributions the same fact is observable in the same distribution by 
comparing different parts of the distribution. Details of the codes in Figure III.4 are 
presented in Appendix I and Chapter 6. 
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Figure III.4: Incentives Depicted as Distributions of Wealth in the Society 
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In capitalism, ―authorities can facilitate business development in numerous ways, 
through incentives, ‗enterprise zones‘ and advantageous tax regimes‖ (Morris, 2002: 
87). People in general and entrepreneurs in particular are motivated by the private 
property ownership obtainable in the competition based market mechanisms of supply 
and demand.  
Competition is ―the essence‖ of the market economy (Morrison, 2002). Corporations 
compete for a bigger share of the demand in the market. Demand is what consumers 
potentially can afford to buy with the incomes they have and market demand is the 
total demand of all the individuals of the society. Supply, on the other hand, is about 
producers and denotes how much of what producers manufacture is offered to the 
market. Market supply, hence, is the total number of available goods and services 
produced in the market. Prices form in market systems by the relationship between 
these two forces. Figure III.5 gives a visual depiction of supply and demand.  
 
Figure III.5: Supply and Demand and the Formation of Equilibrium Price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Morrison (2002: 88) 
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thus increasing the supply.  This is the focal point where the incentive of working and 
producing comes from in market economies. Basically, investors look at the ‗price 
elasticity‘ and ‗income elasticity‘ and make decisions between available markets and 
products such as ‗normal‘, ‗superior‘ and ‗inferior‘ goods/commodities.  
Price elasticity and income elasticity can be expressed as a formula as seen in 
Formula III.1: 
 
Formula III.1: Price Elasticity and Income Elasticity 
 
 
                    (6.1) 
In capitalism, then, ―the system aims to assure citizens that they personally will be the 
beneficiaries of their property and labour‖ (Morrison, 2002: 91) and links these 
incentives to the private ownership of the property. Thus, bluntly we may argue that 
in market societies, people are motivated by a modified version of the ‗stick and 
carrot‘ method: ‗stick‘ is not having, first needs, then wants, then luxuries and status 
symbols, while ‗carrot‘ is having them all following the same levels in their order. For 
instance, many scholars (e.g. Patterson, 2010) believe that the market financial system 
is more vulnerable because of the positive incentives only (negative being the lack of 
positive). 
Since all of these incentive mechanisms are material like financial crime gains, we 
may argue that the incentive mechanisms of market societies are the most vulnerable 
to financial crimes. The most distant system from the market economy in terms of 
incentive and motivation mechanisms would be socialism and the closest would be 
Islamic economy, because socialism uses a social-dominant utility function and 
Islamic economy a morality-dominant utility function. Rationales of these 
comparisons are clearer as we continue to analyse the factors of other systems. 
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III.2.1.1.3. Property rights  
In capitalism, as seen in Figure III.6, means of production are privately owned and 
individually held. In addition to classic ownership of property, modern capitalism 
holds that the intellectual property is also privately owned and can be bought, sold 
and defended against copyright infringements.  
 
Figure III.6: Economic Systems Categories by Resource „Ownership‟ and 
„Allocation‟. 
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Uruguay...‖, and ―Gates‘ friend and legendary investor Warren Buffett, [is] ranked 
second richest with a wealth of $40 billion  ...... a fortune equivalent to the size of 
North Korea‘s economy‖. Both Bill Gates and Warren Buffett like many Forbes 400 
members live in market economies where privately owned property may sometimes 
buy countries.  
There is no doubt that unlimited allowance of private property is very vulnerable to 
financial criminality compared to socialism, because one would not even attempt to 
have more if it will not genuinely be his/her own property. Islamic economy again can 
be put in the middle but closer to the market economy because it allows private 
property but introduces a moral filter which associates ownership with the concept of 
amanah or trust in the sense that all the wealth is from God; and individuals in reality 
only have temporary ownership. 
No economic/financial system is free from social problems and the problems that 
have stemmed from the usual operations of the system are tried and solved by some 
coordination mechanism and information supply and exchange between financial 
institutions, individuals and the state along with the ordinary financial information 
sharing. Let us now discuss such coordination mechanisms in market societies. 
III.2.1.1.4. Coordination methods 
Mainly, market mechanisms are the most important coordination mechanisms in 
capitalism. Even many governmental agencies act in the public market and compete 
for votes or popularity. If for instance certain policies of the police organization are 
unpopular, they are changed by the governments to ‗buy‘ votes (Taylor, 1998).The 
public market decides who stays and who leaves in the polity market. In financial 
markets, the price is formed by the market mechanism and players make almost all of 
their economic decisions based on prices. However, public opinion is generally 
affected by governments‘ and media‘s policies. This is why ―it is necessary to make 
some tacit or explicit suppositions about the accompanying political system‖ (Arnold, 
1994: 4), while discussing market economies. 
However, capitalism is sometimes called the ―invisible-hand economy‖ (Knoke, 
1996: 5), or ―unhampered capitalism‖ (Mises, 1966: 836) or ―free-market capitalism‖ 
(Rothbard, 2006: 301), because co-ordination and provision of information are almost 
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invisible in a society where ―buyers and sellers have equal, full and complete 
knowledge of what they are buying and selling‖ (Randy, 1995: 4). 
Nevertheless, some authors suggest that ―of course, the ideal free market does not 
exist anywhere, has never existed anywhere‖ (Randy, 1995: 4) and that monopoly and 
monopsony conglomerates exercise huge power over the markets. Such ―extreme 
inequalities ... which are inherent in the capitalist model have led to government 
intervention to protect the weakest in the society‖. Competition authorities are 
examples of such interventions along with legislations, regulations to protect smaller 
firms in the market and ―social welfare measures, such as income support and housing 
benefit‖ (Morrison, 2002: 91). 
Because social welfare is not solved through the market mechanisms in market 
societies, it is left to ―the government, [which] was viewed as a benevolent dictator 
acting in the best interest of the governed and in operational terms its problem was to 
choose levels of policy instruments that would maximise a given social welfare 
function‖ (Borooah, 1985: 32).  
In other words, ―politicians can acquire knowledge that would be necessary to 
promote economic stability‖ (Wagner, 2001: 424). This ―traditional‖ approach also 
takes it for granted that ―such knowledge will always and necessarily be put to good 
use, as illustrated by the pursuit of a program of the state acting to counteract the 
forces of instability that would otherwise destabilize a market economy‖ (Wagner, 
2001: 424). However, governments‘ involvement is not always recognized. ―[I]n the 
conventional economic analysis, government is taken as an exogenous actor, which 
does not have any effect on economic analysis‖ (Asutay, 2010; emphasis in original).  
Absence of government, even as a coordinator, in the economic decision making 
process of a market economy is shown in Figure III.7, which is a very common figure 
of ‘introductory economics classes‘. 
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Figure III.7: The Circular Flow- Exogenous Government Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Asutay (2010) 
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Figure III.8: Integrated Politico-Economic Framework, or Politicised Circular 
Flow 
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intervene in the market but sees this intervention as a necessity and takes it for 
granted when markets fail, which again positions the Islamic economy between 
capitalism and socialism, and closer to capitalism operation-wise, but from a 
consequentialist viewpoint it becomes closer to socialism. Overall though, when we 
consider Ibn Taymiyya‘s (1996) statements about the price being the ‗price of God‘, 
we may argue that intervention, although taken for granted, is only consequentualist 
and exception, rather than rule. This puts the Islamic economy again in the middle but 
in terms of coordination closer to the market economy.  
III.2.1.2. Criticism of capitalism 
Many Western economists themselves accept that ―[m]arket capitalism is plagued by 
social injustice. Large income inequalities, poverty, homelessness and mass 
unemployment are all characteristics of the advanced western economies‖ say 
Griffiths and Wall (1999: 680). A September 1999 survey by The Economist points 
out that ―economic concentration presents a paradox of capitalism; the encouragement 
of individual enterprise is the incentive of capitalism, but business, if it grows too big, 
destroys incentives‖ (Morrison, 2002: 92). 
In the first decade of the last three, ―United States equity and Treasury markets have 
often been cited in the academic literature as examples of perfectly competitive 
markets involving numerous buyers and sellers acting as price-taker‖, however, 
―[r]ecent academic research ... has focused on instances where this paradigm fails to 
hold‖ (Cherian et al., January 01, 1993: 200). Indeed, prominent financiers think that 
they ―do not believe in efficient markets‖ (Redleaf, 2010). 
Capitalists criticize socialism for having a naive approach to human nature, but 
capitalism itself assumes that the markets are Pareto optimum, that there is perfect 
competition, markets are efficient and operate in a perfect information game etc. 
However, even if this premise is correct, Okun (1975: ii) argues that markets ―award 
prices that allow the big winners to feed their pets better then the losers can feed their 
children.‖ 
A whole literature has formed around critical theory, which argues that ―it is to the 
unequal structure of our society that we should look in seeking explanations for 
crime. For those working in this tradition, it is capitalism itself that is criminogenic.‖ 
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(Newburn, 2007: 386). In a similar vein, Pearce (1976), Slapper and Tombs (1999) 
and others argue that the structural make-up of contemporary capitalism is an 
important explanatory factor in understanding corporate crime. 
Undoubtedly, the institutions of the market economy have grown to be the institutions 
of all. For instance the IMF and the World Bank have more than 180 members, the 
WTO, similarly, has 153 members; however they are criticized for having a role in 
―contributing to the problems‖ instead of solving them (Harris, 1999: 200). 
Nevertheless, Shiller (2008) thinks that ―markets are inherently somewhat unstable 
when we start thinking up really important new ways of doing financial business, they 
start to grow and they get huge, they get bigger and bigger before you know it‖. 
In this regard, we may argue that capitalism has more systemic risk of financial 
crimes compared to other systems. Let us further explain why. 
III.2.2. Socialism, Transitional Economy and Finance in Theory 
―Although systems change over time, the socialist-capitalist framework of 
comparison has until 1990 proven to accommodate the modest changes taking place 
in economic systems‖ (Asutay, 2010). However, after the 1990s, the tide from 
socialism to capitalism forced academia to search for terms better depicting economic 
systems such as ‗transitional‘ economies. Thus, especially in recent years, socialism 
appears only scarcely in practice and when it appears, it appears in mild, soft forms 
only. 
Many socialists believe that the heritage of socialism goes back to Plato‘s Republic, 
Thomas More‘s Utopia (1903) or early Christianity (Ebenstein et al., 1994). 
However, in a modern sense, the origins of socialism go back to the 19
th
 century when 
it emerged as a reaction against capitalism and the bad working conditions, capitalism 
brought about. Thus, socialism is ―a product of the Industrial Revolution‖ and first 
received attention in Britain and France (Ebenstein et al., 1994: 2). 
Socialist economy is usually called a ‗command economy‘ (Griffiths and Wall, 1999: 
680), ‗planned economy‘ or ‗centralised economy‘. Among many versions of 
socialism, ‗utopian‘, ‗Fabian‘, ‗syndicalist‘, ‗guild‘, ‗Marxist‘, ‗market‘ and 
‗democratic‘ forms are only a few. We cannot explain all of them in detail here, but 
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Marxist, market and democratic socialisms are worth analysing for comparison. 
Definition: Socialism, communism and transitional economy 
Socialism is ―the broadest of political ideologies‖ (Heywood, 1998). We may even 
talk about ‗socialisms‘ (Heywood, 1998: 103) instead of ‗socialism‘. Socialist 
‗internationals‘ are one of the reasons for the inflation of forms. Since the 19th century 
‗internationals‘ offered and helped form many kinds of socialisms. Recently, for 
instance, the term ‗transition economy‘ is widely used to denote socialist countries, in 
place of earlier terms such as communism and social democracy.  
The term ‗socialist‘ is from the Latin verb ‗sociare‘, meaning ‗to combine‘, ‗to share‘, 
which first appeared in a magazine called Co-operative Magazine in Britain in 1827. 
Socialism is a form of economic system in which government, as a representative of 
the society, owns and controls the means of production or plans a great deal of it. In a 
sense, the form of the socialism changes as various degrees and combinations of 
ownership, control and plan change. A system, for instance, is sometimes called 
socialist ―even though the state owns only the large-scale means of production‖ 
(Bradley and Donway, 2010: 74). Heilbroner (1993, 101) defines socialism as ―a 
centrally planned economy in which the government controls all means of 
production‖ and excludes ownership.  
Although the popular time and place may be 1917 Russia in people‘s minds, 
socialism was well established in 1830s England (Chapra, 2003: 107) and France. 
Denis (1973: 245) refers to 18
th
 century France for the initiation of modern socialist 
ideas too. Today, however, socialism means being against capitalism (Brewer, 2009: 
14). 
Literature tends to first make a dichotomous categorization of mild and strict forms of 
socialism. Ebenstein et al., (1994: 1-2) for instance argues that 
There are at least two broad meanings of socialism. The first relates to collective 
ownership of the means of production either through worker cooperatives or state-
run businesses. ... The second ... is a communitarian outlook of the proper way that 
society should be organized, as reflected in public assistance and works programs 
and projects of all sorts, and significant sovereign collective involvement in the 
lives of the people.  
On the other hand, according to Heywood (1998: 104), ―[t]he Russian Revolution of 
553 
 
1917 entrenched this split: revolutionary socialists, following the example of Lenin 
and the Bolsheviks, usually adapted the title ‗communist‟, while reformist socialists 
retained the name ‗socialist‟ or ‗social democrat‘‖. This distinction seems to be valid 
between Maoist China before the 1980s and Xiaoping China since then. The main 
difference between these two is that the first one seeks power through ―revolution‖, 
while the latter seeks it ―through the ballot box‖ (Heywood, 1998: 104). It should, 
therefore, be noted that China is an interesting case, as it is not a social democracy; in 
China there is only one party, the Communist party, however, especially recently, its 
system is called even ‗Chinese Capitalism‘. 
Communism is similarly initiated by Plato in ancient times, and relatively recently by 
Marx and Engels, and the term comes from 1830s‘ Paris (Haywood, 1998: 124), 
approximately the same time as ‗socialism‘. 
Haywood (1998) classifies ‗communism‘ under ‗socialism‘ and defines it as ―a future 
society based on the common ownership of wealth and, possibly, the communal 
organization of social existence‖ or as ―actually existing socialism‖ or ―the regimes 
that communist parties established‖ which suggest no meaningful distinction from the 
definition of socialism itself. 
Historically, we may argue that after the 1917 Revolution in Russia, socialism has 
been popular ―in many developing countries that were still controlled by European 
Empires‖ (Newman, 2005: 4) and after its collapse in 1991, China, who had been 
communist since 1949 and ruled by Mao Zedung (1893-1976), has had the leading 
position of socialism in the world. Socialism is seen in North Korea, Vietnam, Sri 
Lanka, Sweden, Jewish Settlers in Palestine, Arab states, beginning with Egypt, post-
colonial Africa, particularly in Ghana and Tanzania, and Latin America, especially 
Cuba where under the leadership of Fidel Castro a socialist model based more on the 
Soviet Russian model was built and has survived since 1959. 
Socialism, in the last three decades, was represented mainly by China, Cuba and - for 
one decade only - by Soviet Russia. In the first decade, between 1980 and 1990, 
Soviet Russia was not only the sole leader of the socialist world but also one of the 
two  superpowers of the Cold War era. 
Cuba, before the very beginning of the 1980s, was a Soviet ally if not a Soviet state. 
554 
 
Latell (2005: 194) explains the Soviet-Cuban relationship as follows: 
There was no denying of his [Fidel] affiliation with the Soviets. They provided 
about $5 billion annually in economic subsidies. The 1975 estimate concluded 
there were five to eight thousand Soviet civilian advisers working in Cuban 
government, trying to jump start the still chaotic economy. Every year Moscow 
also gave another $1 billion worth of free military supplies ... Several troops  
had fought in 1978 under the command of Soviet generals in the Horn of Africa, 
... To his enemies Fidel was a Soviet pawn. 
As we did in the previous section, we may depict many forms of socialism on an 
ordinal scale of market liberty. Such a scale, then, can be used to show the 
relationship between socialism, capitalism and Islamic economies as in Figure III.9. 
Libertarian socialists usually do not oppose private personal property but oppose state 
socialism and private ownership of the producing property. Titoism (Figure III.9) 
refers to worker self-management and profit sharing in a centrally planned economy 
and is above Marxism because of its more liberal views. 
As a matter of fact, distinctions between the liberal and social interpretations of 
socialism get rather blurred. For instance Morrison (2002: 101), while explaining 
―social market capitalism‖, writes that in the social market model of capitalism, there 
is; 
- Significant state involvement in the economy;  
- Bureaucratic regulation of business; 
- Extensive social welfare programmes; 
- Corporate governance based on social priorities, rather than shareholder value; 
- A closed system of corporate control and little takeover market. 
We cannot then help but argue that sometimes the distinction is psychological, 
cultural or even geographical rather than economic. 
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Figure III.9: Ordinal Scale of Market Liberty of Socialisms 
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III.2.2.1. Principles of socialism 
Dialectical materialism is the main principle of socialism, because Marx and many 
other socialists believed that the history of mankind is the history of conflicting 
powers of material possessions in collective groups. Apart from dialectical 
materialism, determinism, positivism, materialism, biological and social Darwinism, 
dialectics, centralization, plan, rationality, egalitarianism and the emphasis on social 
causes and needs can be regarded as the main principles of socialism because 
scientism and rationality play a crucial role in every act of socialists and they always 
operate claiming the betterment of all rather than self. 
III.2.2.1.1. Decision making structures 
A socialist ―society would have to manage not merely individual aspects of social life, 
but the whole of social life, in all its various activities, in all its aspects‖ (Marx and 
Engels, 1845/1975: 248). Information is loaded in the centre and many, if not all, of 
the important decisions are made in and by the centre formally.  
Some prominent scholars (e.g. Hayek) argue that central decision-making for the 
whole society is not feasible but planning officers of socialist countries did make 
many central decisions. Among such decisions are ―telling factories where to buy 
their inputs, how much to pay their workers, how much to produce and where to sell 
their output‖ (Griffiths and Wall, 1999: 680).  
According to Griffiths and Wall (1999: 680), in socialist countries   
individuals were trained in specialist schools and universities and directed to 
work at specific factories, which provided their wages, houses, health care – 
even holidays in enterprise-owned hotels and sanatoria; the national bank 
was told how much to lend to which factories and how much cash to print to 
pay wages.  
As seen in Figure III.10, in socialism, resources are allocated by the state and the 
decision making, thus, is centralized, unlike capitalism. 
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Figure III.10: Categories of Economic Systems by Resource „Ownership‟ and 
„Allocation‟. 
 
 
 
 
 
However, we should note that in major socialist powers like China, market reforms 
are taking place, following the end of the Soviet Union (Morrison, 2002: 85). Thus, 
especially for the last few decades socialism means market socialism, because ―hardly 
any avowedly socialist states [are] left, and even they, notably North Korea and Cuba, 
have made tentative steps to open up their economies‖ (Morrison, 2002: 85). We may 
then argue that both ownership and allocation were of the state in socialist countries 
before the mid-1980s but after the 1980s states left the ownership of the resources and 
retained the power of allocating resources. 
In terms of financial crime, the most vulnerable group in the socialist state would be 
the higher government officials, because they can be seen as parallel to the richer 
strata of the capitalist and Islamic countries. These are the most vulnerable groups to 
financial white-collar crimes but their number is less than the number of white collar 
people in a market system, because in socialism it is not possible to have a 
corporation independently. All the corporations‘ CEOs are government officials and 
communist party member politicians. Since all the managers of the big state firms in 
socialism are also government officials, numbers of white collar decision makers are 
few in socialism compared to a market system and thus the number of available white 
collar positions and individuals holding those positions decreases too. Market 
economies have corporate people in government too but they do not hold both of the 
positions at the same time, unlike socialist politicians. Thus, in the societies of the 
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same size we may argue that, in terms of decision making structures, socialism would 
be less vulnerable to financial crimes than Islam and much less than capitalism.  
III.2.2.1.2. Incentives and motivation mechanisms 
Incentives in socialism can also be depicted by using the same statistical method as in 
Figure III.11 based on variations in wealth distribution. This figure does show 
materially lower levels of incentives but socialism claims to overcome this 
shortcoming by the distributions of social relations, values and solidarity in the 
society. 
Socialists, at first, shared the liberalist worldview with capitalists; however, through 
the course of time, they (Newman, 2005: 6): 
dissented from two aspects of the liberals‘ outlook. First, rather than individualism, 
they tended to emphasize community, cooperation, and association – qualities that 
they believed to be jeopardized by contemporary developments. And, second, rather 
than celebrating the proclaimed progress arising from capitalist enterprise, they 
were preoccupied by the massive inequality that it was causing‖ 
Incentive mechanisms in socialism are formed parallel to this departure from the 
common liberalism. Entrepreneurs and their investment habits in market societies are 
shaped by advertising and the demand is secured, labour is encouraged to work and 
individuals, in this way, buy the ability to buy more. In socialist states however, there 
is no advertising (BBC4, 2004). They use the same tool, ‗price mechanism‘, for 
motivation, however this time the price of labour is the focus and not the investor. In 
many socialist states, factory workers are paid more if they produce more. We may, 
thus, argue that incentive mechanisms are microeconomically established in 
socialism, while they are macroeconomically established in capitalism. 
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Figure III.11: Incentives and Disincentives as Distributions of Wealth and Social 
Status in the Various Societies 
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In the conventional theory of the socialist economy, even macroeconomic equations 
are formulated by the labour force. For instance, as expressed by Formula III.2, the 
gross national income, or GNI, (Y) is determined by the product of employment (Z) 
and productivity (W) defined as gross value added per employee: 
 
Formula III.2: Gross National Income Calculated by Labour Force and 
Productivity 
Y = Z x W 
 
This GNI can also be ―presented as the product of the real productive fixed capital 
(M) by the effectiveness of this fixed capital (E) defined as gross value added per unit 
of capital, or Y = M x E‖ (Brus and Laski, 1965: 173). 
In socialism, consumption, more than it is planned, is both discouraged and almost 
impossible to get, because ―input and output prices were carefully set to ensure that 
all firms could pay their wage bills and repay loans from the national bank, while at 
the same time pricing consumer goods to encourage consumption of socially desirable 
goods (e.g. books, ballet, theatre, public transport, etc.), and discourage consumption 
of politically unfavoured goods (e.g. international telephone calls, cars, luxury 
goods)‖ (Griffiths and Wall, 1999: 680).  
Regarding the supply-side, socialists claim the effects of ―ratchets and bonus 
systems‖ as ―incentive systems‖ (Collier, 1989: 26). 
These incentive mechanisms, though, are not as powerful as those in a market 
economy or Islamic economy. We may argue that socialism motivates its members to 
be equal and thus static. This is considered to be one of the weakest features of 
socialism. We may form an analogy to be more explicit: the law of thermodynamics 
in physics postulates that the total equality of heat in the universe is the true end of the 
universe, and the fact that we have not seen this end yet is because of the heat 
imbalance. Socialism looks like the social equivalent of heat death or heat balance 
with the aim of equalising all of the members of the society. It creates this imbalance 
only barely and most of the time not explicitly because socialism tries to create an 
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egalitarian society and is not much concerned about the individual incentives people 
get but about the society as a whole. ―If each of the enterprises achieved its 
production targets, there could not be, by definition, shortages or bottlenecks in the 
economy‖ (Griffiths and Wall, 1999: 680). This is what socialism focuses on. 
Because, as Griffiths and Wall (1999: 680) argue, then  
[t]here would be full employment, with everyone working in an enterprise for 
which he/she had been specifically trained at school and university. The total 
wage bill for the economy, which was paid in cash, would be sufficient to buy 
all the consumer goods produced. There would be zero inflation and all the 
country‘s citizens would have access to housing, education and health care. 
Socialism, furthermore, expects its members to be self-motivated. Abolition of private 
property, which is considered to be harmful for society, should be enough to achieve 
such a human condition, because private property poisons the individuals and keeps 
them from acting for the good of the society. Thus, in socialism, absence of private 
property is considered to be an incentive mechanism, because people are supposed to 
maintain this balanced, equal society and would be motivated to work hard for the 
continuation of it. Socialists think that compared to its negation, namely, unequal, 
unbalanced and poisoned by private property, the option of working for the 
continuation of an egalitarian, equal society is favourable. As is known also, socialism 
favours ‗labour‘ over ‗capital‘, because people are born with labour and labour is 
relatively easier to equalise, at least fuzzily. On the other hand, it is not possible to 
have an all-rich society. If everybody is rich then everybody is equal, but if everybody 
is equal nobody is rich because richness is a relative concept, it does not exist in itself. 
It should be noted that socialists have an emphasis on solidarity, cooperation and 
equality. They ―have always rejected views that stress individual self-interest and 
competition as the sole motivating factor of human behaviour in all societies at all 
times‖ (Newman, 2005: 3). 
Nevertheless, this way of thinking fails to distinguish the values of and thus 
imbalance between the labours of astronauts, giants of literature and peasants. 
According to Newman (2005: 3), socialism has a rather optimistic view of human 
nature. This is obvious especially for the utopian versions of socialism like those 
Robert Owen (1771-1858) in Britain and US, Etienne Cabet (1788-1856), Henri 
Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and Charles Fourier (1772-1837) in France supported.  
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In these utopian forms, ethical and aesthetic idealism are ―expressed by writers like 
John Ruskin and William Morris during the nineteenth century ... Ruskin  ... sought 
an older and more traditional way of life, one in which natural and other forms of 
beauty would come before the economic bottom line‖ (Ebenstein et al., 1994: 3; 
emphasis added).  
William Morris for instance ―kept his gaze closer to the ground. He saw around him 
ugly household goods and furnishings and men and women who lacked joy and 
beauty in their daily lives.‖ ―Particularly in town and country planning, the British 
Labour party has reflected directly and explicitly the message of Ruskin and  
Morris ... community planning – more than tearing down slums and building neat 
little row houses of uniform size and style‖ (Ebenstein et al., 1994: 3, emphasis 
added). 
This pursuit of beauty is considered by many socialists to be pervasive in society. If 
so, the society would follow the beautiful. This sometimes oppressive beauty pursuit 
can easily be observed in Hitler‘s national socialist practices too. Especially these 
utopian versions show that socialism is committed ―to the creation of an egalitarian‖ 
(Newman (2005: 2) and not necessarily industrious society. 
In an environment of no advertisement, hardly any competition, very few status 
symbols, restricted number of products and the official promise of full supply of basic 
needs, we may argue that incentive mechanisms would be very weak. This should be 
valid for committing financial crimes, compared to both of the other economic 
systems, because in socialism, the whole society labels the ‗wealth discrepancy‘ as 
the worst evil of all and constantly broadcasts the superiority of being equal and 
social. In this sense, Islam would be second to socialism, because of its relatively 
lesser emphasis on equality and the deteriorating effects of wealth, and capitalism 
would be the last. 
III.2.2.1.3. Property Rights 
In socialism people have property but the kurtosis of the distributed property in the 
society is very high and the variation is very low, as shown in Figure III.12. 
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Figure III.12: Different Levels of Property Ownership as a Consequence of 
Various Kurtoses in Financial Motivation 
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The changing nature of firm ownership in recent centuries (i.e. from individual or 
family owned firms to conglomerates collectively owned by people from various 
countries) is argued to be a reason why the world has had socialism as an economic 
system in the last century, because socialism offered a solution to the problem of 
ownership by which people and states could compete with their huge enterprises and 
production capacity.  The solution was collective ownership both in the market 
economy and in socialism but with differences of application.  
In socialism (i.e. in USSR and Cuba) everybody, even waitresses or state officials live 
on a state salary. Currency is produced by the government and allocated for the whole 
population as salary periodically; in return, the whole population works in publicly 
owned jobs. There are slight variations of this: for instance, in Cuba and China, there 
are two different currencies one of which is convertible and intended for tourists.  
However, this does not mean that people have no private property. There is currency, 
salaries and thievery, because one can buy and own certain things in socialism, 
contrary to the common perception. For instance in Cuba, people have their clothing, 
TVs, furniture, bicycles etc. some of which can even be used as a means of 
production. For instance, in Cuba bicycle-taxis (a man-powered vehicle) can be hired 
by the local people to earn money. Nevertheless, private property is very much 
restricted. Other than these and similar other small properties, everything belongs to 
the public sector, or if not, independent use is extremely limited. For instance, in 2010 
in Cuba one cannot have extra people in one‘s house and charge them rent without 
informing the government; they also cannot slaughter their cows for meat because the 
government plans them for milk production. 
Historically though, in terms of property ownership, there has been an evolution from 
small, individually-owned corporations to conglomerates in the last few centuries. 
In the England of John Locke or the America of Thomas Jefferson, the 
average farm, store or workshop was generally small enough to be owned 
and operated by one person or family ... As the nineteenth century 
progressed however, the individual (or single family) form of ownership 
and work was gradually replaced by an economic system in which large-
scale enterprise grew larger and larger, work became more and more 
collective, while ownership remained private. (Ebenstein et al.,, 1994: 3). 
In order to cope with this issue, two main methods could have been adopted, as 
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argued by Ebenstein et al. (1985: 5):  
(i) The division of large-scale enterprises into small units; so that work and 
ownership could coincide again in one person or family;  
(ii) Collective ownership could be introduced. 
In fact, the very first appearance of socialism, as a concept, in London Co-operative 
Magazine in 1827 was about ―whether it was more beneficial that capital should be 
owned individually or held in common‖ (Newman, 2005: 6-7). Karl Marx, similarly, 
argued that ―in capitalist societies the state is controlled by those who own the means 
of production. Consequently, the interests of the population as a whole could only be 
properly served if such ownership were assumed by the state‖ (Jones, 2006: 232). 
Socialism, thus, holds that the relationship between capital and labour is not 
individual but structural (Brewer, 2009: 16), meaning that the capitalist owns the 
capital in the capitalist system and workers are under constant pressure in this system, 
because of non-individual, structural reasons. Within the theory of historical 
materialism, communal ownership in ancient times first suppressed slaves, then after 
this conflict the synthesis of feudalism was reached, with the conflicting powers of 
serfs and feudalists, which then brought about the conflict between bourgeoisie and 
proletariat of the synthesis of capitalism, then socialism and eventually communism. 
These events in order can form a summary of dialectical historical materialism. 
According to Marx, conflict between certain ‗haves‘ and ‗have-nots‘ of the society 
determine the history of mankind. Thus, the refusal of private property is at the heart 
of socialism. 
To some socialists, ―the ideal commonwealth is Plato‘s Republic‖ because ―its ruling 
class has no personal property and shares all things‖ (Ebenstein, 1994: 2). 
Socialists basically argue that banning private property would abolish the tensions 
between these conflicting powers and bring about a balance and peace to humankind. 
Some socialists, such as Robert Owen (1772-1837), even ―believed that it would be 
possible to abolish money and replace it with ‗labour notes‘, which would represent 
the time spent in work and would be exchangeable for goods‖ (Newman, 2005: 12). 
In socialism all the means of production are publicly or collectively owned and 
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resources are allocated from a centre equally for everybody according to their needs, 
while they are privately, individually owned in capitalism and distributed according to 
the market dynamics as shown in Figure III.13. 
 
Figure III.13: Categories of Economic Systems by Resource „Ownership‟ and 
„Allocation‟. 
 
 
From an optimistic point of view, socialism may be said to provide a technology 
Shiller (2010): 
that works to eliminate risks, to spread them out, to pool them, to share them 
among many different people. So the ideal that theory suggest - and it may be 
unreachable - but the perfect financial system would have all of our risks 
pooled completely. That is nobody suffers alone. If anything happens to me in 
my livelihood, it spreads out over everybody and everybody that means the 
whole world. Whatever happens to me, when it is spread out over six billion 
plus people it ends up divided by six billion and it becomes unobservable. It 
becomes so small that it is meaningless and that is the ideal. That is ... even 
leaving the risks as they are and just sharing them better.  
Although these words belong to a finance course in capitalism, they can be 
euphemistically taken as the optimistic intentions of socialism. 
Consequently, we should be aware that it is not only the ownership of the property 
that should concern us, the control of the property is also important while determining 
socialist characteristics of an economic system because ―[a]fter all, what does 
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ownership of property entail if not the right to determine how it is used?‖ (Bradley 
and Donway, 2010: 78). In this sense, the Islamic economy can be put between 
capitalism and socialism, because Islam recognizes property rights in everything, 
including the means of production, but restricts and controls them officially, morally 
and socially. 
III.2.2.1.4. Coordination methods 
There are different levels of planning in socialism. Classical socialism favours full 
and central control of all commodity, labour and financial markets over free market 
mechanisms; however, market socialism allows quasi-free markets for the allocation 
of goods and services. Central planning is possible by ―administrative commands 
expressed in real terms‖ (Borstein, 1971: 3). 
In Marxist socialism, markets are controlled because Marx sees everything as a 
product of historical materialism and Marxian dialectics, because the history of 
humankind is the history of class struggle (Marx, 1848) and  existence is not 
determined by the consciousness of men but by their social existence (Marx, 1859), 
meaning that the social relations of production determine both the patterns of thought 
and the levels of consciousness (Naqvi, 1994). 
This kind of coordination produces better use of materials and eventually brings about 
better forms of historical materialism in the future. Socialists support communal 
instead of individual practices and decision making, believing in such a way of 
coordination. This requires a gatherer, a planner, and a central coordinator. This is 
why ―certainly one cannot specify a socialist economic system without describing 
some elements of the state apparatus, at least at some level of abstraction‖ (Arnold, 
1994: 4). 
In socialism everything is planned by the state ―elegantly‖ (Griffiths and Wall, 1999; 
680) ―[u]sing ‗input-output‘ analysis (a planning framework which calculated the 
inputs required for each factory in order for it to deliver its planned outputs to the next 
stage in the production process), the planning ministry could calculate precisely how 
much labour, capital and raw materials each enterprise required to achieve its 
production targets. The various production targets for raw materials and intermediate 
and final products all fitted together to ensure a perfectly balanced expansion of 
568 
 
economy‖ (Griffiths and Wall, 1999; 680). 
Thus, in socialism, everything is coordinated according to a static plan, compared to a 
dynamic one in market societies and Islam, which includes a certain relative standard 
of living for certain labour groups in the society. A good example of such standards 
can be observed in Moscow, until 1992. Narkomfin Communal Houses with identical 
apartments for the officers of the same rank are good examples and they also reflect
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the outlook of the state at the time because they were built to ―induce desired byt 
reforms‖ (Burhli, 1999: 146). Since these standards are changeable by command, 
arguably, there is less need for frequent interaction with financial institutions and 
financial products, because all domestic debts and credits are indeed of one firm, 
named as ‗the state‘. Thus we may argue that the frequency of financial interaction in 
the coordination dynamics of socialist finance is weak compared to other financial 
systems. 
However, this does not mean that in socialism there is no finance market: the market 
exists, because a miniscule form of private property
276
 is exchanged and traded. Such 
practices are the reason why small variations of wealth exist in the society but the 
main source of distinctive wealth is possible, for instance in Cuba, from external 
sources only, such as selling an art work without informing the government, which is 
tantamount to committing crime. Thus, without committing crime, wealth 
accumulation is almost impossible in socialist countries and this is what the 
government really wants to do: ‗curbing all material imbalances‘.  
Consequently, in socialism coordination mechanisms are not diverse even in its 
‗market socialism‘ version, because (Arnold, 1994: 5): 
a crucial difference between the most defensible form of market socialism 
and a free enterprise system is that the former, but not the latter, mandates 
by law a certain type of economic organization, the self-managed 
cooperative. By contrast, in a free enterprise system, production can be and 
is in fact organized through a variety of different organizational forms.  
Within the framework of top-down plan and management and order-following 
mechanisms with no runtime effects on financial markets, we may argue that in the 
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lower levels of the economy, socialism does not allow great financial opportunities. 
However, the top strata of the socialist society, which comprise of top state plant 
managers and politicians, are an exception to this rule but their number, especially the 
number of CEOs, are considerably less compared to capitalist societies because 
capitalist markets are open systems and they allow in and out flux to/from outside of 
the national markets and allows competition inside. The issue, again, comes down to 
the comparison of the white-collar strata of the societies. If we assume that this white-
collar top layer stratum of the society is lower in socialism compared to both Islam 
and capitalism we may say that in socialism it is less likely to come up with financial 
crimes. This argument obviously puts Islam in the middle where coordination is both 
top down and at the runtime and capitalism at the extreme end where the whole 
process of coordination is done by the greatest number of people within the rules of 
supply and demand.   
III.2.2.2. Criticism of Socialism  
It is hard to come up with genuinely socialist countries in recent decades. For 
instance, China allowed private property by a constitutional amendment in 1999 and 
her economy was 40% privately owned in 2002, which has been on the rise since then 
(Morrison, 2002). It can be argued that all socialist economies are transition 
economies since the 1980s. Russia and East European countries are a few examples of 
this transition which probably occurred because of the ―[o]verproduction, 
inefficiencies and inflexibility‖ (Morrison, 2002: 107) in socialism. 
Among the famous critics of socialism are Von Mises (1951), Hayek (1948, 2000), 
Milton Friedman (]1991] 2006). Hayek (1948) for instance argues that it is impossible 
for a central authority to predict and plan for every need of every person in the 
society. It is only possible to process this much information through many dispersed 
and complex decision-makers of the free market. 
The information processing problem was more visible with the developing socialist 
economies because (Griffiths and Wall, 1999: 60):  
The complexity of the coordination problem grew explosively, as consumers 
demanded more choice and better quality. With innovation discouraged and the 
central planners being encouraged to set unrealistic targets for political reasons, 
productivity growth slowed and official statistics for production became ever more 
cosmetic. Absenteeism at work and false reporting of output became 
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commonplace. Shortages of consumer goods emerged and, with people unable to 
buy goods with their wages, households‘ deposits with the national savings bank 
piled up. This state of affairs was summed up in the Soviet joke, ‗the factories 
pretend to pay us and we pretend to work‘.  
Another weakness of socialism is the lack of incentives in the economy that stems 
from the attempt to equalise the society. For the Soviet Model, for instance, ―central 
planning provided little incentive for either managers or workers to work harder or to 
innovate‖ (Griffiths and Wall, 1999: 60). The claim of equality not only imposed 
indifference on the society but also stayed within the economic context only and did 
not diffuse into the other functions of the government. Lindblom (1977) for instance 
argues that although communist countries are committed to economic equality they 
never aspired to political equality. 
More generally though, the problem with the socialist thinkers and socialist way of 
thinking is that they relied on the laws of science and their intellectual capacity too 
much, even solely. Although this may seem a bit controversial, the flawless truth in 
this assertion can be felt by consulting Newton and his scientific ‗laws of gravity‘. 
However sound his theories may seem
277
, Newton has been proven to be wrong by 
Einstein. Einstein has proven that time and space are indeed relative; thus scientific 
achievements are dynamic by nature. And it is really catastrophic to build big 
constructions on top of earthquakes with no precautions at all. The precautions in 
capitalism for instance were common sense accompanying scientism and in Islam the 
revelations, whereas socialism claimed a full predictability and full positivism of the 
whole history of mankind through historical, dialectic materialism. However, this way 
of thinking is not completely alien to capitalism especially and this and similar other 
reasons may suggest one linear order of the two systems approaching each other from 
extreme ends of ‗labour and capital‘ or ‗social and individual‘ etc. 
Interestingly, Fulcher (2004), in his book ‗Capitalism‘ writes about ‗Swedish 
Capitalism‘ under the title ‗Managed Capitalism‘ and Newman (2005), in his book 
‗Socialism‘ writes about ‗Swedish Social Democracy‘.  
Figure III.14 tries to show this aspect of the two major economic systems, where 
capitalism and socialism are in one linear order of degrees of freedom of the markets. 
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Figure III.14: Different but Overlapping Economic and Financial Systems  
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However, it is very hard to put Islamic economics and finance in this linear order, 
although we could put it in the middle for the sake of mean values, keeping in mind 
that mean values alone do not give the correct picture of the data. Let us explain why. 
III.2.3. Islamic Economy and Finance in Theory  
Modern economic thinking usually envisions a binary world with many dichotomies 
such as labour/capital, social/selfish, planned/unplanned, centralized/dispersed, 
command/coordination. These dichotomies are pervasive in socialism and capitalism 
probably because of the dialectic nature of these systems. Both socialism and the 
market system operates under the same ontological bases and this is why it is feasible 
for these completely different systems to meet under the same discussions such as 
‗plan or no plan in the economy‘ but they hold different poles because they have 
different epistemological bases. This way of thinking restricts description and 
development of economic systems as the discussions between the poles of white and 
black restricts thinking down to the spectrum of grey only and disregards the 
existence of other colours in the plethora of colours.  
Beginning to discuss Islamic economics from the very beginning of the information 
theory, that is philosophical discussions of ontology and epistemology, is a burden 
because Islamic economics and finance  does not position itself between these poles, 
as it has a completely different ontological basis which dictates ―its distinct values, 
norms, rules and institutions‖ (Asutay, 2010). It is a burden because discussions of 
Islamic economics in any scholarly effort of modern economics forces academics to 
try to eliminate all the ontological misunderstandings in relatively very short pieces. 
These scholarly texts are designed to present discussions that assume no such distant 
information and knowledge from distant ontologies. In addition, mainstream 
economic studies do not require such efforts because they ―are all products of the 
modern era‖ (Newman, 2005: 4) too. English political philosopher John Locke‘s ideas 
(1632 – 1704) are one of the agreed upon commonalities of socialism and capitalism. 
Locke held in his Second Treatise of Civil Government (1960) that (Ebenstein et 
al.,1994: 2):  
Every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but 
himself. The labor of his body and the work of his hands we may say are 
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properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath 
provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with, and joined to it something 
that is his own and thereby makes it his property.  
We call these ideas of Locke the foundational basis of socialism and capitalism, 
because they have been used in favour of both socialism and capitalism in different 
times. As argued by Ebenstein et al. (1994:3) ―... each person had the right to what he 
or she produced, individuals‘ productive efforts belong to themselves rather than to 
the king, a noble, the Church, or any other person or entity. Locke‘s ideas thus were 
used to justify reducing the size and scope of government.‖ 
In other times though, the same idea is used for favouring increased government and 
discouraging ―private accumulation of property. Because each person had an equal 
right to what he or she produced, it was not fair nor was it just for some to possess a 
great deal of his or her share of the collective production, and thus Locke‘s theory 
was used to advocate for ownership of enterprises by workers either directly or 
through the state.‖ (Ebenstein et al., 1994: 3) 
Western economic systems also share ―the common goal of improving material 
welfare of human beings, and also agreed on importance of material conditions (and 
relative unimportance of the spirits, ideas etc.) as determinants of history‖ (Asutay, 
2010).  
First of all, Islamic moral economy and finance does not share this commonality, 
because it ―is defined within the parameters of its own ethical system, which in fact, 
incidentally, demonstrates its originality and relativity― (Asutay, 2010: 4). 
Islamic moral economy has the ―[c]ardinal epistemology of oneness of God (Divine 
Unity‖ (Chaudhury, 1999: 15). ―From this episteme is then derived the episteme of 
unification of knowledge‖ (Chaudhury, 1999: 15, emphasis added). Chaudhury (1999) 
describes other economic systems as ―interactive, integrative and evolutionary‖. Thus, 
both of the conventional systems should be considered through their inductive, 
dialectic and eclectic nature in contrast to the unified, deductive, additive, 
affirmative
278
 nature of the Islamic moral economy.  This totally different ontology 
and epistemology brings about its own terminology and conceptualization.  
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Because Qur‘an and Sunnah provide the source of knowledge in Islam, all the 
knowledge is built on the ideal, revealed knowledge. Thus, everything is top-down 
and everything is a part of the greater ‗order‘. This order lays down all the systems 
within the order including economic systems. Choudhury and Malik (1992: 15) define 
order as ―a totality of several systems integrated together through the bond of ethical 
relationships‖, while ‗system‟ refers to ―functional components that together make 
certain sectors of the ethico-economic order work‖ in Islam (Choudhury and Malik, 
1992: 15). 
In order to internalize the constraining consequences of discussing an ontological 
argument in another ontological environment we may ask the question of the 
existence of God in Hinduism. If the discussion takes place in a Muslim, Christian, 
Jewish environment and if the answer is ‗yes‘ then the first learner would get a 
completely different picture of God in Hinduism. Moreover, if the answer is ‗no‘ the 
first learner would get an even worse understanding. Considering that both of the 
alternative answers to the same yes/no question are wrong people in different 
ontologies have to conclude that their questions are either completely unacceptable in 
other ontologies or must be corrected before the discussion carries on. 
Chronologically, the Islamic economy began with the everyday practices of Prophet 
Muhammad immediately after the revelations of Qur‘an at the very beginning of the 
7
th
 century A.D. However, Muslims believe that Islam is only the last part of ―The 
Islam‖ which was practiced by Jesus, Moses, Abraham, Adam and many others. In 
this sense, Muslims believe that the first economic system that was ever practiced in 
the world was Islamic economy and it began with the first human beings, Adam and 
Eve, because Islam sees a ―continuity and similarity in the value system of all 
revealed religions‖ (Chapra, 2001: 26). This notion is well established even in the 
legal discussions of Islam.  
Keeping this distant history and foundation of Islamic economy and finance in mind, 
modern Islamic economics came into existence in the 1960s and 1970s (Asutay, 2007: 
169) by the studies of founding fathers such as Chapra (1992, 2000), Siddiqi (1978), 
Naqvi (1981, 1994), Khan (1984), Arif (1985), Zarka (2003), Choudhury (1995, 
2000). 
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Figure III.15 shows the relative position of the Islamic economy and finance among 
other systems. In the scale we presented in Figure III.14, Islamic economy and 
finance would be closer to mixed economies because Islamic financial and economic 
order dictates both private property and states‘ involvement in the financial market. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Islamic economy is very similar to the 
mixed economic system. Conversely, as Figure III.16 shows, the Islamic economic 
and financial system is a distinct and standalone system with many components from 
various extreme ends of the dichotomous spectrum presented in Figure III.14. 
Nevertheless, Figure III.15 gives a general picture for the majority of the systems‘ 
positions in the dichotomy of liberal and conservative extremes. 
In a similar vein, Morrison (2002: 85) argues that both capitalism and socialism 
―range from total state ownership and control at one extreme to free-market capitalism 
at the other extreme (emphasis added)‖. Islam is said by many (e.g. Naqvi, 1994: 
73
279
) to be a moderate system in between these poles, but this does not mean that 
Islamic economy and finance is not equal to ‗state capitalism‘ or ‗market socialism‘ 
merely because it has a completely different ontological basis. 
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Figure III.15: Relative Positions of Economic System 
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As can be seen in Figure III.15, the Islamic system of moral economy is considered to 
be political in the sense that Islam is in the politics of the society de jure (e.g. 
Turkey); agnostic in the sense that Islam is neither in the politics of the society de jure 
nor de facto yet a Muslim community somewhat exists and practices Islamically 
motivated transactions (e.g. Turkic Republics under USSR and Muslim communities 
under People‘s Republic of China). 
As seen in Figure III.15, variations in Islamic economics and finance are considerably 
less than in Socialist and Capitalist systems. One of the reasons is that Islam is based 
on revealed knowledge, whereas capitalism and socialism are based on dialectically
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discussed and re-established knowledge, every one of which eventually brought about 
new kinds of them.  
On the other hand, this relatively narrow form of variations of Islamic economics and 
finance are not placed closer to the end point of the linear measurement, because 
some characteristics of it, such as zakah, haram, interest or ban on riba, purification, 
prevent it being in the upper positions, that is closer to capitalism, and its recognition 
of private property, free formation of price, market mechanisms, does not allow it to 
expand downwards, that is closer to the extreme forms of socialism.  
It should be noted that Islamic economics is relatively less known in the literature. To 
make its comparison more explicit, we may utilize the depiction in Figure III.16. An 
explicit introduction is required to overcome the difficulties of comparing two 
ideology-based, bottom-up systems with a belief-based, top-down system. In Figure 
III.16, the connections and relations between the Islamic economic system, socialism 
and market economy are shown. Figure III.16 depicts that the Islamic economy can be 
placed in between many variations of free market economy and socialist economies; 
however, this assignment is not tantamount to saying that Islamic economy is a 
variation of state capitalism or market socialism or a hybrid mixture of them. 
Likewise, it does not mean either that Islamic economics has no components from 
these economic systems, but when it has, they should be evaluated as components of a 
different ontology about which quick conclusions are usually wrong. 
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578 
 
Figure III.16: Place and Form of Islamic Economics in Relation to Capitalism 
and Socialism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, there have been some who equate Islamic moral economy and finance 
with other economic systems. It is even possible to see Marxist (e.g. Boisard, 1987: 
110
281
) and laissez-faire capitalist interpretations of Islamic economics in the 
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literature
282
. These interpretations are not completely wrong. They have a relevance to 
Islamic economy, because Islam has many socialist-like and capitalist-like 
components. Moreover, it has some components that are even more liberal than 
laissez-faire capitalism and stricter than socialism. For instance, hadiths or the sayings 
of the Prophet, like ―he/she who sleeps with a full stomach while his neighbour is 
hungry is not from us‖, orders to share in the smallest society. According to this 
hadith, even when not rich, but simply relatively better off, one must take full 
responsibility for his/her neighbourhood. The punishment in this case, from a strictly 
social point of view, is a severe one (even from the point of view of socialism) and 
the last part of the hadith can even be interpreted as excommunication (in 
Christianity) or cherem (Hebrew for ‗excommunication), because both Macmillan 
Encyclopaedia and the Dictionary of Jewish Lore and Legend define it as ―exclusion 
from the society‖. Maybe even many radical socialists would not render such 
punishments for such unsocial behaviour. Thus, Islam has an unparalleled social 
justice orientation, which can be taken as over-socialist as shown in the Figure III.16. 
Other components are rather self-explanatory, but we may give one last example for 
the original components of Islamic economy. No-interest-economy and finance is one 
of the most prominent of them; it may be followed by the taxing system of receiving 
from the rich and spending on the poor and needy.  
This approach, thus, requires theorizing a situational (not pragmatic) approach in the 
aforementioned comparison criteria of economic and financial systems while using 
those criteria for comparison under Islamic economy. 
III.2.3.1. Principles of Islamic economy and finance 
Islam ―requires a balanced satisfaction of both the material and the spiritual needs of 
the human personality‖ (Chapra, 2001: 25) and decisions are made within this 
framework. Socio-economic justice is the primary objective of Islamic economy
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(Chapra, 2001: 25). This is particularly identified with Islamic methodology based on 
maqasid al-Shari‟ah or the objectives of Shari‘ah, which are defined as ‗human well-
being‘ in the sense that whatever action is undertaken by individuals has to aim at 
human well-being. 
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Chapra (2001: 25) explains the fundamental paradigm of Islamic economics as 
follows: 
This objective takes its roots in the belief that human beings are the vicegerents 
of the One God, Who is the Creator of the Universe and everything in it. They 
are brothers unto each other and all resources at their disposal are a trust from 
Him to be used in a just manner for the well-being of alit (repeat all). They are 
accountable to Him in the Hereafter and will be rewarded or punished for how 
they acquire and use these resources 
According to Islamic teachings, Allah has created sufficient resources for His 
creatures
284
. Scarcity occurs but not because of scarce resources; it ―may be either due 
to lack of proper utilization of natural endowments or an imbalanced distribution‖. 
Islamic economics ―starts from the premise that the resources of earth are ‗adequate‘ 
to achieve falah (salvation) through ihsan (beneficence)‖ and that scarcity ―is a man-
made situation and Islamic economics studies it in order to rectify it‖ (Asutay, 2010). 
According to Islam, Muslims are under the test (Qur‘an, 6: 165; 8: 28; 64: 15) of the 
material world, of worldly pleasures, food, money, gold, land etc. and other kinds of 
belongings. The fact that they privately own things does not mean that they are 
completely free in consuming the utility of those belongings from the rest of the 
community. This is in fact a departing principle of Islamic economics compared to 
other economic systems. In Islam, it is impossible to ban private property for the state, 
because then, the state destroys a mechanism of test, which is purposefully designed 
by the God so that people would see themselves and show the universe whether they 
were coal or diamond.  If the state interferes between the individual and the God the 
test is stained. For instance, if distribution is planned by the government in order to 
secure a decent living for the poor, then this interference spoils the emergence of 
heroes who give even when they do not have or give all of what they have when they 
are the richest in the country.  
For instance, a historical story of a garden is told in Qur‘an (17:33) to teach Muslims 
how some fail the test. This tale is important to show that sharing while having is 
mandatory in Islam. Sharing by order or plan is impossible.
285
 In the tale the failed 
people, in a group, go to their garden to harness their crop very early in the morning 
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in order not to meet some poor people who may want some of the crop for their 
needs. 
III.2.3.1.1. Decision making structures 
Islamic moral economy assumes that economic agents are formed as homo-Islamicus 
who make economic decisions with bounded rationality and bounded free-will (juz‟ al 
iradah) to reach falah (salvation) within the Islamic framework based on Qur‘an and 
Sunnah in an ethical way.  The objective function in Islamic moral economy is 
determined by falah (salvation); in other words, the decision making process aims to 
maximise falah as the outcome. 
Comparing two of the conventional ideologies with religious sets of principles may 
require more effort to bring about better situations of comparison. However, in 
general, ―individualism in the role of vicegerent of God on earth with an objective to 
achieve falah in this world and in the hereafter and accountability for performance‖ 
(Asutay, 2010) can be regarded as the main principles of the individuals deciding on 
alternative choices in Islam. 
Important economic decisions are made either by governments, in planned 
economies, or by individuals in unplanned economies. In Islam, in addition to both of 
these decision-makers, the rules ordered by Qur‘an and Sunnah, namely the 
ontological source, exist. For instance, people may have a certain amount of 
accumulated wealth in a given year. If he/she wants, he/she can give all or part of it as 
alms before the end of the year
286
. This is his/her personal choice and exemplifies the 
first kind of decision-making on property. As the second kind government may take 
part of the earning of the same person as tax and the amount of the tax depends on the 
circumstances. Nevertheless, if for instance the same individual pays 2.5 % or more 
tax on all his/her accumulated wealth in one year he/she cannot say that he/she will 
not pay zakah (the same amount 2.5%) because that portion of the earning is already 
the poor‘s money although earned by the rich (Qur‘an: 51: 19; 70: 24-25). This is the 
additional economic decision making process in Islam. 
Thus, Islamic government is not proactive and direct in its involvement with the 
market, it is only one of the decision-makers. Government makes sure that the 
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decisions are orderly made, interpreted and applied. It is passive until the static 
boundaries of law are breached and at the boundaries of law it is only indirect. For 
instance the Islamic state may interfere between seller and buyer if for instance, gabn 
(excess of upper and lower limits of reasonable selling/buying price) occurs, but 
would not build houses (like Narkomfin Communal Houses) to implement certain and 
probably more moral ways of life (Burhi, 1999). However, ―government as a power 
above, with the responsibility of fulfilling public needs, can force individuals to 
participate in public affairs and works when needed‖ (Kallek (2004: 6). 
According to Naqvi (1994: 73), ―in the Islamic perspective, the freedom of an 
individual to make a choice between alternative options is both an absolute value 
and an instrumental value‖, because both the free will axiom and the – imperative 
and voluntary – responsibility axiom holds in Islam. 
The centrality of the ‗independent choice‘ in Islam is emphasized by very famous 
figures such as Abu Hanifa. He, as the builder of one of the major schools in Islam, 
states that ―[h]uman‘s deeds are only the products of their own will‖ (Abu Hanifa, 
1900: 81) and there are many Qur‘anic verses supporting this view. Then, we may 
argue that the behaviours of the financial agents (individuals only in Islam) are not 
intervened in nor planned in Islamic finance until they reach the boundaries of 
revealed law but they are encouraged, praised, for certain channels and discouraged 
and criticized for others. Indeed, this is what ‗hisbah‟ in an Islamic market is all 
about.  
The frequency of the decision-making is more frequent in Islam, because Muslims 
are deterred from accumulating gold and silver in a safe and not spending it, using 
it, by some verses in Qur‘an (e.g.. 9: 34) and richness is praised (24: 32).  
III.2.3.1.2. Incentives and motivation mechanisms 
Islamic economics is a moral economic system and the incentives toward moral 
targets are obvious but interestingly, material targets are tied to moral incentives in 
Islam as well. For instance an individual may be rich and only by doing business 
honestly may be considered as a martyr (Tirmizi, Buyu, 4) in Islam.  
In principle Muslims believe that they were asked in the Heavens if they wanted to 
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have a test of their faith in God (Qur‘an, 33: 72) and they accepted that offer (Qur‘an, 
33: 72) and are now in this world to prove to Him their faith and keep their promises. 
This is the historical, past dimension of the main source of incentive in Islam and the 
second incentive is the second promise from God that if the promises are kept by the 
people he rewards them by the Paradise and by being happy with their faith to Him.  
Following these principles, all the law in Islam motivates individuals to act and act in 
a legal way. For instance, the only allowed way of earning money is by means of 
labour and/or various means of effort in Islam (Qur‘an, 53: 39). Prophet Muhammad 
says charity is halal neither for the rich nor for the able-bodied (al-Tirmidhi). Even 
the prophets had their occupations and worked in their communities to earn a living. 
For instance, Dawud was a blacksmith (Qur‘an: 34: 10-11), Joseph was finance 
minister (Joseph: 55), Zachariah was a carpenter (Muslim, Sahih IV: 1847), 
Muhammad was a merchant. 
Islam sees an inherited, present motive in human beings for material ownership and 
recognizes the greedy nature of some human beings. A hadith about human nature is 
as follows: ―Even if they had a valley full of gold people would want to have another 
one full of gold‖287. Thus, in Islam, [w]orking hard for the material well-being of one's 
own self, family and society is as spiritual as the offering of prayers, provided that the 
material effort is guided by moral values and does not take the individual away from the 
fulfilment of his social and spiritual obligations‖. Thus, this paradigm does not mandate 
self-denial but attempts to pursue ―one's self-interest within the constraint of social 
interest by passing all claims on scarce resources through the filter of moral values‖ 
(Chapra, 2001: 26). 
―The primary goal of life for humans as described by Islam is to achieve happiness or 
falah in this world and life hereafter (ultimate success)‖ (Asutay, 2010). Falah is an 
important motivational factor in Islamic economics because it promises an infinite life 
full of pleasures and the avoidance of hell along with the ultimate incentive, pleasing 
Allah, the creator, the owner of all. Al-Ghazali mentions four means of ultimate 
success in Islam: (i) goods of the soul; (ii) goods of the body, (iii) external goods, and 
(iv) divine grace (Asutay, 2010). Only the first two are relevant to this physical world. 
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 Bukhari, Muslim, Tirmizi, Ibn Mace, Darimi. 
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―While an individual's self-interest may be served in this world by being selfish in 
the use of resources, his interest in the Hereafter cannot be served except by 
fulfilling his social obligations‖ and moral obligations by means of accountability 
before the Supreme Being (Chapra, 2001: 28). Thus, social ties, neighbourhood, 
brotherhood are important in Islam, however ―Islamic economics ... emphasizes 
both individual self-maximization and maximization of societal well being.‖ 
(Asutay, 2007: 168). 
Chapra (2001: 28) answers the incentive question as follows:  
How does Islam induce individuals to pursue their self-interest within the 
bounds of social interest in situations where there is a conflict between self-
interest and social interest?   
Islam tries to accomplish this task by giving self-interest a longer term 
perspective - stretching it beyond the span of this world to the Hereafter, as 
Islamic moral economy is based on extended utility function by taking the 
hereafter in to the process of utility maximisation. 
In addition to the materialistic motivation, in Islam there is another ―vertical 
dimension‖ of motivation under the notion of tawhid (unity) (Asutay, 2007: 170) 
which provides another dimensions for ethical equality with eternal consequences 
and thus even more important than material motivation.   
While mainstream economics assumes the prevalence of self-interested behavior on 
the part of all individuals, Islam does not assume the prevalence of ideal behavior. It 
adopts the more realistic position that, while some people may normally act in a 
purely ideal or self-interested manner, the behavior of most people may tend to be 
anywhere between the two extremes. However, since ideal behavior is considered to 
be more conducive to goal realization, Islam tries to bring individual behavior as 
close to the ideal as possible. This it does not do by coercion and regimentation. It 
rather tries to create an enabling environment through social engineering based on 
moral values, effective motivating system, and socio-economic reform. It also 
emphasizes the building of enabling institutions, and the playing of an effective goal 
oriented role by the government. (Chapra, 2001: 27) 
In this regard, we should again put Islam in the middle between capitalism and 
socialism, because in socialism, finance is managed, coordinated by the high 
officials in the state and there is less to get for the professionals running the 
financial system other than corruption‘s gains (Yong, 2008). In Islam, on the other 
hand, there are many mechanisms to earn both the moral and materialistic targets to 
be motivated towards, unlike socialism which has mechanisms of social incentives 
only and market system which again has only material incentives. 
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III.2.3.1.3. Property rights 
As an essential part of the strong justice nature of Islamic, the ―[i]ndividual‘s right to 
own private property is respected in Islam‖ (Naqvi, 1994: 74), but the concept is 
totally different than socialism and capitalism. According to Ayub (2007: 33), for 
instance, ―all resources in the world belong to its Creator, One God; human beings are 
holding these resources in trust. Behaving as vicegerent of the Creator, they are free 
to earn and spend the wealth according to His orders given to mankind through His 
Messengers‖ (Qur‘an, 24: 33; 57: 7). 
Thus, in Islam, people are free to obtain material goods and services but within the 
moral filter and boundaries of set rules. For instance, Naqvi (1994: 74) states that 
―Islam gives the individual a right to own property in proportion to his own and his 
offspring‘s needs and their capacity to use it productively‖. Another restriction is that 
the right to private property ―terminates on his death, after which the right of 
disposition is regulated by the Islamic law of inheritance‖ (Naqvi, 1994: 74). Islam, 
hence, offers a temporal ownership on the property. 
From a financial point of view, for instance, people are not totally free to use their 
savings and earnings but limitedly free, as they are expected to invest in an interest 
free manner with the rest of the ethical and Shari‟ah implications; thus, they cannot 
invest in certain types of contracts such as certain future contracts and swaps. 
Nevertheless limitations are to be mentioned only for showing the differences 
between the market economy and Islam, those limitations do not mean that one 
cannot be rich or very rich. Othman, one of the four famous Rightly Guided Khalifas, 
was very rich. As a recent example we can give Iran‘s Hashemi Rafsanjani. In 2000, 
Forbes used his portrait as a cover under the title of ―Iran‘s millionaire mullahs‖.  
As for the theory of Islamic property rights, we may cite below restrictions stemming 
from the following hadith: ―there is no legal validity to any action that brings 
excessive injury to oneself or others‖ (Kerr, 1966: 97; Abd-Allah, 1978: 227). Based 
on this hadith and rulings of earlier khulafa‘, the restrictions below are mentioned by 
jurists such as Malik ibn Anas and Abu Yusuf regarding abuse of rights (Llewellyn, 
1980: 34):  
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(i) If a person has staked a claim to unowned land for the purpose of reclamation, he 
loses his claim to whatever land he does not cultivate within a reasonable time, so that 
another may cultivate it, and arable lands not cultivated by their owners may 
according to some jurists be taken from them if their cultivation is needed by society. 
It is beneficial utilization and not merely acquisition that establishes the right to 
ownership; 
(ii) The right to cultivate virgin lands may not be exercised by either individuals or 
the state where the result would be injurious; 
(iii) A landowner may not without reason prevent on his land a development which is 
needed by his neighbour, if that development brings no injury to himself; 
(iv) Urban design must insure privacy for women with sufficient air and sunlight. 
This affects the regulation of building heights, the design and placement of doors and 
windows, and the design of garden and rooftop walls so that the interiors of buildings 
and courtyard cannot be seen from outside; 
(v) No farm beside a stream may monopolize its water, and if the water is likely to be 
insufficient for all farmers, a new farm may not irrigate until the needs of all 
previously established farms have been satisfied; 
(vi) According to Ibn Qudamah and other jurists, it is forbidden to adversely affect a 
neighbor‘s well by lowering the water table or by polluting the aquifer; 
(vii) A person is forbidden to mistreat his animals by providing inadequate 
maintenance (food, water, shelter and care), or to kill them except for legal purposes 
and by legal methods. According to Ibn Qudamah and other jurists, the state is 
obliged to intervene on behalf of abused animals. This principle would affect the 
design of animals‘ enclosures to safeguard their right to humane treatment. 
Furthermore, there are certain means of possessing goods in Islam such as by ―work, 
inheritance, purchasing/obtaining property for sustenance, properties granted as gifts 
and the State granting possession of something to the citizens‖ (Ayub, 2007: 33) and 
some markets are totally banned due to harming human well-being as stipulated by 
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maqasid al-Shari‟ah, such as all products and services that are related to alcohol, 
drugs, pornography, fighting, pigs and some other animals. 
Nevertheless, undoubtedly, Islam gives such a great value to private property that it 
orders to cut off one hand of the stealer under certain conditions. In a strictly 
materialist sense, this is far beyond the capitalist value of private property. Even from 
a moral perspective, material properties are greatly valued in Islam. For instance, if a 
Muslim dies while defending his/her property (e.g. his/her money), he becomes a 
‗shaheed‟ (martyr) and earns paradise directly. This suggests an unprecedentedly 
devoted value to private property. These can be taken as over-capitalist components 
of Islamic economy. 
In short, ―to facilitate the acquisition of property and wealth, Islam has indicated legal 
means of ownership and its transfer through a variety of contracts. General rules for 
these contracts have also been defined in detail with the possibility of resolving any 
contemporary issues through Ijtihad‖ and ―[r]ules pertaining to investment of 
wealth/property have also been laid down‖ (Ayub, 2007: 33). 
III.2.3.1.4. Coordination methods 
Two main dialectic arguments, namely full competition versus full regulation and 
planning, are not considered to be sufficient (Chapra, 2000: 69) in Islam, because 
Islam‘s economic philosophy is not dialectic (Naqvi, 1994: 75; Sadr, 1982). In Islam, 
many issues are analysed from multiple viewpoints, for instance coordination is not 
seen as a discussion of whether or not state or market should dominantly coordinate 
the economic development, but the importance of the moral values in trade and the 
reform of the players  in their economic activities are also frequently emphasized in 
such discussions.  
Nevertheless, the nass
288
 clearly orders the formation of an independent price in the 
market that is free from fraud and monopoly/monopsony. According to Ibn 
Taymiyyah, the price is God‘s price and there should be no interference to its free 
formation (Islahi, 1988), because ―a much higher price would constitute exploitation 
of the people‘s need, a much lower one would harm other sellers‖ (Islahi, 1988: 96). 
Ibn Taymiyyah also thinks that ―price-fixing is feasible only if there is a known group 
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Unbreakable laws in Islamic law. 
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engaged in trade and business, as a result of whose manipulation, the price increases 
because it cannot be fixed on those who are not suppliers‖  (Islahi, 1988: 97). 
Focusing on the supply-side is observable in the sunnah as well. For instance, the 
prophet ―prohibited people from going out of town to buy merchandise which was on 
its way to the market, telling them to buy merchandise which was on its way to the 
marketplace
289‖ (Al-Qaradawi, 1994: 260). 
Similarly, Al-Qaradawi (1994: 255) argues that ―Allah is the One Who fixes prices, 
Who withholds, Who gives lavishly, and Who provides‖. There are even stricter 
examples from the Prophet‘s times.  For instance, the Prophet rejected ordering lower 
prices even at the time of very high pricing in the market despite the wishes of many 
from the society
290
. In this sense, we may argue that there are times when the Islamic 
market is even more reluctant to fix prices than market economies
291
. 
Nevertheless, many scholars agree that ―[t]he state can introduce necessary laws to 
ensure social justice and to put an end to economic exploitation and oppression
292‖ 
(Ayub, 2007: 38). ―The Islamic economic system gives an important overseeing role 
to the State and regulators‖ (Ayub, 2007: 39). Chapra (2000: 73) cites the following 
authors who emphasize ―the regulation of economic activity and of markets … to 
ensure justice and fair play‖: al-Mavardi (d. 450/1058), Abu Ya‘la, (d. 458/1065), al-
Ghazali (d. 505/1111), IbnHazm (d. 456/1064), Abd al-Rahman al-Shayzari (d. 
589/1193), IbnTaymiyyah (d. 728/1328), Ibn al-Ukhuwwah (d. 729/1329), al-
Nuwayri (d. 732/1332), IbnKhaldun (d. 808/1406), and a;-Maqrizi (d. 846/1442). 
Chapra (2000: 73) also argues that  
―[t]he state need not have any qualms about intervening when the threshold of 
justice and fairness are crossed and there is no justification for waiting until the 
market forces correct the inequalities themselves. Such intervention should not, 
however, be arbitrary for this, in itself, could lead to inequalities. It should 
rather be on the basis of a proper analysis by experts and, if the price is 
                                                 
289―If anyone does buy some of his merchandise, in this manner, the seller has the option of cancelling 
the transaction after arriving at the marketplace‖ (Al-Qaradawi, 1994: 260). 
290
reported by Ahmad, Abu Daoud, al-Tirmidhi, IbnMajah, al-Dari and Abu Y‘ala, ―when the prices 
became high in the Prophet‘s time and people asked him to fix prices for them, he replied, Allah is the 
one Who fixes prices, Who withholds, Who gives lavishly, and Who provides, and I hope that when I 
meet Him none of you will have a claim against me for any injustice with regard to blood or property‖ 
(Al-Qaradawi, 1994: 255) 
291
 For instance, USA fixed prices in First World War. 
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Qur‘an; 22: 41 
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regulated for some valid reason, it should not be out of tune with the price of 
similar goods and services in normal circumstances. 
―Islam has accepted the law of demand and supply as a principle but has subjected it 
to some limitations to avoid any moral and social ills and problems‖ because ―[t]he 
ultimate objective of an Islamic economy is to establish social justice‖ (Ayub, 2007: 
39). Al-Qaradawi (1994: 258) provides a good example of such an objective. He 
refers to Anas from Muslim. Anas says: ―Sale by a resident on behalf of a desert-
dweller was prohibited to us, even though he might be a blood brother‖. This shows 
us that in the Islamic marketplace, agents are ensured access to all levels, ―the market, 
its prices, and sales, should be left free to respond to internal economic forces‖ (Al-
Qaradawi, 1994: 259). Similarly, as related by Muslim, the Prophet stated that ―If 
anyone withholds goods until the price rises, he is a sinner‖ (Al-Qaradawi, 1994: 
256). 
As Spencer (2000) argues, the market financial system is a higher level of abstraction 
than the Islamic financial system. In simple terms, the Islamic financial market can be 
described by the basic Arrow-Debreu (1954) general equilibrium model, which only 
describes ―commodities in very abstract terms, without worrying about time or 
uncertainty. The market opens once, equilibrium prices are found, exchanges are 
made and that is the end of the story‖ (Spencer, 2000: 3). Arrow and Debreu (1954) 
require the fulfilment of the following assumptions within a complete market
293
 
framework: 
(i) there is full information, 
(ii) agents are too small to affect the prices, 
(iii) there are no externalities.294 
However it is not easy to explain the market financial system with the same general 
equilibrium model of Arrow-Debreu (1954) because of the ―high level of abstraction‖ 
which means that the ―individuals arrange consumption and production across future 
time periods and states of nature by exchanging claims on future output‖ (Spencer, 
2000: 3, emphasis added).  
Nevertheless, many (such as: Spencer, 2000; Arrow, 1964) argue that an extended 
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In Arrow-Debreu securities, a complete market requires, ―T time periods × G goods sold and bought 
× S states of nature‖ many contracts.   
294i.e. there are no ―unpriced side effects like pollution‖ (Spencer, 2000: 2). 
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version of this model is still Pareto-optimal and can be used to explain the financial 
market in a capitalist financial system by the use of insurance and options for adverse 
contingencies. For instance Arrow (1964) shows that the same complete market is 
possible by ―T time period × S states of nature‖ many contracts, but this expanded 
model is not sufficient to correctly depict the current dynamic or better to say 
‗continuous‘ financial markets because ―it describes a static equilibrium in which 
markets are open once and then close permanently‖ (Spencer, 2000). 
III.2.3.2. Criticism of Islamic economics and finance 
Asutay (2007: 168) warns that ―Islamic economic theory has developed coherent 
foundational axioms without the operational axioms through which IBF [Islamic 
Banking and Finance] can function.‖ With such a ―pragmatic‖ attitude, IBF ―adheres 
to the precepts of neo-classical paradigm of managing wealth that conflicts with the 
foundational axioms upon which an Islamo-ethical financial system was intended to 
be built‖. Because of these ―contradictions‖, ―in the Muslim world, capitalism in its 
most primitive and inconsiderate form is thriving, despite the fact that Islamic 
economics provides foundational axioms that proposes an ethical system of 
economics and finance based on ontological and epistemological sources of Islam.‖ 
(Asutay, 2007: 168, emphasis added). 
Islamic economics and finance also ignores what Adam Müller (1779 - 1829) calls 
‗moral capital‘ (geistiges Kapital) which encompasses accumulated knowledge and 
information about the ideas and experiences of the earlier generations of scholars and 
practitioners (Kallek, 2004: 6). 
Some suggest and argue that the theory of Islamic economy and finance is not 
encouraging. For instance, ―[t]he recent case study by Chong and Liu (2009: 125, 
emphasis added) of Islamic Banking in Malaysia found that ―only a negligible portion 
of Islamic bank financing is strictly PLS based and that Islamic deposits‖ where PLS 
appears larger, ―are not interest-free, but closely pegged to conventional deposits‖. In 
other places, ―IBF is reduced to the mere removal of riba (interest)‖ (Asutay, 2010: 
169) which raises concerns about a ―growing wedge between ... conventional theory 
and current practices‖ (Hasan, 2005: 11). 
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It is also debated whether or not Islam has an original economic system because some 
of the scholars argue that ―[t]he Qur‘an does recognize the existence of an oppressed 
class (mustadafin) and an oppressor class (mustakbarin)‖ (Naqvi, 1994: 74), while 
others hesitate to accept that they think every tool in financial capitalism is applicable 
to Islamic finance. 
Another criticism is raised by Kuran (1983, 1985) on the ground that Islamic 
economics is not possible due to the behavioural norms; as individuals are considered 
to be responding to the economic incentives rather than religious incentives. In 
addition, an ardent critic of Islamic finance is El-Gamal (2007), who mainly argues 
that there is nothing called Islamic finance as it conducts the same functions as with 
conventional finance with the fictitious ‗interest-free‘ mechanism. He is also of the 
view that Islamic finance is only the product of Shari‟ah scholars to create arbitrage 
for themselves being a ‗special interest group‘. 
III.2.4. Systemic Vulnerabilities as a Precondition for Financial Crime 
Motivation 
In this part of our study, we synthesize the aforementioned analyses about various 
economic and financial systems and their underlying vulnerabilities in Table III.1 
through Table III.4. 
 
Table III.1: Decision Making Structures 
  Market Socialis
t 
Fully 
Islamic 
Partially 
Islamic 
Total 
Systemic 
Vulnerabiliti
es 
Dispersed 
Decision 
Making 
Structures 
5 1 3 
4 when capitalism 
is dominant and  
2 when socialism 
is dominant 
13 
Note: 5 = Very dispersed, 4 = Dispersed, 3 = Moderate, 2 = Not Dispersed, 1 = Centralised 
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Table III.2: Incentives and Motivation Mechanisms 
  Marke
t 
Socialis
t 
Fully 
Islamic 
Partially 
Islamic 
Total 
Systemic 
Vulnerabiliti
es 
Incentives 
for 
Pecuniary 
Benefits 
and 
Mobilizatio
n 
4 1 4 
4,5 when mixed 
with capitalism  
3 when mixed with 
socialism 
13,5 
Note: 5 = Very High incentives, 4 = High incentives, 3 = Moderate incentives, 2 = Some 
Incentive, 1 = No Incentive 
 
Table III.3: Property Rights 
  Market Socialis
t 
Fully 
Islamic 
Partially 
Islamic 
Total 
Systemic 
Vulnerabiliti
es 
Allowance 
of Property 
Rights 
5 1 3 
4 when mixed with 
capitalism 
3 when mixed with 
socialism 
13 
Note: 5 = No restriction on property rights, 4 = Very few restrictions on property rights, 3 = 
Moderate restrictions on property rights, 2 = Many restrictions on property rights, 1 = No 
property rights 
 
Table III.4: Coordination Methods 
  Market Socialist Fully 
Islamic 
Partially 
Islamic 
Total 
S
y
st
em
ic
 
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
ie
s 
Runtime, 
Independent 
Coordinatio
n  
5 1 4 
4,5 when  mixed 
with capitalism,  
3 when mixed with 
socialism 
14,5 
Note: 5 = Everything is decided in runtime, independently, 4 = Majority of the things are 
decided in runtime, 3 = Actions are both planned and left to runtime, 2 = Many things are 
planned in advance, 1 = Everything is planned, nothing is decided runtime, independently. 
 
Capitalism, socialism and Islamic economic and financial systems can be named 
‗pragmatic‘, ‗ideological‘ and ‗belief‘ systems respectively. Capitalism is pragmatic, 
because it does not have many uncompromisable principles; for instance, capitalism 
values market mechanisms excessively, because Adam Smith suggested the ‗invisible 
hand‘ principle that guides economic activity and therefore implies that there is a very 
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limited role for government. Some capitalist economists (e.g. Alfred Marshall) even 
suggested that economics was like biology, as they both dealt with collective systems 
based on matter.  
For obvious reasons socialism is an ideological system, because Marxist ideology is at 
the heart of it, and the Islamic economy is indeed a belief system, because it includes 
dogmas which are natural to observe in religious systems. Despite the positive norms 
being available in Islamic economics and finance, it is socially constructed around the 
principles derived from revelations and the religious verdicts. 
We should be aware that finance is a derivative of economics as a field of study and 
everyday operations and all its processes indeed are follow-up processes of the 
underlying economic routine activities and processes. In this ‗comparative economic 
systems‘ part of our study we analysed the main underlying economic processes of 
financial systems.  
In Chapter 7, a comparison between the financial systems‘ crime propensities are 
discussed by using the ‗opportunity spaces‘ concept that is developed in Chapter 6 
and another comparison of criminological perspectives of these systems exists in 
Chapter 3 as well. 
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